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ABSTRACT
This study of Vallabhbhai Patel’s role and style in In­
dian politics attempts to show how mobilisation of men and 
materials was achieved by exclusively political means for the 
attainment of conservative goals and for the prevention of 
any radical changes. This was done primarily at Patel's ins­
tance in the face of much opposition from many forces, parti­
cularly the socialists who sought a more comprehensive pro­
gramme for a wider section of society. Patel's qualifications 
for this job lay in his background, his personality and his 
affinity with certain regions (Chapter I). Several experi­
ments in controlled mobilisation culminating in the Bardoli 
Satyagraha showed the political effectiveness of Patel's ver­
sion of Gandhi's nationalist scheme (Chapter II). The plan 
of nourishing the roots rather than spreading the branches 
greatly strengthened the Congress organisation and helped 
Patel in steering Congress party policy in the direction of 
conservative goals (Chapter III). Patel and Gandhi's mutual 
reliance on each other, and Gandhi's granting Patel a free 
hand in political tactics, gave much political strength to 
the Gandhiites in Congress. The quest for political supremacy 
was accompanied by efforts to exclude other political groups, 
and particularly the left, from political limelight (Chapter 
IV). There were problems in running an intense political 
race. Threats posed by ambitious leaders, factional infight­
ing and conflicting goals were put down with a heavy hand and 
political opposition was not tolerated (Chapter V). Negative 
steps in some areas were accompanied by positive steps in 
others, such as acceptance of office in the provinces and a 
gradual change of Congress's policy towards the States (Chap­
ter VI). Factors beyond Patel's control such as British 
imperialist policy and the accompanying political readjust­
ments in India brought some setbacks for Congress. But, Patel 
was quick to recover lost ground and rivals were soon outmano­
euvred (Chapter VII).
The thesis argues that Patel typifies the Indian politi­
2
cian par excellence, capable of taking control over all the 
diverse and unevenly developed aspects of Indian society by 
giving them a political direction, thus circumventing certain 
social and economic requirements which leaders with either a 
Marxian or a traditionally reformist vision would consider 
essential for development.
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PREFACE
This is a political study and hence precludes any 
extensive discussion of socio-economic matters. Rather it 
analyses Vallabhbhai Patel’s contribution to the political 
activity of the period. In choosing Patel as the subject of 
my work I have worked under many limitations, the most 
significant being that he wrote very little. Unlike Nehru 
and Gandhi there are no revealing articles, no autobiograph­
ies or ’Experiments with Truth’ in the case of Patel, There 
are only letters written for particular purposes, newspaper 
accounts of political activity and interviews carried out 
with Patel’s contemporaries which form a large part of the 
research on Patel.
I would like to extend my thanks to some of Patel’s 
associates and contemporaries. First of all I am grateful 
to Manibehn Patel, Patel’s daughter, with whom I spent time 
at different stages of my work and from whom I was able to 
pick up interesting details of her life with her father and 
her own personal impressions of his yearly years. She was 
kind enough to permit me to see the Patel Papers at Nava- 
jivan, Ahmedabad. G.M.Nandurkar, the editor of Patel's 
correspondence, also gave whatever assistance he could.
Many of Patel's contemporaries provided valuable in­
sights into his personality and the prevailing conflicts 
of the period. I have formally interviewed and informally 
conversed with them over the entire period of my research 
and, therefore, have not always specified the dates of all 
my encounters with these people. In particular, Jai Prakash 
Narain, J.B.Kripalani, G.D.Birla, S.K.Patil, J.L,Kapur(all 
now dead) and Jagjivan Ram, Morarji Desai, Shankar Prasad, 
Bhagwan Sahay, D.P.Mandelia and P .G.Mavlankar have all 
given invaluable help in discussing Patel’s contributions 
as a leader. In England,the late Lord Mountbatten and Sir 
Conrad Corfield also spared considerable time to talk
about Patel and India.
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No modern historical study of India can be complete 
without the help of two vital institutions - the India 
Office Library in London and the Nehru Memorial Library in 
New Delhi. I am very appreciative of the congenial working 
conditions and atmosphere of cooperation in both these 
establishments.
£ also wish, to thank Profs, Ravindra Kumar and S,Rt 
Mehrotra for sparing the time to discuss particular aspects 
of Congress with me. My husband, Vijay, who has been ac­
tively grappling with, the inter-action between the Congress 
Party and the Government in relation to some voluntary 
socioeconomic schemes with which he is closely connected, 
has provided me with some information pertaining to current 
Congress functioning at various levels. To him I am in­
debted for this and for doing my ’running around’,in Eng­
land if I was in India, and vice versa.
I began my work under Dr.B.N.Pandey's supervision. 
However, I was deprived of his guidance midstream when he 
died in J.982, Dr,Peter Robb, who took over from him, has 
shown me excessive patience and forbearance and saved me 
from much of the despair that set in two and a half years 
ago. To him I am most grateful.
This thesis terminates in 1947 and not 1950, the year 
of Patel’s death, Patel’s administrative period for which 
he is particularly admired by Indians has only been briefly 
surveyed in this work. I have sought primarily to assess 
Patel’s role as a nationalist and analyse his contribution 
to the independence movement. The omission of the last 
three years of his life does not affect the argument of the 
thesis in any way.
London. Rani Dhavan Shankardass
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INTRODUCTION
Indian politics before 1947 have been variously inter­
preted by historians. Much thought has been devoted to the 
larger question of the direction from which control, initia­
tive and change emanated in the colonial context. Within 
this thinking fall what Stokes called the simplified dicho­
tomies of East and West, tradition and modernity, caste and 
class, status and contract, feudalism and capitalism, con­
tinuity and change, which formed the basis of nineteenth 
century thinking of the study and progress of the society. 
More recent interpreters of colonial rule in India - ortho­
dox Marxists, neo-Marxists, anti-ideologists, Namierists, 
neO'rMachiaveIlians, moffusilites, kulakites, and subalter- 
nists - explore the nature of society more thoroughly, 
while differing in the emphasis they place on the causes 
of conflict and the prime determining factor of change. 
Whatever the emphasis, whether the focus is on the struc­
ture of Indian society, or changes in modes of production 
or processes of modernisation, it becomes increasingly 
clear from most recent studies that the role of vested 
interests in determining the degree of conflict and the 
direction of change is vital. This is because it is the 
one factor that moulds and shapes the thoughts and activi­
ties of persons and groups of different economic back­
grounds, social traits and political ideologies and it can 
be translated into an idiom and language understood equally 
by all people in all periods. It may broadly be defined 
as that interest which, either as individuals or as members 
of economic, social or political groups, people tend to 
safeguard above all other interests. In a diversified 
society like India vested interest takes different forms 
and assumes different nomenclatures. In the context of the 
Indian national movement some studies have focused on the 
class or caste factor, or the primordiality factor, or the 
modernisation factor to explain the nature or direction of 
nationalism or other movements engaging people. Historical
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analysis being as complex as it is the single factor 
approach certainly has its limitations. So does a multi­
factor approach which does not bring out the extent to 
which a particular factor actually governs interactions at 
particular periods, in particular areas and between parti­
cular participants. This study seeks to emphasise the role 
of the political factor during a particular phase of the 
national movement, specifically in the style of one parti­
cular leader of the period - Vallabhbhai Patel.
Some years ago a friend and historian, Rajat Ray, 
grouped the various interpretations of Indian nationalism 
into three broad categories - Marxists, neo-traditional 
and predominantly political. He asserted that an interpre­
tation that rests exclusively on any one of these features 
was not likely to make wholesome history. It is my conten­
tion, however, that in interpreting Patel's role and style 
of leadership the 'predominantly political' plays the most 
important and at some points an exclusive part, and is con­
tributory to an understanding of the politics of that 
period and of present day politics.
In the epilogue to Congress and the Raj, B.R.Tomlinson 
says, ' the origins of the political system of indepen­
dent India must be sought in the events of 1934-39, not 
those of 1945-47'. My thesis suggests that the origins of 
the modern Indian politician can be traced back to the 
political career of Vallabhbhai Patel. The relevance of 
Tomlinson's remark for my thesis is that the years 1934-39 
provide that peak period of political activity which is 
crucial in illustrating some aspects of Patel's political 
role and style which typify the Indian politician.
Individually, Gandhi's contribution in resolving con­
flict and effecting some form of change within the imperia­
list context has received the maximum attention from 
historians writing about twentieth century British India. 
This work looks at the role of Vallabhbhai Patel in relation 
to conflict and change in the imperialist and nationalist
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context. Conflict here is seen as the quest for supremacy 
by dominant groups or individuals over numerically or other­
wise subordinate groups or individuals. Change is the 
process whereby individuals or institutions adapt to new 
or altered economic, social or political stimuli . In 
studies of prominent peasant groups or area studies of 
Gujarat, Patel has been portrayed as a conservative Patidar 
who methodically developed a following of his own. This 
was based initially on his ability to satisfy the needs of 
specific sub-groups of Gujarat’s landed peasantry to regain 
economic and social dominance by galvanizing them in the 
political field under the banner of Gandhiism. This thesis 
seeks to add a vital dimension to this portrayal. It seeks 
to show how, through a distinct political style, with the 
assistance of the bogie of imperialism and the ideology of 
nationalism, and more particularly Gandhiism, Patel exten­
ded his control to the national scene to the exclusion of 
those who ideologically or otherwise, had a wider appeal 
than he did. Patel took great pains to curb the efforts 
of other political groups in gaining influence and spread­
ing mass movements either of landless peasants or workers.
In the spheres where he held control he tried to give a 
particular direction to the national movement. This the­
sis seeks to assess the nature of this direction and deter­
mine what was for Patel the most effective way of meeting 
the challenges posed by the conflicts of the period.
In the 1920s the political reforms offered by the 
British increased the field of political participation for 
Indians. Nationalists were divided between changers and 
no-changers, and among the latter there were two categories: 
the Gandhiites, who were less opposed to seizing power and 
the socialists and other leftists, who were opposed to the 
reforms and had their own vision of an independent India 
and their own methods of fighting for it. Starting out as 
a no-changer Patel soon found himself combating the double 
challenge posed by imperialism and socialism. To that end 
he set about revising some of the Gandhian programmes and
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the Congress Party's policies. In handling the British 
strategy of reforms which was directed in part towards 
reducing the growing strength of the Congress, Patel tigh­
tened the organisation and made it top heavy and conse­
quently less democratic. To meet the British and socialists' 
threats simultaneously he extended the Congress arm to the 
village level thereby equipping the Congress party to combat 
its adversaries as well as fight elections. Apart from 
facing the problem of divisions among themselves, if the 
socialists were unable to control political activity gene­
rally and Congress policies in particular it was largely 
due to the doggedness of men like Patel who took charge of 
much of the execution of Congress's political strategy and 
tactics. Patel's reactions to the two threats posed by the 
imperialists and socialists supplemented each other. There 
were junctures at which it was difficult to determine which 
of the two threats was greater for Patel. Gandhiism helped 
Patel find an answer to both.
The cumulative effect of Patel's experience as a mof- 
fusil lawyer, municipal councillor and Gandhian worker was 
the attainment of a political status whereby he was able 
to make a smooth transition from the provincial to the 
national scene. The provincial links were nevertheless 
continuously nurtured by him, for obvious reasons. They 
gave him the connections required to sustain a network on 
which he was to rely to advance himself politically, and 
also to combat the advancing influence of leftists or other 
radicals. The provincial links also made Patel narrow in 
outlook and lacking in vision. Yet this was not neces­
sarily a shortcoming in the Indian context at the time.
The politics of India were not, to an extent are still not, 
the politics of broad horizons. For the most part objec­
tives were limited, confined to areas, communities and 
interest groups; and even when the goals seemed wide the 
means of mobilisation and achievement were narrow. Patel's 
parochialism was therefore in keeping with a prevalent 
Indian view of goals and the means of achieving them.
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In order to ascertain Patel's distinct contribution to 
Indian politics along these lines this thesis will analyse 
his political activities from the time of the no-tax cam­
paign in Bardoli in 1928 which made him a national leader, 
to the time that Congress formed the Interim Government and 
went on to bargain for India's independence. Chapter I 
describes Patel's social background and attempts to bring 
out the role of his family and social group in developing 
tu him such, traits as pragmatism. An interesting question 
is* how:, during this period, he reconciled the contradictory 
impulses of a municipal councillor and a khadi-clad village 
worker. The Bardoli no—tax campaign, the subject of Chapter 
II , was the fourth satyagraha which Patel directed and it 
brought him on the national scene. Labelled a Gandhiite 
he now had to work his way towards a position from which he 
could assist Gandhiites in their domination over Swarajists 
or other groups, like the leftists, within the Congress.
The beginning of this quest for dominance is evident in 
Chapter HI, Its intensification and Patel’s role as the 
pivot of a move by Gandhiites to change tactics to meet 
more political threats, such as those from the left, is the 
subject of Chapter IV. From a national movement, the 
Indian National Congress transformed itself into a Party 
organisation, preparing itself for the role of an alterna­
tive government. An open umbrella-like association shel­
tering many groups of differing opinions gradually gave way 
to a more closed association run by like-minded leaders 
whose clash was not merely with British imperialists. By 
now Congress was also in direct conflict with those groups 
that wanted it to specify what kind of India it stood for 
before fighting to gain it. Although by forming ministries 
in seven out of eleven provinces Congress entrenched its 
position and put its adversaries at a considerable disad­
vantage, it is evident from the next two Chapters, V and VI, 
that Patel went to great lengths to keep Congress and 
Gandhiites at the helm of affairs. Accusations of high­
handedness were levelled against him; but for him the end 
seemed more important than the means. With the coming of
11
the war and the resignation of the ministries, Congress 
seemed to be losing much of the advantage it had gained in 
relation to the other political groups. Chapter VII dis­
cusses how Patel sought to regain that advantage (a) by 
trying to secure the best terms possible for Congress in 
the negotiations with the British and (b) by strategic 
planning when two sets of elections had to be contested by 
Congress in 1945 and 1946, for the Central and Provincial 
Assemblies and for the Constituent Assembly. All these 
manoeuvres culminated in Congress forming the Interim 
Government in September 1946 thereby fulfilling most of its 
political objectives. The final scene was a consolidation 
of all that Patel had been striving towards during those 
years. Socialists, Muslims and princes were all handled 
firmly in keeping with his style of leadership.
In this thesis answers to different questions are 
sought at different stages. Given that Patel claimed 
adherence to the Gandhian method of social and political 
response, how far did he actually assist Gandhi in the 
achievement of essentially Gandhian goals? After all Gandhi 
did relate the national movement to a long-term scheme for 
India wh_ich Patel was not very concerned about at this 
Stage and did not support in its entirety at any time. 
Gandhi and Nehru both had their separate visions of a 
national India which can be gathered from their respective 
political activity. What vision of India can be drawn from 
Patel’s role and style? If there was no particular vision, 
then what was Patel’s distinct contribution to Indian poli­
tics which earned him the title of 'Iron man of India’? 
Percival Spear puts Patel in the category of 'rational' 
leaders who are 'neither worshipped nor followed faith­
fully’ but obeyed. He also puts limits on the scope of 
such leadership. The nature of some of these limits will 
be looked at in those political activities of Patel which 
form the subject of this work, However, it will also be 
demonstrated how, with an emphasis on the 'purely politi­
cal’, Patel made this type of leadership less confined and
12
more enduring than other types and became the archetype of 
the modern Indian politician.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROVINCIAL EXPERIENCE 
Early years to 1927
Gujarat has been called the 'Garden of India' because 
some areas like Charotar, the central part of Kaira dis­
trict, are rich in soil and fertile. The farmers of such 
areas are, therefore, well rewarded for their hard work and 
enterprise. By far the most well-known and economically 
well-off community in rural Gujarat is the Patidar community. 
It is not easy to define in precise terms what a Patidar is. 
Fitting this community into one of the four varnas of Hindu 
society poses problems. In the last century, Patidars 
formed part of a large caste group called Kanbis, which in 
turn was divided into Levas and Kadvas, names which origi­
nate from those of the two sons of Rama, Lav and Kush. 
Patidars are those Kanbis who belong to the Leva group.
They call themselves Kshatriya because of the frequent 
reference to their supposed descent from Rama. Others call 
them Vaisyas. Some Brahmins, who resent their key positions 
in many villages, call them Sudras out of personal animo­
sity, In any event, most research on the community and its 
origins tends to emphasize and describe customary social 
traits of Patidars in order to define their Patidar-hood. ^  
These traits vary and help to establish a hierarchy which 
differentiates Patidars from other Kanbi as well as catego­
rize 'superior' and 'inferior' Patidars. The only constant 
attribute is the one that defines their economic origins 
and relates to their occupancy of government as opposed to 
alienated villages as shareholders who divide the payable 
revenue among themselves without any interference from out­
side. Apart from that, we have only accounts of their 
enterprise and industry in agriculture. There are also 
suggestions by some sociologists that even their social 
practices - Indian bride price, dowry debts and marriage 
networks - contained an 'investment component' and a pro­
cess of capitalization:
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In giving away his daughter with a large chunk of his 
wealth a Patidar father was, among other things, pur­
chasing a share in an increasingly profitable corporate 
enterprise, one which may be thought of as an agrarian 
banking system. 2
Whether one actually accepts the above statement and 
the detailed reasoning that is used to substantiate it or 
not, it is well known that the Patidars^jshrewdness on the 
agricultural scene was matched only by that of the Vania's 
in commerce and trade. Among the predominant caste groups 
in Central Gujarat - Brahmins, Patidars, Vanias; Baraiyas 
and Patanvadias - the Patidar community acquired status 
through their social network and economic skill; it gained 
a reputation as the most enterprising community in Gujarat.
Patidar villages are classified as 'superior' or 
*Inferiort depending on whether they are predominantly 
inhabited by superior or inferior Patidars, The criteria 
for establishing superiority or inferiority are inter-marri- 
age and inter-dining. Superior Patidars are the pace­
setters simply by virtue of belonging at the top in a hier­
archy of families accepted by Patidars.
Vallabhbhai Patel was a Leva Patidar from Karamsad 
which was the ancestral village of Vallabhbhai's father 
Jhaverbhai Patel, who owned ten acres of land there. Jhaver- 
bhai was born in 1829 and married Ladbai whose family came 
from Nadiad and was better off than his own. The influence 
of rural Patidar life on Vallabhbhai is not difficult to 
determine. Dwellings in most villages were laid out caste- 
wise. Jhaverbhai's home was a brick house with two storeys 
traditionally laid out with a verandah and court-yard and 
equipped and furnished with an eye for the useful rather 
than the ornate. Vallabhbhai often recalled his simple 
village life and felt it made for more rounded healthy per­
sonalities, He always regarded town life as inferior in 
3
comparison. Central Gujarat villages were not as isolated 
as many villages in central and northern India. Lying on 
trade routes from the interior to the sea they were cons­
tantly exposed to outside influences in terms of commodities
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that came to the local bazaars, and traders that came to buy
and sell in these villages, Patidars had much contact with
Vanias; Pocock suggests that the Patidar emulated the Vania
4
and learnt many of his shrewd ways. Many Patidars of Kaira 
district had become wealthy as a result of the introduction 
of cash crops and agricultural improvements. But, certain 
natural disasters like drought, floods and locusts at the 
close of the century caused considerable distress to farmers 
and resulted in an emigration of those ambitious Patidars 
I from Kaira distrist who had either become traders or recei­
ved education and gone into professional jobs. Ahmedabad 
became the haven for some people; others - and their number 
was quite large - emigrated as far as East Africa as traders. 
Those who emigrated to Ahmedabad either went into trade or 
law or formed part of the technical and administrative staff 
of textile mills. Baroda also provided new opportunities 
I to Patidars from Central Gujarat. By the turn of the Cen­
tury many Patidars with wealth had gone into trade or fina­
nce. These Patidars are described by the urban historian 
Gillion as * the middle class of modern Ahmedabad....more
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politically conscious than the Vania elite of the old City*. 
Jhaverbhai, however, had neither made much money from land 
nor explored other financial opportunities which had been 
availed of by fellow Patidars. A devout believer in the 
I Swamynarayan cult founded by Swami Shahajanand in Gujarat
in 1829, he spent a lot of his time in religious observances 
at the expense of worldly gain or advancement. He had six 
children, five sons and a daughter, the latter being the 
youngest in the family. The sons, beginning with the eldest, 
were Somabhai, Vithalbhai, Narsinhbhai, Vallabhbhai and 
Kashibhai. Vallabhbhai lived with his father till he was 
seventeen. Although he fasted with his father and observed 
some of the rituals which his father did, the long term 
effect of his father's religious fervour was that Vallabh­
bhai shunned orthodox religious practice in his adult life.
He seems to have imbibed from his mother a practical approach 
to people and problems. Much less is known about his
16
mother, but people recall her ability to participate in
0
neighbourly activity and communal living.
Vithalbhai and Vallabhbhai both went into law. The 
former took the district pleaderrs examination in 1895 and 
started practice, first in Godhra and then in Borsad, which 
was only a few miles from the family home in Karamsad. Five 
years later, Vallabhbhai also took this examination and 
practised first in Godhra and then Borsad, which was the 
centre of the taluka's criminal courts. The experiences as 
a lawyer in a moffusil town were invaluable. There was no room 
for pretention either in the profession or life style. Val­
labhbhai tried to accumulate as much of knowledge as he 
could of procedure, the peculiarities of interpersonal rela­
tionships and the malpractices that existed in the legal 
7
field. The two brothers made a name for themselves in the 
area and, spurred on by their success, decided to go to 
England to qualify as barristers. Vallabhbhai took the 
initiative, but Vithalbhai exercised the elder brother's 
prerogative and asked Vallabhbhai to transfer him the travel 
papers and admission to the legal courses which were in the 
name of V.J.Patel. After Vithalbhai returned, Vallabhbhai 
left for England. His stay there was not marked by any 
extraordinary experiences and most of his time was spent 
reading law. This was in marked contrast to Gandhi who took 
dancing lessons and explored many aspects of British social 
life by moving around with different kinds of people. Valla­
bhbhai kept to himself and was almost unadventurous on his 
first and last visit abroad. He performed as well in the 
Bar examinations as his elder brother had done and, on his 
return in the summer of 1913, settled in Ahmedabad. This 
was partly because he was familiar with many of the Patidar 
families who had moved there and partly because Ahmedabad 
had only six barristers at the time, so that Vallabhbhai'sg
chances of professional success were quite bright there.
His initial impact following his return from abroad is des­
cribed by G .V.Mavlankar, a resident of Ahmedabad and an 
early associate of Patel:
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A smart young man - stern and reserved - not given to 
many words - and of a firm and pensive expression al­
most as if he looked down upon the world with a sort 
of superiority complex. 9
In particular, he went on:
His cross-examination of witnesses was brief but 
pointed and he had such a quick judgment of men that 
by a mere piercing glance at the witness he knew what 
type of person he was and led his cross-examination 
accordingly...he always exhibited a thorough mastery 
of facts....But the one great quality which struck 
everybody...was the fearlessness with which he dealt 
with the Court. 10
We are concerned here less with Vallabhbhai1s professional 
success and more with his entry into public life. This stage 
of Patel’s life is particularly significant. It explains 
his entry into both a government institution - the munici­
pality, and anti-government political activity - the satya- 
graha. In his day-to-day work at the Bar he came across 
clients, fellow lawyers, magistrates, judges, government 
officers and political officers, whose relationships with 
each other revealed certain features that made an impres­
sion on him. He found clients, fellow magistrates, judges 
and officers arrogant in their dealings with Indian subor­
dinates and he detected a certain brusqueness in the atti­
tude of police officers, all of which bothered the superior 
Patidar who was not accustomed to servility. He felt that 
institutional authority was held in awe by people generally. 
Among his associates at that time were Patidar district 
pleaders and lawyers such as Govindrao Patel, Shivbhai 
Patel, Chimanlal Thakor, Maganbhai Chaturbhai Patel and 
others who either held or aspired for positions in local 
government. It might be mentioned here that by 1913 his 
brother Vithalbhai had gone through the paces of entry into 
political life. He had been elected first to the Borsad 
Taluk Board in September 1911, then to the Kaira District 
Board in November 1911, and from there to Bombay Legislative 
Council in January 1913. The initial inspiration to enter 
politics came to Vallabhbhai from the success that his bro­
ther had achieved. He was also encouraged to think of a
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public career by the activities of various members of the 
elite in Ahmedabad, members of Indian political associations 
like the Gujarat Sabha, with whom he spent much time playing 
bridge at the Gujarat Club. With Vithalbhai he attended the 
1915 session of the Bombay Presidency Political Conference 
organised by the Gujarat Sabha at which matters pertaining 
to municipal organisation were discussed. In 1915, Gandhi 
came to settle in Ahmedabad and set up an ashram in Kochrab 
village which was later moved to the banks of the Sabarmati. 
His experiences in South Africa and the doctrine of truth 
and non-violence became the subject of many discussions at 
the Gujarat Club, and although initially Vallabhbhai took 
all these talks lightly, the accumulated effect of this 
exposure, his meeting with men who were politically active, 
and his brother's success was his almost simultaneous entry 
into two fields - the Ahmedabad Municipality and the Gujarat 
Sabha.
We shall first discuss his activity in the Municipality 
from 1917 to 1927. The object is to highlight some aspects 
of his personality and his political style that were formed 
at this stage and were directly related to the local Ahme­
dabad scene in terms of rivalries among Indians and rela­
tions between the officers and elected Indians, The idea 
is not to recount Patel's activities in the Municipality; 
these have been adequately dealt with in various secondary 
works cited in the notes. The object is to observe Patel 
in a typical Gujarati city with which he had developed 
strong social links, and in which the British had never 
been fully assimilated, and to assess his role in a British 
institution - the Municipality - which became the first 
instrument of his political ambition and recognition. There 
was no scope for any revolutionary changes either in the 
organisation or the city for they were likely to be resis­
ted, in the one case by the British authority and in the 
other by the local tax payers, the vested interests in 
Ahmedabad. Within these constraints Patel tried to make 
a mark in the municipal organisation and in the city.
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In January 1917, Patel was elected to the Ahmedabad 
Municipality in a by-election* The Municipality had been 
superceded for incompetence in 1910 and replaced by a Com­
mittee of Management which brought about many improvements 
in those areas where the previous Municipality had failed - 
the strict enforcement of Municipal by-laws, control over 
staff, orderly water supply and drainage, collection of 
taxes and so on. The elected Municipality was restored in 
1915, after an amendment of the District Municipal Act, 
whereby it was stipulated that the Chief Officer in the 
Municipality would be a Municipal Commissioner who would be 
an ICS officer having stronger powers than before. The 
Ahmedabad Municipality was to have twenty seven councillors 
elected as follows: four by those eligible through education, 
one by the Millowners Association and twenty two by the 
wards. The President was to be elected by a two-third majo­
rity of the councillors. Patel's first concern was to en­
sure the smooth working of the Municipality. To him a good 
starting-point was to ensure a harmonious working relation­
ship between the elected councillors and the municipal offi­
cers. The elected members of the municipal board looked 
upon the amendment of the District Municipal Act, which pro­
vided that ICS officers would be chosen Municipal Commissio­
ners, as a curtailment of their freedom and, therefore, they 
objected to the arrangments. Objections, formal and infor­
mal, had been registered about the prohibitive cost to the 
municipality of the burden of appointing highly paid ICS 
officers as Municipal Commissioners. The first officer who 
occupied such office in Ahmedabad only confirmed the fears 
that people had about the undue control an official could 
exercise over the representatives. John Shillidy was appoi­
nted Municipal Commissioner of Ahmedabad and took every 
opportunity to overawe the forty members of the Municipal 
Council and other subordinate officers. Patel, being tempera­
mentally not the kind of man who would be overpowered too 
easily, decided to take some action in the Council, In the 
first instance, he set about mastering all the facts and 
figures pertaining to the Municipal Act and the powers, rules
20
and regulations contained therein. Next, he studied the 
vagaries of the local administration of the area and then 
embarked upon exploring the ways and means whereby he could 
better the existing relations between the elected and the 
appointed councillors inter se, as also those between the 
councillors and citizens. He then looked for the appropri­
ate opportunity to embarrass the Municipal Commissioner.
An incident pertaining to a swampy lake near the rail­
way station gave Patel the chance to launch a meticulously 
prepared attack on the Municipal Commissioner with the ob­
ject of exposing misconduct. It had been established at law 
th£\tthe lake was the property of the Municipality and it was 
considered desirable that it should be covered because it 
had become a breeding ground for mosquitos. Shillidy managed 
to procure it on permanent lease for the setting up of a 
match factory by Fateh Mohamad Munshi in consideration fqr 
his generous contribution towards the war loan. Patel got a 
motion passed by the Board to get Shillidy removed on the 
ground that the latter had misrepresented to the Government 
of Bombay a Municipal Board decision pertaining to the lake. 
Shillidy had to leave his post.^  This was only the beginn­
ing. Patel then carefully studied all the areas in which 
the previous Municipality (which had been super^eded)had 
failed and those in which the appointed committee of 1910 
had succeeded. He realised that success for him could lie 
in performing extraordinary feats in those areas. As Chair­
man of the Sanitary Committee he attended to all the mundane 
matters pertaining to the Municipality like the problems of 
water supply, collection of rates, good drainage, relief in 
time of flood and famine. What all these meant to a city 
like Ahmedabad can be adequately gauged from accounts of
Ahmedabad's decline in urban schemes despite its rapid ad-
12vancement in urban finance and industry. Patel was anxi­
ous to achieve results, and principles or legal obstacles 
were often abandoned or surmounted by negotiating a way 
around the problem so that the resulting benefits would far 
outweigh the seeming irregularity that may at times have
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been unavoidable. He later recalled to his colleagues that
the lessons learnt at the municipality level were of much
use in provincial and national politics when dissensions had
to be tackled in the party or, in the event of a dispute,
13advantage secured over the government.
Most improvements were well in keeping with the style of 
the Patidar, with an emphasis on the utilitarian rather than 
the decorative. The reservoir at Kankaria was the nearest 
Patel came to constructing a beauty spot. He recommended 
the maintenance of gardens around the reservoir. What his 
associates and other citizens recall as the outstanding fea­
tures o;f Patel *s term in the municipality were, firstly, his 
eagerness to delve directly into mundane city problems as 
opposed to paper and desk work, and, secondly, his activity 
in challenging the highhandedness or incompetence of offi­
cers, Within two years he gathered sufficient support on 
his side and could almost boast of leading a party within 
the Municipality, By 1920, when the Municipality got the 
right to choose its own municipal commissioners and an Indian 
headed the organisation, politics within the organisation 
increased. What was more, Gandhi's non-cooperation call soon 
reached the municipal area and members formed camps and alli­
ances on the basis of their strength in the political field.
A crisis occured in the Ahmedabad Municipality in 1921, 
when the Government appointed a Deputy Inspector of Schools 
to supersede the Schools Committee which was in charge of 
maintaining, managing and administering the schools. This 
was the result of the Municipality’s decision to non-coope- 
rate with the government in educational matters. The trou­
ble arose when Pratt, the Commissioner, usurped the rights 
of the Schools Committee and persuaded the Ahmedabad agent 
of the Imperial Bank of India to transfer Rs.12,000 of the 
Municipality's money to the account of the Deputy Educational 
Inspector. In January 1922, there was a stir in the Munici­
pality when a Member, Rao Sahib Harilalbhai Desai, argued 
that the Bank should restore the money failing which the 
President and the Managing Committee should file a suit
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against the Imperial Bank, Ahmedabad, to recoyer the amount. 
Patel, aware of the odds which the members of the municipal 
lity faced against the all-powerful Government, suggested 
what he considered were effective pressurising tactics. He 
anticipated that the Government would find shelter behind 
some section of some statute or the other which members 
of the Municipality might not be able to match,^ The 
Commissioner had already decreed that under Section 178(3) 
of the Bombay District Municipality Act, Government could 
take charge of it, if it could show that a Committee had 
defaulted in its duty in some way or other. Commending the 
teachers of the schools for refusing to take their salaries 
from the Deputy Education Inspector, Patel said that the 
entire issue would be publicised all over the country. In 
particular, the conduct of the Bank would be exposed to indi­
cate to the people how the Bank had abused the confidence 
placed in it by making money deposited with it by one party 
available to another. Failure to return the money would 
prompt the Managing Committee of the Municipality to advise 
the public that it was unsafe to leave their money with 
Imperial Bank, Although the Bank denied that the public had
reacted to the propaganda, there were reports that there had
15been a rush for withdrawal of money on the Imperial Bank.
Moral and social pressure was brought into play for 
quicker results. Patel's inclination to by-pass slow and 
cumbersome institutional procedures showed itself again and 
again in his political career. The thorny question of actu­
ally obtaining money to function had to be tackled. The 
Government had clandestinely obtained information about the 
Municipal Board's activities on 7 January 1922. Vallabhbhai 
conducted a thorough investigation into how the Commissioner's 
order of 7 January, invalidating the Municipality's resolution, 
was conveyed to the Municipality on the same day as the lat­
ter had passed the resolution. The investigation revealed 
.ike.
that/jHol lector had sent a Chief Officer (N.D.Mehta) to the 
Municipality to procure the proceedings of the Board before 
they were concluded. The Board, on its part, learnt of the
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Collector's intentions, and before tbe order could be for­
mally communicated to tbe Board, two cheques totally a sum 
of Rs.14,000 were drawn from tbe Bank. When the amounts 
were being paid out, the Chief Officer appeared on the scene 
to stop payments; but, by then, Rs.10,000 had already been 
paid out and the Municipality was able to pay the teachers' 
salary from that amount, Patel, by putting a question to 
the President of the Municipality, exposed all the irregu­
larities whereby the Board’s proceedings were conveyed to 
the Collector late at night in order that the Collector might 
forestall any move of the Municipal Board. An act deploring 
all this was passed by the Managing Committee at Patel's 
instance and it was further stipulated that the School Com­
mittee’s powers could not be taken away, because these did
1
not come from the order suspended by the Collector. Gove­
rnment employed its final weapon and the Municipality was 
I superceded by the Government and run by a Committee of
Management. The President of the Municipality, a moderate 
by the name of Ramanbhai Mahipal, and Nilkanth, who was not 
a non-cooperator, continued as Joint Chairmen.
Two years later, in 1924, under pressure from vested 
interests in the city, elections were held again and the 
Municipality restored. Vallabhbhai Patel became its Presi­
dent and exhibited considerable zeal in the progressive 
developments of the city. A programme which involved drai­
nage schemes, water supply, facilities for schools, suburban 
schemes, road construction and the demolition of the city 
wall, showed Patel as an effective and thorough administra­
tor and helped him to develop a network of alliances with 
prominent persons which henceforth were to become his modus 
operandi.
There was friction in the Municipality as a result of 
which Patel resigned in April 1928. A Chief Officer on Pro­
bation called I^R.Bhagat made serious allegations against 
the Municipal Engineer, Gore, and because the status of both 
officers was the same, Patel conducted the inquiry himself.
He discovered that not only were Bhagat’s allegations ill-
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founded but, that he was guilty of many improprieties him­
self and, therefore, could not be confirmed in his post as 
Chief Officer. Bhagat, however, intrigued to stay on. Amba-
•i
lal Sarabhai, the most prominent raillowner of Ahmedabad, 
organised his own party to fill the Municipality, because 
Patel's partymen were closely allied with the Congress,which 
had been espousing tha cause of workers in recent labour 
disputes in the city. Sarabhai, however, had sufficient 
strength to win over men from Patel's party. In the mean­
time, the post of Chief Officer fell vacant and four persons- 
Bhagat, H.L.Dewan, Paranjpye and Morarji Desai, who was in 
Government service, applied for the job. Patel supported 
Dewan and Sarabhai opposed him. The balance of forces was 
such that with members voting individually, Bhagat was 
chosen. Caste, community, relationships-all seemed to have
played a part in the elections. In April 1928, Vallabhbhai
17Patel resigned from the Municipality.
Between 1917 and 1927, Patel was simultaneously involved 
in a British established institution, the Municipality, and 
in an anti-British institution, the Congress, that was 
engineering the boycott of British institutions. These were 
certainly contradictory impulses in fact, but not entirely 
so in terms of the preceptions of the people in this period.
A Municipal Councillor turned khadi-clad Congress worker was 
not regarded as such a blatant incongruity. Initially, 
Municipal Councillors were elected on a much narrower fran­
chise than members of provincial legislatures were after 
1920. Yet, they were never acused of having sold out, beca­
use the nature of the work could be adequately explained as 
undiluted service to the city dwellers. As Patel later re­
called and explained:
I served Ahmedabad Municipality to the best of my 
ability...to all of us to serve our own city must 
give unmitigated pleasure and satisfaction which I 
cannot get in any other sphere. Further, to clean 
the dirt of the city is quite different from clea­
nsing the dirt of politics. From the former you get 
a good night's rest while the latter keeps you 
worried and lose your sleep. 18
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Patel's involvement in the Municipality and in politics 
was simultaneous and directed towards one goal - that of 
public recognition for purposes of politics. In 1917, Gan­
dhi had just made a tremendous impact at Champaran and 
Ahmedabad gave him much acclaim. Patel was more than likely 
to get drawn towards Gandhi, if for no other reason then 
simply as a vehicle for political take-off. He began his 
apprenticeship under Gandhian patronage in 1917. He became 
the Secretary of the Gujarat Sabha of which Gandhi was the 
President. That same year, the Gujarat Sabha became involved 
in the Kaira 'no-rent' movement. The agitation has been 
comprehensively analysed by Hardiman and features like the 
nature of support and system of alliances have been dis­
cussed at length. The events of the agitation are being 
recounted here for two reasons. The nature of the disaster 
that stjuck Kaira farmers was likely to have affected farmers 
in many other areas as well. On Gandhi's own admission, 
most Kaira farmers were 'highly respectable land owners' 
whose plight resulting from the successive mishaps in the 
district could not have been worse than that of the really 
downtrodden people of the other areas, that is, the subsis­
tence farmers or landless labourers. Yet, the plight of 
these farmers was emphasized to the exclusion of other far­
mers. Why this was so needs an answer. As we will see 
from the conduct of the campaign, the forging of links with 
rent payers seemed a vital feature of the agitation. Sec­
ondly, the nature of the conclusion of the agitation is dis­
cussed at some length because it gives an indication of the 
purpose of the agitation for politically-minded leaders like 
Patel.
The movement was initially sponsored by a local man - 
Mohanlal Pandya - a Vadadra Brahmin of Kathlal, from a rich 
peasant and money lending family - who later sought the 
support of Gandhi and the Gujarat Sabha. On the grounds that 
the farmers of Kaira were in distress, the movement demanded 
a remission of land revenue. The farmers of Kaira had been 
hit before. Famine in 1899, cholera epidemic and crop
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failure in 1900-01t rain scarcity and rat epidemic in 1901- 
02, plague in 1902-03, locusts in 1903-04, failure of rain 
in 1904-05, excessive rain and flood in July 1905 follo­
wed by drought in August and September 1906-07 and crop 
failure in 1907—08. Between 1908 and 1914 there was a res­
pite from the successive disasters, with a steadying of pri­
ces as a result of good harvests in 1912,1913 and 1914. The 
year 1915 was again a bad year and the kharif crop had fai­
led. The next year was better; but in 1917, there was seve­
nty inches of rain and the crops, particularly in the rice 
tract, were badly damaged. At the end of the monsoon, when 
the bajri and kbdra crops were cut and laid out to dry, 
there was rain again and the crops rotted. The winter crops 
were destroyed by rats. Quite clearly there was a strong 
case for land revenue remission or at least the sympathetic 
gesture of postponing collection of land revenue dues for 
that year. The entire atmosphere of demoralisation in Kaira 
helped Gandhi in his efforts to piece together fragmentary 
agitations into something big. The revenue officers, how­
ever, were not inclined to advise the government to make any 
large-scale remissions.
At the Gujarat Political Conference held at Godhra in 
November 1917, Gandhi invited leading men to come and talk 
to the peasants in Gujarati and help them articulate their 
demands. Land revenue, vath and other political problems 
were discussed and their solutions suggested. These solu­
tions were related to problems of caste solidarity, the 
damage to dairy and family milk-business and the glaring 
need for 'our upright management of civil affairs’. In par­
ticular, the Conference deplored the fact that with regard 
to the revenue matters of a district the Collector was 
wholly dependent on the one-sided reports of the Mamlatdar 
and the police. It suggested the appointment of an advisory 
board of elected members for each district. Soon, political 
workers were travelling all over the area, determining the 
nature of the problem and advising the farmers. Young Pati- 
dars joined the movement. At Kathlal, in the north of the
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district, in Kapadyanj taluka, Mohanlal Pandya and Shankar- 
lal Parikh prepared petitions for the leading Patidars of 
their area and then for those of other areas. These were 
sent to the government and, while they awaited a reply, the 
farmers of Kathlal refused to pay revenue. However, all 
that they were told in reply was that the revenue officers 
had ample opportunity to decide the issue. On 27 November 
1917, some representatives of the agriculturists went to the 
Collector to ask him to await the reply of the Bombay Gover­
nment before beginning the collection of revenue * In the 
-meantime, Gokuldas Parikh and Vithalbhai Patel, elected 
members of the Bombay Council, toured about twenty villages 
in Kapadvanj and Thasra talukas and gathered first hand 
information about the losses and hardships of the farmers. 
They made their recommendations to the Collector, V.K.Nam- 
joshi,who decided that suspensions of revenue could be made 
to the effect of half in forty villages of Nadiad taluka, 
thirty—four villages In Kapadvanj, thirty in Mohammadabad 
and seven in Matar taluka. But, in fact these suspensions 
were not carried out and there was agitation, Pandya and 
Parikh then entreated the Gujarat Sabha to involve itself 
directly and in January 1918 visited Vallabhbhai Patel’s 
house(which was the Gujarat Sabha's headquarters)everyday. 
They had extensive discussions with Patel who had an ear 
for detail and who made a thorough study of their problems. 
The Sabha had already sent a letter to the Bombay Govern­
ment on 1 January 1918 asking for a full enquiry into the 
matter. With the appeals from the agriculturists increasing, 
the Sabha at Gandhi's suggestion decided on 10 January to 
advise the farmers not to pay revenue until the government 
had replied to the Sabha's letter. Unfortunately, two fac­
tors complicated the issue. With the delayed rains it see­
med the rabi crop would be good. Revenue was supposed to 
be collected first in December (after the' kharif harvest) 
and then in April (after the rhbi harvest). In some areas 
the dues were collected separately for the two crops, in 
December and April, and in other areas for both together 
in April. Kapadvanj was an area that had a December collec­
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tion and hence the no-revenue campaign began there in Decem­
ber. By the time payment was due in the other areas the 
situation was not as bleak as it had been at the time of the 
khairif crop harvest. The l*abi crop promised to be good and 
the failure of the khhrlf harvest was not likely to be 
apparent. To determine the effects of the khkrif crop fail­
ure a thorough inquiry into the personal hardships of the 
farmers was needed. The officials did not lend much cre­
dence to the farmers * woes; they based their reports on the 
likelihood of a good" l*abi crop harvest. This irritated the 
Gujarat Sabha leaders. So did the rebuff that some of the 
Sabha leaders received at the hands of Frederick Pratt, the 
Commissioner of the Northern Division, when seven leaders 
went to see him on 11 January 1918 and four of them were 
turned away. This only made the Gujarat Sabha leaders stro­
nger in their support for the no-revenue campaign. They 
bided their time for Gandhi’s return from Champaran, and, in 
the meantime, tackled the press statement of 16 January 1918 
which had been issued by the Government of Bombay following 
parleys with those Indian leaders who still felt inclined to 
try constitutional means. This statement supported the act­
ion of the Collector of Kaira District in demanding land 
revenue and the outstanding taqaVi repayments. It also 
questioned the locus standi of the Gujarat Sabha of Ahmeda­
bad among the farmers of Kaira and called their advice 
<thoughtless and mischievous’ and asserted that the governm­
ent would not allow ’any intervention in the normal work of
the collection of land revenue dues’ in the 'rich and fertile 
19district’. Gandhi sent a telegram to the Gujarat Sabha 
and urged them to give a convincing reply to the Govern­
ment ’s statement. He told them to ask for an independent 
investigation and also to give the Government sufficient 
proof that the visits of Gokuldas Parikh and Vithalbhai Patel 
to Nadiad on 12 December 1917 and to twelve villages in 
Kapadvanj and Thasra were made at the request of the Sabha.
He added:
That agriculturists who have to borrow or to sell their
cattle in order to pay land revenue should do so is an
29
advice I would not hesitate to give. The government
can do what it likes, 20
When Gandhi arrived on the scene on 4 February 1918, he was
asked to join a deputation to the Governor of Bombay, The 
whole picture changed; for with the popularity after Cham- 
paran and his sympathetic attitude towards the recruitment 
campaign he could not be dismissed lightly by the Govern­
ment, At a meeting with Gandhi on 5 February 1918, Willing- 
don conceded Gandhirs demands for an independent inquiry in­
to the matter. In the meantime Gandhi sent a stiff letter 
on 7 February to Pratt, the Commissioner of the Northern
Division, protesting about the threatening notices and cir-
21culars that had been issued by the Mamlatdar of Kapadvanj.
On 9 February the Governors secretary wrote to Gandhi:
Neither from the discussions which took place bet­
ween you and His Excellency on the 5th, nor from 
the accounts which have appeared in the papers is 
it clear to the Governor that the local officers 
have in any way been harsh. He is not satisfied 
that any advantage would be gained by appointing 
an Independent Commission. 22
The Kaira struggle was on. The Executive Committee of 
the Gujarat Sabha met at Vallabhbhai1s house on 14 and 15 
February to determine the course of action to be taken. 
Opinions differed. Indulal Yajnik, a Nagar Brahmin of Nadiad 
and an enthusiastic political worker in Gujarat, wanted 
extreme measures to be taken. Vithalbhai Patel and Gokuldas 
Parikh, who had come from Bombay especially for the meeting, 
were against unconstitutional measures. Gandhi decided that 
the Gujarat Sabha as an organisation could not act because 
it could not be assumed that everyone endorsed Gandhi's 
method of satyagraha. He undertook the campaign as an inde­
pendent venture and those people who wished to follow him 
were asked to accompany him on 16 February to the Hindu 
Anath Ashram in Nadiad, which became the headquarters of the 
movement, and from there disperse to different villages to 
inquire into the peasants' grievances. Most of the Gujarat 
Sabha leaders, including Vallabhbhai Patel, followed Gandhi.
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Vallabhbbai Patel threw biigself heart and soul into the
campaign and discarded his English dress and from February
231918 onwards wore a dhoti and hurt a. The team of people 
that came to Nadiad divided themselves into groups and each 
group was to inspect roughly fifty villages by 10 March and 
then report its findings. Based on some of these reports, 
Gandhi*s letter of 26 January 1918 to the Collector/^sugges- 
ted that though he personally was fully satisfied that post­
ponement of land revenue was justified,the Collector might
appoint his own enquiry of independent men, representative
24of all sides, and satisfy himself. In many areas the 
first instalment, and in some areas both instalments, had 
been collected, sometimes after the selling of cattle. The 
Collector questioned the basis of Gandhi*s inquiry and poin­
ted out the likelihood of a good rabi crop. There seemed 
less and less room for negotiation until,on 22 March 1918, 
Gandhi formally commenced the satyagraha at a large meeting 
of agriculturists at Nadiad.
For much of the campaign, Gandhi was away from Kaira 
and left Vallabhbhai Patel in charge. At a meeting presided 
over by Patel at Nadiad on 31 March, farmers took a vow 
pledging their support and expressing their willingness to 
face all consequences including attachment rather than bet­
ray the cause. Patel warned them of coming hardships and 
commended their courage. He visited many villages including 
Uttarsanda, Chakhasi, Bhainal and Golel at which meetings 
were well attended. Leaders of villages commented upon 
Vallabhbhai1s sacrifice of his professional interests and 
his keen interest in peasant affairs. The presence of Pati- 
dar district pleaders who had come to their native villages 
from Ahmedabad to help in the campaign gave further import­
ance to the cause. Patel*s presence also created enthusiasm 
and in Borsad, where the Patel brothers were well-known, 
farmers took them in a procession and paid them tributes. A 
signature-collection campaign was started for making a peti­
tion to the Government and publicising the strength of the
25movement. By 4 April,about 1500 people had signed. Com-
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mending Patel's efforts, Gandhi said at Karamsad In April 
1918:
This is Vallabhbhai*s native place. Vallabhbhai is 
still in the fire and will have to endure a good deal 
of heat, but I think out of all this we shall have 
gold in the end. Let your good wishes go with him. 26
Patel was first exposed to the method of satyagraha in 
Kaira. Instilling the spirit of endurance among people, he 
toured extensively all over Kaira with Gandhi, when he was 
there, and with other workers. An eyewitness commented on 
Patel*s style:
He spoke seldom. He watched closely Gandhi*s method 
of work. He observed carefully the way in which . he 
carried on his correspondence with officials and con­
ducted his discussions with them; he observed the way 
in which he kept up the morale of the people and tes­
ted their mettle; and above all noted the way in 
which at the height of the campaign he watched for an 
opportunity to secure a settlement. 27
As they toured from village to village, Patel was able to 
notice that the response of each village depended on the 
nature of the response of the dominant caste or community 
of that village. He involved them accordingly and the 
movement came to be based mainly on the support of the domi­
nant caste. The aims and methods of the satyagraha suited 
the Patidar who had status and economic benefit to gain and 
not much to lose by participating in it. Landowners in the 
area had an average of 20 bighas of land. Od, in Anand 
Taluka, was a village of big landowners and more than fifty 
landowners had signed the declaration when Patel visited
them on 3 April. An Uttarsanda landowner with 250 bighas
28allowed an attachment to be brought against his goods.
The Patidars* only fear was the permanent loss of lands 
which might be confiscated. The vehemence with which Patel 
asserted that confiscation was after all only a fresh entry 
in the register of the Revenue Department and would make no 
sense if the owners could ensure that no one came forward 
to cultivate, reinforced the faith of the Patidars. Patel's 
own village, Karamsad, at first responded feebly compared
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with. Ras, Sunav and Nayagaig* It was a prosperous yiiiage 
and the progressive and prosperous Patidars there had opened 
many avenues for themselves. Famines and mishaps had not 
altered their position much and economic rivalry between 
them reduced the likelihood of their making common cause. 
Patel noticed this during his visit to Karamsad in April 
1918:
...I see you frightened of officials. This is clearly 
due to lack of unity amongst yourselves. If even on 
an occasion like this you are not able to get rid of 
disunity when will you be able to do so? 29
Evidently this factionalism, which existed in some of the 
villages, often tended to prevent participation in popular 
agitations because each faction feared that any land or pro­
perty confiscated from it would be bought by a rival fac­
tion.
Gandhi rebuked the three factions of Patidars in Od, 
saying:
...Let me tell you what I heard about you in Nadiad.
I was told that the people of Od are quite spirited 
but that they have till now, used their courage and 
strength not for their good, but in quarelling and 
wrangling among themselves.... And so it happens that 
this soil of Kheda, fertile and lovely which your 
forefathers had transformed into a land of gold, had 
been ruined while you have been stubbornly fighting 
for your claims against one another. 30
Gandhi chided Patidars for their bad reputation in some mat­
ters. Their attachment to land made them weak and cringing 
before officials. This weakness was unmanly and manliness 
was a quality that was most vital in a satyagraha. They 
were the enterprising community of the region and so it was 
natural that they were covetous of land. But he reminded 
them that they were also kshatriyas and, therefore, they 
were bound to their pledge. They must not be intimidated
by Government orders which, on mature consideration, they
31regarded as unjust or oppressive. On 12 April, Pratt, 
the Commissioner of Northern Division, addressed the Kaira 
cultivators. Vallabhbhai Patel sat in the audience. In an
33
intimidating speech., the Commissioner warned those yillagers 
who were servants of the State - Mukhis and Matadars - that 
if they did not collect revenue their posts and hereditary 
rights would go. All *chothais*, fines and forfeitures 
would fall on them and not on the political leaders. Their 
estates and houses would go, their wives and children would 
be left destitute and they would be reduced to the level of 
labourers. They would be foolish to fall for the Congress 
leaders* promises. Drawing their attention to the recent 
Ahmedabad labour dispute, the Commissioner said that workers 
had taken a pledge for a 35 per cent demand and the Congress 
leaders had not been able to fulfill their promises so that 
the workers had to break their pledges and return to work 
with a 27 per cent increase. He said it would be regretta­
ble if respectable Patidars lost precious lands in a futile 
exercise of false claims. Patel challenged Pratt on the 
misrepresentation of facts of the Ahmedabad mill strike.
The agriculturists who were present pleaded for mercy and 
said that grain was not selling well. Bajri was being sold 
for Rs.3-4 as. a maund and rice for Rs.4-6 as. a maund.
Iron (for implements) was expensive and so was labour. Sto­
ring mohuva flowers was illegal and,therefore,any side- 
income from country liquor was impossible. Pratt was unwil­
ling to go into these details. His stern threats were 
greatly resented by the public and the following remark 
became the subject of some controversy:
The lands of those who will not pay will be confis­
cated. Those who are contumacious will get no land in 
future. Government do not want their names on their 
Records of Rights. Those who go out shall never be 
admitted again. 32
Apart from giving moral reassurances, Patel met these threats 
with concrete gestures. By the end of April, financial sup­
port from magnates in Bombay had been procured for the Kaira
33campaign by Patel through his brother Vithalbhai.
About the same time, on 24 April, Pratt issued a cir­
cular that the pressure for payment on people should be 
reduced. The circular was reiterated on 24 May. It was
34
only when the circular had a yisible effect on the mamlat- 
dars who led the harassment of cultivators, that Gandhi 
called off the campaign. Willingdon, the Governor of Bom­
bay ridiculed the claims made by Gandhi and Patel, that the 
satyagraha had been called off because concrete concessions 
had been elicited from the Government. The Governor decla­
red that the campaign had ended because the April and May 
circulars generally released the pressure on villagers.
We gave no concessions and my Commissioner tells me 
that Gandhi*s assertion that he knew nothing of our 
orders to the mamlatdars in April and May is a bare­
faced lie. 34
It might be mentioned that although Gandhi laid emphasis on 
the undertaking given by the Mamlatdar of Nadiad - that if 
the well-to-do Patidars paid up, the poorer ones would be 
granted suspensions - he confessed quite openly:
It was clear that the people were exhausted...I was 
casting about for some graceful way of terminating 
the struggle which would be acceptable to a satya- 
grahi. 35
The Kaira satyagraha is of particular significance not 
merely because it marked the beginning of Patel*s involve­
ment in active politics but also because it gave him a poli­
tical power base. As a result of his methods of functioning, 
he linked Gujarat to the Congress Party in a manner which he 
himself could use to his and the party*s advantage. Coming 
from a peasant community Patel understood the peasant scene. 
It was not the cause of landless peasants and labourers that 
he espoused. The rural hierarchy was a reality which he 
accepted and endorsed. In the Kaira satyagraha Patel was 
tackling the wrongs being done to those higher up in the 
rural hierarchy - the landowners who paid rent or tax and 
had a stake in the social structure. He made no promises 
of a classless or egalitarian society and functioned with 
the stratified society. The peculiarities of particular 
areas were fully exploited to mobilise support. In Chikodra, 
the compact village of bold Arya Samajist Patidars, Patel 
ensured that appeals were based simultaneously on the Arya
35
36Samajist and Patidar factor of the society.
Vallabhbhai Patel worked in Kaira and other Gujarat 
areas with a view to making them future reservoirs of support 
for Congress. His Patidar background, the experience in 
rural Gujarat, his capacity and eagerness for political 
advancement made Patel an asset, a *Deputy General1 to 
Gandhi. Gandhi said in a speech after Kaira:
I wondered who the deputy general should be. My eye
fell on Shri Vallabhbhai. I must admit that the first 
time I saw him I wondered who that stiff man could be. 
What could he do. But as I came in contact with him
I knew that I must have him. 37
Gandhi was quick to point out that the association between 
the two satisfied Patel's ambitions as much as much as it 
fulfilled Gandhi's needs. He suggested that there was no 
dearth of people who would have followed Gandhi and done 
his bidding and if Vallabhbhai came forward it was because 
he had everything to gain and not much to lose from it. Addre­
ssing the agriculturists and workers on the ' lessons of the 
satyagraha1, Gandhi said that Vallabhbhai had the wisdom to 
realise that to make any kind of mark in the politics of 
the time it was imperative that he join the new movement. 
That was his best way of leaving a legacy to his heirs - a
better legacy than his money, which could be squandered 
38away.
While at the local level, in Kaira district, a particu­
lar grievance of peasants provided Patel with the opportu­
nity to learn the art of agitation, at the wider party level 
- the provincial Gujarat Congress - he was learning lessons 
of another kind. Negotiations, bargaining and decision­
making for the purpose of determining Congress policy and 
gaining political advantage now occupied the attention of 
Congress leaders who were emerging in the front ranks in 
different areas. In Gujarat,the men in charge of the Pro­
vincial Congress Committee were prominent agitators of the 
Kaira satyagraha who had been rewarded with positions in 
the party. Patel became President of the Gujarat Provincial
36
Congress Committee in 1921 and remained so till 1942. G,Y< 
Mavlankar and Indulal Yajnik were made General Secretaries 
and there were ten working committee members of the Gujarat 
PCC. In December 1920, at Nagpur, the Congress organisa­
tion had been altered so that each hierarchical level of the 
party corresponded with that of the administration. The 
Provincial Congress Committee became the key level in the 
organisation and provincial power bases became valuable.
Patel busied himself in Gujarat learning steadily the rules 
of the game. He was in charge of Congress finance and that 
put him in a position of strength, particularly as Patel
was also a very skilful fund-collector and could prevail up-
39on almost anyone to contribute. His- control over the purse 
did, however, lead to personal conflicts and in one such con­
flict, in 1921, Indulal Yajnik and Vallabhbhai Patel fell out 
with each other. The Bhils in the Panch Mahals District were 
in a sad plight as a result of the failure of crops in the 
area. Indulal Yajnik was inclined to give generously to the 
downtrodden victims. Patel rationed contributions and wished 
to distribute them as he deemed fit and prudent. He did not 
consider Bhils a good investment in terms of political supp­
ort for the Congress. Indulal appealed to Gandhi who expre­
ssed sympathy for the Bhils but was reluctant to interfere 
directly in the matter. Indulal submitted his resignation as
Secretary of the GPCC in October 1921 and relations between
40him and Patel were never normal after that incident.
Patel was Chairman of the Reception Committee at the
Ahmedabad Congress in December 1921 and his arrangements
41were commended. He took pains to give the session the new 
Gandhian look. Particular emphasis was placed on simplicity 
and swadeshi. The party organisation needed to appear attr­
active enough and sufficiently open to attract widespread 
support even while it was being tightened for controlled and 
regulated political activity. Citing Gujarat as the best 
example of the executors of Gandhis programme, Patel said 
in his speech that a lakh and ten thousand charkha wheels 
were at work in the Province and 2 lakhs of pounds of
37
khaddar had been produced during tbe past two years* In
temperance work (jprohibition) and tbe abolition of untoucha^
bility too Gujarat bad excelled. All tbese figures were
designed to sbow tbat Gujarat should be regarded as the lea-
42ding province in terms of Gandhi*s national movement. The 
Congress programme of non-cooperation had been endorsed at 
the Nagpur session of 1920. In Ahmedabad,the preparations 
for turning this non-cooperation movement into Civil Dis­
obedience were discussed. Particular areas in Gujarat were 
to be chosen to lead the civil disobedience movement and 
Patel spoke proudly about Gujarat*s preparedness for the 
struggle despite Government*s premature arrests of workers 
and volunteers.
The final choice of the area where Gandhi would lead 
the civil disobedience movement was between Anand in Kaira 
district and Bardoli in Surat district. Vallabhbhai Patel, 
to whom Gandhi had left the choice, picked Bardoli. He did 
so primarily because the Bardoli Patidars, upon whom the 
success of the campaign depended, were less ridden with dis­
sensions than the Patidars in Anand. This was because the 
largely tribal lands in Bardoli had only been settled in the 
last century by caste Hindus and there was a clear-cut divi­
sion between them and the landless labourers,with few inter­
mediaries. Of a population of 87,000 in Bardoli, Patidars 
numbered about 30,000 and Dublas (a backward class of land­
less agriculturist workers) about 54,000. The rest were 
Muslims, Anavil Brahmins, Vanias and untouchables. The lea­
ding Patidars had formed a Patidar Association and since 
1908 had taken an active part in politics. Swadeshi, prohi­
bition and national education had all gained a firm foothold 
in the area. At first Gandhi had intended starting civil 
disobedience in both Anand and Bardoli so as not to offend 
Kaira. But some symptoms indicating the somewhat violent 
mood of the Anand Patidars made Gandhi endorse Patel*s 
choice of Bardoli. Moreover,Bardoli had many passive resis­
ters of the South African Indian struggle, who had returned 
to positions of responsibility in the local Congress. Every
38
village b.ad men ttLat had been associated with. Gandhils South
43African passive resistance.
Vithalbhai Patel, whose opinion Gandhi had also sought, 
agreed with the choice after a thorough survey of the region 
in January 1922. It is noteworthy that during his legendary 
campaign in Bardoli in 1928, Vallabhbhai used the knowledge 
*of the area derived from the surveys and impressions gathe­
red at the time of the proposed 1922 campaign.
The decision to launch the movement in Bardoli in Feb­
ruary 1922 was abandoned by Gandhi because of the eruption 
of violence at Chauri Chaura in Gorakhpur District. The 
Working Committee of Congress ratified Gandhi*s decision to 
stop non-cooperation on 11 and 12 February. Gandhi was 
arrested in March 1922 and jailed for two years.
Although Patel did not wholly agree with Gandhi*s deci­
sion of stopping civil disobedience, he had not fortified 
his base sufficiently to make any independent moves. Patel 
had built his reputation as a prominent political leader on 
the provincial scene, but not yet on the national scene.
For that he still relied on Gandhi. He tried to enthuse 
disillusioned Patidars of Kaira, but to no avail. The sixth 
Gujarat Political Conference was held at Anand on 25 and 26 
May 1922 with Kasturba Gandhi presiding and was relatively 
poorly attended. At the conference, the vitality of the 
constructive programme and Gujarat*s faith in non-coopera­
tion were reiterated. Vallabhbhai was at pains to prepare 
Gujarat so that it had an edge over other provinces in the 
next round of political action. In June 1922, at Lucknow, 
he was anxious to demonstrate to a disillusioned AICC that 
Gujarat was still enthusiastic about non-cooperation and 
prepared for it. That Gujarat had become the province par 
excellence as far as political programmes were concerned 
was admitted by leaders from other provinces. P.C. Ray 
visited Ahmedabad on the occasion of the laying of the foun­
dation stone of the Gujarat Vidyapith on 9 March 1923 and 
attended several functions at schools and colleges. He went
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back to Bengal quite impressed tbat Qujarat was way abead in 
tbe national movement. Remarking in bis address tbat areas 
like Gujarat and Bombay were ideal for national institutions 
be said:
Here your boys are brought up in an atmosphere of 
business and independent initiative, not as in my 
province where service is looked upon as the sole 
means of livelihood...things are otherwise in Ben­
gal and I have no hesitation in saying that Bengal 
must follow in the footsteps of Bombay if she is 
to prosper. 44
Not all of this was of Patel’s making. He had made conside­
rable headway in preparing Gujarat for political activity : 
whereas he moulded some of the politics in Gujarat, he was 
also greatly affected by it. This is demonstrated by the 
satyagraha campaigns as well as by his political activity 
later. The agitations were not entirely made by the lea­
ders; the leaders were also made by the agitations.
The Nagpur satyagraha came immediately after a sharp 
division in Congress over the profitability of the politics 
of non-cooperation. There had existed, ever since the inau­
guration of the 1919 Act, a body of moderates in Congress 
who did not want the policy of boycott to extend to the 
Councils. With the disillusionment of 1921 and 1922, this 
body of opinion, led primarily by C.R.Das, grew; but, even 
when civil disobedience was abandoned, council entry was not 
adopted as a policy. At Gaya, in December 1922, Motilal 
Nehru proposed a resolution advocating Council Entry^ which 
was lost; Rajagopalachari1s resolution adhering to the 
view that civil disobedience was the best way to oppose im­
perialism was carried with Patel’s backing. Patel,,however, 
was quite inconsistent on the two subjects, of civil disob­
edience and council entry. On the one hand he asserted that 
Gujarat was one province that was fully prepared for any 
kind of agitation in 1922-23. On the other hand, he descri­
bed other provinces as quite unprepared for agitation. In 
the Punjab, Congress institutions were lying dormant; in 
U.P., the stage was not set for agitation; and in Delhi, 
there was indifference to it. Most of north India he said
40
was rife with. Rindu-Muslim disunity. In Qujarat, other lea-r 
ders like Qidwani and Abbas Tyabjt favoured a movement. Lea­
ders who were casting around for support and political riva­
lries, came to the surface each time a decision was made or 
altered by the Provincial Congress. At the Gaya Congress, 
Patel was both advocating civil disobedience as the best 
policy and vetoing its embarkation. Yet, within five months 
he was agitating in Nagpur, a totally alien territory for 
him, seeking to assert that non-cooperators were ahead of 
counci1-wallahs in terms of manifest political success. The 
reason for this is that agitations could not be started by 
leaders so easily; the so-called 1 followers* were their own 
masters to a degree hitherto underplayed by elitist histo­
rians. Subaltern studies remedy this balance somewhat.
The Nagpur Flag Satyagraha was a face-saver for Patelf 
who had resigned from the Congress Working Committee in May 
following a confrontation between the * changers* and * no­
changers* and the passage of a resolution proposed by P.D.
Tandon which suggested a compromise with those who advocated 
45Council Entry. Patel saw in the proposal of Council Entry 
an attempt by the moderates in Congress to take power and 
attention away from the Gandhian non-cooperators who had 
just about found their feet. This feeling of resentment 
towards any group that sought to wrest control away from the 
Gandhian group was increasingly evident in later years too 
(1934-39), when such attempts were made by leftist leaders 
towards the then moderates and conservatives (Patel and 
Gandhi). Vithalbhai Patel admonished Vallabhbhai for being 
discourteous to Congress and resigning and not accepting the 
party*s decision to compromise with the counci1-wallahs.
Much could be achieved in the legislatures he said *if only 
the President of the Gujarat Provincial Congress Committee 
would learn to respect the orders of the AICC*. Vallabhbhai, 
who did not take kindly to criticism, replied in a tone that 
was almost proprietorial towards Gujarat and Gandhi. Point­
ing out that it was not he but members of the Swaraj 
Party who were spoiling the image of Congress unity, he said:
41
Gujarat knows Qandhi far better tban PatelCVithal^ 
bhai), His party bas merely jnade use of Qandhijij 
wbereas Qujarat endeavouring to tbe best of its 
ability to follow in tbe footsteps of Gandbi....It 
was not necessary for Patel to remind Gujarat tbat 
Gandbiji always respected tbe resolutions of tbe 
All India Congress Committee. Gujarat also knows 
tbat wben Gandbi was free the whole country carried 
out his wishes unquestioningly. Today tbe very lea­
ders who do not respect tbe basic resolutions of the 
Congress itself demand that others should respect 
those of its resolutions which favour their point 
of view. 46
Vallabhbhai also rebuffed Jawaharlal Nehru*s overtures tow­
ards compromise and was determined to stick to his decision 
to abide by the Gaya resolution and not to accept the alte­
ration made by the All India Congress Committee at Bombay; 
the AICC was, after all, only a Committee of full Congress.
He made it a matter of personal prestige and would not sud­
denly and so obviously alter his own stand. Rebuking Nehru 
for his wavering attitude he wrote:
I assure you that it is painful to add to your trou­
bles, but I have been scratching my brain to find 
out how of all people you would be a party to the 
arrangement which was expected to creat such a com­
plex situation....At Bombay in your speech in the 
meeting you said you had to choose between two 
evils, you anticipated troubles, now why should you 
blame us. 47
On 10 July 1923, on the second day of the meeting of the
AICC called by the Swarajist Party at Nagpur, Jawaharlal
Nehru moved for disciplinary action against those Provincial
Congress Committees that did not accept the Bombay decision
of the AICC; in short, against Vallabhbhai Patel and Raja-
48gopalachari. But the move was lost by two votes.
Thus, Patel took a stand against the Swarajists with 
only a few leaders on his side at a time when elections under 
a Swarajist banner were likely and Swarajists were bound to 
accumulate considerable political support in key provinces. 
Reasons for this stubbornness are not hard to find. It 
would not be accurate to say that he had any ideological 
objection to council entry. He was still a member of the 
Ahmedabad Municipality and intfact became its President in
42
1924. Moreover, local leaders In Qujarat lias been denoun­
cing non-cooperation and it was inexpedient to ignore their 
attitudes. But,compromising with Swarajists like C.R.Das 
and Motilal Nehru would mean playing second fiddle to them 
for the foreseeable future. Patel was aspiring for the 
front line and would rather be at the head of a dissenting 
minority than a follower in a compromising majority.
Having taken a stand against the Swarajists, Patel was 
casting around for worthwhile political activity. The C.P. 
provided the opportunity when, not for the first time, trou­
ble arose over the issue of the National Flag in March 1923. 
The Working Committee of the Nagpur District Congress fixed 
1 May 1923 as the date for the beginning of an organised 
protest against the Governments interference with the right 
to carry the National Flag publicly in Nagpur. A press com­
munique issued by the local Government had been published in 
the Hitavada which stated the Governments stand in the mat­
ter. The most influential Britons lived in the Civil Lines
area and it was here that the Government forbade the carrying
49of the National Flag. On 30 April, the Congress leaders 
published a route that they intended to take and on 1 May 
the Nagpur Flag Satyagraha began formally. Day after day, 
several volunteers carried the flag along the prescribed 
route in defiance of the District Magistrate^ orders,sub­
mitted themselves for arrest and pleaded guilty before the 
Magistrate and received sentences of two or, sometimes, three 
months* rigorous imprisonment or one months* simple imprison­
ment under Sections 143 and 188 respectively of the Indian 
Penal Code. This became the city*s daily tamasha and people 
went to witness it as they would see a show. Government ser­
vants in offices were warned that if they were found standing
near a place where arrests were being made, action would be
50taken against them. The Magistrates who convicted the 
non-cooperators, and the sub-inspectors who arrested them, 
were mostly Indians. The reservoir of volunteers was kept 
full by the appeals made by the prominent leaders of differ­
ent areas to the people to join the satyagraha. For example,
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on 23 May in Balghat, a plea made by Jamnalal Bajaj, who?being
the most prominent local man in the Province, was the chief
patron of the movement, produced a batch of 250 volunteers
51ready to leave Balghat for Nagpur straightaway.
Jamnalal Bajaj had joined Vallabhbhai Patel in isolating 
himself from the rest of the National Congress leaders over 
council entry. It was at this time that all attempts at re­
conciliation between the two sections had failed and Patel 
and a few others had resigned from the Working Committee. It 
was, therefore, most gratifying to both of them that the 
national flag satyagraha provided an opportunity to demons­
trate, firstly, that non-cooperation as opposed to counci1- 
entry was not a spent force and non-cooperators still had 
tremendous support behind them, and secondly, their personal 
organisational capacity. Three days after resigning from 
the Working Committee Patel was in Nagpur and he witnessed 
the arrests of Congress non-cooperators from a distance, 
alongwith Rajagopalachari, Prakasam, Hardayal Nag, Gangad^tr- 
rao Deshpande, George Joseph, Rajendra Prasad and Devdas 
Gandhi, all of whom were opposed to council-entry. On 31 
May 1923, Vallabhbhai Patel addressed a public meeting and 
vindicated the stand taken by those who had not endorsed the 
recent AICC decision. The AICC, he said, had no jurisdic­
tion to deliberate on a motion passed by the general Cong­
ress session at Gaya and, therefore, the AICC decision was 
not binding on Congressmen. He asked voters not to vote for 
pro-councillors until the latter had courted arrest by carry­
ing the national flag. He assured the Nagpur satyagrahis of
concrete support by promising them a regular supply of volun- 
52teers. During his speeches he continued to express bitter­
ness over the Congress split and to rationalise the stand of 
the no-changers. At the height of the satyagraha campaign 
Vallabhbhai was denouncing C.R.Das and the latter!s criticism 
of Gandhis refusal to accept Reading's offer. He did not 
mince his words in expressing his strong disapproval of C.R. 
Das and his methods. He wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru when the 
latter gave a Press interview criticising Rajaji and Patel
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for their attitude to the Bombay decision;
I wonder why you would not allow those who are in the 
right to have their own way and prefer to allow those 
who are in the wrong to do so.,..1 trust you have been 
carefully following the adventures of Mr.Das in Mad­
ras. Do you think if the terrific onslaughts are allo­
wed to be delivered day after day without protest....
How do you expect us to watch with equanimity the rapid 
demolition of the magnificient edifice that has been 
erected by the combined sacrifice of so many in this 
land. 53
In Patelfs eyes, C.R.Das was guilty of cowardice because he
had not * charged* Gandhi for not accepting Reading’s offer
at the time when the offer was made. To choose an opportune
moment for attacking Gandhi was, in Patel’s opinion, not a
very courageous act:
Had r.e ventured to charge Mahatmaji in this manner 
eight months ago would anyone have listened to him?
But that would have not been Deshbandhu*s way. 54
In addition to his utterances being a manifestation of the 
resentment that he felt towards the Swarajists, they were 
designed to win over a large section of Swarajist suppor­
ters in the Central Provinces. The general population of 
this area was closely allied to that of the Bombay Deccan.
In the pre-war period Tilak had a large following in this 
area. More recently,C.R.Das had captured the support of the 
people with his talk about the advantages of fighting the 
British in the Councils. Thus, getting supporters in an area 
that had already been 1 captured1 by others was not an easy 
task for Vallabhbhai. To keep the movement going, the lea­
ders had to depend on the import of volunteers largely from 
Gujarat and Bombay, and to a lesser extent from Bihar, Sind, 
Punjab, Bengal, Karnataka, U.P., and Hyderabad. After Jamna­
lal Bajaj was arrested, the Working Committee of Congress, 
which met in July, entrusted the task of coordinating the 
campaign to Patel. He arranged for every province to send
a certain number of volunteers and also ensured that at least
5550 volunteers were available for arrest every day.
The momentum of the satyagraha abated somewhat after two 
months. This was not due only to diminishing enthusiasm. The
45
beginning of July saw tbe monsoon in full earnest and tbe 
transportation of volunteers became increasingly difficult, 
Many parties of volunteers came on foot and torrential rains 
often resulted in some groups having to abandon tbeir tasks. 
There was also disunity among volunteers. They came from 
different areas to an area which was not so much a Congress 
as a Swarajist stronghold; this annoyed Patel sometimes. In 
a letter to Mahadev Desai, he complained:
This is indeed a stimulating struggle. If only the 
people are united, it would be possible to make the 
Government yield within a week. But here we have 
an orchestra in which every player plays whatever 
tune he likes....In the next issue or two of Young 
India you must appeal for money. This appeal 
should be well drafted. 56
By the end of July demoralisation had set in; not many peo­
ple seemed interested in the satyagraha and the movement was 
on the verge of collapse. On his return to Nagpur on 22 
July, Vallabhbhai sent bleak reports of the movement:
For the first two days nobody would come near me.
Nagpur is absolutely cold. There is no response 
and I had to rely on outside help. My brother 
came here on the 25th and we found that unless 
things could be made more lively the movement 
would collapse and it would be a great disaster. 57
Vallabhbhai thereupon left his brother in Nagpur and went on
a volunteer recruitment campaign. He went to Calcutta and
asked Rajendra Prasad to meet him there. At Calcutta,he
arranged for *four big batches from Bengal and Bihar to reach
Nagpur as soon as possible1 with a promise to send twenty
volunteers every day for a month. Maharashtra and Karnataka
58promised fifteen and the Tamil area twenty every week.
Vithalbhai Patel*s involvement in the movement requires 
explanation. The Swarajists were due to contest elections 
in a few months and they calculated it to be better strategy 
to see the movement handled gracefully within the legisla­
ture than have it peter out disgracefully outside. The 
Government of C.P. was *bent on finishing the whole show 
before the 2nd August* because the Executive Council was
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scheduled to meet on that day to decide on the policy to be 
adopted In the Legislative Council which, was due to meet on 
the 6th to discuss the subject, Vithalbhai Patel, therefore, 
joined in the struggle and decided to liaise with Vallabh­
bhai who, as is evident, was becoming weak atthis stage. 
Vithalbhai Patel planned to get a resolution moved in the 
forthcoming session of the C.P. Legislature suggesting the 
cancellation of the DM*s order under Section 144.
The resolutions passed in the Legislative Council of 
C.P. demanded (i) the cancellation of the order of the Deputy 
Commissioner Nagpur, applying section 144 of the Criminal 
Procedure (ii) the unconditional release of volunteers and 
Congress workers imprisoned in connection with the national 
flag agitation (iii) the withdrawal of pending prosecutions 
of those already arrested and Civ) the granting of permis­
sion to railway authorities to issue tickets for Nagpur to 
all passengers that desired them. However, the Government 
was not prepared to give effect to these resolutions.
A series of negotiations between the C.P. Government
and the Patel brothers ensued. There were about a dozen
59meetings and Vallabhbhai was present at some of them.
There was a gentleman's agreement between the parties that 
the negotiations, including the correspondence pertaining 
to it, would be kept confidential. The inconclusive nature 
of the talks and the proximity of the renewal date of the 
new order led Vallabhbhai Patel to make a settlement on 16 
August. He reminded the people that the old order of the 
Deputy Commissioner, passed two months ago, was due to ex­
pire the next day. On the 18th,a procession would go through 
the Civil Lines and it was hoped that it would not be obs­
tructed. He was shrewd enough, however, to accompany the 
announcement with reassuring remarks, for the Governments 
benefit, about the spirit in which the entire movement was 
being conducted. He was speaking with the authority that 
had been vested in him by the Working Committee and pointed 
out that the Committee wished to make it clear that the 
organisers of the processions never intended to cause annoy-
47
ance to any section of the public. He also repudiated tbe
suggestion tbat there was an attempt, implied within tbe
GOmovement, of insulting tbe Union Jack, Tbis statement 
bad tbe desired effect and tbe Home Member met Vallabhbhai 
Patel tbe same day to work out a settlement. Tbe Govern­
ment was to allow the procession on tbe 18th if after that 
tbe struggle was formally called off by tbe Congress. This 
Patel agreed to do if all persons arrested during the course 
of the satyagraha were released and a promise given that 
after their release a procession would be allowed in accor­
dance with a required undertaking. This last act of nego­
tiation was between the Home Member and Patel. In fact, all 
the negotiations were between the Patel brothers and the C.P. 
Government. The police felt flighted, as did the Government 
of India. The District Superintendent of Police*seeing that 
the Government had decided not to renew the order under Sec­
tion 144, issued a notice under the Police Act that his 
prior permission was necessary before any procession went 
through the Civil Lines area. Patel wrote to the D.S.P. 
informing him about the proposed procession and sent him the 
leaflet that had been issued to the participants. The pro­
cession of 100 went as scheduled through Civil Lines, obser­
ving silence as it passed a church and reached its destina-
61tion, Sadar Bazar, unobstructed.
The controversy did not end there. Vithalbhai Patel, 
who had gone to Bombay on the 16th, made a premature announ­
cement of victory that added to the indignation that was
62being felt in some quarters. The Government of India re­
primanded the Government of Central Provinces for yielding
to the Congress and for agreeing to the release of prisoners,
63an undertaking which they had no right to give. The Gove­
rnment of C.P. was clearly embarrassed by the reproach and 
felt let down by the Government at the Centre. They, on 
their part, had asked the Patel brothers not to insist on 
the prior release of prisoners but to * trust in the judgment 
and good intentions of the Government*. The C.P. Government 
tried hard to rationalise their decisions and explained that
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local officers supported the release of prisoners and that
6 4commitment could not be broken, On J. September -1G23, 
Government of India sent a further rebuke:
....While sympathising in their desire to find a 
solution for situation Government of India regret 
that Government of C.P. considered it necessary... 
to enter into understanding involving release of 
prisoners....Government of India consider that 
they should have been previously consulted. 65
The Government of India also deplored the Government of C.P*s
promise to Congress permitting a second procession, after the
66
release of prisoners. The Viceroy was perturbed by the 
whole arrangement which the Government of C.P. had made with 
Patel:
....in regard to the release of prisoners it would 
appear that an implied understanding was arrived at 
by C.P. Government with Patel, and in this they 
were undoubtedly wrong... 67
However, at the end of it all, they accepted the view of the 
Provincial Government recognising that 1 any withdrawal or 
variation at this juncture, of terms arranged would be con­
sidered as a breach of faith and will probably lead to a
68renewal of agitation on this highly unfavourable issue1.
Trivial statements were issued. Patel was anxious to 
show that there had been no loss of face in the termination 
of the satyagraha and made what the government called b o m ­
bastic statements...claiming to have achieved a great triu­
mph'. Government's final verdict on the minor disputes 
relating to who had won and who had lost can be summed 
up in a Minute by M.Seton:
The controversy is really like a squabble between two 
lower school boys as to which has scored. 69
The important thing is whether Patel, who had fought in 
a Swarajist stronghold to show his strength to Swarajists, 
achieved his aim. The Flag Satyagraha was a novel idea in 
the continuing quest for dominance by Gandhi's supporters 
in areas where they had failed to make much impact. Gandhi's 
in-roads into C.P. politics had been initiated earlier by
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Jaranalal Bajaj who had been fairly successful In winning 
support for Qandhi in the area with the help of his influ­
ence and resources. That Patel chose Nagpur to show his 
strength to Swarajists was probably on Bajaj *s suggestion;
Bajaj had also resigned from the Forking Committee after 
the Bombay^ decision to accommodate Swarajists. The success 
of the satyagraha must be gauged from the view point of the 
Swarajists and the Government, For the Swarajists, the suc­
cess of the satyagraha was questionable because Patel took 
their help ultimately in executing his campaign and in its 
termination. Apart from involving his brother Vithalbhai, 
he also invited B.S.Moonje, the Deshastha doctor and M.R. 
Cholkar, his Brahmin lieutenant, to attend and address the 
public meeting organised by the two brothers. Swarajists 
were willing because elections lay a few months ahead and 
the publicity could be used advantageously.
Local newspaper reports certainly did not credit Patel 
with having conducted a successful satyagraha or arranging 
a respectable settlement. Opinions in these papers suppor­
ted the Swarajists and came down heavily against Patel*s
expedient use of the Flag Satyagraha to further his politi- 
70cal ambitions. The IJdaya (from Amraoti) remarked:
The truth appears to be that the so-called non­
cooperators think it below their dignity to seek 
unity with their own countrymen differing in 
political views, but are ever ready to try for 
compromise with the government with the help of 
their intermediaries.... 71
The Lokmat from Yeomal gave all the credit to the Swarajists 
and denounced no-changers for their criticism of councillors:
Although the non-cooperators have all along been 
branding pro-council people as traitors to the 
mother land, it is after all the present counci­
llors of the Province who ran to the rescue of 
the flagwallahs and saved the situation from 
being more humiliating to them. 72
As far as victory over government was concerned, it might be 
worthwhile to quote the Government of India’s attitude to the 
flag problem before Patel joined the struggle. While believing
50
t h a t  proscribing a flag could he done by certified legisla^ 
tion, the Government of India declared;
!fe are of course aware that the use of this flag may 
produce a disturbing effect on Parliament and public 
opinion in England ; but^..we attach far more impor­
tance to the consideration that we should be penali­
zing as illegal an act which should have great diffi­
culty in proving to be either seditious in itself or 
involving danger to the State,...'Swaraj * does not 
necessarily imply independence of the British Crown,
As so frequently happens in India the demonstrators 
have for the most part taken action without a defi­
nite idea of its implications. 73
Government did not consider the satyagraha as a big threat
and,given the local public reaction,certainly did not regard
its conclusion as a defeat for itself. The object of the
satyagraha for Patel personally was clear. It was conducted
with a view to rationalise the stand against counci1-entry.
At the height of the campaign, in addresses to the public,
Rajaji and Patel made constant allusions to and comparisons
74between the Swarajists and no-changers. Government also
believed that the satyagraha had been used by non-coopera-
75tors to further their own ends. The whole affair they 
thought was a triumph for Government and Swarajists and not
rj r*
for non-cooperators.
Ultimately, the no-changers capitulated at the Delhi 
session of Congress, in September. Patel, Bajaj, Rajendra 
Prasad and others entered the Delhi meeting carrying the 
national flag at the head of a procession of Nagpur satya­
graha prisoners and received acclaim and applause from the 
audience. The gesture was intended as a triumph for non­
cooperators. A murmur of disapproval was heard from them 
when Maulana Azad in his address failed to mention the vic­
tory of the Nagpur satyagraha. Mohammad Ali made a plea at 
this meeting to accommodate council-entry and non-cooperators 
complied. Patel was asked later why he had not accepted the 
earlier Bombay compromise ( r e f erred to as Nehru*s compromise) 
and accepted a far worse one at Delhi. Patel said that on 
the one hand the Delhi compromise gave non-cooperators a 
feeling of showing that they were making a sacrifice and on
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the other hand turning down Mohammad Ali^s plea would
have alienated Muslim opinion. Koweyer, the fact remains
that Swarajists had in fact gathered tremendous support and
strengthened their organisation, and electoral victory had
become more than a likelihood to them by September. As the
77results showed,Swarajists faired well in most provinces. 
Jamnalal Bajaj presented a grim picture of the lack of Gan- 
dhian control over Congress institutions in what he called 
the *Maharashtrian Province*. That he could influence peo­
ple to strengthen Congress Committees has been demonstrated.
78But a permanent hold over them seemed difficult. The free 
hand that was required to be given to Swarajists in the Pro­
vince certainly caused people like Patel and Bajaj much anx­
iety. Bajaj warned Patel that it might even have a detri­
mental effect on areas like Kaira where Congress had worked
79hard to establish control.
Patel reverted to Kaira district to retain and streng­
then the Gandhian Congress base in the area. Like the Nag­
pur satyagraha the next satyagraha in Borsad was undertaken 
to vindicate a stand on wider political issues. It has al­
ready been mentioned that the abandonment of Civil Disobedi­
ence in 1922 had not been welcomed in Gujarat. Patidars 
had become disillusioned and Patel*s efforts to revive them 
by piece-meal measures like picketing and calls for minor 
no-rent campaigns had proved futile. Similarly, his propa­
ganda among Congressmen against Swarajists who were due to 
go in for elections in October had also not had much success 
as before. Dadubhai Desai and Jesangbhai Patel, Legislative 
Council Members for Kaira who had undertaken to represent
Kaira landlords* interests, seemed to have sympathetic audi-
80ences at their meeting* All this caused differences in 
the thinking of Congressmen who put up their own candidates 
against the incumbents. Vallabhbhai reprimanded them for 
their interest in electioneering but some leaders continued 
and even achieved political success. All this considerably 
damaged the unity among Congressmen in Kaira. Vallabhbhai 
Patel turned his and their attention to Borsad taluka with
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a view to mobilising and cementing theip la a moyement. It 
was important to show bis power to mobilise just then while 
Ca) Qandhi was in jail and CD) Swarajists were trying to 
overshadow the disunited no-changers. At meetings in Bor­
sad Patel asked people to make a straight choice whether 
they wanted councillors or Congressmen to alleviate their
burdens. A few educated people in Councils, he added, could
81not change the situation in the country.
Borsad taluka was a southern taluka of Kaira district 
with a population of one and a half lakhs of which more than 
half were Patanvadias and Baraiyas. These castes were part 
of a non-Kanbi section of the population originally called 
'kolis* and some villages were totally inhabited by these 
communities. Before the advent of British authority these 
communities were renowned for Kshatriya and Thakur traits, 
on which basis they claimed to be Kshatriyas. They formed 
the fighting forces of the neighbouring princely States.
With the advent of British rule and the gradual replacement 
of local forces by British forces,these warring communities 
lost their jobs. They had already slackened in their second 
occupation - land - and were not enterprising enough to make 
agriculture profitable. Patidars had stepped in where kolis 
were unsuccessful. The latter mortgaged land with sowkars 
and Patidars and fell into further decline and gradually in­
to bad ways to obtain money. Gradually, they were lumped 
with criminals and tribals for having committed petty offen­
ces and came under the Provincial Criminal and Tribals Act
whereby they had to report regularly to the local police
82and were carefully watched as potential criminals. Patel 
had an association with these so-called criminals between 
1902 and 1913 when he was a district pleader in Godhra and 
Borsad. One such person was Gulab Raja of Singlav village. 
His offence had been committed in the neighbouring Baroda 
State but he had alienated the police and the Bania commu­
nity in his village. He once entered into a dispute with 
a Bania and,given his unpopularity with the community and 
police, was arrested. He approached Patel to defend him,
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but was convicted, Patel took bis case? feeble though it 
was, and accused the judicial machinery" of corrupt ioa.* His 
client,however, became a more hardened criminal after he 
served the sentence. As a lawyer Patel's contacts in the 
area were widespread and his involvement in a movement was 
likely to bear some positive result in terms of extensive 
mobilisation of support. He could not, however, start a 
movement from the top.
In September 1923,a special punitive tax had been imposed 
(Rs.240,074) on the people of Borsad to pay for the expendi­
ture that the Government was going to incur for the additional 
police that were required in the area as a result of an incre­
ase in the incidents of dacoity, murder and robbery. Anglo- 
Indian papers alleged that Gandhi's teachings had accelerated 
criminality among the people. In 1919#the Collector of Kaira 
had punished Banias pof Sarajedi and Nadiad. Now it was the 
turn of the whole adult population of Borsad. Vallabhbhai
Patel pointed out that dacoits like Gulab Raja flourished
83long before Gandhi came on the scene. After the special 
Congress meeting at Delhi in September, where no-changers had 
yielded to the Swarajists, Patel went to Ahmedabad and met 
local leaders who appraised him of the Borsad problem. He 
called a meeting of the Gujarat Provincial Congress Committee 
and Mohanlal Pandya and Ravi Shankar Vyas (a Vadadra Brahmin 
and Arya Samajist) were assigned the task of conducting a 
village to village enquiry into the matter. The facts were 
reported to Patel who perused them thoroughly and questioned 
his two investigators so persistently that one of them, Ravi 
Shankar Vyas, resolved never again to work for such a strict 
and stiff person as Vallabhbhai Patel. However, when in his 
speeches, Patel commended the report, Ravi Shankar apprecia­
ted the rigorous cross-examination that he had been subjected 
84to. The Committee reported events and happenings leading 
up to the imposition of additional police for which the taluka 
was paying the price. For seven years Borsad and Anand taluka 
had been subjected to many acts of violence committed by an 
outlaw Babar Deva, a Patanvadia of Golel. He had collected
a big gang and it was said lie bad murdered about twenty^fiye 
people including bis wife's pother wbo bad tried to betray 
him to tbe police. Another outlaw, a HusTim called Alt from 
Borsad village, bad also been pestering tbe people and bad 
been arrested; but,in a deal witb the police he was released 
to enable him to lead them to Babar Deva. The plan of send­
ing a thief to catch a thief did not materialise. Ali had 
been supplied with weapons by the police and he had used 
them for more acts of crime. To absolve themselves of any 
blame in failing to catch the outlaws,the police were send­
ing reports that suggested that people of the villages were 
in league with the criminals. The Government based its deci­
sion to impose more police on the villages on these reports 
and ordered the costs to be realised from the villagers, who, 
they stated, were guilty of complicity. This was done first 
in two villages, Khadana and Johan, in April 1921. As the 
problem persisted,the police and the tax were extended to 
the whole taluka. The police sought to aid the Government 
by blaming the people. The people blamed the police for 
being hand in glove with the criminals and sharing their 
booty. In the course of his investigations Patel came into 
possession of evidence that suggested that the police force 
had been instructed by its Superintendent in the case of Ali
to turn a blind eye to his offences because he was assisting
85them to arrest Babar Deva. He also procured an official 
letter from the Mamlatdarfs office in which the Mamlatdar 
advised the Collector that the people of Borsad were too 
poor to pay the punitive tax. This letter had been obtained 
by Patel's youngest brother Kashibhai. On 1 December 1923, 
when the Congress Provincial Committee met at Borsad, Patel 
reported that his Enquiry Committee was satisfied that the 
proposed tax was unjustified, that the government had not 
provided people with the protection it should have and ins­
tead had falsely accused the people of being in league with 
the dacoits. The people were, therefore, justified in refu­
sing to pay the tax and would bear whatever consequences 
might follow. In subsequent meetings he laid stress on the
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fact that it was not for the sake of saying the Rs.2-7~Q
per person that the nontax campaign was being waged. The
main point was that the Government Had no right to insult
the people by suggesting that they were the companions of
86thieves and dacoits.
Police and tax officials went ahead with raids and 
87collections. The struggle lasted for five weeks and ended
on 8 January 1924. Patel had taken pains to collect evidence
to support his charges against the police. The charges agai-
88nst the government were published in all the newspapers.
The Governor of Bombay, Sir Leslie Wilson, who had taken 
over from Sir George Lloyd in December and was anxious not 
to begin with a tarnished image, had the matter investigated 
and sent tte Home Member, Sir Maurice Hayward, to Borsad on 
4 January 1924, to ascertain the exact nature of the happen­
ings in the taluka. The villagers made a representation to 
support their case against the proposed levy and to prove 
that some police officers were guilty of corruption. Ulti­
mately, on 7 January 1924, the Government of Bombay dropped
the proposals to deploy an extra police force in the area
89and to levy extra charges.
Organisation in this movement was interesting. The 
headquarters were at Ras from where the satyagraha was con­
ducted in eighteen centres. The Commander was Mohanlal Pandya 
and the local leaders, through whom the day-to-day touring, 
pamphleteering and lectures were delivered,were Darbar Gopal- 
das, Ravjibhai Nathabhai Patel, Ravjibhai Manibhai Patel,
Phulchand Bapuji Shah, Shivajibhai Ashahbhai Patel, Bhogilal
90Nathabhai Choksey, Chhotalal Vyas and Gokuldas Talati. At 
the 21 November meeting when the taluka Congress was being 
planned it was decided that each village would send one 
representative per hundred persons and all village activities 
would be supervised through these delegates. The delegates 
were to be the fworthy people of the village*. These leaders 
went from village to village telling people not to pay the 
new levy and to resist attachment of property by local police 
officers. The leaders, as it can be seen from the above list
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of names, were either Patidars or Yanias or members of the 
other socially and economically well-placed communities and 
groups. They appealed to the Baraiyas and Patanvadias of 
the villages by recalling their antecedents as jagirdars 
and thakurs. Patidars who dominated some villages like 
Golel allowed attachment of their property purely as a res­
ponse to the call from Patidar brethern. Vanias in the area 
supported Gandhian leaders as a group because Gandhi had 
propagated the setting up of cow-protection societies in the 
course of his constructive programme and was encouraging the 
tenets of their way of life. Patel appealed to all these 
groups and addressed them as the elevated sections of Gujarat 
on whom the prosperity of the Province depended. Meetings 
were often held community-wise. At combined meetings people 
sat in community groups. Patel*s affinity with the higher 
socio-economic groups and lack of interest in landless,under­
developed peasant communities was quite apparent to the dis­
cerning eye. Patanvadias and Baraiyas who had turned dacoits 
were more sympathetically treated by him than the downtrodden 
Ujliparaj and Kaliparaj in the area. To the former two he 
made appeals based on their high Kshatriya caste status and 
their hitherto prosperous jagirdari and thakur background, 
and expressed faith that the waywardness of some of them was 
a temporary aberration caused by economic necessity and im­
perialist callousness. In the case of Ujliparaj and Kalip­
araj, he entertained no hope of their upliftment and emanci­
pation. He accused them of being ignorant and devoid of
community spirit and felt that any efforts towards reforming
91them would be futile. There was also an element of inti­
midation on the part of Patidar leaders. In Virol they held 
a meeting and passed a resolution that whoever helped govern- 
mentjservants in their work of attachment or bought or handled 
auctioned articles would be fined Es.101 and excommunicated. 
Other communities like Dharalas (including watchmen, Ravania
and Pagis) Dheds, Bhangis, Barbers, Khumbars were all requi-
92red to pass resolutions to stay away from auctions.
A few observations about Patel emerge from these satya-
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graha campaigns. They help in assessing Patel's political 
role at this stage,albeit at the provincial level, and also 
indicate how^ political aspirants could make the link from 
the local to the provincial and then to the national scene. 
Kaira, Nagpur and Borsad were all designed towards harness­
ing local political problems to the national political acti­
vity which Gandhi had made possible for ambitious politici­
ans. On his own Patel would have had difficulty in making 
the jump from the local to the national stage. These satya­
graha movements helped him to play supervisor and organiser 
of local talents and thereby cause attention to be turned 
towards him. He formed links with the local men and after 
Kaira,which elevated him to the special position in Gandhi's 
camp, he dealt with local leaders with a feeling of superio­
rity. The local links were based on his community ties and 
professional connections in these areas. To Patidars of 
Borsad were now added Patanvadias and Baraiyas, thus increa­
sing the supporters of Congress and Patel in Kaira district. 
But, Patel had difficulty in procuring the support of castes 
or groups that were socially and economically lower than 
these. In this he was quite un-Gandhian.
Patel's alliances with other provincial leaders were 
also made at this stage. The Nagpur Flag Satyagraha brought 
Patel and Rajendra Prasad together in a political partnership 
based on a natural alliance. Both had relatively privileged, 
rural origins and both were associated with Gandhi without 
being disciples. Their position and style was conditioned 
by these two factors. Rajendra Prasad wrote of Patel later:
It was during this visit to Nagpur that I came closer 
to Sardar Patel....It was here that we had greater 
opportunities for closer contacts which led to the 
beginning of an intimacy which was to last till his 
death....His gravity, efficiency and qualities of 
leadership inspired in me deep regard which was to 
increase with greater association. 93
Ra^agopalachari, who was with Patel in trying to diminish
the influence of the Swarajists,also developed a rapport
with Patel at this stage.
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It would be erroneous while analysing Fatal*s role eyen
at this point to think that Patel and Gandhi had the saj^ e
political goals much less the same political styles, Judith
Brown has underplayed Patel's role in her analysis of the
94Kaira Satyagraha. In fact Patel was indispensable to the 
movement even though it was carried out under the aegis of 
Gandhian ideology. In 1917, Patel was better known in Kaira 
district than Gandhi. In 1923 too, at the time of the Bor­
sad campaign/Patel could boast of his own links with the 
local community even while the platform from which he add­
ressed his workers was that of the Gandhian Congress.
Features of Patel*s style surface at various points in 
the progress of the agitations.. Patel's hallmarks were,con­
centrating on ends rather than means, coordinating somewhat 
limited grass roots activity rather than participating in it 
himself and emphasizing political changes rather than social 
revolution. They won him the support of Patidars, Vanias 
and other privileged groups; but they also brought him the 
antagonism of socialist groups which had begun to organise 
themselves during the 1920s. Related to this was his idea 
of unity - which was one of the pragmatic coming together 
of like-minded persons or groups for achieving specific obje­
ctives. It did not mean a coming together of one and all for 
the achievement of all encompassing visionary socio-economic 
goals. His earlier views on unity are expressed at the fami­
ly level and hold good in his approach to the resolution of 
political and social conflict. On the personal front he 
talked a lot about the advantage of unity, as a policy. Advi­
sing his daughter when she was evidently having problems with 
her sister-in-law, Patel said that it was natural to be dis­
united but to expose disunity to the outside world was a 
blunder. The lessons of give and take, negotiation and com­
promise/that one could learn in a family set up could come 
in very useful in dealing with the world outside. Quite
apart from increasing bitterness and reducing harmony,discord
95
in the family Cor in a party) could be exploited by outsiders. 
In 1929, his daughter-in-law got meningitis. Patel requested
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his daughter, Manihehn, to treat her §i§terrv4Ji~law well and
96thereby contribute to h&rpjony in the family. PateL had
made expediency hi& watchword in private and public life.
He advised hi& son Dahyabhai against making enemies and said
97it was likely to bring him long term disadvantages. Valla­
bhbhai wanted Manibehn and Dahyabhai to have good relations 
between them and tried to put some pressure on them but he 
could not impose his will on either of them. Dahyabhai had 
difficulties with other relations too and Vallabhbhai sugg­
ested that he should stay away from them rather than clash
98with relatives repeatedly. Vallabhbhai had his own prob­
lems with relatives and seems to have learnt to look at such 
matters with considerable objectivity. His relations with 
his brother Vithalbhai were governed by such an outlook. He 
was always cautious about keeping the family image and con­
tained disagreements within the group. He did this with the 
party organisation too and wanted discontentment and conflict 
to be kept under control. Disagreements did not leave him 
unruffled, but to worry unduly about them was in his view a 
dissipation of energy. Rebuking Dahyabhai for getting agi­
tated about the unseemly behaviour of his cousin and aunt in 
family affairs, Vallabhbhai said that getting caught up in 
quarrels dissipated one's energy. 'Although it is difficult 
to rise above it, it is worthwhile to try to do so'. It 
remains to be seen whether he was able to do so himself and 
whether, on the political scene, conflicts were always trea­
ted with the same magnanimity he was advocating to his family 
in their personal lives. At what cost disagreements were 
contained within the group will be observed in the next few 
chapters.
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CHAPTER II
CONSOLIDATING THE PROVINCIAL BASE 1928
Bardoli was the spring board from which Patel was able
to enter the national scene. The Bardoli satyagraha of 1928
made Patel a national leader not because of any particular
features in the satyagraha, but because of its timing. The
general political scene during the period that immediately
preceded it and Patel!s position in that scene gave Bardoli
its importance. This scene was related to the activities
of non-Gandhian groups in Congress (like Swarajists), of
non-Congress groups (like Socialists) and of the Government.
The connection between the wider political scenario and
Patel was provided by Gandhi. Soon after his release from
jail in February 1924, Gandhi was called upon to give his
views on the political situation and particularly on the
question of council entry.^ His commendations of Patel and
2
of Gujarat were made in superlative terms. Patel had been 
working towards just that. The satyagraha campaigns, which 
from the wider view point were mere side shows, did give 
Patel an edge over other provincial leaders by obtaining 
for him political recognition in Gandhi's eyes and a power 
base to rely upon and revert to whenever required. At this 
time Gandhi needed to strengthen his hold over Congress 
after an absence of two years, and Patel needed to strengthen 
his holdover Gandhi. To do this he had to assist Gandhi in 
establishing control over Congress. In May 1924,Patel took 
Gandhi to Ahmedabad to rest and also to appraise him of the 
whole political situation.
To honour Gandhi upon his release, Patel urged Gujarat 
Congressmen to present Gandhi with a purse of 19 lakhs of 
rupees for the constructive programme. The response to this 
appeal was remarkable. Donations came in at the office of 
the Gujarat Prantik Samiti everyday. Gujaratis living in 
areas as remote as South Africa and Japan contributed to the 
fund. Abbas Tyabji, Darbar Gopaldas Desai, Devchandbhai
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Parekh (General Secretary of the Kathiawar Political Cong­
ress) and Fulchand Shah toured different parts of Kathiawar; 
and Vallabhbhai Patel and Manilal Kothari went to Mansa,
Kadi, Patan and other important areas of Gujarat for collec­
tion work. Sums contributed varied from Rs.10 to over Rs. 
10,000. In Bardoli and Borsad talukas collection work was 
particularly brisk. At the Gujarat Political Conference 
held at Borsad in May 1924, Kaira district and Vallabhbhai 
Patel were praised for their valiant spirit. Commending 
the people of Kaira for the supply of volunteers for the 
Nagpur Satxyagraha and for the victory at Borsad,the Confer­
ence led by Vallabhbhai Patel, Tyabji, Mahadev Desai, Indulal 
Yajnik and Manilal Kothari put before the people definite 
lines for the execution of the constructive programme as 
laid down by Gandhi. Meanwhile, Gandhi was with Vallabhbhai 
Patel at his Bardoli Ashram until July 1924. In June 1924, 
at the AICC meeting at Ahmedabad,the Gandhi/Patel team put 
forward four resolutions calling upon Congress to express 
the extent of its faith in Gandhi's leadership. These reso­
lutions sought the introduction of a spinning franchise, the 
disciplining of Congress workers who did not follow instruc­
tions, and the strengthening of the five boycotts. These 
were all recognised as Gandhian trademarks. The resolutions 
and the method of their passage in the Committee were seen 
as a triumph for Gandhi even while Swarajists stuck to their 
own programmes. Patelfs firm support of Gandhi in Ahmedabad 
earned him the title of a fblind follower of Gandhi1; for 
Patel it was part of a political course.
From Ahmedabad began the process of handing over to the 
Swarajists the political wing of the Congress while Gandhi 
took charge of the constructive wing. The Calcutta Pact 
(November 1924) followed by the Belgaum resolution (December 
1924) ratifying the pact, followed by the Patna AICC (Septem­
ber 1925) decision, followed by Kanpur (December 1925) were 
all aimed at reducing the tensions within the Congress exe­
cutive by granting enough authority to the Swarajists to 
carry on their council policy. Some no-changers resented
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this; other more shrewd members of Qandhi*s camp forged ahead 
in the alternative spheres of activities.
Between 1924 and 1928 Congress is described by Narhari
Parikh as going through a 'depression1 and by Tomlinson as
3
leading a 'schizophrenic existence*. Having given Swara­
jists a free hand in political matters Gandhi concentrated 
on the constructive programme. The All-India Spinners Asso­
ciation was started and although Gandhi kept reminding his 
followers and those Congressmen in particular areas that had 
been politically active, that the constructive programme was 
the real national work, he could not keep an organisation of 
nearly two lakh members in fighting trim simply by having 
them spin, weave and fight the evil of drink. Patel had 
reverted to the Municipality, and also taken to constructive 
work. But,followers who had thought that they could make a 
full time activity of political agitation could not be con­
vinced. Recourse to spinning was no substitute for active 
politics; specially when council-wallahs were offering alter­
native political activity. Clearly, Patel faced heavy odds 
in this period. It was difficult to create activity when 
the supporters were disillusioned and a stimulating cause 
was missing.
The break in this low key activity of no-changers was 
provided, as was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, 
by a number of factors related to the wider political scene. 
These factors are significant because they reinforced Patel's 
stand against opposition groups (including the government). 
First of all,the position of the Swarajists needs examina­
tion. Their election methods and results in Bombay Province 
alone provided enough evidence of (1) the disunity within the 
Party and (2) its increasing parochialism and communalism.
A hunt for unity between the warring wings of Congress began 
by the end of 1926. At a public meeting in Bombay in Decem­
ber 1926, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu plauded the pleas for unity 
among Swarajists and Congressmen which were being made by 
members of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee. In 
typically poetic language she pointed out that it was for
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Congress leaders to recall the Swarajists into their fold. 
Moderate opinion in Congress, however,did not think that lea­
ders like Patel would compromise their stand. Commenting on 
Sarojini Naidu's use of poetic language - fCome back ye chil­
dren who are exiled1 - to get Swarajists and alienated lea­
ders back into the Congress, the liberal newspaper Leader 
wrote:
But can the Congress say this so long as its policy 
is dictated by one or two individuals who have been 
frustrating all attempts at unity and have made their 
institution a purely party organisation which has 
been pursuing a policy of intolerance and exclusive­
ness. 4
The reference was to leaders like Patel.
At the provincial level, the differences between cons­
titutionalists and agitators continued,with each side vying 
with the other to establish the superiority of its methods 
in resolving conflicts between the people and the ruling 
power. In rural Gujarat, the measures of their respective
strength was the degree to which they could safeguard pea- 
5
sant interests. Land revenue, its settlement, increases 
and reductions were all matters handled by the bureaucracy 
according to regulations. Constitutionalists in the Bombay 
Legislative Council had been demanding a review of these 
regulations and,pending such a review, had suggested that all 
settlements should cease. The Government of Bombay rejec­
ted such demands and paved the way for those who favoured 
agitation to display their strength in the one field in
which leaders could make much political capital - land reve- 
6nue.
The other front on which leaders like Patel felt threa­
tened was that of the socialists and communists. In the mid- 
1920s organised efforts were afoot to spread communism in
7
India and infuse socialism into the Congress. Both move­
ments caused concern to Congress leaders who were struggling 
hard to keep the organisation in their grip. Although socia­
lists' inroads were not of such magnitude as to cause general 
alarm, some areas were considered better targets than others.
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Bombay Province was particularly vulnerable to leftist pro-
g
paganda. Happily for Congress tbe Bombay Government was
equally concerned about 'the Communist problem1 and was ex-
9
ploring ways of acquiring powers to deal with it.
Within the Congress organisation some prominent leaders 
like Jawaharlal Nehru were actively propagating the adoption 
of a socialist creed for Congress. Their efforts led to 
resolutions being introduced at the Madras session of Cong­
ress in December 1927, in which several communists partici­
pated : S.A.Dange, Muzaffar Ahmed, S.V.Ghate, K.N.Joglekar, 
R.S.Nimbkar and Benjamin Spratt. Congress was criticised 
by leftists from now on for its 1middle class or babu poli­
tics' and urged to orient its policies solely towards the 
10masses.
Threats and drawbacks on one side and new opportunities 
on the other gave the no-changers a chance to show their 
organisational skill. A natural diaster helped in restoring 
some of the Congress's lost image and giving Patel a chance 
to show his acumen at speedy provincial mobilisation. In 
July 1927 Gujarat had very heavy rain resulting in floods. 
Ahmedabad, Baroda and other towns were affected. The worst 
hit area was Kaira district which experienced acute short­
ages of food and other supplies. Patel,who was still Presi­
dent of the Ahmedabad Municipality and of the Gujarat PCC, 
got to work immediately. The provincial workers that had 
helped in earlier satyagraha campaigns came forward and 
organised themselves in batches functioning from centres 
that had been set up by Patel to dispatch relief to the badly 
hit areas. With financial assistance from magnates in Ahme­
dabad and Bombay, Patel procured supplies and sent them to 
the trouble spots. After the floods resettlement of peasants 
was undertaken through existing Congress Committees. Employ­
ment, loans, medical facilities, shelter and seeds were all 
provided at subsidised rates. Gandhi offered to come and 
help. But Patel turned down his offer:
If you wish to give us an opportunity to show how well
we have learnt what you have taught us and how we are
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putting into practice the training that you have been 
giving to us for the past ten years, do not come. 11
Gandhi made appeals for funds through NaVaj ivan; for the 
rest, Patel managed the entire operation. Once again Gandhi 
commended him for organisation and service:
Shri Patel is a seasoned soldier and has no other 
occupation than that of service. He has got an 
efficient agency of workers under him. Donors need 
therefore have no fear of wasteful expenses or mis­
appropriation. 12
For Patel it was useful to be able to work in Gandhi*s name 
but without Gandhi*s active involvement. It gave him recog­
nition and enabled him to strengthen associations with pro­
vincial workers who in turn looked upon their repeated asso­
ciation with Patel as a good political investment. Along 
with Patel they too received due credit from the general 
Congress organisation and from Provincial and Central Legis­
latures for the training and discipline they had learnt under 
Gandhi's tutelage and Patel's direction. It must be remem­
bered that at a time when Provincial Congress workers and
£ISvolunteers in Gujarat were demoralised/a result of the sus­
pension of non-cooperation, activity that shone some lime­
light upon them was likely to be welcomed.
The Bardoli agitation thus had a political background 
that was as important as the particular issues and incidents 
of the movement. It was also not an isolated incident of 
protest against revenue increase. Some talukas of Kaira 
district were settled in 1923-24 and increases of 27 per­
cent in Borsad and 25 percent in Anand, and reductions of 
7 percent in Thasra and 8 percent in Nadiad and Kapadvanj, 
had been recommended. Protests had come in from several 
Kaira villages. This had opened up the age-old controversy 
about what is the best ground for determining land revenue -
rent or other considerations relating to profits and envi-
13ronmental changes and so on. In the 1920s this debate
was carried on by F.G.H.Anderson, the Revenue Settlement 
Commissioner of Bombay, who supported the theory of rental 
statistics, and H.L. Painter,the Commissioner of the Northern
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Division, the supporter of the theory of ’other considera­
tions’, the latter also being supported by R.M.Maxwell, the 
Collector of Kaira. Anderson and Painter were the two typi­
cal personifications of the support and rejection of the 
theory of rental statistics. This dispute among the offi­
cials also came into play in the Bardoli land revenue dis­
pute.
Bardoli taluka and Valod peta in the Surat district con­
tained 137 villages over an area of 222 square miles. The 
flat country in this area, traversed by three big rivers - 
Tapti, Purna and Mindhole - had a population of about 87,000 
most of whom were agriculturists. The expanse of flat land 
was interrupted only by the tributaries of the three rivers.
In fact, the rivers divided the entire area into three main 
compartments, the north, the middle and the south, without 
causing any physical differences between these divisions.
Soil differences existed between the eastern and western 
parts of the taluka and peta, the western half being endowed 
with rich black soil with an extraordinary capacity for 
moisture-retention. On the whole, the soil was fertile in 
the entire region which was also wooded with luxuriant mango 
groves. In the decades before the 1920s most of the culti­
vators had concentrated increasingly on cotton because it 
was a profitable crop involving low costs and minimal trou­
ble. Bagayat cultivation,requiring intensive labour and 
more money, was abandoned even at the cost of good wells 
lying idle. The cotton crop was also encouraged by adequate 
road and rail communication : Bardoli-Supa Road and Tapti 
Valley Railway improved connections with the trading centres, 
Bardoli and Navsari. There were local facilities, moreover, 
for ginning and pressing, at Bardoli, Madhi, Valod, Kanalchod 
and Buhari : the cotton was then exported because there was 
no local cotton mill. The area of land under cotton cultiva­
tion increased from 25,000 acres in 1894 to 40,099 in 1923-24. 
In contrast,the land under jowar, 27,554 acres in 1894,went 
down to 18,642 acres in 1923-24.^^
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The most hardworking and enterprising cultivators in 
the taluka were the Leva Kanbis CPatidars) and the Matias.
The land was cultivated by owners with the help of 'halis*.
The women folk of the Matias also helped in the field. The 
contrast between the fields of Kanbis and those of
Muslims and Kaliparaj was distinctly noticeable and was a 
result of the general unwillingness of the latter to work 
too hard. In Valod peta, Kaliparaj, Chodras, Brahmins and 
Muslims cultivated their fields.
The size of the holdings of agriculturists and calcula­
tions made on the basis of the family size and population 
and their standard of living gives some indication of the 
economic and social conditions in the taluka. Shirin Mehta
gives a detailed account of all these features in her book 
15on Bardoli. In a forthcoming article I have shown that the
section of the peasantry that was directly affected by the
increase in assessment was neither as numerically large nor
as economically destitute as the agitation made it out to be.
I have analysed the socio-economic nature of the taluka and
of Congress support to show exactly how far the Bardoli
16movement could be called a truly peasant movement. Existing 
literature on the subject differs in the emphasis it places 
on the basis for analysing the peasantry. Exclusive catego­
ries based on 1 class', modes of production or primordiality 
do not make the task of studying Indian peasant societies 
easier. Certain features of the Bardoli agitation are of
more importance here than quantitative details of the pea-
17santry which have been analysed by other writers.
The settlement that was due to be revised comprised 137 
government villages (one village less than in the earlier 
settlement because Chandraya village of Valod peta had been 
included in the village limits of Sikar). The factual deta­
ils of the ground on which the government enhanced the asse­
ssment and the arguments put forward by those who recommended 
the increase and the reasons given by the Committee appointed 
on behalf of the cultivators for rejecting the Government's 
recommendations are all recorded in the comprehensive accounts
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of the Bardoli satyagraha that have been written in English
jL8
and Gujarati, The broad facts of the case need to be 
recorded here, greater stress being laid on the movement and 
its political implications.
Proposals were submitted by Jayakar, the Assistant Set­
tlement Officer, for the second revision settlement of the 
area on 30 June 1925. The physical features of the taluka 
and peta and its general agricultural improvements were des­
cribed. Some of the conclusions reached about economic condi­
tions and change were similar to those already set out above. 
It was felt that the climate was healthy and the rain suffi­
cient, wealth had increased, roads had improved and conse­
quently the traders were more active than before. Prices 
of food grains had risen; cotton had become an increasingly 
better source of income for the agriculturists. Farmers 
owned more cattle and farm workers got better wages. Prices 
of land had risen and it was observed that the assessment 
represented a steadily decreasing proportion of the rent.
Most important of all, the price of the total products of 
the taluka represented a clear increase of 15,08,077 rupees 
over the price of the products during the previous settle­
ment. The Settlement Officer recommended an increase of 25 
per cent over the existing rates of assessment; twentythree 
villages were elevated to a higher group so that the total 
increase came to 30.59 per cent. The old assessment was 
Rs.5,14,762 and the new Rs.6,72,273.^
The Commissioner of Settlement, F.G.R. Anderson, dis­
agreed with much of what the Settlement Officer had said. He 
did not accept the groupings of the villages and made new 
ones based on the differences in sale and rental value bet­
ween dry crop and rice lands. In the Revenue Department 
resolution it was stated that Anderson had rejected Jayakarfs 
groupings because the latter ’had not taken sufficiently into 
account the statistics of sales and leases and rental values 
which he had collected*. In view of the great differences 
in the sale and rental values of dry crops and rice lands,
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the Commissioner of Settlements had proposed entirely differ-
2q
ent groupings for these two categories. Anderson recomme­
nded an increase of 29.03 per cent based on rental value {as 
against Jayakar’s idea of the gross value of produce), which, 
Anderson asserted, * is a fallacious starting point - for 
consideration of increased cost of production could nullify 
the whole argument . Therefore, settlement proposals based
on rental and not gross produce and prices are the required 
21thing*. The government finally recommended their own figu­
res, an increase of 21.97 per cent throughout the taluka,and 
passed orders on 19 July 1927 that the new rates should be 
introduced during the current revenue year 1926-27 and levied 
from the revenue year 1927-28, guaranteed for a period of 
thirty years. It was stated that all petitions to the con­
trary made by the people had been con adered and the order
22had been carefully looked into.
The Bardoli taluka Congress Committee appointed a sub­
committee to prepare a case for the peasants of Bardoli. It 
sought to answer the arguments for enhancement put forward 
by Jayakar and Anderson. It was stated that Bardoli had 
already paid enough in revenue for the rail and road bene­
fits. The factor of increase in population applied only to 
four or five villages that were trade-oriented and semi-urban 
and not rural. The people had more milch cattle than before 
in order to supplement the waning income from farming; plough 
cattle, moreover, had decreased. Other manifestations of 
good living, such as 'pucca houses’ and ’imported rice and 
refined sugar’ were all obtained by incurring debts with the 
sowkar.
The sub-committee conceded that there had been a rise 
in the prices of food grains, but contended that the figures 
were for abnormal years 1914-23. The people contended that 
Jayakar had not actually inspected the people’s representa­
tions or the actual facts contained therein. His report was 
based on statistics collected by talatis and,it was alleged, 
the economic conditions of the people had not formed part of
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tbe inquiry, Anderson, for kis part, had based his evalua­
tion on statistics of rent, but, the peopled committee sta­
ted, had used erroneous figures: a total of 42,923 acres 
subject to rent, though Jayakar had clearly asserted that in 
the taluka 23,995 out of 97,500 acres were in the hands of 
non-agriculturists and that more than two-thirds was in the 
hands of those who cultivated it. Government, moreover, had 
instructed Settlement Officers that statistics of rent were 
not to be used in deciding assessments unless they existed 
in considerable volume (Anderson maintained 42,923 acres was 
‘considerable*). Further,section 107 of the Land Revenue 
Code laid down that 1 profits of agriculture* should be the 
basis for fixing assessments. Having determined from Jaya­
kar *s inquiries (for he had made no attempt to discover net 
profits) that the profits of agriculture had increased by 
more than 20 per cent in Bardoli, the Government decided 
that the assessment should correspondingly increase by 21.97 
per cent.
The Taluka Congress Committee then appointed an enquiry 
committee to collect facts and figures from the farmers. It 
declared that they were not in a position to pay the existing 
rate of assessment let alone the enhanced rates, and that 
there had been no profit worth the name from the land. In 
September 1927, after the Government Resolution had finali­
sed the revision settlement, a conference was held in Bardoli 
under the presidentship of Babubhai Desai, Member of the Bom­
bay Legislative Council. It was decided that the people were 
not to pay the increase. Government, however, issued orders 
to the talatis to collect the new assessment from 5 February 
1928.
Kalyanji and Kunverji Mehta, the two brothers who in 
1921 had invited Gandhi to organise a civil disobedience 
movement in Bardoli and who had been working towards main­
taining a functioning organisation in the taluka, went to 
Vallabhbhai Patel, alongwith the Taluka Secretary, Kushalbhai , 
and asked him to lead the peasants in a no-tax campaign. 
Vallabhbhai was not inclined to interfere while Council
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members were involyed in helping the Bardoli agriculturists. 
He did not want any duplication in leadership and wanted peo­
ple to come with a second request. When the peasant leaders 
repeated their request Vallabhbhai set to work straightaway 
and called a conference of the agriculturists on 4 February 
1928, the day before the collection of the assessments was 
due. Representatives from seventy-nine villages attended; 
they included Patidars, Anavils, Kaliparaj, Parsis and Mus­
lims. There was vacillation among some who feared the con­
fiscation of their lands and thought it might be better 
to concede the old assessment and withhold the enhanced ass­
essment. At the end of the meeting most dissidents had been 
convinced that the taluka would have to think as one if any­
thing was to be achieved. They were given a week to give 
their final decision, while Patel communicated to the Govern­
ment, in Gandhian style, a last warning before starting the 
action. He suggested to Government to appoint an impartial 
tribunal, failing which he would be compelled to advise the 
people to refuse to pay the assessment and suffer the conse­
quences. In the first place, he pointed out, rent had been 
adopted as the basis of assessment - and this was erroneous. 
In the second place, the groupings of many villages had been 
altered so that these villages now came into a high assess­
ment category; and this was arbitrary. Moreover, all this 
had been done without giving the agriculturists notice. In 
the last week of July 1927, thirty-one villages had been 
served a notice to submit their objections within two months 
to what in reality was a final order passed on 19 July 1927 
to increase the assessment. The notice seems to have been a 
futile exercise of formality. The Government had already 
passed the final order on 19 July because in order to bring 
it into effect in the current revenue year, which is what 
the Government wanted, it had to be passed before 1 August.
To serve a notice inviting the public to submit objections
to an order that had already been irrevocably passed seemed
23to Patel both ridiculous and deceptive.
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On 12 February 1928, Vallabhbhai Patel met the agricul­
turists of Bardoli. Re had not had a satisfactory reply to 
his letter to the Government and now openly advised the far­
mers to * refuse payment of the entire assessment so long as
24the Government do not come to terms1. There seemed little 
point in delaying the decision because the government had not 
made the conciliatory gesture of suspending the collection of 
tax pending a decision on Vallabhbhai's letter. Vallabhbhai 
in the meantime went into the legalities of the matter and 
satisfied himself that apart from being iniquitous the orders 
of the Government were against the letter of the law. The 
requirement,that according to Section 107 of the Land Revenue 
Code notice must be served on agriculturists in the event of 
regrouping of villages two months before any order was passed, 
was blatantly violated by the Government. Thus,the opportu­
nity for representation had been deliberately denied to the 
people.
The following resolution was passed on 12 February 1928:
This conference of the people of Bardoli taluka resolves 
that the revision settlement in Bardoli...is arbitrary, 
unjust and oppresive, and advises all the occupants to 
refuse payment of the revised assessment in full until 
the Government is prepared to accept the amount of the 
old assessment in full satisfaction of their dues, or 
until the Government appoints an impartial tribunal to 
settle the whole question of revision by investigation 
and inquiry on the spot. 25
Vallabhbhai particularly impressed two things on the peoples' 
minds: (1) that the Government would attempt to divide their 
ranks, a move which they must resist to the best of their abi­
lity and (2) that the Government would first strike at the 
leaders and confiscate the best lands so that if the most 
influential men succumbed the rest would yield sooner or
2 6later. The people were advised to be wary of such a move.
On no account was it a smooth sailing campaign. There 
were indications that the leaders were more keen to carry 
through the campaign than the people. There was lack of co­
hesion among the different communities and within each com- 
27munity. Patidars as a community tended to act together,
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often to distinguish themselves as a class of superior peo­
ple, If a few superior Patidars acted one way then all 
others would do likewise to demonstrate their high status. 
This, incidentally, made for greater solidarity among them.
* Solidarity seeking1 has been described as an inherent trait
of Patidars - a trait that has been directed successfully
28into political channels. Vanias, on the other hand, felt 
that they had much at stake financially in the land and in 
the crops trade; some also had social relations with Govern­
ment officials and could be embarrassed by the consequences 
of non-payment. They were, therefore, prone to be weak in 
such a campaign, and likely to act independently rather than 
as a community. Dublas, who accounted for about half the 
population of the taluka and were the debtors and workers 
for the monied communities, had no direct reason to fight; 
some of them were likely to follow their creditors or masters 
in their attitude to the campaign. Anavil Brahmins, described 
as *proud and defiant*, had not joined at the initial stages
and their calculating nature made them hesitate until the cam-
29paign was in full swing. Parsis too had been cool and the 
Muslims had been lukewarm in their attitude at the beginning. 
Mohanlal Pandya, the man who had shown enterprise during the 
Kaira campaign, seemed much less hopeful at the time of the 
Bardoli campaign. In a letter to Vallabhbhai written after 
reconnoitring the taluka, he said:
No one seems to me to be in fighting trim. They are 
going about their business as though nothing had hap­
pened....! do not despair, but let us not overrate 
our strength. 30
Patel made a mental note of all these weaknesses of the 
taluka and then set out to base the campaign on what he knew 
to be the strength of the taluka. He did not think that 
pious platitudes would make anyone change his mind. He tried 
to exert some social pressure on the villagers. Four centres 
had already been set up in the taluka with - influential 
persons in charge - at Bardoli in the centre with Kalyanji 
Jugatram and Kushalbhai, at Sarbhon in the south-west with
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Dr. Tribuvandas, at Modhi. tn the nor tlx with. Makbanji Desai, 
and at Vedchchi in the east with. Chunilal Mehta and his wife. 
In areas where influential Vanias and Patidars counted for 
something among the population, Patel set up centres so that 
the influential people of each area could be prevailed upon 
to help the campaign and their exemplary action would persu­
ade the rest of the people in the area to follow suit. Valodt 
the Mahal headquarters, and Bahari in the south-east were 
Vania strongholds. Vankaner in the heart of the taluka and 
Vared and Bamni in the north , were Patidar strongholds. The 
Raniparaj areas of Valod and Buhari were put in the care of
Dr.Chandulal, and Abbas Tyabji and Imam Saheb Abdul Kadar
31Bavazir took charge of the Muslims.
The key words in Patel's speeches were 'organisation' 
and 'discipline', and as stated above, he did little moral 
sermonising. The arrangements were modelled on the army. 
Urging villagers to organise he directed them to send daily 
bulletins to headquarters punctually and follow all instruc­
tions from headquarters accurately. Warning them to beware 
of those patels and talatis who would betray them to the
Government, Patel asked them to close their ranks and not to
32let Government cause a breach. The emphasis on organisa­
tion continued throughout Patel's political career. As he 
became more and more prominent in the party machine he ins­
tilled into his colleagues and subordinates the necessity 
of discipline in organisation.
The Government of Bombay was quite baffled by the 
Bardoli land revenue agitation. It blamed the Collector of 
Surat who in turn blamed the lower officials:
It is very evident that on the first warning given to 
the Collector that there is likely to be any possible 
trouble about the payment of the revised assessment, 
the Collector should take immediate action.... 33
The inadequacy of the existing law in dealing with a campaign 
like the one at Bardoli was felt again and again. Only the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, could be used to declare 
illegal any association that was planning such a campaign.
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The Governor sent a plea to the Kome Department at the Centre
to devise ways and means of making the organisation illegal.
The Viceroy, however, considered the law existing under the
34Criminal Law Amendment Act sufficient for the purpose. The
Secretary of State seems to have urged the use of firm and
early action in a Bardoli -type situation and,on the basis
of Leslie Wilson*s C Governor of Bombay ) dissatisfaction
with the existing laws to deal with the satyagraha, suggested
35that the matter be studied Comprehensively*.
Government expected the satyagraha to fizzle out by
the end of May 1928 when lands would be put up for sale and
the threat of new buyers would bring the present owners to
their senses. Government was refusing an inquiry because
they feared that Vallabhbhai would follow up his success in
36Bardoli with agitations for other settlements. In March, 
the Government issued a Press Note announcing the reduction 
of a considerable number of villages in Bardoli taluka and 
Valod Mahal to a lower group which would result in a reduc­
tion in their rates. The Land Records Staff had also been 
directed to investigate the question of reclassification of 
soil in several villages where deterioration had occurred
due to erosion. Patel was requested to reconsider the posi-
37tion in the light of the above facts. But Patel did not
yield. The 12thof June was observed as *Bardoli Day*. In
Bombay all the markets were closed, Marwari Bazar, Moti
Bazar, cloth markets, grain markets, jewellery shops, Mar-
wadi Chamber of Commerce, cotton markets, commission agency
firms and all other commercial concerns had closed for busi- 
38ness. In other provinces too Bardoli day was observed by
speeches being given to congratulate Patel on his courage-
39ous stand and by the collection of funds. Soon the reper­
cussions of the agitation had widened and Bardoli was recei­
ving support from outside.
By April,eight members of the Bombay Legislative Council
from Gujarat had tendered their resignations to the Govern- 
40ment. In June,K„M0Munshi, who had been carrying on a cor­
respondence with Government on the subject, resigned. Gradu-
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ally, most prominent citizens of Bombay had pledged their sup­
port to the cause. Constitutionalists had also taken a stand 
In the matter. Other eminent men in other organisations be­
gan to express strong opinions from various stand points. 
Purshotamdas Thakurdas, H.N.Kunzru, Motilal Nehru, Tej Baha­
dur Sapru and others urged the holding of an enquiry into 
the matter. Purshotamdas Thakurdas tried to bring to Patel*s 
notice that there was no indication that Government would 
* descend from their Olympian heights* and he hoped that 
Patel would not push the people too far in their sufferings. 
Patel assured him that contrary to what Thakurdas had heard 
in Surat:
My own opinion of the people*s temper is that they are 
out for suffering to the uttermost rather than surren­
der the principle for which they have upto now bravely 
stood up....We can wait as long as Government want to 
41
Support among prominent people outside Bardoli presented an 
attractive prospect for Patel of securing a position in wider 
areas, thus providing that vital link between the provincial 
and the national.
The pragmatist in Patel looked for an opportunity to
avoid stalemate rather than take a stance and obtain nothing.
Sumant Mehta, an active leftist Congressman from Gujarat,
wrote of Patel's strategy in Bardoli at the beginning of
42June: *He knows when to negotiate and on what terms’. By 
the middle of June mediating parties had taken Patel’s per­
mission to make some attempts towards a compromise. Pursho­
tamdas Thakurdas, Lalji Naranjee and H.P.Modi corresponded 
with and met the Governor to negotiate terms for a settle­
ment. Patel made visits to Bombay in this connection and 
although he seemed anxious to arrive at an honourable settle­
ment, he was equally anxious to conceal his desire for a 
settlement. Yet, a mellowing in his attitude was discernible. 
He wanted to settle the matter before the peasants showed 
signs of weakness. Their trial of strength had already wea­
kened them considerably. It was better to call a halt before
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they showed signs of further weakness. At a meeting in 
Bombay on 4 July, Patel said:
I guarantee that if there is a change of heart on the 
part of the Government and if they grant the humble 
request which peasants of Bardoli are making, the pea­
sants will pay their assessment dues in 24 hours. 43
By mid-July 1928, developments brought Vallabhbhai Patel 
and the Governor face to face. While the Governor went to 
Simla on 13 July to see the Viceroy and discuss the situation 
with him, Vallabhbhai addressed a large District Congress at 
Ahmedabad. At the Congress he laid emphasis on the fact that 
the demand of the peasants was only for a re-enquiry. This 
was not a political movement. He was not a politician - he 
had cleared the gutters of Ahmedabad. It was clarified at 
this Congress by N.C.Kelkar that Vallabhbhai Patel was the 
only accredited representative of the peasantry of Bardoli 
and the Governor would be well advised to treat him as such. 
The Governor sent for Patel to meet him at Surat where he 
was due to arrive on 18 July. Talks were held between the 
Governor, his advisers and twelve satyagrahis. The Governor 
promised an enquiry into the alleged errors of official cal­
culation provided the old assessment was paid up and the dif­
ference between the old and the enhanced assessment was depo­
sited with the Government by a third party until the results 
of the inquiry were known. The immediate payment of the old 
assessment and the calling off of the movement were conditions
that had to be fulfilled before the Government made any move
44on its part. Patel found the Governor’s offer inadequate. 
However, he did not want to lo^se the opportunity for a settle­
ment. Aware of his own strength as well as the Governor's 
weaknesses, he clarified his point about the nature of the 
inquiry:
Let me, however, clear one point. I have never asked 
for nor do 1 ask for an unofficial inquiry in the sense 
thatjjshould be unconnected with or uncontrolled by the 
Government. I would be satisfied with an official in­
quiry committee in the selection of whose personnel the 
people have adequate representation and which should be 
open, impartial and therefore of a judicial nature. 45
As Patel's attitude mellowed, the Government stiffened its
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posture. In his address to the Legislative Council on 23 
July, the Governor, while promising *a lull, open and inde­
pendent inquiry* upon payment of the revenue and cessation 
of the movement, also gave an ultimatum addressed through
46the Surat members of the Council to their constituencies.
The role of the Council members needs to be discussed 
at some length to determine both Patel*s and the Government*s 
motive in giving the members the attention they did. Gover­
nment announcements of May and July on Bardoli were designed 
to create a favourable atmosphere for the passage of the two 
Bills that were due to be introduced in the Bombay Legisla­
ture in the next session. The idea was to placate those 
members in the Council who were interested in the settlement 
of Bardoli, and thereby ensure the smooth passage of the 
Small Holdings Bill and the Land Revenue Code Amendment Bill. 
Non-Brahmins as a group in the Legislature were opposed to 
the former bill. Non-Brahmins generally were also supporting 
the Bardoli movement. The idea was to appease them and get 
their support. Also, if Bardoli could be settled the Gujarat 
members, who had resigned, could be won over. Patel’s atti­
tude to the Council members concerned was a mixed one. For 
some time he had been opposed to Council members meddling 
in his affairs. Patel’s resentment of Council members' 
interference in his personalised campaigns had been expre­
ssed more than once. Apart from criticism of Chunilal Mehta 
for suggesting institutional remedies without actually coming 
to Bardoli, Patel had also attacked Council members earlier 
for interference in his work at the time of the Gujarat 
floods. Chunilal Mehta defended himself thus:
One word more as to the remark you have made that I 
have not been to Bardoli...you are perhaps aware that 
this is not my department....Besides, I had enough 
experience of unpleasantness from both sides in conne­
ction with the Gujarat floods. You have probably not 
forgotten that when without your invitation, I went 
on my own accord to see you gentlemen at Anand, at the 
commencement the language of both Mr.Abbas Tyabji and 
your goodself, though I am sure it was not meant, came 
very near to insult. 47
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There was a general Reeling that Patel looked upon 'Bardoli* 
as his 'show1.
In June, Patel had tried to counteract Government's move 
and the Council members' role in the Bardoli movement. He 
had instructed Gangadharrao Deshpande, the Karnatak PCC Pre­
sident, to explore the possibilities of resignations of Kar­
natak Council members. Gangadharrao Deshpande's feedback 
from the area was not very favourable. Of the six councill­
ors three were prepared to resign; two non-Brahmins who were
title holders and one large landowner were not prepared to 
48resign. Vallabhbhai's rapport with the Council Members 
(except those of Gujarat) was, therefore, negligible.
The matter was further complicated by the fact that 
Chunilal Mehta (the Finance Member) was sponsoring the Small 
Holdings Bill. He was also sponsoring a resolution in the 
Council for the appointment of a committee to assist the Simon 
Commission which Congress had decided to boycott. His ini­
tiative in seeking a resolution of the Bardoli question was
directly related to enhancing his reputation in the Council
49in the light of the two resolutions he had sponsored.
By early August, Patel could not take too negative an 
attitude to the moves made by the Council Members towards a 
settlement of the Bardoli issue. Apart from the reports 
sent by Gangadharrao Deshpande, K.M.Munshi's inquiry among 
Council Members and his meeting with the Governor also rev­
ealed that progress towards a solution was only possible 
with the involvement of the Council Members in some negotia­
tions with the Governor. The Governor had ruled out direct
negotiations between himself and Vallabhbhai Patel or any of
50Patel's spokesmen. Surat members were required to give 
an unconditional undertaking that the revised assessment 
would be paid (even if the difference was obtained from their 
own agencies). Then and then alone would Government look 
into cases of reinstatement of talatis and patels or the 
return of the confiscated lands and property and other mat­
ters. Council members seemed willing to compromise and were
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prepared to pay the difference from private sources. While 
writing disparagingly of the Council Members1 compromising 
attitude and flattering Patel by repeated remarks about the 
mobility of the movement, Munshi did betray a certain uncer­
tainty about where he stood, in this remark:
I may be wrong but I somehow cannot reconcile the 
courage and the mobility with which you have condu­
cted the movement and our Council Members* utteran­
ces and resignations with the efforts which some of 
us are now making to accommodate ourselves to the 
ultimatum delivered. I may however assure you that 
if no compromise is made, the consequence to you and 
to Gujarat will be terrible as the movement is likely 
to be dealt with as a rebellion. 51
Secretly, he too hoped for a quick compromise.
The Surat Members* letter to the Revenue Member, Rieu, 
was vague and unspecific but, Chunilal Mehta insisted that 
that was in fact the virtue of the letter, that there were no 
specific commitments on the part of the satyagrahis, and yet 
it still communicated a gesture of good-will to the Govern­
ment. Patel felt disinclined to accept the terms of the 
commitment. He wanted Mehta to make the conditions of the 
satyagrahis more specifically known to the Government. Mehta 
indicated that all Government really wanted was to retain its 
prestige and, therefore, if a vague communique like the one 
being sent gave the feeling and did not betray the trust and 
self-respect of the satyagrahis, it should not worry Patel.
The latter did,however, insist on the announcement of the in­
quiry being made immediately after the letter from the Surat 
members to the Revenue Member regarding the reinstatement of 
talatis, restoration of lands and release of prisoners.
The settlement was thus made with an emphasis on the 
spirit rather than the letter of the issue. It must be added, 
however, that throughout the campaign Patel gave priority to 
the institution of a full, open and independent inquiry in 
any settlement. This he did achieve in the end. Earlier 
attempts had not procured this:
The Surat Statement contemplates a very limited in­
quiry to be conducted by a Revenue Officer assisted
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by a Judicial Office** to investigate 'errors of calcu­
lation and fact1^ and a totally different tiling from a 
'full , open and independent inquiry*. I hope there­
fore that undeterred by the threats contained in the 
Government’s deliverance, public opinion will concen­
trate only on the one point that I have mentioned. 52
When the resolution of the Governor in Council instituted 
an inquiry into the revision settlement of Bardoli on 18 
October 1928, it was clearly stated in Clause 3 of the reso­
lution :
As the inquiry is to be full, open and independent, 
the persons interested should be allowed to lead as 
well as to present evidence before the officers with 
the help of their representatives including legal 
advisers. 53
The financial result of the inquiry led by R.S.Broom­
field and R.M.Maxwell was a net total increase of Rs.30,806 
or 6 per cent over the old assessment of Bardoli taluka and 
of Rs.17,842 or 5.24 per cent of Chorasi taluka, compared 
with the second revision settlements as sanctioned, for which
the latest figures were a total of Rs.6,30,650 in Bardoli
54and Rs.4,07,965 in Chorasi respectively. In the two talukas 
together, therefore, whereas the second revision settlement 
imposed an increase of Rs.1,87,492 or 22 per cent, the 
Broomfield Maxwell proposal resulted in an increase of 48,648 
or 5.7.per cent only.
In arriving at their proposals Broomfield-Maxwell made 
it clear that Jayakar and Anderson in making their proposals 
regarding the second revision settlement did have regard for 
the 'profits of agriculture1, a stipulation laid down in 
Section 107 of the Land Revenue Code:
In revising assessments of land revenue regard shall 
be had to the value of the land and in the case of 
land used for the purpose of agriculture to the pro­
fits of agriculture. 55
But their actual estimates of what the profits of agriculture 
were likely to be during the period provided for may have 
been wrong. In Broomfield and Maxwell's opinion they were 
'unduly high'.
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But to misread the evidence, or to he misled hy faulty 
evidence is a very different thing from acting contrary 
to the law, 56
The settlement also represented a victory for one element in 
government circles which had always argued in favour of pro­
fits and 'other considerations1 as opposed to rental value.
It is interesting to note that conflicts within government 
often took a vital dimension in these controversies and gave 
the lie to any notions that nationalists had about a monoli­
thic imperialist adversary. While thus safeguarding the 
prestige of the Revenue Officers responsible for the Second 
Revision Settlement figures*the report did, however, reduce 
the increase in assessment substantially and above all con­
ducted the inquiry according to the demands of Vallabhbhai 
Patel. Bhulabhai Desai and Patel were also present during
the proceedings. K.M.Munshi had been carrying on the inquiry
57instituted by the Indian constitutionalists. That too had 
some effect on the spirit and thoroughness with which the 
officers conducted their inquiry. The Broomfield-Maxwell 
report was published on 13 May 1929 and Patel gracefully 
acknowledged the credit that was due to the Government, cla­
rifying at the same time that he would wait to see if gover-
58nment had learnt something from the whole incident.
Politically, the agitation was a victory for Patel, except 
that he had not managed without the help of constitutionalists. 
The conduct of the campaign gave Patel considerable prestige 
amongst the agriculturists. Gandhi had not established dir­
ect relationships with the farmers of Gujarat. Patel's rela­
tionship was primarily with particular sections of the pea­
santry (Patidars) or with local leaders, who in turn had links 
with particular sections of the peasant groups. It will be 
observed later that Patel had the edge over socialists in 
the 1930s in areas like Gujarat for just this reason. He 
had worked so intensively with leading peasants in Gujarat 
and with local leaders, that outside forces just could not 
penetrate his network.
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There are two contentions ahgut Bardoli that need reex­
amination, One is the assertion that all castes and classes
59of agriculturists participated in the Bardoli agitation.
In fact this was not really so. Some facts about who supp­
orted it and who did not and why have already been mentioned 
on pp. 79-83 . The main basis on which it is called a 
successful peasant agitation is the participation of the 
Kaliparaj (called 'Raniparaj' by Gandhi, as untouchables 
were called Harijans to elevate their otherwise lowly status). 
The presence of the Raniparaj at meetings called in particu­
lar villages of Surat is no indication of their role in the 
movement itself. The conversion of tribals and other ostra­
cized sections of people in Surat to Gandhiism was brought 
about as a result of factors that had little to do with land 
revenue agitations or similar satyagraha. First of all,the 
Bhakti movement and social reformers like Arya Samajists had 
tried to end the isolation of the tribals and landless in the 
19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Later, during the 
first non-cooperation movement, Gandhi had tried to encourage 
his workers to tap Adivasi support. Kunverji Mehta tried to 
influence them in their own idiom but no full-scale Gandhian 
propaganda was carried out to begin with. After the suspen­
sion of the first proposed Bardoli movement in 1922,the Bar­
doli Ashram was set up and Gandhian influence was sought to 
be widened through khadi activity. Jiwanbhai Bababhai Chau- 
dhri and Gomjibhai Lalbhai Chaudhri of Vedchchi village ( a 
predominantly tribal village of Valod) asked leaders of the 
Bardoli Ashram to set up spinning centres in their area.
This task was assigned to Chunilal Mehta and Keshavbhai 
60Patel. Adivasis themselves also initiated reform move-
61ments in their own communities and in their own idiom.
Jugatram Dave then took on the work among the Raniparaj. 
In 1924fthe Second Raniparaj Conference held at Vedchhi bro­
ught out Adivasis in large numbers. Khadi work spread rapidly 
from 1925-27 and provided work for many idle hands. During 
the Bardoli satyagraha Raniparaj attended meetings held in 
and around their village because Gandhian workers called
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them. Their active involvement in propaganda, resistance 
and arrests in the Bardoli satyagraha was negligible and 
certainly there was no political inclination among their lea­
ders. Later, Jugatram Dave set up a Raniparaj Vidyalaya in 
Valod in 1929 and an Adivasi donated 12 acres of land for i?? 
A centre for basic education was also set up. But the 
socio-economic activity led to no political activism. In 
fact from a recent study of Valod*s rural development one 
gathers that as a result of the lack of activity among such 
areas and peoples, patterns of land ownership have not chan­
ged even during the post-independence period, marginal far­
mers having lost land to middle or rich farmers and joined
6 3the ranks of landless labourers. The Bardoli movement too 
was purely one which in numerical terms benefited and was 
supported mostly by the 6 to 25 acre group of landowners.
One can tell something of the socio-economic background of 
some of Gandhi’s supporters^in Surat and Bardoli in particu­
lar, from a list of the names of those who rendered Gandhi 
assistance (mainly financial). Many had gone to South Africa 
and East Africa. Some stayed there and sent financial assis­
tance. Some who had returned also supported the satyagraha.
On these, on Patel*s trainees from Kaira and on those who 
had kept a Congress organisation active in Bardoli since 1921 
(like the Mehta brothers) depended the success of the campaign
through the support of the dominant groups like Patidars and
1 +■ 17 • 6 4later Vanias.
Related to this point about the socio-economic nature 
of the support on which the campaign was based is a second 
point about Bardoli that needs reexamination - the attitudes 
of the participants in the satyagraha. A critical account 
of the nature of support clarifies only some of the confusion 
over the reasons that led to the agitation. The extensive 
controversy over the middle peasant thesis has been discu­
ssed elsewhere and briefly mentioned in my forthcoming arti- 
65cle. What is important in the present context is not sim­
ply who supported the campaign but why was it embarked upon. 
Explanations for the agitation have been ranged between
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1 short term and narrowly economic reasons* and * long term 
and political reasons*, While reiterating that the pea­
sants of Gujarat were not a passive docile lot that could 
easily be led in a campaign, it must be added that details 
of the conduct of the campaign do give the impression that 
the peasants (rich,middle and poor), did not have very strong 
reasons to initiate the campaign. It has been demonstrated 
how the Bardoli agitation (in its full and comprehensive 
form) was politically inspired by leaders. The reasons for 
which it was supported by the differentiated peasantry were 
not economic (1) because each peasant category had different 
interests to safeguard and (2) the accruing benefits were 
more socio-political than economic. In a study of three 
satyagraha campaigns, A.W.Nakhre brings to light the attitudes 
of satyagrahis, both leaders and rank and file,with particu­
lar emphasis on the use of non-violence. Having located 45 
original participants Wakhre shows that contrary to widely- 
held beliefs, the rank and file participator was more dedi­
cated to the Gandhian method of satyagraha through non-viol­
ence than the sub-leaders, who looked upon the movement and 
participated in it as a 'purely pragmatic' exercise. The 
sub-leaders and many of the rank and file participants were 
young, elitist and of comfortable economic status and looked
to the satyagraha as a medium through which some kind of
67power could be obtained. It might be mentioned here that 
rank and file here does not mean those lower in the economic 
or social strata. It simply means ordinary supporters as 
opposed to those assigned leadership positions. Power is 
defined here both as a vehicle of control over others and as 
a moral phenomenon.
In the ultimate analysis it would be more accurate to 
say that the Bardoli agitation was not intended as a peasant 
movement per se„ It was an agitation geared towards politi­
cization and political mobilisation in separate ways, of 
particular sections of the peasantry for political purposes 
and designs. The linking of local grievances with national 
politics seemed the most expedient way of extending the Gan-
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dhian hold over the different axeasi, Even if aome. Dhpxalas, 
Dublas and other backward groups supported Patldar landowners, 
the fact that no changes in the structure of social and eco­
nomic relations between Patidar landowners and poor peasants 
was intended or achieved surely disqualifies the Bardoli sat­
yagraha from being labelled a peasant movement. The backward 
classes were in fact encouraged to preserve the status quo. 
Curiously, the ’weapon* of non-violence, supposedly intended 
to strengthen the weaker sections of society, actually dis­
armed them and exposed them to greater exploitation by those 
who could manipulate them for their own ends. Patel had no 
commitment to non-violence; he adhered to it and discarded 
it at his convenience. In the 1920s and 30s when Congress 
was in the process of ascending, Patel considered non-violence 
useful in keeping control over wide-spread movements. In the 
1940s when Congress was strong and entrenched,he was willing 
to use violence against rivals and opponents. In Patel*s 
hand non-violence and other Gandhian methods were tools to 
be used for wider political goals. Peasants, either as one 
or many, would not derive enough economic benefit from the 
agitations to compensate the loss of lands or movable pro­
perty that would result from supporting the agitation. Poli­
tical influence or recognition might compensate the loss or 
threat to property that would accompany participation in a 
land revenue agitation.
Dhanagare sees * tension management* as one of the signi­
ficant features of Gandhian programmes intended for the up-
68liftment of the masses. Gandhian ventures also seem to 
have inculcated self-confidence in a people that had hitherto 
been suppressed socially and economically. In return for a 
life of simplicity, sacrifice and service they got recognition 
and acclaim. Patel benefited greatly from this situation of 
mutual advantage. He had at his disposal a * reservoir* of 
supporters and volunteers that came in use from time to time 
when a show of strength had to be made. His responsibility 
was to see that these supporters were rewarded directly or 
indirectly. In making the 'confiscated lands' matter a big
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issue or personally dealing with the selection of candidates 
at election time, Patel discharged those debts he incurred 
when he needed support. In the post-Bardoli period, Patel 
also intensified his political calculations and bargaining 
power to meet the new situation.
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CHAPTER III 
EMERGENCE ON THE NATIONAL SCENE 1928-1934
The laurels obtained during the Bardoli satyagraha secu­
red for Patel considerable political power and a distinguished 
place among the national leaders of the time, a place which 
he retained till the end of his life. With the title of 'Sar- 
dar1 conferred on him by the people of Gujarat, Patel moved 
on to a role that required fuller participation on the natio­
nal scene.
The period after Bardoli was one of severe difficulty 
for the Congress and its leadership. The fairly united pro­
test over the appointment of the Simon Commission was followed 
by differences over the goals of Congress, which were now 
being disputed by socialists and radicals who wanted to give 
the Government an immediate ultimatum. Dominion status, 
acceptable to some, was vehemently opposed by those who would 
not settle for anything less than independence. The quarrel 
between the changers and no-changers could not be resolved. 
Vallabhbhai Patel's background favoured a rural conservatism 
as opposed to Motilal Nehru's urban middle class conservatism. 
The latter formed a vital part of 'moderate opinion' which 
the British sought to 'detach' from the 'artificial anti­
government unity' that had been forged among Indian politi­
cians in the wake of Viscount Simon's visit.^ Patel was 
a moderate of a very different brand. He was not in favour 
of winds of change turning into a storm that would blow 
through the countryside (in his case Gujarat), and disrupt 
the areas and groups and his own support. It was far better 
in his view to strengthen the powers of the countryside in 
a smooth unobtrusive way whereby interests of the different 
groups would be taken care of by their spokesmen who would 
nurture their own areas of interest and influence and also 
enhance the prestige of particular groups with which they 
had some socio-economic affinity, than to allow a clean 
sweep by egalitarians who would, in his opinion, make no sub­
stantial political advancement in the diversified social and
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political set-up of the Provinces. He had already expressed 
his disapproval of the Independence Resolution at Lahore in 
December 1929 on the grounds that it went against the spirit 
of the Calcutta resolution, which had accepted Gandhi1s com­
promise. Subhas Bose referred to all these differences as
*the fundamental cleavage between the elder school and the
2
new school of thought*.
By 1928-29 Gandhi had established himself as the undis­
puted *guru* in Congress and any individual or group that 
wanted to forge ahead in the party at the national level 
clearly needed Gandhi*s blessings to do so. As a result, up- 
and-coming provincial leaders vied with such other for first 
place in Gandhi*s eyes. The competition was usually healthy 
but often caused rivalries that were exacerbated in times of 
political crises and burrowed deeper and deeper with every 
major political development. Patel’s rivalry with Jawaharlal 
Nehru was one such example of a relationship that became 
worse because of their common and close links with Gandhi. 
Gandhi took Vallabhbhai for granted though he needed him even 
in his own province, Gujarat, having no rural roots there 
himself. The Nehrus too were necessary for they were Gandhi’s 
best link with the liberal, middleclass and intellectual world. 
Gandhi was somewhat overawed by them and, when it came to 
making choices, on one or two occasions, Gandhi blatantly 
opted for the Nehrus, and Patel had every reason to feel 
slighted.
The elections of the President of the Indian National 
Congress in the years 192 8 and 1929 were two occasions when 
Gandhi exercised his prerogative in favour of the Nehrus.
Patel was the victim who dared not protest. In 1927 too 
Patel had been considered a good choice for Congress Presi­
dent but, second to Jawaharlal Nehru, who was regarded as the
3
best by Motilal and Gandhi. That year Dr.Ansari was offered 
the Presidency as part of the strategy to appease the Mus­
lims. In 1928, Patel*s name featured again, this time against 
Motilal Nehru, but the latter was unwilling to accept. The 
youth of the country wanted Jawaharlal Nehru. However, at
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this juncture the leftists and young radicals were still 
gathering strength and could be disregarded in favour of 
the rightists whose influence and weight in provinces like 
Bengal was a deciding factor in determining the choice of 
President. Motilal Nehru was acceptable to this section of 
Congress. So was Patel. Gandhi, however, backed Motilal, 
and Patel surrendered to the Mahatma's will. In 1929, Patel 
was pitched against Jawaharlal Nehru. This time the Presi­
dency was strategically important. The Congress ultimatum 
to Government was due to expire around the time of the ses­
sion of the Congress and a negative reaction on the part of 
the Government portended a massive campaign on the part of 
the Congress. In the light of this struggle it was not easy 
to decide who might be more suitable as President. Jawahar­
lal Nehru had, by then, developed a massive following among 
the young intellectuals and his revolutionary ideas were 
shared increasingly by thousands inside and outside Congress 
who thus formed a new pressure group that defied party boun­
daries. Patel, on the other hand, had become the great or­
ganiser of the party machine at least in Gujarat and that was 
of immense value if a mass movement had to be conducted with 
a new intensity. If Gandhi had let it be a straight fight 
between Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru, the former would have 
emerged victorious. Gandhi too, was in demand in ten out of 
eighteen provinces. Of the other, five had recommended Patel 
and three Jawaharlal. When Gandhi opted out, he asked Patel 
to do likewise, thus ensuring that Jawaharlal was elected 
unopposed. If Gandhi had not put pressure on Patel to step 
down, most of the provinces that had backed Gandhi would 
probably have shifted their support to Vallabhbhai, for 
Congress was dominated by right-wing provincial leaders to 
whom Patel was more acceptable than Jawaharlal. There was 
a host of reasons why Gandhi considered Jawaharlal Nehru 
more suitable for the Presidency. Jawaharlal appealed to 
the young, to intellectuals and to the masses; and he was 
more acceptable than Patel to the Muslims. If Nehru ever 
got carried away?which he did, Gandhi and Patel, who worked
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as a team, would put sufficient pressure to keep him in 
check. In the case of Patel, Gandhi was confident of his 
steadfastness and approved of his style, which by now was 
quite set; he also believed he could rely on Patel. That 
was no comfort for Patel and in later years he made his 
bitterness quite apparent.
By 1929, Vallabhbhai Patel*s political style was well 
defined. That he was primarily interested in the political 
as opposed to the socio-economic was also clear. Patel had 
come to national politics via the province and his power lay 
in retaining that provincial link. He kept that link out of 
expediency and necessity. National political activity often 
changed according to prevailing British policy. The province 
was the only area with some degree of constancy. Building a 
provincial base could never go wrong,whether the Congress 
was agitating or participating or negotiating. Moreover, 
Patel*s political stature at this juncture was not that of 
a giant. His social background, education and life style 
all catered for a modest and moderate style of politics. 
Plodding persistently and showing concrete results he inten­
ded to make himself indispensable to the Congress organisa­
tion in particular and to politics in general.
Thus, even though Bardoli gave him the status of a natio­
nal leader, in the post-Bardoli period Vallabhbhai made 
fewer speeches on the national stage than on the local and 
provincial. He was less preoccupied with larger and general 
issues than with specific, limited ones. He was President 
of a society formed in Surat district and the neighbouring 
Indian States to combat the evil of intoxicating drinks. The 
Parsi community had a special stake in resisting Congress 
propaganda on the subject of prohibition and the system of 
free or cheap labour that Parsi landowners enforced. In 
encouraging the Raniparaj and Koli communities in the area 
Vallabhbhai said that they should resist harassment and ill- 
treatment by employers 'even if you have to attack your opp- 
nents'. However, he also assured the Parsi landowners and 
liquor merchants that he would be presiding over the seventh
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Raniparaj Conference to be held on 25 April 1929 at Unai in
Surat district, and that he would look into all instances of
4
harassment of Parsis. Patel*s brand of political consolida­
tion was always in keeping with his conservative spirit.
In matters pertaining to land he claimed special exper­
tise. It has already been indicated that he asserted more 
than once that slogan-shouting did not make the young revo­
lutionaries the spokesmen of the peasantry. The problems of 
those who lived by the land could best be grasped by those 
who had lived with them, and he considered himself better 
equipped than most over such questions like the assessment
5
and remission of land revenue and the role of officials.
On 23 July 1929, a representative conference was held with
Patel as President and a body called the Land League was 
0
inaugurated. Patel*s concerted efforts to maintain strong
links with particular sections of agriculturists were the 
more necessary at this stage in order to counter the increa­
sing interests of socialists in the countryside. Some wes­
tern papers believed that he regarded himself as the * Local
7
Lenin*. Such a title would have been anathema to him. He 
sneered at the self-styled leaders of the peasant revolution:
First show that you have ability and the strength to 
carry out a revolution before you shout victory to 
revolution. What is the good of asking others to g 
shout victory for something which is not in existence?
The 1930 civil disobedience movement was Congress*s 
answer to the political stresses and strains both within and 
outside the party. The year 1929 had been difficult, with 
socialists, extremists and moderates pulling their own ways. 
Socialists and left-wing organisations were demanding a change 
in the economic and social structure of the country. Particu­
lar pressures from the left wing in the form of trade union 
demands or the clamour of leaders like Subhas Bose and his 
followers, all had to be accommodated in the next move of 
the Congress. The fact that civil disobedience was decided 
upon was no indication that extremists had won the day. Cong­
ress was, as always, a conservative body, even when its
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declared aims sounded radical. Non-cooperation was designed 
to achieve moderate political goals and Congress had no in­
tention of altering the basic social structure of the coun­
try. It is relevant in this context that Gandhi*s master 
move, the spectacular march to Dandi to manufacture salt from
the sea, is said to have been inspired (1) by a South African
9experience and (2) by Vallabhbhai Patel. In November 1913, 
Gandhi had protested against the South African Government’s 
discriminatory laws by leading a march of 2,221 Indians from 
Natal to the Transvaal. This provided the model for his 1930 
March. The area and details of organisation came from Patel’s 
Bardoli example. A campaign like Bardoli, limited in area 
and purpose and dependent for resources and support on a re­
liable and constant human reservoir, encouraged Gandhi to 
plan along similar lines. Patel planned the route of the 
march through Bardoli and also suggested to Gandhi that the 
band of men he should take with him should be trained Ashra- 
mites who could fetch the best publicity by their exemplary 
conduct.
However, while Gandhi was leading the Salt March to 
Dandi Vallabhbhai Patel, one of the first Congress leaders 
to be arrested during the campaign, was in jail. He had gone 
to Ras in Borsad taluka on 7 March 1930 to address the people 
there. The magistrate prevented him from making his speech 
before a large crowd that had assembled to hear him. Patel 
was taken to Borsad where a semblance of a trial took place 
before the District Magistrate, the magistrate who arrested 
him and the Superintendent of Police. He was in Sabarmati 
jail for three months while his friends outside disputed the 
legitimacy of his arrest. The political repercussions were 
felt acutely in Gujarat with the Congress and the Government. 
Within a week, six police patels, fifteen matadars and three 
ravanias (hereditary police patels) had resigned as a protest 
against Patel’s arrest. Commercial groups also protested.
This response and that in the rural areas further streng­
thened Gandhi’s faith in Kaira and Surat and his reliance on 
Gujarat. Ras, where Vallabhbhai Patel was arrested, was one
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of the first places in Kaira to resolve not to pay taxes.
Three thousand rich Patidars in that area had refused to pay 
taxes and their lands had been confiscated; Government got 
Baraiyas, who bad been employed earlier as working hands, to 
cultivate these lands under Government protection.^  While 
encouraging further resignations of talatis and applauding 
the resignations of village officers, particularly in Kaira 
and Broach districts, Gandhi said that Gujarat on its own had 
the capacity to win complete independence for India. There 
were 90 lakhs of people in Gujarat but 40 lakhs would be
12adequate if all of them participated seriously and unitedly.
Vallabhbhai Patel's intense efforts had given confidence 
to Gujarat. Gandhi referred to Patel again and again during 
the march and noticed that the invocation of his name had an 
electrifying effect on the people of the areas through which 
he passed. The civil disobedience movement forged ahead 
with success in most provinces. Gujarat was the main theatre, 
by design. As the Secretary of the GPCC, Manilal Kothari, said:
...with the excellent training and discipline which it 
had all these years received under the inspiring lead­
ership of Mahatma Gandhi and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, 
it will on this momentous occasion, put into the field 
all its available men and resources and lead the quiet 
and firm struggle to a victorious end... 13
The Government also acknowledged that Gujarat had sur­
passed all other provinces in the conduct of the civil dis­
obedience movement campaigns:
The movement had for various reasons such as the build­
ing up during last 10 years by Gandhi and Vallabhbhai 
Patel of the organisation in Gujarat and its success 
at Bardoli, reached a more advanced stage than any­
where in India. 14
By the time Vallabhbhai Patel was released on 26 June 
1930, other Congress leaders from Gujarat and from other 
provinces were in jail. When Jawaharlal Nehru was arrested, 
Motilal Nehru had been appointed Congress President; and 
when he was arrested on 13 June 1930, he appointed Patel as 
Congress President. The Working Committee of Congress and 
its other organisations and offices had been declared illegal
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by the Government. Responding to a rousing welcome in Bom­
bay after his release, on 3 July 1930, Patel said in an 
interview:
I want every single man, woman,and child in each Pro­
vince, district and tavn to feel that he or she should 
take up the burden of carrying on the national fight 
if the Congress organisations are declared unlawful 
and all recognised leaders are put in jail. Each 
Congressman then becomes a Congress Committee for the 
purpose of the fight. 15
He spoke out openly and unequivocally against those who were
vacillating and hesitating to fight. Addressing a large
gathering at Bai Kanubhai*s Wadi in Bombay he admonished
collegiates for not giving up their studies, while Nehru
16*the prince of Indian youth* was in jail. In another re­
primand to college students he asked them if they knew that 
their idol Jawaharlal was in jail and that hundreds of women 
were the victims of police lathis and physical illtreatment
in the fight for freedom, while they, the students, stood by
17idly or spent their time doing mathematics and history.
We may take it that the criticism was implicitly also of their 
leader who could not inspire a better response among his 
supporters.
That the fight required *money and munitions* rather
than big talk was the burden of many of his speeches. His
message to Congress workers on the inauguration of Congress
week in Bombay on 14 July 1930 indicated clearly that the
week was being celebrated to gather men and money. A house-
to-house campaign to enrol members and collect money was
18undertaken by each ward at his behest. The focus on the 
efforts of Bombay and Gujarat was sustained by his concen­
tration on these regions. It was an opportune moment for 
him to control the movement: he was out of jail for a short 
period of time and made political capital out of it. Criti­
cising those who were entertaining ideas of peace talks,
Patel said it would be^blunder for Congress to show weakness 
by yielding just then. Irwin's statement (of November 1929) 
had made it quite clear that India could be offered only what
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the spokesmen of Britain agreed to give as a result of dis­
cussions at a Round Table Conference in London. Vallabhbhai 
Patel pointed out that those who participated in such a Con­
ference would be quite disillusioned. Nor was the recent 
statement made by the Governor of Bombay (in the Legislative 
Council) conciliatory. Patel replied to the Governor*s add­
ress at a public meeting at Azad Maidan on 20 July 1930 and 
characterised it as a gross libel on India and on Gujarat in 
particular. The Governor had said that the entire civil dis­
obedience movement was charged with violence and Bombay Pro­
vince was rife with disorder. Surat and Kaira in particular 
had been picked by him as examples of areas where Congress 
had encouraged the growth of violence and disorder. Patel 
contradicted all these charges and declared that in this
spirit peace moves would never be entertained; in fact the
19struggle would be intensified after the monsoon.
During 1930, Patel was in and out of jail three times. 
Early August saw him back in jail in connection with the 
Tilak Anniversary procession; he was sentenced for three 
months. On 5 November he was released but was taken in cus­
tody on 6 December from Ahmedabad to Bombay in connection 
with a speech delivered at Bombay a month earlier while open­
ing Soorji Vallabhdas Khadi Bhandar in Mandvi. In between 
jail sentences, he made sure the grip on Congress supporters 
was strengthened by adequate reassurances to them about the 
return of the lands that landholders had been called upon to 
forfeit both during the Bardoli campaign and the current 
civil disobedience movement. In urban areas (Ahmedabad and 
Bombay) merchants, who were increasingly supporting Congress 
with a prudence that was typical of them, needed clarifica­
tion on the issue of the boycott of foreign cloth and the 
position of millcloth. These two matters were crucial in 
Ahmedabad and Bombay which were the leading textile areas of 
the country. Purshotamdas Thakurdas wrote to Patel that 
manufacturers and salesmen of indigenous millcloth seemed to 
have got the impression that Congress wanted the cloth market 
in Bombay to be closed as part of the current political
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20movement for Swadeshi. A clear statement was communicated 
through Purshotamdas Thakurdas to the Bombay merchants by 
Patel that the closing of the Bombay Cloth Market was neither 
intended nor desirable as part of the movement. *What Cong­
ress wants is, as is well known, the stoppage of import or
sale of foreign cloth. As far as I am aware even the Bombay
21PCC is not against the sale of mill made cloth...*
There were merchants who had large stocks of foreign 
cloth. Their plight had to be met too. At the opening of 
Soorji Vallabhdas Khadi Bhandar, Patel said the idea of the 
sale of such cloth later should be dispelled by merchants.
The only guarantee he would give them was that if they had not 
already taken such cloth to Delhi and burnt it, they should 
make an inventory of their stocks and seal them and he pro­
mised to pay them every penny when a national government was
22established in the country. Farther assurances were given
on the question of general hartals which were to be treated
purely as symbols of protest and not as an impediment to
23commerce or trade. Patel took great pains to protect his 
allies.
Gujarat had posed an increasing threat to Government in 
its successful conduct of no-tax campaigns. Even more impor­
tant, however, was the prominence that the Gujarat situation 
received in the peace talks that began between the Gandhians 
and the Government as a result of the parleys between the 
moderates and Gandhians in Yerawada jail in August 1930.
Ramsay Macdonald announced on 19 January 1931 that the Round 
Table Conference was arriving at some agreement that the aim 
of the intended reforms should be a Federation,the nature of 
which would be determined after further discussions with the 
representatives of British India and the Princes. Irwin then 
announced on 25 January that in order to facilitate negotia­
tions, the Government in consultation with local Governments 
had decided to free those members of the Congress Working 
Committee who were in prison. The Gandhi-Irwin agreement, 
also widely known as the Delhi Settlement, was not received 
with great enthusiasm by many Indians and more particularly
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by many Congressmen. Much energy had to be devoted by the 
protagonists of the agreement to convince those who felt that 
the suspension of civil disobedience as demanded by the sett­
lement was a betrayal ; and to argue that the agreement, far 
from obstructing Congress*s interests, would help Congress 
in gaining lost ground. On his first visit to Ahmedabad at 
a large public meeting at Azad Maidan on 8 March 1931, Patel 
explained the truce by saying that the nation would lose no­
thing if it laid down its arms while the discussions at the 
Round Table Conference were going on. In inviting Congress 
to formulate its demands Government had in fact given recog­
nition to Congress and realised its strength. The basis of 
the agreement was that India would be treated as indivisible, 
consisting of the Indian States, and what was called ‘British 
India*; responsible Government would be a condition in the 
discussion of any future scheme and the safeguards and reser­
vations that were to be negotiated would be in the interests 
24of India. But more important than the nuances of the cons­
titutional problem was the issue of confiscated lands which 
was Patel*s own condition for the acceptance of any proposals, 
which condition Gandhi was obliged to fulfil no matter how 
smoothly discussions on other matters might proceed. He 
faithfully promised:
I shall see that every inch of the confiscated land 
goes back to the rightful owner. There cannot be any 
alternative proposal in this regard. The land will 
and shall be restored to the man who owns it inspite 
of the Government whose contract is closed. 25
The issue took on serious proportions as negotiations between 
Gandhi and the Viceroy proceeded. Government accused cultiva­
tors of non-payment of dues, and cultivators accused Govern­
ment of using intimidation and force to extract revenue. At 
this juncture Vallabhbhai Patel’s prestige depended on the 
successful solution of the Gujarat lands and revenue pro­
blem so that he could carry on negotiations with the Govern­
ment with the sanction of the people behind him. While Patel 
recommended Gandhi’s settlement to the people, Gandhi under­
took to lend his prestige to Patel’s campaign to reassure
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the cultivators of Gujarat that they would not be let down
and all promises made to them would be fulfilled. On 12
March, a week after the Gandhi-Irwin agreement, Gandhi marched
with Patel from Ahmedabad to Borsad, through the villages of
26Baroda territory to encourage and reassure the people.
As President of the Karachi session of Congress, Patel 
urged Congress to endorse the settlement that the Working 
Committee as 'accredited representatives' had entered into 
with Government. He pointed out that it was not really open 
to the general Congress to repudiate the agreement unless 
they passed a vote of no-confidence in the Working Committee. 
Discussing the settlement at length Vallabhbhai asserted that 
the clause about 'safeguards and reservations' should not 
alarm anyone; British advice would be taken, not their dicta­
tion, whether it was in the field of defence, finance or civil 
administration. To pacify the protagonists of complete inde­
pendence he said that there would be no receding from the 
Lahore resolution of complete independence. But a childish 
refusal to associate with the British or any other power would 
be unwise and he was decidedly not in favour of it, as he 
openly admitted:
I am aware that there is strong body of opinion in the 
country to the effect that before a partnership could 
possibly be conceived, there must be a period of com­
plete dissociation. I do not belong to that school. 27
Congress's big political opportunity for participation had 
come and Vallabhbhai Patel was not going to allow extremists 
from any side to ruin Congress's chances. One can discern 
from this point onwards an all-out effort on Patel's part to 
procure for Congress the real benefits that would accrue from 
any reforms that were likely to be introduced as a result of 
the negotiations. To that end he also started shaping the 
Congress in his own image, with Gandhi's consent and full 
cooperation. At the first AICC session under Patel's presi­
dentship on 1 April 1931, Gandhi prepared a list of new mem­
bers of the Working Committee in accordance with Patel's
n o
plans for shaping a Congress that would do his bidding. Bose 
was dropped from the Working Committee, and certain provinces 
were not represented. Gandhi made a revealing statement 
about it:
If you want work from Sardar Patel you must not put in 
any man on the Working Committee who might strike a 
discordant note. 28
Much evidence of this attribute could be seen as the Congress 
moved forward, bargaining all the time, in the period of poli­
tical development that accompanied the British reform scheme. 
How the entire Congress machine was geared towards procuring 
the desired political gains will be seen in the next chapter.
The Karachi session of Congress was described as a
291historic session* by many Congress leaders who attended it. 
The atmosphere in the country was mirrored in the session 
proceedings. There was a difference of opinion on the reso­
lution on Fundamental Rights and the National Economic Pro­
gramme in the Subject Committee. Eventually, with appropriate 
changes, the resolution was accepted at the session and many 
of the Fundamental Rights drawn by Jawaharlal Nehru were in­
corporated later into free India's Constitution. Gandhi and 
Patel thus placated the restless revolutionaries; Patel also 
reproached them for their impatience. He assured them that 
eventually the Congress organisation would be in the hands 
of the younger men. If they really had strength behind them 
and did not approve the Constitution formulated by the mode­
rates 'they could always throw it into the waste paper bas­
ket' when the time came. Until then discussion on the settle­
ment would not be encouraged and the orders of 'Commander-
30Gandhi' would have to be obeyed.
In his capacity as President of Congress did Patel reveal 
any distinctive features of style in dealing with political 
and non-political matters? There were a few things that were 
given priority in keeping with Patel's own interests. The 
dispute over lands confiscated during the no-tax campaign 
was one such issue. Vallabhbhai had much at stake in terms 
of political support and credibility in fulfilling the pro­
ill
mises he had made to the Gujarat peasants. In the Gandhi-
Irwin talks Gandhi indicated quite clearly that it was Patel
who had to be satisfied in any arrangements that were agreed
to in relation to confiscated lands. After the agreement
Patel was perturbed that there was continuous harassment
of peasants in Valod Mahal, that pending cases had not been
withdrawn, confiscated lands had not been returned and police
had been posted in several places to prevent farmers from
31entering their fields. Several instances of pressure by
police and officials occured and Patel reported them to
Gandhi, who was in Simla .at the time. When police prosecution
became intolerable and a blockade was imposed on some villages,
Patel became desperate: *For God*s sake allow fighting if
32this cannot be stopped*, he urged. Government was irritated 
by the importance that Gujarat farmers had assumed in the 
negotiations with the Congress. Fully aware that Vallabhbhai 
would not yield on this subject they chided him for being 
more solicitous about his reputation among his Gujarat sup­
porters than about the peace that a settlement might bring. 
Gandhi was anxious that Congress should participate in the 
negotiations but not at the cost of alienating the solid 
support of those leaders on whom he was beginning to rely 
more and more for taking the Congress forward with him. Guja­
rat, therefore, became a stumbling block in any move towards 
a solution ; as Sykes put it to Irwin: *...it was a question
of how far Vallabhbhai will be prepared to sacrifice his own
33reputation in the interests of peace*.
Patel also dealt with the Gujarat problem directly. He 
undertook to fight for some of the patels who had resigned 
and not been reinstated. In Ras, a Patidar-dorainated village, 
several such incidents had occurred. In one particular case 
the new patel of a criminal tribe had a conviction and was, 
therefore, not qualified to fill the post ; yet he had been 
retained instead of the previous Patidar patel who had resi­
gned at the instance of Vallabhbhai Patel. To regularise the 
position of the new appointee, the Government was contemplating 
removing the disqualification of the patel they had appointed:
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...instead of removing them from service it is now 
seriously proposed to remove their legal disqualifi­
cation. I must emphatically protest against this 
wanton breach of the settlement. 34
Patel was prepared to fight to the end to get the old patel
reinstated; that is how he made life-long supporters. His
continued support for Patidars returned enormous dividends
at every juncture. In addition, he ardently espoused the
cause of the Patidars generally at this point. He had put
forward their complaints to the Collector from time to time
in the matter of confiscated lands and pressures put on them
for non-payment. The Government had put special police in
the area for the protection of Patidars* property. Then the
police was removed and the Dharalas began harassing Patidars
again. Patel vehemently fought out the Patidars* point of
view and rejected any suggestion that Patidars should be
35expected to work jointly with Dharalas.
Apart from the land issue and remission of land revenue 
and the general advancement of Gujarat, internal Congress mat­
ters needed careful handling by the President. Patel had to 
face many attacks from individuals and regions. In particular, 
Bengal became an increasing source of trouble for Congress as 
the years went on. Bengal was unhappy with Patel ; Subhas 
Bose at a Students* Conference made a general attack on the 
Working Committee and a specific one on Patel that Bengal had 
been completely neglected for about eighteen months. The 
Bengal Congress had not been approached in connection with
o  o
the Hijli tragedy. Sen Gupta was putting pressure over 
the affairs in Chittagong where violence and repression had 
occurred. He wanted an 3ll-India demonstration to be orga­
nised. Patel consulted M.S.Aney in the matter. Aney*s opi­
nion was that Congress would be ill-advised to take up such 
a step as an all-India demonstration. But he did corroborate 
the general feeling that Congress had neglected the province 
of Bengal:
He is of opinion that nothing of that kind could be 
done although he feels that in Bengal a feeling had 
been worked up that the province had been neglected 
by the Congress. 37
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The Bengal Congress was having its own internal trouble.
Subhas Bose and Sen Gupta were at odds, and the former had
asked the Working Committee to intervene. Complaints had been
coming in for some time from Bengal about the difficulty that
some District Congress Committees were having in obtaining
membership forms from the Secretary of the Bengal Provincial
Congress Committee. The rule in Bengal, as in some other
provinces, was that the sanction of the PCC had to be obtained
before membership forms could be obtained by the DCCs. Some
38DCCs had been refused the forms. Subhas Bose and Sen Gupta 
had quarelled partly because the latter had ordered the print­
ing of membership forms,in anticipation of being denied prin­
ted forms,despite being told not to do so. He also wrote to
Bose suggesting that as Secretary he should issue forms libe-
39rally and not give cause for complaints. M.S.Aney was 
appointed to settle the dispute which threatened to get out 
of proportion. Aney's award did not help and the settlement 
between Bose and Sen Gupta was short-lived. Patel called 
Subhas Bose to Delhi to discuss matters but the latter refused 
and said that the meeting would have to be in Calcutta as he 
was not inclined to go to Delhi.
Subhas is angry with us because we refused to inter­
fere in their quarrels as desired by him at the last 
meeting of the Working Committee... I wired to him in­
viting him to come to Delhi with the proposals about 
Bengal...he has wired back saying that we must meet 
in Calcutta and that he cannot come to Delhi. 40
Patel decided to assuage the Bengali Congressmen and requested 
Rajendra Prasad to go to Murshidabad to attend the Bengal Con­
ference. Nariman also agreed to go. Having done that, he 
wrote to Nehru:
I do not think that any Bengal friend should now com­
plain that Working Committee was in any way neglecting 
Bengal. The step of sending two members of the Work­
ing Committee specially to go and attend a Provincial 
Congress is not anusual one. 41
Patel too had his grievances against Bengal's attitude 
to other provinces. In Calcutta, a campaign of picketing 
against Ahmedabad and Bombay mill cloth had been carried on
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for a month and a half. Patel was angry about it and upset 
over Tagore’s role in it:
Tagore had been rubbing the Gujaratis and Marwaris 
the wrong way. They complain of his narrow provin­
cial propaganda for Bengal..a leaflet in Bengali... 
had been issued by Tagore recommending boycott of 
non-Bengali mills and the purchase by Bengalis of 
Bengal cloths alone. 42
Nehru visited Bengal in November 1931 and came back as dis­
traught as Patel was over Bengal’s parochial and antagonistic 
43attitude.
Apart from attending to the problems within his own pro­
vince and those of and between other provinces, Patel had to 
meet demands from individual Congressmen for the solution of 
their problems. These he handled with tact and shrewdness.
A man named P.A.Pereira living near Bombay complained to Patel 
that the Bengal Mercantile Life Insurance Company, with its 
headquarters in Calcutta, was not paying him a due sum although 
his policy had matured a year before. Patel’s reply was:,
I regret that you should have so much difficulty in get­
ting your dues but I am afraid it was not within my ju­
risdiction as President to go into private affairs of 
the members of the Congress. I am afraid therefore that 
I can do nothing in your matter. 44
Nehru’s reaction to the same complaint was quite different:
...the Congress cannot tolerate the exploitation of peo­
ple in this way by Insurance or other companies. In 
particular we are concerned with the efficient and hon­
est management of Swadeshi concerns... the present case 
appears to be a glaring instance of inefficiency as well 
as want of bona fide and I am therefore giving publicity 
to it so that the public may be put on their guard. 45
Similar complaints were made on behalf of rural organisations 
- that in conflicts with those interest groups in Bombay which 
were important for Congress, Patel tended to keep the interest 
groups happy. When the prices of cotton and grain fell and 
farmers were adversely affected, it was brought to Patel’s no­
tice that this was largely due to forward markets and associa­
tions in cities like Bombay. The ’commercial princes and 
their clients’ bought grain cheaply and then depressed prices
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by 1 short selling1 in forward markets. Patel suggested that 
only the association representing the various trades and com­
mercial interests of Bombay could take action in this matter:
Much as I regret the effects of extensive gambling in 
regard to cotton and grain commodities, I am afraid 
there is very little that I can do in my capacity as 
President of the Congress to improve the situation. 46
However, on another occasion not long afterwards Patel 
seems to have gone far beyond his jurisdiction as President 
of Congress. Before the Puri AICC Congress session, he ins­
tructed the Secretary of the DCC of Puri to remove or efface 
'the ruins and other obscene images on temples in our coun­
try*. Decent people he said found such figures revolting 
and, therefore, the sooner temples like Jagannath at Puri were 
rid of them the better. That the figures were of archaeolo­
gical and historical value did not concern him. He had to 
keep up the Congress image of a body of *pure minded persons1 
No one else was consulted; instructions were given and the 
job had to be done:
I shall be glad to hear from you that the proposed eff- 
acement had been effected. I have no doubt you will
move in the matter with promptness and see that the
offensive features of the great gopura and elsewhere in 
the Puri temple are obliterated forthwith. I wish that 
the process should be completed in good time before the 
ensuing Congress at Puri. 47
Patel was emerging as authoritarian and conservative, 
with a genius for organisation. Skilful though he was as an 
organiser, Patel had his short-comings as a negotia­
tor and reconciler. He seems to have recognised this himself 
Conscious of the difference between his and Gandhi*s approach
to political and other problems Patel indicated once that he
had less patience with and was more intolerant of dissenters 
and breakers of agreements than Gandhi was. * Gandhi*s ways* 
he said 'were the ways of peace and persuasion1. But, he 
(Patel) was not versed in skills like letter writing and long 
drawn out negotiations. This was by way of warning to the 
Government that if it committed breaches of the peace settle­
ment in Gandhi's absence from India it would be doing so at
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• \ 48its own risk. As agitators Gandhiites could offord to 
appear tough. Yet, during negotiations later when Congress 
was likely to gain substantially by compromising somewhat, 
Patel was the first among the Gandhiites to settle for a bird 
in hand rather than aspire for two in the bush (See Chapter 
VII).
Patel's involvement in the solution of the communal pro­
blem was negligible at this stage. Mobilisation of Muslims 
during satyagraha campaigns was left to Muslim leaders and he 
had no close relations either with Muslim leaders or with any 
Muslim groups inside or outside Gujarat. He was more inter­
ested in the 'truce* with Government to the extent that it 
pertained to Gujarat. The main stumbling block in the way of 
Gandhi's departure for London had become Government's unsatis­
factory answer to his letter relating to breaches of the 
* trucewhich breaches related to the crisis in Bardoli caused 
by revenue extracted from peasants under duress. That Patel 
was unyielding on the subject was evident. His word carried 
sufficient weight in Congress by then for Gandhi to tour Bar­
doli and Borsad as well as go to Simla for talks with the
49Viceroy on the subject in order to satisfy and pacify Patel. 
Patel's rigidity led to rumours that the Government was con­
sidering it necessary to arrest Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru 
at Simla at the beginning of July. While Gandhi was willing 
to give a longer rope to the Government on the question of 
the appointment of a tribunal to look into breaches of the 
peace in areas in Guj arat, Patel was clear that a tribunal of 
his design would have to be a precondition to Congress parti­
cipation in the Round Table Conference. Gandhi agreed to an 
impartial official inquiry instead of an Arbitration Board 
and later even conceded that he would advise the Working 
Committee to accept a 'one-sided tribunal' if Government
accepted the principle that between the Government and the
50people, the Congress would act as an intermediatory.
Congress discussions in the meantime were progressing 
on two fronts (1) between Congress members on the issue of 
communalism and (2) between Congress members and the Govern-
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ment on the Delhi Settlement and the observance of its condi­
tions. On the first question, at the Congress Working Commi­
ttee meeting that was held on 7 July 1931 in Bombay, Dr.Ansari, 
the leader of the Nationalist Muslims, had talks with Shaukat 
Ali who was a spokesman for those who were adamant that sepa­
rate electorates were necessary albeit for an initial period 
of about ten years. The question as to whether Muslims should 
accept joint electorates after the stipulated period would be 
decided by a 60 per cent majority of the Muslim members of the 
legislatures elected by separate electorates. The Nationalist 
Muslims (Dr.Ansari, Maulana Azad, Dr.Alam and Syed Mohammad) 
were not prepared to compromise to that extent. Even if they 
yielded on the issue of a five or ten year period for separate 
electorates, they were quite clear that they would not allow 
separate electorates to continue beyond this period. To ward 
off criticism from the general Muslim populace, they also 
contended that the communalist Muslims were not more concerned 
about the interests of the Muslims than they were, and were in 
fact compromising the Muslim position by accepting a 46 per 
cent minority in Bengal and a 40 per cent minority position in 
Punjab in exchange for separate electorates. In Bengal and 
Punjab the Nationalist Muslims were adamant that a Muslim maj­
ority should be preserved. The inability of the two Muslim 
groups to agree led Congress to appoint a sub-committee to 
draft a formula on the communal problem which would meet with 
the Nationalist Muslim view point and satisfy Hindus, Mus­
lims, Sikhs and all minority communities that held nationa­
list views.
Gandhi, Patel, Jawaharlal Nehru and Abdul Ghaffar Khan 
went to Simla on 25 August in a last bid to solve the prob­
lem. Caught between his anxiety to retain control of Congr­
ess policy as well as of the massive active support and orga­
nisation brought to bear on Congress by Vallabhbhai Patel, 
Gandhi made a statement that would placate all sides, such 
as:
There is not the slightest desire to humiliate or em­
barrass the government or anybody. The only desire
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is to get justice somehow or other. Let it be after 
the Governments manner but it must be so just that it 
would be acknowledged as such by those who are striv­
ing for it.... 51
By the end of August, the contradictions between Gandhi’s keen­
ness to go and Patel’s insistence that Gandhi could only par­
ticipate if the Bardoli crisis had been given consideration, 
were well known. Bombay Chronicle reported clearly that
’Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel is no longer in the way as the in-
52quiry into Bardoli affairs has been conceded*. Patel had 
his way. In later years; at the time of constitutional nego­
tiations when Government had to ascertain the Congress posi­
tion on various matters, Government realised and admitted that 
rather than carry on discussions with the Congress President 
it was better to call Vallabhbhai Patel and get an idea of 
real Congress thinking.
This difference in approach between Gandhi and Patel 
appeared more and more clearly as the opportunities for poli­
tical participation and involvement increased. It took con­
crete shape in the formulation of a new policy by Congress to 
meet the new political stimuli. Patel’s greatest anxiety 
was the one he had for the freedom movement. He was anxious 
I that the India that emerges should be a conservative India. 
Gandhi was no radical, but he did want many changes in the 
social structure. Patel’s and Gandhi’s style and role in 
achieving a conservative India were poles apart. The next 
chapter reveals this in ample measure.
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CHAPTER IV
CONGRESS *S NEW POLICY AND THE ASCENDANCY 
OF THE RIGHT WING 1934-1937
As a result of the Round Table Conference held in London,
the Communal Award of August 1932, the White Paper of March 
1933 and the proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian 
Constitutional Reform, Congress leaders who were not attrac­
ted to civil disobedience and who favoured entering the legis­
lature became active once again in attempting to frame a 
policy that would be an adequate and advantageous response to 
the political stimuli being offered. During the years that 
Gandhi, Patel and other prominent leaders were in jail, parti­
cularly the period between January 1932 and July 1934, there
was a certain amount of dissatisfaction among Congress leaders
with existing Congress policy. The British referred to it as 
a 'drift' and regarded it as very suitable for their purposes.'*' 
Apart from disagreements on the continuance of civil disobe­
dience, the constitutional reforms, communal electorates and 
other specific issues, Congressmen had accentuated their 
ideological differences. Previously, owing primarily to Gan­
dhi's genius, moderates and extremists, socialists and capi­
talists, revolutionaries and reactionaries,all had somehow 
managed to co-exist under the Congress umbrella. With Gandhi 
in jail along with his 'action man' Patel, things had gone 
roughly for Congress as an organisation. Dissensions had 
deepened and Gandhi seemed to have lost his grip over many 
moderates and extremists alike. The jail interlude was not 
favourable from the point of view of Gandhi's hold over his 
differing Congress colleagues. He shouldered a heavy respon­
sibility in directing and continuing civil disobedience from 
within the jail while other leaders outside had different 
plans for Congress. Events that were happening outside dis­
mayed Gandhi; Patel on the other hand seemed to anticipate 
them and rebuked Gandhi repeatedly for shutting his eyes to 
the reality and for undertaking fasts each time something 
went against his wishes.
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Elections to the Central Legislature were due in Novem­
ber 1934 and Congress had to formulate a policy on the mat­
ter. Congressmen outside jail attempted to gauge opinions
in the different Congress provinces on the future programme
2
of Congress, and on civil disobedience in particular. Con­
gress leaders who were not in jail met on 12 July 1933. M.S. 
Aney, the acting President, strongly urged the withdrawal of 
civil disobedience and the capture of the councils. All the 
provinces were represented and most leaders pleaded for a 
change in the programme; even those who favoured the conti­
nuance of civil disobedience admitted that the movement was 
at an ebb. The conference passed a resolution authorising 
Gandhi to seek an interview with the Viceroy failing which 
civil disobedience was to continue unabated. The Viceroy*s 
reply to Gandhi was unfavourable as the Viceroy had declined 
to negotiate with the representatives of an association 
which had not abandoned the movement against the Government. 
However, the pressure on Congress continued from those lea­
ders who wanted a new programme for it. The idea was put 
forward that some leaders * should meet and decide to re­
start the Swaraj Party and go over to the country with a
3
concrete programme of work*. It was recommended that indi­
vidual civil disobedience might be allowed and also the pro­
pagation of the constructive programme as a scheme towards 
the preparedness for another fight.
On 31 March 1934, about forty Congress leaders met at 
Dr.Ansari's residence in Delhi. The outcome was the revival 
of the Swaraj Party to contest the elections with the object 
of rejecting the Government's White Paper and replacing it 
with national demands. Gandhi approved the decision and 
wrote to Vallabhbhai Patel that he hoped that the latter 
endorsed his approval. *1 feel it is better not to exercise 
any more check' and, therefore, those who wished to enter the 
legislature might do so in their own name, not in the name
4
of the Congress. Gandhi was well aware that many would re­
joice at the new developments. He was eager to have Patel's 
opinion and was confident that of all the Congressmen close
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to him Patel would Appreciate the correctness of the deci­
sions’. A meeting of the revised Swaraj Party was due in 
Ranchi and Gandhi was anxious that even while he disagreed 
with them he should still lead the men who had hitherto 
followed him unquestionably. He wanted to show them that 
he saw their point of view and did not want to lose their 
following. He confided this to Patel:
It is only fair that those who daily attend the coun­
cils in the spirit should be permitted to enter them 
in fact, then alone can they realise the advantages 
and disadvantages of such action. Is it not better 
that one who daily eats jalebis in his imagination 
should eat the real thing and know the wisdom or 
folly of doing so? 5
Patel's formal response to the new development could only 
be obtained after his release; in the meantime, Gandhi made 
it clear that Patel's views were vital if any irreversible 
decisions were to be taken:
r I can only say that any conclusions that any confer-
/ ence majiy_ arrive at can only be inconclusive without
the presence of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru. 6
The suspension of general civil disobedience was ordered by 
Gandhi in a statement issued from Patna on 7 April 1934.
This order and the recognition bestowed on the revived Swa­
raj Party started fresh ripples in the political stream.
Once again political activity began all round. The Ranchi 
meeting of the Swarajists on 3 May sought to get the reso­
lution of the Delhi Conference of March approved and to 
elaborate further the implications of the developments both
in relation to Congress and the general political scene. All
7
proposals were to be subject to the approval of the AICC.
The AICC and the Working Committee meetings held in Patna 
on 18, 19 and 20 May 1934 endorsed Gandhi's statements of 
7 April regarding the suspension of general civil disobedi­
ence and the adoption of the programme of council-entry. The 
decision led to the formation of the Congress Parliamentary 
Board to which was entrusted the task of contesting the elec­
tions. The Working Committee decided that the existence of
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a Swaraj Party as a separate party was unnecessary and the 
parent body, Congress, would undertake through its own Board, 
the work of implementing the new policy of the Congress. It 
was also decided that an open session of Congress would be 
held in Bombay in October to give finality to all these deci­
sions. Alignments and manoeuvrings once again became the 
preoccupation of Congress and non-Congress leaders, not unlike 
what had happened after the Gaya Congress in December 1922.
Vallabhbhai Patel was released from jail on 14 July 1934. 
Much had happened outside during the two and a half years 
that he had spent in jail. The Communal Award had been ann­
ounced in August 1932, leading to great protest by Indian 
leaders, Gandhi’s fast and the Poona Pact. A White Paper 
with detailed constitutional proposals for the future of 
India’s political development had been published on 15 March
1933. A Socialist Party had been formed and the Swaraj Party 
had been revived to enter the councils. Patel’s views on 
each of these subjects were significant in terms of the dir­
ection that Congress was now going to take to meet the poli­
tical situation. The Communal Award caused disagreements 
in the Congress Parliamentary Board soon after the Board was 
set up. The Nationalist Muslims endorsed the position taken 
at the Ranchi Conference on 4 May that the Award should nei­
ther be accepted nor rejected until an agreed settlement bet­
ween Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs was brought about. At the 
CPB meeting on 16 June, Gandhi firmly stated that Congress 
stood for Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and others and nothing should 
be done to make the Muslims feel that Congress had departed 
from that position. M.M.Malaviya and M.S.Aney, however,wan­
ted the unequivocal rejection of the Award and threatened
to resign their positions on the Board and the Working Commi-
o
ttee respectively if Congress did not reject the Award. At 
its meeting in Benaras at the end of July, the Working Commi­
ttee issued the Election Manifesto approved by the Congress 
Parliamentary Board. The White Paper was deplored and a 
Constituent Assembly was recommended, elected on the basis 
of adult suffrage or its nearest equivalent, with power given,
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if necessary, to the important minorities to have their rep­
resentatives elected exclusively by electors belonging to 
such minorities. The White Paper lapsing, the Communal Award 
would lapse automatically. The Constituent Assembly would 
determine the method of representation of important minori­
ties and make provisions for safeguarding their interests.
On the Award, in particular, the Working Committee felt 
that as long as differences persisted the position still had 
to be that it could neither be rejectednor accepted:
By common consent it is intrinsically bad. It is anti­
national. But Congress cannot refuse to take into acc­
ount the attitude of Musalmans in general who seem to 
want the Award; nor can the Congress accept it, as 
Hindus and Sikhs reject it. 9
It was further stated that all members would be obliged to 
carry out the Congress programme and all office members who 
did not do so would be disciplined unless they had a consci­
entious objection to doing so. Malaviya and Aney resigned 
from the Parliamentary Board and the Working Committee res­
pectively.
It was at this point that Patel was forced to make 
explicit his displeasure at the tendency towards increasing 
indiscipline in the Congress organisation from several quar­
ters. Initially he believed that Malaviyafs and Aney’s 
revolt would not be able to damage Congress prestige. Reply­
ing to a request from Choitram Gidwani, the President of 
the Sind PCC, for a reconsideration of the Working Committee’s 
resolution in the light of the increasing tendency to revolt 
as evidenced by the attitude of Malaviya and Aney and that 
of Roy, Gupta, Tandon and Kidwai on the Counci1-Entry pro­
gramme, Patel said: ’God willing, we shall come through 
elections and successfully, leaving no marks of bitterness 
behind*.^ But the revolt soon took on serious overtones 
and led to a strong reaction from Patel. Malaviya formed 
the Nationalist Party in Calcutta,stating on 19 August that 
it was not a revolt against the Congress. Nonetheless, Patel 
issued a statement a few days later to the effect that the 
new party would be undermining the strength of the Congress
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and was, therefore,working against the Congress’s interests.
In view of the fact that Gandhi had given conscientious 
objectors to the Award the freedom to speak against it, it 
was not necessary for dissenters to form a new party. Bona- 
fide Congressmen would be put up as candidates even while 
they spoke against the Award. If, however, non-Congressmen 
were intended to be put up as candidates by the Nationalist 
Party, then clearly it was working towards weakening the Con­
gress. Clarifying the relationship of the Nationalist Party 
with the Congress Party, Patel said that the former had no 
authority to contest the elections in the name of Congress. 
Refuting Malaviya's claim that the Congress Nationalist Party 
was a party within the Congress and that it stood for the 
essential principles of the long-established Congress to a 
greater extent than the Congress Parliamentary Board, Patel 
retorted:
....without the authority of the Congress being duly 
received it cannot with propriety be called 'Congress 
Nationalist Party' especially when it is formed deli­
berately to propagate a policy in direct contradic­
tion to the official policy of the Congress. 11
Patel looked at the prevailing problem of internal con­
flict in the Congress from two angles. He felt strongly 
that discipline and solidarity were now of greater import­
ance, given the forthcoming legislature entry. To that end 
it was necessary that the agency that the AICC had appointed 
be obeyed and no Congressmen could owe allegiance to any 
other organisation so far as the election and related pro­
grammes were concerned. Dissenters had to be dealt with 
firmly. Patel put forward the argument that Congressmen 
who were now fighting the elections had derived the autho­
rity to do so from the AICC resolution adopted at Patna in 
May 1934. The same resolution also enjoined all Congressmen 
to be guided in all matters pertaining to the elections by 
the Congress Parliamentary Board. Malaviya and other dis­
senters were disobeying the dictates of a resolution that
12they had been party to. Patel also felt conflicts were 
becoming increasingly discernible and would undermine the
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strength of the Congress at a crucial juncture when united 
action and a diminution of conflict was imperative. With a 
view to presenting a united front at the time of the elec­
tions, Patel suggested a fresh attempt towards arriving at 
a working arrangement between the Congress and the Nationa­
list Party. The Working Committee invited Malaviya and 
Aney to work out a compromise at their meeting at Wardha 
which began on 8 September 1934. No compromise emanated 
from twelve hours of joint and separate discussions between 
Malaviya and Aney on the one side and Gandhi, Patel, Dr.Roy, 
Bhulabhai Desai and Maulana Azad on the other. Congress 
offered Malaviya ten seats for his party but Malaviya wanted 
more.
The Congress Working Committee concluded its session 
with a general statement of its policy and a particular set 
of instructions directed at dissenters, that all Provincial 
and subordinate Congress organisations had to obey the Cong­
ress Parliamentary Board in all election activities and that 
no office-bearer or member of any Congress executive could 
support any candidate who did not fully endorse the policy 
of Congress. ^
Thus began an era in Patelfs relationship with Congress 
in which he made it quite clear that as long as he had any­
thing to do with the running of the Congress organisation he 
would not tolerate any indiscipline or rebellion. This was 
also the beginning of a period in the development of the 
Congress organisation when particular emphasis was placed 
on strict discipline, the forging of unity even at the risk 
of curbing freedom, and to that end, the setting up of a 
machinery that permeated all levels of the provinces and 
executed a programme and policy that came down from the top 
of the structure. Within a few days of having laid down the 
Congress position in relation to Malaviya and the Nationalist 
Party, Patel asserted it heavily against the Berar Provincial 
Congress Committee and invalidated the proceedings of their 
meeting at Amraoti at which Vamanrao Joshi was re-elected 
President, Kaanada Sastri of Buldana and B.H.Jatkar of
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Yeotmal were elected Vice-Presidents and Biyani and P.Y.
Deshmukh (Congress Socialists) were elected Joint Secreta- 
14ries. He also threatened disciplinary action against the 
Town and District Committees of Allahabad for their resolu­
tions against the Working Committee’s statement on Council 
15Entry. It became increasingly clear that Patel would not 
tolerate independent opinions on any matter on which the 
Working Committee made a decision. Addressing Congressmen 
when laying the foundation stone of Ghaffar Khan Nagar, which 
was being erected for the forthcoming Bombay session, Patel 
said:
You might have your own views on the political situa­
tion in the country. But forget it as long as you are 
volunteers. You are supposed to know nothing but ser­
vice. 16
Patel was even more intolerant of the new Congress 
Socialist Party that had been formed in his absence. In 
dealing with the problem of socialists Gandhi and Patel were 
at one. Neither could tolerate either the theory or practice 
of socialism; Patel, however, was more ruthless than Gandhi 
in his attacks on all socialists. His political support came 
from areas and groups whose vested interests had to be pro­
tected. Socialists all over the country were pledging them­
selves to the destruction of the vested interests. Their 
threats had become more sharp ever since the Congress Work­
ing Committee had yielded to pressure from the Council- 
Wallahs. Socialist leaders were trying to persuade the gene­
ral Congress to plan Congress strategy according to the 
socialists' programme. They had decided to permeate the 
Congress body and the Congress strongholds like Bombay and
17Gujarat in order to undermine the strength of the right wing.
The Executive Committee of the Bombay Congress Socialist Party
was particularly critical of the Working Committee’s policy:
Congress socialists will not be deterred by the Working 
Committee's disapproval but will double their efforts 
to get the Congress to adopt the programme on which 
alone the broad masses of the country can be organised 
in the struggle for independence and to stop the dis­
astrous drift to the Right. We appeal to the rank
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and file of the Congress to rebel against the policy 
of fraternisation with Liberals, Pseudo-Liberals and 
Mahasabhaites. 18
From U.P., Acharya Narendra Dev, Jai Prakash Narain, Sri 
Prakash and Sampurnanand criticised the Working Committee for 
referring to the socialist programme of class war and confis­
cation of private property as 'loose talk'.
In his first interview after his release, Patel made it 
clear that if the new Congress Socialist Party lowered the 
prestige of the Congress in any way he would oppose it vehe­
mently. Unity and discipline were of great importance at
that juncture; moreover. Congress owed something to those who
19had made sacrifices in supporting the party. As socialists
stepped up their propaganda Patel increased the intensity of
his opposition till it bordered on becoming an obsession. In
almost every speech he criticised the socialists for their
'foolish talk' about straightening the Congress ideology.
Peasants could not benefit by reading Lenin or by indulging
in academic discussions; socialists should go to the rural
areas and work among the peasants as he (Vallabhbhai) had 
20done. At the Working Committee meeting in Benaras at the 
end of July, Gandhi tried to accommodate the socialists in 
the hope of somehow winning them over. A resolution was pas­
sed to the effect that the Congress resolution in which the 
words 'loose talk' had been used was not intended to be cri­
tical of the Congress Socialist Party or its programme, but 
of individual socialists who engaged in loose talk. But, 
Patel then obliterated Gandhi's soft-pedalling at a meeting 
at Kashi Vidyapith a few days after the Working Committee 
meeting by dismissing all the socialists' efforts as 'tall 
talk' and 'mere moon-shine'. Vallabhbhai said that he spoke:
...as a man of the people who had all his life lived 
in closest touch with the conditions in village life,
I know what reorganising of the peasants and workers 
means. Let our Socialist friends show me a single 
village or a single union of industrial workers which 
they have organised to their satisfaction according 
to their ideas. 21
Throwing yet another challenge to the socialists who wanted
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to replace the charkha in the Congress flag with the trico­
lour, Vallabhbhai said in Matunga:
It is no use condemning Congress and Congress leaders 
for doing this and omitting that. Let them accompany 
me from Cape Comorin to Kashmir, work amongst the pea­
sants, handle tractors, and examine the comparative 
value of all their theories imported from the west. 22
More than the socialists' general encroachment into the 
Congress organisation Patel resented their intrusions into 
his political domain of Gujarat. Presiding over a special 
meeting of the Gujarat PCC on 3 October 1934, Patel pointedly 
told socialists that he would not tolerate any interference 
from them in Gujarat where he had dedicated his life to win 
Swaraj. Even if Gandhi left the Congress, he said, he (Patel) 
would not leave the Gujarat PCC. He had commitments to Guja­
rat and had to rehabilitate all the farmers who had been
23ruined during the civil disobedience movement. At a public
meeting in Ahmedabad he gave a stern warning that, unlike
Gandhi, who was kind even to his enemies, Patel would deal
toughly with anyone who came in his way and tried to undo
24what Congress had done. Replying to an accusation denoun­
cing him as the enemy of farmers and a friend of capitalists 
Patel said that everyone knew of his affinity with the pea­
sants. As for being a friend of capitalists, he believed
that in the struggle for freedom the help of capitalists,
25land-lords and princes should also be enlisted. This only 
gave socialists more ammunition to attack Patel. The Publi­
city Officer of the Congress Socialist Party retorted that 
Patel resented socialists simply because the latter believed 
in divesting the vested interests upon which Patel relied 
for help and support. Rejecting Patel's special claim over 
Gujarat, the socialists declared:
Whether Mr. Patel will tolerate the socialists or not, 
the socialists certainly are not going to be elbowed 
out by such heroics. They know what they are about 
and inspite of Mr.Patel the socialists will carry out 
their programme in Gujarat, as in other parts of the 
country. 26
It became clear as time went on that as Patel hardened his
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attitude to the socialists, the socialists intensified their 
campaign against Patel. Moreover, his intolerance of socia­
lists increased and influenced many of his political decisi­
ons, particularly those that pertained to the organisation 
and personnel of the Congress Party. The entire decade of 
the 1930s was for Patel a period of consolidating Congress 
gains in such a way that like-minded Congressmen would con­
trol the decision-making apparatus and keep the left-wing 
out of the machinery of Congress. Patel’s attitude to the 
Congress's new programme of council entry was related to the 
idea of Gandhiites seizing control and initiative in Congress 
affairs. Gandhi could not do it. His ideological commitment 
and proclamations precluded power politics which now assumed 
importance. Patel was willing to take on the challenge of 
the new Congress programme inclusive of its party politics. 
Tomlinson's assertion that Gandhi's lack of faith in the
parliamentary programme was backed to the hilt by associates
27like Patel does not seem justified. Patel asserted several 
times that Congress was now desperate to capture the legis­
latures for it was a chance which if missed may become a 
severe setback for Congress:
If people all over the country do not vote for the Con­
gress candidates, and the majority of Congressmen are 
not returned to the Assembly in the forthcoming elec­
tions, then it must be understood that the Congress 
will not be able to do any work in the country for a 
few years to come. 28
He admitted that although earlier he had been an opponent of 
council-entry he had decided now that Congress prestige and 
morale demanded taking up the challenge which Government had 
thrown to the Congress. Success at elections was imperative 
for Congress and once that was obtained he would steer Cong­
ress along the right way:
Exercise your votes to the fullest extent and see that 
as many Congressmen as possible are returned to the 
Legislature, then come to me and I will show you the 
way. 29
Patel saw party politics as a necessary evil and intended 
dealing with them rather than wishing them away. The socia­
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lists or other dissidents posed a big threat to the Gandhi­
ites which needed immediate attention. Apart from carrying 
out propaganda and disciplinary action against the socialists 
Gandhiites had to take positive measures to build Congress’s
own strength in a way that would make future attempts to
30undermine their strength difficult. Patel had a comprehen­
sive scheme directed towards that end. Even Gandhi became 
an instrument, albeit by design, in the big plan for domina­
tion.
Closely related to the three issues which have been dis­
cussed above which engaged Patel's attention as soon as he 
came out of jail was a fourth problem which required even 
greater shrewdness than the other three, namely the role of 
Gandhi in the Congress organisation in the immediate future, 
given the ramifications of the new political situation. It 
can be seen from the several meetings that Patel had with 
Gandhi between the Benaras meeting in July and the Bombay 
Congress session in October that Patel was closely associated
with Gandhi's decision to retire from active leadership of 
31Congress. After one such meeting at the beginning of Sep­
tember, Patel said in an interview in Wardha that the next 
meeting of the Working Committee was very important for seve­
ral reasons and that some vital matters would come up in Con­
gress soon. Two days later a report was leaked out by the 
correspondent of The Hindu which stated that Gandhi inten­
ded to retire from the Congress. Although Gandhi rebuked the 
correspondent for publishing a report of a confidential con­
versation between him and Patel he admitted that there had 
been discussion on that subject, and also stated that the
decision to retire was not directly related to Malaviya and
32Aney's current moves against the Congress policy. A draft
of Gandhi's statement regarding the proposed retirement was
sent to Patel for approval before it was actually made public
33on 17 September 1934. The statement said that the decision
to retire was prompted by what Gandhi regarded as 'fundamen-
34tal differences between the Congress intelligentsia and me'. 
On the spinning wheel, khaddar, entry into the legislatures,
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socialism, policy towards the States and even non-violence, 
Congressmen disagreed with Gandhi, and he in turn refused to 
accept any of their views:
I see that the educated and intelligent section of the 
Congressmen no longer have faith in my programme of 
work....Out of personal consideration for me or because 
they are afraid to oppose me openly, they are refrain­
ing from open opposition and support my programme al­
though they are not genuinely convinced of its merits.35
Whatever may have been proclaimed as the reasons for
retirement the real reasons were not hard to determine. They
could be ascertained from the moves and statements made by
Gandhi before and after the first announcement of the proposed
retirement and from the changes Gandhi wished to introduce in
the Congress organisation. That a Congress without Gandhi
would be better able to combat the ascendancy of other groups
than a Congress inhibited by Gandhi's immaculate image had
become increasingly evident. Gandhi expressed resentment at
the socialists' encroachment : 'If they gain ascendancy in
the Congress as they well may, I cannot remain in the Cong- 
30ress'. But he could not take the more drastic step of figh­
ting the socialists tooth and nail as Patel intended if they 
crossed his or the Congress's path. Gandhi was burdened with 
the responsibility of maintaining his image ; Patel had no 
such problem.
It might be argued that Patel's taking control was the 
result of the fact that Gandhi had been outmanoeuvred in 
Congress and would now await the call for direct action which 
he expected to lead. But, it must be remembered that in inter­
nal Congress politics, Gandhi did not mean simply the singular 
Gandhi any more. Gandhi had already begun functioning (poli­
tically) in accordance with much of Patel's strategy. Lack 
of interest in spinning and disillusionment with civil dis­
obedience were not sufficient indicators of Gandhi's being 
out-manouevred. Gandhi's followers were not all of one kind. 
There were the true Gandhians who lived and worked as he did 
and followed his precepts religiously, having made Gandhiism 
their life. They were the people who did village-uplift work
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and spent much of their time in Gandhian ashrams. Then there 
were the Gandhiites who found his political techniques of 
satyagraha and non-cooperation effective and joined him pri­
marily for these and marginally for Gandhiism. Patel belonged 
to this cateogry. There was also a third category who asso­
ciated with him because of the success of his political tech­
niques; they believed neither in the techniques themselves 
nor in the general Gandhian ideology. These broad categories 
did not emerge suddenly. They had existed for several years.
By 1934, however, the third who comprised the least constant 
of Gandhi’s associates, had become restive and to deal with 
them it was not ideological Gandhians that were needed but 
pragmatic Gandhiites. Patel seemed the most appropriate 
choice. With Gandhi's blessings on the one hand and conc­
rete support from provincial leaders on the other, he felt 
he would be able to see the Congress through the crisis.
Rajendra Prasad from Bihar and Rajagopalachari from Mad­
ras were expected to provide that concrete support. Between 
them,the three leaders would be able to command enough supp­
ort and gather adequate strength to fight to the bitter end. 
Gandhi had expressed his faith in Rajendra Prasad:
...who unlike Jawaharlal shares most of my ideas and 
whose sacrifice for the nation judged whether in 
quality or quantity is not to be excelled. 37
Gandhi expressed his confidence in the three leaders to Rajago­
palachari when the latter visited him at Wardha at the end of 
August to discuss Gandhi's retirement:
If after my withdrawal the Congress being free from my 
deadweight turns down all that we have prized dearly, 
naturally you and others, including Rajendra Babu, 
will retire. I expect no such catastrophe. On the 
contrary I believe that they will listen to you and 
will be eager to retain your co-operation. 38
Rajagopalachari seemed to require a little more convincing 
than Patel and Prasad. He felt that the move had come at 
the wrong time and was likely to be seen as a triumph of the 
Government over the Congress and the Viceroy over Gandhi, and 
that all political hope and enterprise was likely to be des-
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troyed. However, Gandhi's retirement was being carried out 
with the limited object of strengthening the Congress orga­
nisation by leaving it in tougher hands and not with the 
wider object of encouraging political hope all over the coun­
try. To that end the timing had been chosen with the concur­
rence of Patel, as Gandhi admitted: 'Sardar Vallabhbhai had
agreed with me that the time had arrived for me to retire
39from the Congress'. Patel corroborated this at a public 
meeting in Nagpur in an interview given in Wardha at the end 
of September:
My views on Gandhi's statement are well known. I said 
to him a fortnight ago and I believe it even now that 
the time is ripe for him to retire from the Congress...
Patel also conceded that the work of restoring 'purity and
discipline' in the Congress would be much facilitated if
Gandhi was absent from Congress deliberations in Bombay. This
statement led to the widespread belief that Patel had asked
Gandhi not to attend the Bombay Congress session so that the
organisation might be effectively purged of all the elements
41which were prone to insubordination and lack of discipline.
From this point onwards, Vallabhbhai Patel took on a
crucial role in the Congress organisation. He had now become
Gandhi's 'deputy general' in a very real way. He was going
to follow Gandhi's general strategy but the tactics would be
his own. He felt he knew what was toyEone.Gandhi trusted his
instinct and let his mantle fall on Patel. He had told Jamna-
lal Bajaj soon after Patel's release that much load could now
be shed on Patel who being out of jail could take on a great
deal of work and shoulder much of his (Bajaj's) responsibi- 
42lity. Patel took on the organisation and arrangement of
Congress programmes and Gandhi referred such matters as the
schedule for Congress elections and scrutiny of the names to 
43him. While he assigned all this work to Patel he also feared 
that the worst thing that could happen at this juncture would 
be if Patel were to fall ill, for the new edifice would col­
lapse:
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However, I remember the case of William, the Prince of 
Orange. As long as God wanted him to live and serve, 
he remained unharmed even in the midst of a shower of 
bullets. 44
In speeches delivered shortly before the Bombay Congress, 
Patel was able to speak on Gandhi’s behalf with a forthright­
ness that Gandhi himself often shied away from. Contradict­
ing statements of people like B.G.Horniman, who said that 
after all the hue and cry Gandhi would not retire, Patel 
said that Gandhi was simply disgusted with the hypocrisy and 
cheating that were rampant in the Congress organisation:
A man gives a hundred rupees and gets 400 members en­
rolled. At the time of elections he buys some khadi 
and clothes these members in it to vote for him and 
gets a place in the Congress Committee. 45
Addressing a Gandhi Jayanti meeting at Kalbadevi in Bombay,
Patel told the crowd that if they did not want to follow Gan-
46dhi's precepts they should not keep Gandhi in the Congress.
47If they had no faith in khaddar they should say so openly. 
Ironically, Patel himself was not with Gandhi for his 'pre­
cepts' or his khaddar and,of all the Gandhiites, was perhaps 
the only one who recognised that some of the 'hypocrisy' that 
he was condemning on Gandhi's behalf was essential if elec­
toral victory and monied candidates were required. Persona­
lly, he was more concerned about lack of discipline than hypo­
crisy. Patel also asked people to endorse the plan that Gan­
dhi and he had in mind to strengthen the Congress organisa­
tion. It might mean that individual freedom would hav^ to 
be replaced by submission to the dictates of the leaders:
In the midst of a great struggle if every soldier wants 
to think and act for himself, the war cannot be carried 
on, much less won....we must accept some limits to 
democracy of thought and action. 48
Discipline, which he used interchangeably with unity in many 
speeches,meant simply the observance of his dictates and suc­
cumbing to his will. An illustration of this can be observed 
in the next chapter in the kinds of people he supported and 
opposed.
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In addition to ensuring that Congress would be managed by 
those who would have a community of interest, Gandhi and 
Patel had also worked out a plan for adapting the machinery 
of the Congress to the new climate which was being created.
On 15 October,Gandhi made a statement proposing amendments 
to the Congress constitution (the statement was prepared 
with the help of Vallabhbhai Patel who was in Wardha till 
14 October). Before spelling out the detailed changes Gandhi 
said:
In order that the change contemplated may not come with­
out due warning to the nation, with the consent of Sar- 
dar Vallabhbhai I have taken the liberty of placing the 
amendments before the public. There is no question of 
threat or ultimatum behind the amendments. It will be 
open to the Subjects Committee and then to the Congress 
to reject the amendment, but I would warn them against 
so doing without the most careful considerations. 49
The changes proposed were as follows: The number of dele­
gates was to be reduced from 6000 to a maximum of 1000,elected 
not according to the population of each province but in accor­
dance with the number of Congressmen in the Congress register, 
in the ratio of one delegate to every 1000 or more Congress­
men. Voters would have to be registered for at least six 
months before exercising the vote, and delegates would repre­
sent constituencies from which they were elected and no other 
area. These delegates would become the AICC for the year, 
and delegates from each province would become the PCC members 
in their respective provinces. Calcutta would be a separate 
province like Bombay. The PCCs would be in charge of creating 
the organisation of district and taluka Congress Committees.
To strengthen the Working Committee the President would have 
complete power of appointing his colleagues. The reason was 
elaborated by Gandhi:
The idea is to save time and some degree of vexation.
Not to accept the recommendation of the President in 
such a matter would be a vote of no-confidence. No 
President can work if his colleagues are imposed on 
him. 50
At the Bombay session of Congress,Gandhi moved his amen­
dments which were passed for the most part except that the
139
figure for delegates was agreed at 2000 and the AICC was re­
duced to 166. The 1934 amendments to the Congress Constitu­
tion were significant, given the political background that has 
been described earlier. The aim was to make the Congress 
organisation compact and manageable and to give the Working 
Committee the power to run it in its own way. The stress on 
delegates being directly connected with the constituencies 
from which they were elected made local leaders in provinces 
important, and if the Working Committee was composed of mem­
bers who were extremely powerful in their provinces and had 
control over local leaders, then clearly the entire Congress 
organisation would be at their beck and call. While the cen­
tralisation of the Congress was intended to give power to 
those persons who would be entrusted to run the Congress orga­
nisation, the ruralisation of Congress at the lower levels was 
intended to combat the propaganda of socialists and others rel­
ating to the Congress's lack of real interest in the masses. 
Gandhi intended to manouevre things in such a way that 
the entire Congress organisation would be equipped to meet 
political stimuli both from the Government and the people, 
and to combat adversity in a strong, silent and legitimate 
manner.
Patel acceeded to Gandhi's strategy relating to the Party 
but carried on his more forthright tactics as well. Socialists 
Deshpande and Purshotamdas Tricumdas suggested that Gandhi's 
amendments be circulated and then discussed at the next ses­
sion. Patel snubbed their proposal and said that the amend­
ments were the result of Gandhi's unparalleled maturity and 
experience which could not be matched by anyone else in the 
Congress. The proposal was defeated; Gandhi and Patel won 
the day. Gandhi had been at a moral advantage throughout the 
session having announced his retirement from active leader­
ship of the Congress and Patel had the tactical advantage of 
having Gandhi's full backing. The day after the session en­
ded, Patel was able to sneer at all those critics who had 
doubted the success of the Bombay session and had said that 
Congress had lost its influence. Those who had faith in the
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people and its leadership knew the Congress would be a sue-
 ^ 51 cess and it was.
Gandhian leadership in general and Patel in particular 
came in for much criticism after the victory at Bombay. The 
Congress Socialist Party continued its vitriolic attacks. 
Particular leaders condemned the move towards excessive cen­
tralisation of Congress; they saw Gandhi’s retirement as a 
ploy to make Congress disagreeable for non-Gandhiites and
regarded the constitutional changes as harmful to the Cong-
52ress mass character. T. Prakasam made a pointed attack on 
Patel, the no-changer, for not resigning from the Working 
Committee when the pro-changers' policy of council-entry had 
been adopted by the Congress:
It passes my comprehension how Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel 
who very recently declared in a public speech that if 
he had been outside the jail when the Parliamentary 
Board was brought into existence he would have preven­
ted it, would continue as a member of the Working Com­
mittee to carry on the Council Programme. 53
Prakasam advocated a change in the personnel of the Working 
Committee and also announced that Gandhi had promised to re­
commend to Rajendra Prasad, the new President of the Cong­
ress, that a Congress socialist should be appointed to the 
Working Committee. But the socialists were sorely disappoin­
ted for they were unrepresented.
The new Working Committee was announced on 31 October
1934. Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr. Syed Muhmud and J.B. Kripalani 
were to be secretaries, Jamnalal Bajaj was to be the Trea­
surer and the members were as follows: Vallabhbhai Patel,
Khan AbdulGhaffar Khan, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, Sardar Sardul 
Singh, M.A. Ansari, Maulana Azad, C .Rajagopalachari, Ganga- 
dharrao Deshpande, P .Sitaramayya and Jairamdas Daulatram.
No Bengal leader replaced the late Sen Gupta and Bengal was 
represented by Maulana Azad. It was said that with all the 
bickerings that had gone on between rival groups in Bengal 
over the choice of candidates for the Provincial Congress, 
it was thought advisable not to choose any one. Gangadhar- 
rao Deshpande was the only new name. He was a strong suppor-
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54ter of Vallabhbhai Patel. Thus*the new Working Committee 
was adequately strengthened to perform its new role.
While Patel was to keep the reins of the Congress orga­
nisation in his hands, Gandhi had devised his ingenious 
scheme to spread Gandhian influence as far out as possible, 
through the All-India Village Industries Association which 
he had set up...
....under the aegis of the Congress and as part of its 
activities, an autonomous organisation under the advice 
and guidance of Gandhiji...with power to frame its own 
constitution to raise and to perform such acts as may 
be considered necessary for the advancement of its 
objects. 55
The activities of the Association and the involvement of such 
powerful leaders as Patel in spreading its branches and pro­
moting its work led to the feeling among both government off­
icials and other political groups that the Village Industries 
Association was really a camouflage for political work. Gover­
nment viewed the whole scheme of Gandhi's retirement and his 
propagation of intensive village uplift with suspicion:
It has therefore most dangerous potentialities... Mr 
Gandhi contemplates a three fold attack in future. Con­
gress members of the legislature will do all they can 
to hamper 'repressive' action by government, the vill­
age organisations will be available for an intensive 
civil disobedience campaign, and the socialist left 
wing, which is gradually moving into closer touch with 
the communists will be the allies of the Congress in 
this campaign. 56
The Government circular from which the aforesaid extract had 
been taken was sent as a warning to provincial officers that 
Gandhi's new movement, with its emphasis on village indus­
tries, was really the move of an astute politician to rope 
in the rural masses for his next big revolutionary movement.
It suggested certain precautionary measures to combat the 
movement if the need arose and sought the opinion of the 
provinces on the appraisement and on the suggested precau­
tions. In the newly elected Legislative Assembly in January 
1935, the circular was attacked vehemently by Congress mem­
bers. Satyamurti said that Government's intentions of frus-
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trating Congress designs to represent the masses seemed irre­
concilable with their earlier declarations that Congress 
could only be taken seriously if it represented the people 
as a whole. The direction in which the Congress intended 
to go was further clarified in the Assembly:
We, speaking on behalf of the Congress here, undoubtedly 
claim to become the alternate government of this country 
as early as possible. Undoubtedly we are here to take 
over the government of this country. 57
Patel too intended to assert the claim of being the alterna­
tive government as soon as possible,except that while Satya- 
murthi had openly declared his aspirations a few years ear­
lier and had entered the legislature, Patel was working out 
a master-plan whereby Congress would be the alternative go­
vernment and he would be the leader of the Gandhiites politi­
cally (as opposed to morally and socially). References to 
Vallabhbhai Patel as a dictator became frequent from now on, 
but as long as Gandhi was on his side he had nothing to fear. 
The election campaign and programme were planned by Patel. 
Gandhi had pleaded ignorance of such matters when he had re­
quested Patel to ’create the climate suitable for me to get
58out of the Congress'. He knew he would have to depend on 
Patel and his allies to take the Congress to electoral vic­
tory. 'I haven't the slightest idea how elections are fought'
he admitted to Patel in August 1934 when he was discussing
59the new strategy of Congress with him and Prasad.
Throughout October 1934, Patel had been accepting or 
rejecting the names of persons who wished to file their nomi­
nation papers to stand as Congress candidates in the Assembly 
elections due in November. Each province was required to 
send the names of candidates to the Parliamentary Board which 
had the power to accept or reject them. In effect Patel's 
word was law. Over Bombay, Gujarat and Maharashtra,he had 
direct control and could even go so far as to recommend names 
himself. Even in other provinces Patel's sanction was neces­
sary. In the conduct of the campaign Patel addressed himself 
to people on all the subjects that were troubling their minds.
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Starting with Punjab, immediately after the Bombay Congress 
session, he then went to Bihar where Malaviya had done inten­
sive propaganda on the Award and had put up Pandit Jagat Na- 
rain Lai against the Congress candidate Anugraha Narain Singh. 
Bihar became particularly important in the fight (it was cal­
led the 'Kurukshetra' of the elections) because Malaviya was 
exploiting the sentiments of the Bengali Hindus in Bihar and 
Bengal by pointing out that Congress was not doing anything 
to safeguard Hindus’ interests and,what was more,that Rajen­
dra Prasad had not bothered to include a Bengali in his Work­
ing Committee. Patel had to painstakingly trace the history 
of the Communal Award and the proceedings of the Round Table 
Conference and to point out that when no solution to the 
communal problem was forthcoming at the R.T.C., Malaviya 
signed the document requesting the British Prime Minister 
to give a solution to the problem. This he did in the form 
of the Communal Award. Addressing Bombay's cosmopolitan 
crowds he said:
I want specially to remind the minority communities 
that the interests of every minority community are 
safer in the hands of Congress than any other party 
in the country. The Congress had proved this over 
and over again...the Congress is even prepared to 
risk being misunderstood by a section of the majori­
ty community rather than give up what it considers 
to be a proper attitude. 60
The conduct of the campaign enabled Patel to gauge the
0 1strengths and weaknesses of many provincial leaders. He 
was particularly perturbed by the failure of some leaders to 
provide the funds they had promised. In some provinces like 
U.P. and Bihar he made good the deficit that these breaches 
of promise caused. But he held those things against the 
leaders in question (in this case Dr.B.C.Roy who had promised 
to collect money for those candidates in these areas who could 
not produce money for themselves). In the election,Congress 
won 46 seats in an Assembly of 142 seats. At the time that the 
new Legislative Assembly began its session in Delhi in January 
1935,the Congress members in the Assembly decided that they 
would abandon their parliamentary independence and be governed
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by the rules and instructions issued for their guidance by
the Congress Working Committee, the AICC and the Congress
62Parliamentary Board. That implied that Bhulabhai Desai, 
the member from Gujarat, would only be the nominal leader 
of the party; he would get his orders from the leaders who 
formed the nucleus of the party. The implications of this 
were far-reaching and will become clear presently.
Having chalked out, with Gandhi, the method and manner 
of gaining supremacy for Gandhiites inside and outside Cong­
ress,Patel now set about implementing the scheme in stages.
At the end of 1934 and throughout 1935, despite an attack 
of jaundice in the summer and of piles in the winter, he was 
active in equipping Congress as a party for the coming poli­
tical events and developments. He did this both by positive 
steps geared towards strict discipline in the party and nega­
tive acts designed to keep out those individuals and groups 
that had doubts either about Congress policy and strategy or 
about Patel's methods. It was an opportune moment for Patel 
to reinforce his own political strength at the provincial 
level which had been the key to his success. Last but not 
least, the intrusion of socialists into Gujarat was a factor 
that spurred him on to establish greater control over the 
Gandhiites in the area. Anyone who came in the way was not 
likely to be treated gently.
In December 1934, Patel toured Gujarat. He relied hea­
vily on Gujarat when he calculated his strength and, there­
fore, was anxious to reestablish his contacts in the area 
after an absence of two and a half years. The socialists 
had set up a branch of the Congress Socialist Party in Guja­
rat and were seeking a direct contact with the people, in 
accordance with their policy of mass mobilisation. Other 
newcomers had also made attempts to gain quick political 
influence in Gujarat and Patel looked disdainfully at such 
opportunists:
Whatever policy the Congress had adopted inside or out­
side the Legislature one thing is certain, that Congress 
will not allow self-seekers to get positions of influence 
and power as far as it can help. 63
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Patel had received reports of some Gujarat leaders trying 
to develop and strengthen their own political links. A meet­
ing had been held in Broach on 22 April 1934 at which promi­
nent Congressmen from all parts of Gujarat were present.
Among other things,every effort was made by these leaders to 
reassure the Gujarat peasants that Congress would ensure that 
they were adequately compensated for what they had lost in 
their fight for Congress. Chandulal Desai took charge of a 
committee to collect funds for farmers. An assessment of 
the farmers' losses was made in detail; losses as a result 
of attachment or confiscation of land during the civil dis­
obedience movement were calculated. Chandulal Desai issued
a public statement that nearly Rs.500,000 were required and
64of that sum Rs.100,000 were needed immediately.
All these appeals appeared to be directed at restoring 
Congress prestige and glory as well as that of particular 
leaders in the provinces. As time went on and Patel himself 
returned to Gujarat, he did not look very favourably upon 
what he considered encroachments by men like Chandulal Desai. 
Chandulal's quest for mass support in Gujarat was resented 
even more because he had made expressions of public support 
for the socialists. In a speech in Bombay on 28 April 1935 
at the monthly flag salutation ceremony at Congress House, 
on the Congress platform, Chandulal commended the spread of 
socialism in Gujarat and criticised Patel's rigid stand on 
the subject. His criticism of Congresss's prevailing policy 
and programme was made in clear terms:
...the impression that I gathered at the Jabalpur meet­
ing (of the AICC) was that there was a deliberate atte­
mpt at crushing the socialists. Whatever opinion one 
might have about the ultimate goal of the country, I 
for one assume that it is going to be a socialist state.’
He went on to say that the Council-Entry programme was a mis­
take and would achieve nothing.
The country is at present not looking to the Assembly 
or the councils for its solution. It is waiting for 
the release of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. I am sure 
that immediately after his release the whole politi­
cal atmosphere is going to change. 66
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Patel took this as a personal affront and admonished Chandu­
lal Desai for his lack of understanding of the prevailing
67situation of capitalism and of those who believed in it.
As the year went on,Patel's differences increased; not 
only with Chandulal Desai but also with other Gujarat leaders 
like Morarji Desai, Darbar Sahab and Dinkarrao Desai. Morar- 
ji Desai and Vallabhbhai Patel clashed over the use of the 
Gujarat Peasants' Relief Fund. Morarji and his supporters 
wanted farmers to receive some amounts no matter how meagre, 
to enable them to be satisfied enough to continue to support 
the Congress. Congress resources were limited and could only 
be distributed to a small section of farmers,thus leaving a 
large section of them dissatisfied. Patel felt it was better 
for Congress to withhold the distribution of funds altogether 
than incur hostility of those who would not receive any. The 
Government observed these differences between Gujarat leaders 
closely and attributed them to Patel's autocratic and high­
handed manner and the power he had gained as a result of Gan­
dhi 's full confidence in him, which in turn was also related 
to Patel's strength in Gujarat. They analysed the situation 
as follows:
It is also reported that as Vallabhbhai had earned an 
all-India reputation, he had neglected his co-workers 
in Gujarat....It is a curious fact that though such 
dissensions are known to Gandhi, he had not come over 
to pour oil on troubled waters, on the contrary he had 
given Vallabhbhai a free hand in Gujarat. One may 
perhaps be permitted to speculate and wonder if the 
tail is now wagging the body. 68
This analysis was partly true. Patel had been given a free
hand in dealing with dissenters; and that did encourage him
into an attitude of intolerance towards rivals and opponents.
Immediately after his release when he returned to Gujarat
and observed the internal bickerings among some leaders, and
described the scene to Gandhi, the latter replied: 'I fully
understand your impatience regarding Gujarat. Do what you 
69think fit'. Patel had rewarded many of the Gujarat leaders 
by placing them in key positions in the local PCC. More than 
this he did not intend to do. They were expected to remain
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followers, a role which not all of them accepted. Patel felt 
perfectly within his rights to tackle as he deemed fit any 
political persons or groups that obstructed his plans. As 
President of the Gujarat PCC he had the authority to deal 
with local leaders firmly, and it was this firmness that some 
leaders resented. In letters to Darbar Sahab on 9 and 11 
January 1935 and to Morarji Desai and Chandulal Desai on 7 
November and 17 December 1935, Patel expressed sorrow at his 
colleagues' suspicions and indicated that contrary to their 
belief he had no love of office. To Chandulal Desai he exp­
ressed regret that his colleagues were mistrusting him:
I am deeply distressed at the poison which has now 
spread into the political life of Gujarat...I have 
become disillusioned and I can see that it is now 
my duty to move out of Gujarat. Once that happens, 
everyone will have complete f reedom of action and 
they will have an opportunity of getting rid of 
their unjustified suspicion and distrust of me. 70
He was prepared to resign and indicated that to Dinkarrao 
Desai on 31 December 1935:
By my continuing in office in the Provincial Committee 
...there is a possibility...of an increase of hostility 
and misunderstanding....That is why I think that if I 
resign, things will become easier. 71
Meanwhile,the socialists continued to try to undermine 
Patel's political base. In a public meeting under the aus­
pices of the Gujarat Congress Socialist Party, they had said 
that the struggle for real independence depended on the con­
scious organisation of the masses, and that Congress Village
Industries work could not get swaraj; nor could their pro-
72gramme of council entry. They repeated their allegation 
a year later at the Gujarat Congress Socialist Conference 
at Ahmedabad on 22 and 23 June 1935 when they passed resolu­
tions that were designed to lower Congress's prestige. Apart 
from calling Congress's council entry programme an alliance 
between the imperialists and the native exploiters, the so­
cialists demanded the abolition of Indian States, called for 
the cooperation of States' subjects in the struggle for inde­
pendence and declared that the activities of the Village 
Industries Association were detrimental to the country's
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interests because they would not solve the problem of the 
peasantry and were likely to mislead the revolutionary ele­
ments in the c o u n t r y . ^
In a cordial letter to Patel, Narhari Parikh presented 
his analysis of the aftermath of the Socialist Conference in 
Gujarat. To him the attraction which the young felt for 
socialism was quite natural; it was strengthened, however, 
by the weakness of the Congress as it functioned at the ti 21. 
Patel was not convinced by this reasoning. He went ahead 
with his plan for Congress to permeate as many areas in as 
many ways as possible. In some areas, vertical mobilisation 
was attempted through existing elites such as dominant castes; 
in others, horizontal mobilisation based on shared interests 
and economic influence was sought. The cellular approach 
was also tried through ashrams that were specially set up in 
some places and people were encouraged to go to these ashrams 
to seek help and to learn Gandhian ways.
In the Surat district, Congressmen took up the work of 
arbitration in civil, criminal and social disputes. In Kaira 
district, the Village Industries Association scheme was intro­
duced in the Matar and Thasra talukas. Institutions related 
to this scheme were also started in West Khandesh district. 
The Gujarat Prantik Samiti started the organisation of far­
mers' unions first in North and South Daskroi talukas of the 
Ahmedabad district. The idea was that if these proved to be 
of some value, unions would be formed in other talukas too. 
Congress leaders in Gujarat purchased 1000 bighas of land in 
Kathwada in the Baroda State adjoining Ahmedabad to rehabi­
litate the peasants of Ras who lost their lands in 1930-31.
The Government did not look favourably on this move, for 
accompanying it was the intention to have Kathwada as the 
headquarters of the All India Village Industries Association 
for the Ahmedabad district, so that Congress work could be
carried on from there without interference or fear of confis-
75cation of property. The Borsad plague epidemic also gave 
Patel and the Gujarat Congress a chance to raise their stock 
among the local community. Local Congressmen took the oppor­
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tunity to decry the lack of effort on Government's part in 
alleviating the villagers' plight at the time of the epide­
mic and assured the people that Congress would not fail them 
as the Government had done.
This spurt in Congress activity, intended primarily to 
counteract the interests of the socialists in Gujarat, did 
have some effect on the people, but relative to the method 
that was adopted. Where Congress set up arbitration work 
the point was to present Congress as an alternative or subs­
titute government and thus impress the people. In so doing, 
however, district Congressmen only limited the social charac­
ter of the Congress by allying it to those elites who could 
enforce decisions through social sanctions or influence in 
each locality. It is this very character of Congress that 
socialists were critical of; hence this method did not really 
meet the socialists' criticism. The scheme to set up farmers' 
unions was limited to areas around Ahmedabad. Its limitation 
lay in its orientation towards redressing grievances of far­
mers against the Government - such as confiscation, remiss­
ions of revenue and so on. This plan focused on landed pea­
sants and not the landless and was not directed against the 
ills of the social or economic structure of society which the 
socialists were trying to tackle. The work done through the 
Village Industries Association was probably the only one that 
came near to looking at the problem from the viewpoint of the 
under-privileged,on whose behalf the socialists claimed to 
be fighting. It was this Gandhian activity that gave Cong­
ress enough strength to overawe both government and socia­
lists. It showed up government deficiencies and highlighted 
its shortcomings both by redressing local grievances and 
carrying on propaganda against government activities. Gover­
nment admitted indirectly that its efforts were inadequate:
It had been represented that there is considerable 
scope for sympathetic attention and assistance on the 
part of government. If local grievances were atten­
ded to and local wants supplied not necessarily at 
great expense, there would be a reaction in favour of 
government. 76
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Gandhi's and Patel's involvement was taken as a challenge 
and Government sent instructions all over the country that 
the Congress programme would have to be forestalled. Govern­
ment also made its own investigation about the local condi­
tions in villages to take over some of the activities that
the Village Industries Association was carrying on for the
77benefit of the villagers. Special mention was made of 
the case of the plague epidemic in Borsad taluka where all 
the work done by Congress and particularly Patel was effec-
78tively publicized and Government's measures passed unnoticed.
Congress had opened a special plague hospital and Patel went
around the villages supervising the work that was being done.
Government looked upon Congress activity in these areas as
directed against them. It was nervous about the increasing
strength of Congress and made some gestures to match Gandhi's
Village Industries Association. A sum of one crore of rupees
for the economic development of rural areas was sanctioned in
the budget presented to the Legislative Assembly in March 
791935.
Gandhi had given Patel a special commendation for this 
work in Borsad:
There are many such holes like Borsad into which fresh 
air needs to be introduced and we suffer because we neg­
lect them. What you are doing is the only solid work. 80
It was Patel's initiative that was partly responsible for 
restoring Congress's prestige. But, ironically, it was the kind 
of activity that the Village Industries Association did that 
Patel personally took least part in. In the administrative 
aspects-constituting its Board, selecting the President, cho­
osing the location for the head office and establishing the
81centres - Patel assisted Gandhi. But, in the actual work
of village uplift and in improvement schemes for harijans,
Patel had a minimal role. Gandhi entreated men like Mavlan-
kar, Ranchchodlal and Shankarlal Banker to try and get money
82for these schemes. Patel, Gandhi said, had too many bur­
dens already and, therefore, he did not want to trouble him.
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By June 1935, Patel had reinforced his hold over Gujarat 
and spread Congress influence in all those vital areas which 
had been considered important and where support had to be 
demonstrated. His stock in Gujarat was high. Gandhi was 
given a less demonstrative reception than Patel in the areas 
they visited at this time. Government officers pointed out 
that Patel was more in favour in districts like Kaira than 
Gandhi was, adding, however,that ’the venomous Patidar agita­
tor is more to the taste of the intriguing and turbulent Pati- 
83dar community1. It must be added of course that Gandhi had
left the field to Patel because much of what had to be done
required Patel’s skill; as he himself put it: ’I have given
an undertaking to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel that I should not
84meddle with the affairs in Gujarat’.
Factional disputes were prevalent in other provinces as 
well as Gujarat, and Patel's anxiety about Congress victory 
in elections led him to look quite intolerantly at the par­
ties involved in these disputes. Patel's involvement also 
related to his role in the selection of candidates for the 
elections. Patel was the one Gandhiite who laid emphasis 
on an appearance of unity at this stage. But, as said before, 
unity for him meant the imposition of the will of Gandhiites 
on those who were showing signs of striking out on their own. 
At no point do we find that Patel sought unity by accommoda­
ting dissent; the quest for unity became an excuse for asse­
rting his conservative views and maintaining the status quo 
in the Congress. The provinces which had shown signs of in­
discipline over the past year - factional fighting having 
been prompted by the decision to contest provincial elections 
- were chiefly U.P., C.P., Bengal and Madras. In U.P.,
there had been commotion at the Lucknow Congress Committee 
meeting in September 1935 and further disputes in meetings 
of the PCC at Kanpur, Saharanpur and Allahabad,and finally
at Lucknow, the last over the inclusion of particular names
85in the Reception Committee for the Lucknow session. At 
Aligarh,the District Congress Committee had split and two 
rival meetings had been held. Patel had not concealed his
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disgust over the behaviour of the Congressmen and wrote to 
the Congress President, Rajendra Prasad:
The U.P. crowd is behaving very badly and you must 
write to them strongly or take over control from 
them. They are disgracing us all. 86
Nagpur had posed problems at the end of 1935 when rival
Congress groups came to blows at meetings and police consta-
87bles had to be brought in to terminate the fight. Patel
expressed his displeasure towards this behaviour too, to
88Rajendra Prasad. Dissension in the Bengal PCC had been go­
ing on for many years. After the death of C.R.Das, J.N.Sen 
Gupta and Subhas Bose had formed groups and later B.C.Roy and
J.C.Gupta had carried on a rivalry for the supremacy of their
89groups in the PCC. But the politics of the Communal Award 
coupled with renewed interest in electoral politics had only 
exacerbated provincial trouble in Bengal. Finally in the 
middle of 1936, Madras posed a problem which led to C.Raja- 
gopalachari tendering his resignation from the Working Commi­
ttee. A dispute arose in August 1936, when the Chairman of 
the Trichinopoly Municipality had to be elected. Satyamurthi, 
President of the Tamilnadu PCC, had instructed local Congress­
men that P.R.Devar would be the Congress nominee and no one 
else must be put up as a candidate. At the election, Dr.Rajan 
an M.L.A. and a Congressman, proposed the name of Poonniah
Pillay (a Congress Councillor) and the latter defeated the
90official Congress nominee by three votes. A delicate situ­
ation arose. The Congress Working Committee was meeting in 
Bombay within a few days of the event and the Election Mani­
festo of the Congress Party had to be finalised and then 
announced by the AICC immediately afterwards. Patel tried 
to persuade Rajagopalachari not to resign so that the progress 
of the Party and the election campaign would not be marred.
He asked Satyamurthi to help:
We must persuade him to withdraw his resignation. Please 
put all your pressure on him and Dr.Rajan as also on 
other Congress friends there so that they may meet and 
find out some solution of these resuming difficulties.
It weakens the already disturbed Congress organisation 
all throughout the country. 91
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But Rajaji refused to withdraw his resignation. Direct dis­
ciplinary action against Dr.Rajan was also not considered 
advisable by Patel who felt that an amicable settlement would 
have to be found which would not tarnish the image of Congress 
in Tamilnadu and elsewhere. A meeting of the TNCC was held 
under the Presidentship of Satyamurthi, and Dr.Rajan and his 
supporters were asked to resign over the Trichinopoly affair.
At the ^entre, Congress politics revealed the confronta­
tion between Gandhiites and socialists in full measure. We 
have already seen in the first half of the chapter how the 
Congress organisation was prepared for the pressure from the 
left. It now remains to be seen how in actual fact the soc­
ialists failed to make much headway as a result of the politi­
cal methods and strategy of the Gandhiites and more particu­
larly Patel. The tenure of the CPB formed in May 1934 (for 
a year) expired in April 1935 and a new Parliamentary Board 
had to be elected. On 23 April,the AICC met at Jabalpur to 
elect the next Board. This meeting became yet another battle­
ground for Gandhiites and socialists on the issue of war, 
States’ people and office, the socialists pressing Gandhiites 
to take a clear stand. Patel was able to overcome the pres­
sure then and also at the meeting of the Working Committee 
on 29 July 1935, and the AICC on 17 October 1935. The Lucknow 
session crystallized Congress attitude on all the subjects 
that had been in the forefront - the reforms, the Communal 
Award, the left, office acceptance and the States’ question. 
The socialists did manage to be of sufficient nuisance value 
to the Gandhiites to make the latter try more than one way 
of handling them - placating or cajoling but never ignoring 
them at any stage. The 'war' between Gandhiites and social­
ists has been discussed by Tomlinson and Wilson in their 
92works. Socialists' strength in provinces like U.P.,and 
Bihar, their interest and relations with the Kisan Sabhas and 
trade unions, and their consequent attempts to put pressure 
on right wing Congress leaders into taking stronger stands on 
some issues than they might otherwise have done, does suggest 
that for sometime the Congress right wing was more than pre-
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occupied with socialists. For Patel, the existing problem 
of pressure from the left took a personal and somewhat irate 
dimension when Gandhi got Jawaharlal Nehru to be President of 
the Lucknow session of Congress in 1936, to placate the lef­
tists. Patel let out much steam at the Lucknow session and 
made no secret of his displeasure at Gandhi's attempts to 
humour Jawaharlal Nehru to keep him in the fold, and felt 
that without such moves the right wing's tactics had already 
borne fruit.
He made it amply clear also that he was not happy with
the ex^uberance with which Jawaharlal Nehru had propagated
/
socialism in his Presidential address, and took issue with 
him on a number of specific counts. First, in particular, 
while reiterating the Congress stand on the Communal Award, 
he explained that, to oppose it, Congress had to be prepared 
to fight the government as well as the Muslims. That was 
neither desirable nor possible. Even the socialists with 
their tall-talk and constant criticism of the Working Commi­
ttee's decision, he said, had taken a neutral stand on the 
Award and Patel wanted to know whether that was to 'help the 
cause or was it a vote catching device'. Secondly, he met 
Nehru's slanted references to the right-wing High Command by 
assuring him that the members of the Working Committee were 
not personally interested in Council-Entry or the acceptance 
of office. Referring to Rajendra Prasad and himself he said 
that they were as interested in revolution as any socialist, 
but not interested in destruction. Men like him, he said, 
also had sacrificed their careers and were inspired with the 
same fire of revolution. They intended to participate until 
they found that their bones had grown too weak; they would 
then retire into the jungles. Patel pointed out that Jawahar­
lal or his socialist friends were not alone in regretting the 
change in Congress tactics from non-cooperation to Council- 
Entry. But the entire situation had changed and Gandhi's 
decision for Council-Entry had been taken after taking into 
account all the new political developments and postures of 
the political groups in the country. Reiterating his faith
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in Rajendra Prasad, Patel said that the former had travelled 
all over the country during the preceding eighteen months 
and had carefully observed the conditions and attitudes eve­
rywhere. He had reached the conclusion that office acceptance 
had to be undertaken if it strengthened the country. Jawahar­
lal Nehru on the other hand had been in jail and abroad much 
of that period and was ill-equipped to give concrete remedies 
to the new problems. It would be immature and unwise to under­
estimate the strength of the enemy. The British had framed 
a constitution after thorough research into the prevailing 
political situation and had borne in mind and anticipated 
many of the moves that Congress might make. To fight that 
Constitution without thought and deliberation would be, in 
Patel's opinion, suicidal. That was the problem; instead of 
strengthening the organisation, fighting the elections and 
revitalizing the movement, members of Congress were busy qua-
relling among themselves. That would only lose them seats
93at election time.
Between the Lucknow session in April 1936 and the Faiz- 
pur session in December 1936, minor incidents kept occuring 
which increased suspicions among both right and left wingers 
in Congress. For example, Patel and his supporters resented 
Nehru's suggestions that various special committees should 
be appointed for causes related to peasants and workers, and 
that Congress should see to it that only such Congress mem­
bers are included in these committees who had direct
94contact with labour. Then, again, on 18 May 1936, Nehru 
made a speech in Bombay in which he tried to save himself 
from the attack that there were no women in his Working 
Committee by saying that his Working Committee was not of 
his choosing:
The responsibility of choosing the Working Committee 
members rests with the President and you all know what 
the situation was at Lucknow. You must know the price 
I had to pay for my views and I will have to continue 
to pay such price. Choosing the Working Committee 
members was not so easy...I, as President, encountered 
many odds...my wishes were not carried out. 95
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Reactions to this blunder were strong. Gandhi, Patel, Pra­
sad, Rajagopalachari - all protested. Patel's resentment in 
this matter was merely an extension of his disapproval of 
many of Nehru's ways. Moreover, Patel could have been Presi­
dent at the next (Faizpur) session but for the policy of 
keeping the left happy by electing Nehru. Above all, he was
unhappy that Nehru had 'put us in the wrong before the pub- 
96lie'. Rajendra Prasad, Patel and Rajaji corroborated each 
others' disapproval of Nehru's style; Patel wrote:
I can't stand the attitude of injured innocence he had 
assumed regarding the nomination of members on the 
Working Committee...Rajaji feels equally strongly. 97
When Gandhi intervened and wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru asking
him to clarify his position, the latter sent explanations
which Patel refused to 'swallow'.
It is a humiliating position in which I for one would 
not agree to stay at any cost. He was expected to act 
honourably with his colleagues and if he cannot do so 
or if he feels that we are a drag on him we must clear 
the way for him. 98
On 29 June 1936, despite Gandhi's earnest efforts, seven mem­
bers of the Working Committee resigned; but, two days later 
the letter of resignation was withdrawn. It had achieved 
its purpose of binding Nehru to the opinion of the majority. 
Patel rubbed in the latter point when he declared for the 
benefit of others that henceforward Nehru would put the party 
above all and would endorse a majority decision even if it 
was repugnant to him.
At the Working Committee meeting at the end of June 1936, 
Nehru's public utterances again came in for discussion. All 
through May and June he had been giving speeches insinuating 
that there were certain persons in Congress who did not beli­
eve in socialism; but stating that he was firm in his mind
that that was the goal of Congress, and without it the poli-
99tical democracy that was being talked about was a sham.
But by this time Patel had realised that he would have to 
extricate himself from unnecessary controversies with the 
adversaries lest they undermine the strength of the organi-
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sation in forthcoming elections. Inaugurating the election 
campaign on 7 July in Bombay, Patel indicated what the prio­
rities for Congress were at that time:
Outside the Congress there are many who are interested 
in seeing Congressmen engage themselves in fruitless 
controversies or stand divided. But we, who have fought 
many battles of endurance, hardship and suffering, can­
not be expected to be easily led astray. For the first 
time, except in the case of the last elections, the 
Congress in its history in the last fifty years had 
decided to capture the Legislatures and no Congressmen 
can afford to ignore the effect that failure or succ­
ess of the Congress at the polls will have on its 
prestige and position. 100
Thus, although he was fighting socialism all the time 
that he ran the Congress organisation, for the brief period 
during which winning the elections was the goal, Patel advo­
cated the avoidance of quarrels. For that reason he withdrew 
from the contest for Presidency of the Faizpur session of 
Congress that year:
For the present there should be no divided counsel but 
perfect co-operation amongst all forces that are found 
in the vast national organisation of ours for achiev­
ing independence.... I therefore withdraw from the con­
test for Presidentship of the Faizpur session of the 
Congress. 101
He did, however, take pains to convey that his withdrawal 
did not mean that he endorsed Jawaharlal Nehru's views; in 
fact he wanted people to be fully aware that 'on some vital 
matters my views are in conflict with those held by Pandit 
Jawaharlal'. He said that he did not believe in the inevita­
bility of the class war. Gandhian truth and non-violence 
could convert many exploiters who were mercilessly exploiting 
the masses. Speaking from firsthand knowledge of the peasan­
try he insisted that the peasants would awaken to a sense of 
their terrible condition and fight for their rights by the 
effective methods taught by the Gandhians:
Being a farmer myself and having identified myself with 
the peasantry for years I know where the show pinches, 
but I know that nothing can be done except by the power 
of the people. Fortunately we have learnt what non­
violence non-cooperation can do. When people learnt
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that art of withdrawing their co-operation from the 
forces of evil, it will perish from want of nourish­
ment. 102
Moreover, Patel took great pains to point out that his ges­
ture should not be interpreted as meaning that Jawaharlal 
Nehru had greater powers than were possessed by the Presi­
dent's office:
The Congress President has no dictatorial powers. He 
is the Chairman of the well built organisation...The 
Congress does not part with its ample power by elec­
ting any individual no matter who he is. 103
The real power in Congress had been placed in the hands of 
the Working Committee at Lucknow. It will be seen that the 
Working Committee further strengthened its hands by the rules 
of discipline agreed at Faizpur. Patel had a plan and his 
reasoning may be seen to have gone something like this: the 
socialists had admittedly captured support among workers, 
students and other sections of society; but they could be 
contained if Nehru were made President for a second time.
Nehru could be more or less controlled by the Working Commi­
ttee. And thus, if open controversy were avoided and the 
voters successfully wooed?there would be victory at the polls 
which would rebound to the credit of the Gandhian Congress. 
The strategy of 1934 depended on this victory, and other 
matters would be sorted out later, when it was supposed the 
Gandhians would be in a position of even greater strength.
An advantage of this approach of course was that many on the 
left agreed that the elections had to be won. At the Faiz­
pur session Nehru provoked the right-wing by disagreeing 
openly with Patel’s statement that if Congress did not accept 
office someone else would; he nevertheless managed to exer­
cise sufficient restraint to avoid an open quarrel.
As President of the Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee 
with the task of approving the choice of Congress candidates 
and supervising the entire election campaign, Patel was in a 
strong position to ensure the hoped-for outcome. He there­
fore refused to be provoked:
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I do not want to enter into a controversy about things 
which are expected to come about a long time hence. I 
am concerned about the immediate future. My business 
is to think about the next majority of the Congress in 
the legislatures, without the help of any party or 
individuals which happen to come into the legislatures.
By thus closing their ranks for the avowed object of winning 
the elections the right-wing leaders had made sure the orga­
nisation would not be changed. The Faizpur session saw a 
further increase in their strength when on the one major issue 
that was still hanging in the balance - office acceptance - 
their resolution was adopted?that the question would be deci­
ded by the AICC as soon after the Provincial Assembly elec­
tions as practicable. In Patel's mind the question of office 
acceptance had been answered in the affirmative, though he 
thought it impolitic to be too open about it at that time.
The subject was formally shelved in order that the actual con­
duct of the election campaign may not be tainted by accusa­
tions of power-hunger against Congressmen. But, the Congress 
Parliamentary Committee considered the applications of candi­
dates with their suitability for office in mind and was quite 
clear about the type of candidates that would win in each 
area and do well in office.
Indeed it can almost be said that Patel's efforts to 
appear to maintain unity at all costs averted the danger of 
a socialist takeover of the Congress organisation, and reim­
posed the old guard. Faizpur saw the beginning of a period 
of decline of the socialists' strength in Congress and other­
wise. Not only did they lose over office acceptance, but 
they saw the right-wing election manifesto endorsed. Then, 
the Working Committee passed disciplinary rules which were 
intended to keep in check all those who criticised Congress
decisions and which applied to all Congressmen, not only
105those in the legislatures. And it was not long before
these new rules were enforced. For example, Guru Raghubir 
Dayal, President of the Kanpur DCC, had refused to withdraw 
his candidacy against the official Congress candidate, Jawa­
harlal Rohatgi. The President, therefore, decided to suspend
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him from membership of all Congress Committees. Endorsing 
the action, Vallabhbhai Patel said:
The Working Committee has just framed rules of disci­
pline which are intended to be rigorously enforced and 
it is hoped that the Congress will not be forced to 
use them against responsible members. 106
Similarly, Patel sent letters to the Presidents of Andhra,
Tamilnadu and Kerala PCCs instructing them to ask N.G.Ranga,
a member of the AICC, to explain why he had circulated pledge
forms prepared by the Andhra Peasants’ Association among
Congress candidates of Andhra, Tamilnadu and Malabar and
urged them to sign these forms in return for support at elec- 
107tion time. Congress candidates in those areas were told
to pay no attention to such overtures and to confine their 
loyalty to the Congress manifesto alone.
For the conduct of the election campaign, Patel had been
delegated special powers, particularly in relation to Bombay
province. He exercised his authority fully and pragmatically.
He explained to the electorate again and again that it was
most vital that Congress capture the legislature, and urged
Bombay to give a lead as it had always done, and back Congress 
108solidly. He was confident that in the end the weighty
and influential elements of Bombay would carry the day, re­
gardless of any flutter caused by the socialists, and despite 
the dissatisfaction expressed in some quarters over his 
choice of candidates. Thus,trade union circles decried the 
Congress Parliamentary Committee’s rejection of the candida­
ture of R.S.Nimbkar and its choice of Jinnabhai Joshi for E 
and F wards, but Patel paid little attention to the disen­
chantment and issued a statement that the Parliamentary Sub­
committee was not obliged to give any reasons for the rejec­
tion of the candidates and that 'it is enough to say that
109nobody was in favour of Mr.Nimbkar's selection'. Some
critics felt that Maharashtrian candidates too had been ill- 
picked: the local leaders were rebuked for not having chosen 
a 'better lot'. Dissatisfied Congressmen were alleged to 
have said that candidates had been chosen in such a manner
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that only the right-wing had found their way in the list, 
and that the whole plan was to find men who were rich, would 
work the constitution and accept office when the time came.
Vallabhbhai stated the ultimate objective thus:
There is no difference of opinion about the objectives. 
All of us want to destroy the imposed constitution. How 
to destroy it from within the legislatures is the ques­
tion. It will depend upon the resources and the reso­
urcefulness of those men and women who enter the legis­
lature under the Congress banner....I can visualise an 
occasion when the acceptance of office may be desirable 
to achieve the common purpose....We might in the course 
of events be driven to such an acceptance. 110
But, it was evident that he was fighting socialism all the 
while that he ran the Congress organisation^ for that was the 
idea behind Gandhi's retreat and Patel's advancement. Beneath 
the facade of unity, there still lay his obvious differences 
with Jawaharlal Nehru,his rejection of the class war and his 
acceptance of the capitalist system; as he said: 'I do believe
that it is possible to purge capitalism of its hideousness'
To a Poona audience he revealed what we have already seen to 
be the thinking behind his work for the elections:
. .remember that those who are opposing us today will 
have to work with us tomorrow, for they are of us. Our 
greatest need is unity and our subjection is due to 
our weakness and our weakness is disunity. 112.
Thus, Patel travelled far and wide in Punjab, the North-West 
Frontier Province, Maharashtra, Madras and other areas : the 
energy with which he participated in the election campaign 
was matched by only one other leader, who may indeed have 
surpassed Patel in the zeal with which he canvassed. That 
leader was Jawaharlal. Patel's message of appeal for a united 
stand for Congress success at the polls was also a subtle 
denunciation of all those political groups or mushroom parties 
who claimed to be more representative of the peasants and 
workers than was the Congress.
Patel also wanted to demonstrate that his policy depen-
113ded on his own control over the party machine. At the
time when all kinds of allegations were being made against
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Congress over the choice of candidates, Patel assured the 
public that there was scarcely any need for misgivings in 
the matter because as the disciplinarian of the party he 
could say confidently that the Party's authority was suffi­
ciently rigid to prevent the Congress from being injured by
114what he called miscreants and betrayers.
The result of the elections was thus evidence of the 
triumph of the right-wing. It came as no surprise to Cong­
ress or its opponents or the Government. Congress won 74 
per cent of the seats in Madras, 62.6 per cent in Bihar, 60 
per cent in Orissa, 57 per cent in C.P., 59 per cent in U.P., 
49 per cent in Bombay , 32 per cent in Assam, 38 per cent in
N.W.F.P.,24 per cent in Bengal, 10 per cent in Punjab and 12
115per cent in Sind. Sections of the press had tried hard
to belittle the Congress at the last lap of its campaign by 
saying that the Congress had gone all out to win and had 
stopped at nothing. The criticism was of no consequence
and nothing spoke as eloquently for Congress as its own suc­
cess .
After the election, the Congress had to decide on office 
acceptance. The Working Committee decided at its Wardha meet­
ing on 28 February that if Governors gave special assurances 
that they would not use their special powers of interference 
or set aside the advice of their ministers in regard to their
constitutional activities, then Congress would form ministries
117in the six provinces where it had obtained a majority. The 
Government was duly informed of this decision. This pretence 
of reluctance fooled no one. The likelihood of office accep­
tance had been considered almost a year before when Patel 
had openly declared more than once that it might be necessary 
in the interests of the common purpose. Reopening the ques­
tion after Congress had got a majority was a tactical move.
In the first place,Congress was in a strong bargaining posi­
tion, and was hardly likely to forego the fruits of having 
gained a majority in so many provinces. Secondly, by drawing 
public attention to the Government's special powers, it could 
make Government somewhat cautious of their use. Thirdly, a
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certain amount of drama had to be enacted for the benefit of 
those who had accused Congress of being power-hungry. One 
more point rendered this move necessary. Ever since the 
Bombay Congress of 1934, with the change in the Congress Cons­
titution and the announcement of a parliamentary programme 
in the provinces, provincial leaders had been in a position 
to realise that more and more powers could now come within 
their grasp. Electioneering had also been very much a pro­
vincial exercise, and even national leaders like Vallabhbhai 
Patel, Rajendra Prasad and Jawaharlal Nehru were men who 
were deeply entrenched in their provinces and relied on pro­
vincial men to a certain extent. It was partly to re-assert 
central discipline, lest success at elections tempt the 
provincial leaders to assert themselves, that the Congress 
Executive wanted to show from the start that all vital deci­
sions beginning with the vital one of office acceptance would 
be made by the Working Committee. Socialists accused the 
Working Committee of assuming the role of a fascist grand 
council to which Patel promptly replied:
If the Working Committee was assuming the role of a 
fascist Grand Council, it was doing so under the lea­
dership of a first class Scientific Socialist (i.e. 
Nehru). 118
While the Government's response to the Working Committee 
demands of assurances was awaited, and the PCCs voted on off­
ice acceptance in the different provinces, the Working Comm­
ittee continued to tighten its hold. That the Congress High 
Command regarded the matter of the election of the Congress 
leaders in the new legislatures as a matter of vital interest 
was made clear by informal instructions to provincial leaders 
that the final decisions in the choice of such leaders were 
not to be taken without reference to the Working Committee.
The President of the Congress was reported to have expressed 
the view that the post of the President of the Party in the 
Legislature involved constant contact with Government, and
would not be given to any individual purely as reward for
119distinguished service. The interests of the party would
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play a role in the choice. Patel met accusations against the 
Congress High Command's dictatorial role in an interview on 
26 March. Impressing upon the public the need for complete 
unity in Congress he said:
All sorts of reports about control from the centre are 
speculative, imaginary and exaggerated....Provincial 
leaders would require no guidance to carry out the 
Working Committee's instructions on which there will 
be naturally, a uniform policy, nor is there any dif­
ference of opinion between leaders and members of the 
Congress. The Congress today is absolutely of one 
mind. 120
That this was not actually so became clear soon enough with 
the appearance of controversies directly involving Patel.
But, Patel went ahead undaunted towards the goal which had 
been clear to him for some time.
Having striven hard to see Congress in office, however,
it became important for him to ensure that they could take
up the opportunity. He expressed his nervousness to Nehru
over the stalemate caused by Government's refusal to give
121assurances to Congress. He was anxious to obtain some
conciliatory gesture from the Government and took pains to 
show that Congress intended to behave itself in office:
...if the assurances required in the AICC resolution 
are forthcoming there will be no hesitation on the 
part of the Congressmen to utilise the machinery of 
the Act in building up the strength of the nation 
by all legitimate means. 122
The stalemate on the provinces continued for three months 
during which time Minority Ministries were set up. The Con­
gress in the meantime mellowed its stand at the instance of 
Gandhi and agreed that Congress Ministries in each province 
would accept a gentleman's agreement from the Governor that 
the special powers would not be used as long as the Ministers 
acted within the Constitution. Certain parts of Linlithgow's 
statement of 22 June were considered satisfactory for the 
purpose of serving as an assurance. Linlithgow regarded as 
baseless the apprehension on the part of the Ministers that 
the Governor would intervene at random in the administration 
of the Province. Such an intervention was neither desirable
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nor advisable according to him:
Special responsibilities are, as I have said, restric­
ted in scope to the narrowest limits possible. Even so, 
limited as they are, a Governor will at all times be 
concerned to carry his Ministers with him; while in 
other respects in the field of their ministerial res­
ponsibilities it is mandatory on a Governor to be gui­
ded by the advice of his Ministers even though for 
whatever reason he may not himself be wholly satisfied 
that advice is in the circumstances necessarily and 
decisively the right advice. 123
On 7 July 1937, the Congress Working Committee decided 
on office acceptance. The Parliamentary Sub-Committee, under 
Patel's chairmanship passed the following resolution:
Resolved that in cases of emergency members named 
below be authorised to deal with matters coming within 
the purview of this Sub-Committee in the provinces 
mentioned against their names respectively:
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : Bombay Presidency (compri­
sing Congress Provinces of 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Bom­
bay City and Karnataka) ; 
Madras Presidency (compri­
sing Congress Provinces of 
Andhra, Tamilnadu and Ker­
ala) ; Central Provinces 
of Mahakoshal, Nagpur and 
Berar ; and Sind.
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad : Bengal, U.P., Punjab and
N.W.F.P.
Rajendra Prasad : Bihar
Patel had secured the victory of the Gandhiites, albeit at some
cost. He asserted that much of what the Gandhiites were 
doing was for unity and consensus. In fact this was not 
really so. Patel made no compromises or sacrifices of his 
underlying position at any point; whether dealing with 
groups or individuals, the treatment was the same - strict 
discipline and imposition of his point of view.
A significant feature of this period is the differences 
of style between leading Congressmen. There was a differ­
ence between Patel and Gandhi and between Patel and Nehru.
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At present, our concern is with the differences in their 
methods for ensuring that Congress was the primary organisa­
tion in the fight against imperialism. Strangely enough
there were more similarities between the methods of Nehru 
and Gandhi than were apparent. Both had identifiable, though 
different,goals for Congress and occupied themselves with 
these goals while undertaking political activity. Patel had 
made the pursuit of political activity itself his goal to 
a large extent, justifying it by saying that rhetoric and 
declarations of aims was no substitute for the effective 
handling of power politics. His pre-occupation with power 
politics increased with time, as the following chapters will 
show.
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CHAPTER V
MAINTENANCE OE CONGRESS DISCIPLINE 1936-1938
(i)
The Nariman Episode
Patel himself was caught up in a controversy soon after 
the elections in March 1937. The issue, which became known 
as the Nariman Episode thereafter, pertained to the election 
of the leader of the Congress Party in the Bombay Provincial 
Legislature.
K.F.Nariman was a prominent lawyer of Bombay who had 
participated successfully in local politics, finally becoming 
President of the Bombay Province Congress Committee. The in­
cident relating to his being rejected in the choice of the 
leadership to the Congress Parliamentary Party is important 
for a number of reasons. It typified both Patel's and the 
Congress High Command's strict control over provincial affairs, 
an indication of which had been given earlier in the steps ta­
ken to put down indiscipline among Congress members. It also 
revealed such traits in Patel's style of political functioning 
as ruthlessness and toughness,for which he was chosen to serve 
as the most effective 'hatchet man' of the Congress Party.
Maharashtrian Congressmen met in Poona on 9 March 1937 
and expressed the opinion that, as they were numerically the 
largest section in the legislature, they should exercise a 
major role in the choice of the leader of the Bombay Congress 
Legislative Party. On 12 March 1937, Patel convened a meet­
ing at Bombay of the Congress members of the legislature at 
which the leader of the party was elected. The proceedings 
that took place were subtly regulated and controlled by 
Patel. The show was stage managed; Vallabhbhai Patel made 
the gesture of withdrawing from the meeting to indicate non- 
partisanship 'but the meeting pressed him to stay'.'1’ Mangal- 
das Pakvasa, member of the Legislative Council, was proposed 
to the chair. The press was asked to leave and the proceed­
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ings for the election of the leader began. Gujarat had han­
ded over its authority to Patel who indicated that the Pro­
vince was not interested in the leadership. Gangadharrao 
Deshpande spoke for Karnatak as well as for Maharashtra 
because Shankarrao Deo, who was Maharashtra's representative, 
was not at the meeting. K.M.Munshi handed over the authority 
for Bombay City to Patel. He later stated in his deposition 
on the Nariman episode:
... I was one of those who appealed to the House to 
make the election unanimous and in accordance with 
the resolution of the Bombay members of the 10th I 
requested Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Gangadharrao 
Deshpande to ascertain the wishes of the members 
and find out the person who had the largest supp­
ort of the House. 2
Patel and Gangadharrao Deshpande had constituted themselves 
into a sub-committee which during a two hour period of adj­
ournment of the meeting ascertained the views of the indi­
viduals present. B.G.Kher and K.F.Nariman were the two can­
didates in the running. Kher's name 'was regarded as agree­
able' and Nariman's chances were clearly indicated as being
nil. When the meeting reassembled the sub-committee recom-
3
mended Kher's name which was carried by 'acclamation'.
Immediately after the meeting, disenchantment with Patel's 
choice began. Crowds gathered outside shouting 'Vir Nariman 
ki jai1. Newspapers began a tirade against Patel. Public 
protests were recorded against the manner in which Nariman 
was rejected. A meeting convened specially to record its 
disapproval of the method adopted in the election of the 
leader called upon Nehru as Congress President to intervene 
and reinstate Nariman as leader. It was asserted that demo­
cratic principles had been violated and that the preservation 
of unity was not a good enough reason for Kher to have been 
elected. 'Certain persons' in the party, it was said, were 
damaging the prestige of the Congress. Patel was severely 
criticised much to the discomfort of the Gujaratis in the 
audience.^
On 15 March 1937 Nariman issued a statement to end the 
speculation about his own attitude to the controversy. He
176
submitted to the will of the High Command although he admi­
tted that he would not pretend ’that events like last Friday’s
5
election do not affect one's personal feelings'.
When the Working Committee met in Delhi from 15-22 March 
1937 it was requested to consider a representation signed by 
the members of the Congress Party in the Bombay Legislature 
drawing attention to the agitation over the procedure of the 
election of the leader of the Party in the Bombay Legislature 
and asking the President to issue a statement deprecating 
the agitation. The Committee called Nariman and heard him 
at length. Nariman complained that Patel had taken the help 
of Gangadharrao Deshpande and Shankarrao Deo in influencing 
the Karnatak and Maharashtra voters. The Maharashtra mem­
bers had expressed their intention to elect Nariman as lea­
der and when Patel read about this in the Marathi paper 
Navakal and in other newspapers he was anxious and angry. On 
9 March he sent telegrams to Gangadharrao Deshpande and 
Shankarrao Deo asking them to meet him in Bombay on the 11th, 
a day before the meeting of Congress members of the Bombay 
Legislature. These telegrams which became the focus of high 
drama in the next few weeks were alleged to reveal clearly 
that a conspiracy was being carried on to keep Nariman out 
and get Kher in. To Shankarrao Deo Patel had wired: 'Poona
reports cause anxiety. Achyut you must meet me Bombay Thurs­
day . Vallabhbhai'. To Gangadharrao Deshpande he had sent 
the following message: 'Please meet me Bombay Thursday Valla­
bhbhai '
Nariman's allegations were regarded as unconvincing and 
the Working Committee stated that the agitation against the 
decision to elect Kher was groundless and should be abandoned. 
The insinuation that Patel had used undue pressure in the 
election was considered unfounded and the Working Committee
deplored the propaganda being carried on against him. The
Working Committee also passed a resolution by which the Par­
liamentary Sub-Committee consisting/r4.tel, Rajendra Prasad 
and Abul Kalam Azad was appointed 'to be in close and cons­
tant touch with the work of the Congress Party in all the
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legislatures in the Provinces and to advise in all their 
activities and to take necessary action in any case of emer- 
gency1.
When Nariman returned to Bombay on 23 March he clarified 
his position once again and appealed for an end to the con­
troversy, pledging his support and loyalty to the leader and
accepting as final the 1verdict of our Highest National Tri- 
g
bunal' . Patel had already been ‘cleared1 by the Working 
Committee. On 26 March his colleagues Gangadharrao Deshpande 
and Shankarrao Deo and Achyut Patwardhan gave him further 
backing and support in their indictment of those who were in­
dulging in ’malicious propaganda’ against Patel and the mem­
bers of the Bombay Legislature. They proclaimed that they 
and not Patel had made an effort to ascertain beforehand the 
views of the Congress members of the Bombay Legislature on 
the most acceptable candidate:
We desire to make it clear that Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel had taken no initiative in the matter and never
influenced a single vote in this connection. 10
The matter rested for a while but was stirred up again in 
May 1937. Nariman wrote to Nehru that he wished to bring 
to the latter’s notice some additional facts and information 
about the controversy. The letter was answered by Nehru on 
17 June because he was in Singapore when Nariman's letter of 
12 May reached him. In his reply Nehru sought to clarify 
that Patel’s two telegrams, which by then had been widely 
reproduced in the newspapers, had already been put before 
the Working Committee at Delhi. Explaining Patel’s reasons 
for sending the two telegrams Nehru pointed out that the 
eagerness that individuals had been showing to become Minis­
ters even before the office acceptance issue had been sorted 
out had become a source of great distress to all the Cong­
ress leaders. The Maharashtrian MLAs’meeting was considered 
a bad sign. He had issued a press note denouncing the MLAs 
attitude and Patel, who had expressed his consternation to 
Jawaharlal Nehru, despatched the two telegrams to Shankarrao 
Deo and Gangadharrao Deshpande. 'The action that he took*
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claimed Nehru, 'was entirely in accordance with our talks 
in the Working C o m m i t t e e ^
Nariman, however, persisted in his complaints to Nehru 
about irregularities in the method of handling the contro­
versy. On the one hand,he did not want the affair prolonged 
and on the other, he came up with fresh charges each time.
In essence, he wanted what Nehru called 'protection from
12this persecution'. Nehru assured him that the Working 
Committee would look into the matter, as he himself was at 
a loss to understand what actually Nariman wanted to be done 
at that time. Nariman was asked to come to Wardha on 7 July. 
He persisted in his allegations that Patel's telegrams to 
Gangadharrao Deshpande and Shankarrao Deo had sinister mo­
tives :
The object of summoning Gangadharrao was merely to 
secure his help and influence to bring over the Kar- 
natak members against me. And when the two 
telegrams are read together the motive and object of 
the first is also quite apparent. 13
He, therefore, demanded that an independent, impartial and dis­
passionate enquiry by a tribunal outside the Working Committee 
should look into the matter and give its verdict.
The Working Committee met from 5 to 8 July and the issue 
was again considered, after which Patel issued a statement from 
Wardha on 9 July. It may be noted that he had maintained a 
judicious silence on the issue since the issue began and now 
decided, with Gandhi on his side, to answer Nariman's alle­
gations. Patel revealed that on 4 March, a week before the 
meeting at which he was supposed to have brought undue pres­
sure to bear on the election of the Bombay Party leader, 
Nariman had come to see him and took him for a drive at Worli 
to talk to him about the ensuing election. He sought Patel's
help which Patel said he could not give; but he did promise
14not to jeopardise Nariman's chances if they came up. Nari­
man's rejoinder to Patel's statement of 9 July extended the 
controversy further and Gandhi castigated him for it. Nari­
man categorically denied that he had ever asked Patel for
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help in the election: ‘I was all along protesting against
the onesided and sedulous campaign that was being carried on
against me behind my back by certain people and had a right
15to demand an explanation’. Gandhi supported Patel's ver­
sion of the story and thus gave the lie to Nariman's denial:
Indeed you left me the impression that when you took 
the Sardar for a drive you did seek his help. And if 
I am rightly informed you sought the help of the oth­
ers also. What was wrong in it if you did? In your 
first statement in reply to the Sardar's you have al­
most made the admission. Nevertheless, if you accuse
the Sardar of lying, naturally it is up to you to
prove your case. 16
Nariman's grievances were described as imaginary. His legal 
acumen was put to doubt and his craving for office critici­
zed. His complaint that his 'claims were defeated' was ri­
diculed by Gandhi who said that public men had no 'claims'. 
The golden way, Gandhi insisted, was through selfless sac­
rifice and not through 'a baseless hysterical agitation'. 
Defending Patel to the hilt, Gandhi said:
The target of this agitation remains unharmed. The
Sardar had no parliamentary ambitions. He had no
ambition for leadership either. Nature had endowed 
him with certain qualities and he uses them. You 
won't find him going to the press and complaining 
if he loses hold on the populace. 17
Nariman’s vacillation on the question of the inquiry 
agreed upon with the Working Committee, and Gandhi's growing 
impatience with his increasingly excited statements, even­
tually resulted in an enquiry conducted by Gandhi and D.N. 
Bahadurji,a Parsi non-Congressman. Each Congressman or non- 
Congressman even remotely connected with the affair gave 
evidence. The issue became larger and was subdivided into 
two; first, an inquiry into Nariman's role in the 1934 elec­
tions when he was chosen as one of the candidates from Bom­
bay to the Central Legislative Assembly and when he was 
alleged to have betrayed Congress by not pursuing his can­
didature after it was invalidated for some technical rea­
sons by the Government; and secondly, an inquiry into the 
1937 elections for the leadership of the Congress Party in
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the Bombay Legislature, in which Kher was chosen and Nariman 
and his supporters began a campaign against Patel and his 
supporters. Patel submitted a statement of 25 pages on the 
first issue and 17 pages on the second issue in addition to 
some letters to Gandhi and supplementary statements answer­
ing Nariman's submission. Nariman's statement likewise ela­
borated on the two issues and met Patel's arguments on them.
In regard to the first, the fact was that Nariman and Dr. 
G.V.Deshmukh had been nominated by the All India Congress 
Parliamentary Board. Electoral rolls for these elections 
were published on 14 July 1934 and closed on 24 September 
1934. From 1 to 11 October nominations were permitted to 
be filed. On 6 October Dr.Deshmukh informed Nariman that 
the latter's name was not on the electoral rolls and that 
there was a discrepancy in the rolls about Nariman's address 
which had been put down as 45 Esplanade Road, whereas the 
address on his nomination papers was different. Nariman a 
few days later, informed Deshmukh that everything was in or­
der and Deshmukh thereupon filed Nariman's nomination papers. 
On 11 October Nariman realised that the address in the rolls 
was that of his brother's office, his brother's name also 
being K.F.Nariman. Despite Patel's request that he should 
not withdraw his nomination papers, Nariman withdrew them 
on the ground that to have allowed the nomination papers to 
stay on the record would be an act of deception or imperso­
nation. Nariman was accused of withdrawing to make place 
for another Parsi, Cowasji Jehangir, who was standing as an 
independent and, of not wanting to let down his commu­
nity. Nariman, however, insisted that he had been reluctant 
to stand right from the beginning for financial reasons:
I made it clear that in the then financial difficulties 
I would not be able to bear the great financial burden 
which the election would impose, but I was given to 
understand that some arrangement would be made with 
regard to that and on that understanding I agreed to 
stand. 18
Another allegation against him was that on polling day he 
brought about Munshi’s defeat. The Congress vote was supposed
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to be divided equally between the two candidates, Munshi and 
Deshmukh, to ensure the election of both. In the afternoon, 
Nariman claimed to have noticed that Munshi's elections see­
med certain but Deshmukh was lagging behind. At the request 
of ’some friends’ he went around the city to ascertain the 
position and at Dadar, Muzaffarbad Hall and other places 
reminded the voters of the Congress agreement of equal dis­
tribution of votes between Munshi and Deshmukh. Nariman was 
accused of disturbing the arrangements. In his defence he 
asserted that votes were wasted because Jamnadas Mehta, the 
Democratic Party candidate, had split the vote. Nariman 
thought it ridiculous that he was being accused of having 
tried to get Cowasji Jehangir elected; he had in fact once 
conducted an inquiry into the arrangement of bogus votes 
for Sir Cowasji Jehangir, who wrote to Gandhi that the rumour 
that Nariman and he were in collusion was baseless. They 
were on opposite sides of the fence and the only relation
that they had was that Nariman was his tenant ’and a good 
19one too'.
The inquiry committee was not convinced by Nariman's 
defence in this matter. His arguments for withdrawing the 
nomination papers were found to be weak as also his reasons 
for not checking on the information given by Deshmukh rega­
rding the discrepancy between the address on the rolls and 
that in the nomination paper. A verdict of ’negligence' 
was passed against Nariman in the case of the 1934 elections. 
The Parsi community did not react well to this verdict. 
Dinshaw Mehta wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru as President of the 
Congress:
...the whole Parsi community has been upset as much so 
as to lose confidence in the Congress which was brou­
ght into existence by the ceaseless efforts of the 
Parsis. 20
Dinshaw Mehta was reminded that 'the verdict in both affairs 
had been delivered by D.N.Bahadurji who cannot be accused of 
any communal bias, and if he had any it will be in favour of 
Shri Nariman, who is a Parsi rather than in favour of Shri
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Vallabhbhai1.21
On the second issue of the 1937 elections, statements
were handed in from many prominent people including Kher,
Deshmukh, A.B.Latthe, Shankarrao Deo, Hansa Mehta, L.M.Patel,
Achyut Patwardhan, K.M.Munshi, S.K.Patil, Cowasji Jehangir
22and Patel's nephew, Ishwarbhai Patel. The solidarity that 
was revealed in the support given to Patel was remarkable. 
But, apart from the result in which Patel emerged victo­
rious, a few interesting facts do need comment for they 
lead us to question some of the conclusions that were arri­
ved at in the indictment of Nariman and the victory of
Vallabhbhai Patel.
Patel asserted in his statement on the 1937 elections 
that when he went to recuperate after the elections in War­
dha at the end of February, Shankarrao Deo, Gangagharrao 
Deshpande and Achyut Patwardhan came to plead with Gandhi 
and Rajaji to persuade Patel to lead the organisation in 
Bombay. When Patel said that that was quite out of the 
question, they said that Nariman had to be kept out at all 
costs and that Kher should,therefore,be persuaded to accept. 
On Vallabhbhai's own admission,he did tell them that he 
considered Kher the best choice. The three leaders said
that in the normal course a contest between Nariman and
Munshi was expected and that Kher's entry was likely to 
embarrass Patel in view of the latter's leanings towards 
Munshi’. They were assured that Kher would be the best 
choice and that, in the event of his accepting, 'all others
might withdraw and there would not be any contest and I
23would be relieved of an unpleasant situation'. In view 
of the initial brief that Shankarrao Deo, Gangadharrao Desh­
pande and Achyut Patwardhan had received from Patel on the 
matter,there was little likelihood of any other candidate 
getting the High Command's approval and,therefore,by impli­
cation pressure had already been put on the choice of leader­
ship. It was known that Patel could be quite firm with peo­
ple who disagreed with him and had his own subtle ways of 
making them feel sorry. It was not difficult,therefore, to
183
/a
get MLAs to fall in line with the choice which was made 
known by Gangadharrao Deshpande, Shankarrao Deo and Achyut 
Patwardhan. Gangadharrao gave his account of the events 
to Jamnalal Bajaj who was ascertaining the facts for Gandhi 
when the matter was brought before the Working Committee.
That Patel did not want Nariman to be leader had been cle­
arly indicated to the three leaders, Deo, Deshpande and 
Patwardhan. But doubt had been expressed about Kher1s 
accepting the position and the three leaders had been ins­
tructed to get Kher's approval.
Nariman would have done well to lie low for some time 
and then raise his head at an opportune moment. Instead he 
decided to fight with a man who had far too many strong for­
ces behind him and on whose strength Gandhi had staged his 
retirement. Moreover, Patel normally did not take the first 
step in a dispute, but once attacked, spared no pains to 
counter-attack. Nariman's personality and reputation were 
severely damaged by the time Patel was through with him.
It was said that Nariman had taken pains to obtain copies 
of the two telegrams in a 'highly suspicious1 manner, although 
copies of the telegrams were deposited by Patel in the Par­
liamentary Board's office and then went to the Bombay Pradesh 
Congress Committee office where Nariman 'had a free access' 
to them. On 6 June 1937, when photocopies of the two tele­
grams appeared in the Kaiser-i-Hind with the purpose of 
'exposing Vallabhbhai Patel's bona fides', Patel made a tho­
rough investigation from the Telegraph Check Office in Cal­
cutta and the Post Master of Bombay and Ahmedabad about the
24leakage of the telegrams. He concluded that Nariman was 
responsible for obtaining them and making them available for 
publicity purposes. In addition to establishing that the 
telegrams were quite straightforward Patel maintained that 
the methods used by Nariman to obtain the originals of the 
two telegrams condemned him straightaway 'as a man unfit to
21hold any responsible post or to associate with as a comrade'.' 
'With devilish ingenuity, third class police court method 
was adopted and mean and fraudulent procedure was resorted
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26to1 by Nariman.
Nariman's campaign was directed against Patel but was
represented as an insult to the Working Committee. It nece-
27ssitated the use of drastic measures to end it. The autho­
rity of the Working Committee was thus channeled towards the 
entrenchment of Patel's own position. He was left more power­
ful than before. Nariman was put aside after long and uns­
tinting contributions to the Bombay Congress and largely as 
a result of Patel's bitter counter-offensive, and despite 
Patel's claim to have acted with moderation. He pointed out 
that any other man in Nariman's place would have been expe­
lled from the Congress for similar behaviour:
...but he belongs to a small and sensitive minority 
community and I understand the amount of patience and 
forbearance with which such a matter has got to be 
dealt. 28
Gandhi and D.N.Bahadurji gave independent judgments on the 
Patel-Nariman controversy which held Nariman guilty on all 
accounts. He was, however^ saved the humiliation of seeing 
the judgment published in all the papers upon making a public 
confession that he was in the wrong. Nariman issued the 
following statement:
I am convinced that in the matter of election of 1934,
I neglected my duty as a responsible office bearer of 
the Congress and gave some of my friends cause to feel 
that my neglect amounted to a grave breach of trust.
In the matter of election of the leader of the Bombay 
Parliamentary Party in 1937 I am sorry to confess I 
misjudged the general position. 29
But that was not all. At its meeting in Calcutta in Novem­
ber 1937, the Working Committee passed disciplinary measures 
against Nariman. Nariman,by then quite disgruntled, issued 
a statement proclaiming that the Working Committee measures 
were ultra vires and illegal, that the original resolution of 
the Working Committee dated 11 December 1936 which laid down 
the disciplinary rules required that the accused had to be 
given a chance to explain what was considered 'indiscipline' 
on his part:
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I am constrained to challenge the verdict of the 
Working Committee on constitutional, equitable and 
moral grounds and will take all steps that are open 
to me within the constitution of the Congress. 30
He resigned as President of the Bombay PCC in November
1937. Patel had made a permanent enemy of Nariman. The 
latter attributed yet another malicious motive to Patel for 
the decision to oust him from the leadership of the Congress 
Party in the Bombay Legislature. He tried to discredit 
Patel by making a statement to the effect that had it not 
been for Patel's interference the matter of forfeited lands 
in Gujarat, in which he was invloved^would have been amica­
bly settled in 1931 and the original owners would have been 
satisfied several years ago. Nariman claimed that in April 
or May 1931, Gandhi's secretary had sent for him and sought 
his help in restoring the lands to their original owners 
with the help of some influential Parsis in Bombay. Nariman 
arranged a meeting between Cowasji Jehangir, J.J.Vimadalal 
and a Mr.Garda, who had bought at least half if not more of
the forfeited lands in Gujarat. The meeting took place at
Bardoli Ashram where Gandhi was staying at the time. Garda 
agreed to sell the lands for about Rs.14,000 which was 
well below the market value. But Garda had already antago­
nised Patel in the first instance by his speedy purchase of 
the land when the Government had seized it; Patel had orga­
nised a boycott of Garda, and did not forgive Garda for his 
eagerness. Nariman narrated that:
The strained relations between Mr.Garda and Vallabh­
bhai were known to all. When he saw us with Mr.Garda
returning from the Ashram, he naturally suspected our
mission. 31
Intimidated by Patel, Garda broke off the agreement with the 
Parsis and the fate of the lands remained unsettled. When 
the Congress won the elections in Bombay in February 1937, 
one of the first things that Congress and more particularly 
Patel intended to do when Congress came into office was to 
restore the lands to the peasants. Nariman's contention 
was that he had openly stated to Congress colleagues that
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in fact Patel had ruined Congress's chances of speedily 
settling the matter. He had stated:
...that but for Vallabhbhai Patel, by this time the 
peasants would have long settled down on their lands.
I blamed the Sardar for the breakdown of those almost 
completed negotiations brought about after great dif­
ficulty some years ago; and those unpleasant remarks 
were obviously conveyed to him and they naturally 
caused him irritation and provoked his wrath. 32
Nariman's belated tirade against Patel was contradicted by 
the Secretary of the Gujarat PCC, B.D.Lala who ridiculed each 
one of Nariman's charges. Quoting extracts from the news­
papers of April and May 1931 Lala stated that the entire 
issue had been reported then, including a letter from Garda 
on 13 May 1931 and nowhere was there any mention of Patel's 
role in the breach of the settlement. Garda broke the 
agreement at the instigation of Government officers who did 
not want the lands restored and also wanted to see breaches 
of the Gandhi-Irwin truce. Lala also expressed amazement at 
the fact that Nariman had not mentioned this incident for 
seven years, not even on the occasion of the formal inquiry 
instituted against him in 1937, he went on:
I am in a position to state that in none of the volu­
minous statements and counter-statements published by 
him in the Press or submitted in the Gandhi-Bahadurji 
Enquiry, did he ever put forward this story. It only 
springs up now to furnish a fresh ground to explain 
his pet theory that he was ousted by the Sardar from 
what he considered his well deserved right to the 
Premiership of Bombay. 33
Nariman's estrangement from Congress was more unpleasant 
each time he tried to rationalise his stand on the issues 
over which he had crossed swords with Patel.
The idea that the way Nariman was dealt with would act 
as a deterrent to future dissidents did not bear fruit. Other 
provincial leaders did not take the intended lesson. As we 
shall see in the next section N.B.Khare, the Premier of the 
Central Provinces, came in for disciplining in the summer of 
1938, and was ousted from Congress by Patel and other mem­
bers of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee. Patel lost as much
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as he gained in these exercises. There was a further dis­
advantage for Patel. The importance of the Nariman episode 
does not lie simply in the personal rivalries within the 
Bombay Congress which were brought to the surface; or in 
the dictatorial manner in which Patel engineered both Nari­
man's dismissal and his 'political death'. Among the fac­
tors which had affected the leadership choice in Bombay 
were the numerical strength of the Congress party in the 
legislatures, the fact that the Maharashtra members formed 
the largest group in the party, and the pressures that were 
being put by the Maharashtrian MLAs and also by those from 
the Karnatak for a proportionate share in the Ministry.
These factors could not be taken into account with Gangadhar­
rao Deshpande (Patel's man) speaking for Karnatak and Maha­
rashtra, and with Patel (and a Sub-Committee) eliminating 
Nariman and declaring Kher the only eligible candidate for 
the leadership. Maharashtrian members in the Legislature 
were interested in Nariman's candidature. For them the as­
cendancy of Patel and his Gujarati stronghold created an 
imbalance in the PCC which they intended to redress in the 
legislature. Patel destroyed all these plans and lost much 
sympathy from Maharashtrian legislators as a result.
(ii)
C.P. Crisis
Among the political problems posed by the provincial 
ministries, the most crucial turned out to be that of the 
Central Provinces Ministry headed by Dr.N.B.Khare.
In the Central Provinces, unlike Uttar Pradesh and 
Bihar where the confrontation was primarily with the Govern­
ment over the release of political prisoners, the dispute 
was between Congressmen themselves, although the Governor 
was involved. The administrative unity that was the Central 
Provinces and Berar was a conglomeration of several Congress 
Provinces. Linguistically, it was composed of a smaller
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Marathi-speaking and a largerHindi-speaking area. The poli­
tics of the Central Provinces were faction-ridden. In the 
Marathi region the Gandhian movement had not caught on at 
first. The Hindu Sabhaites and Responsivists held sway. 
Leaders like Moonje and Waman Rao Joshi were the idols. Gra­
dually, Congressmen (Swarajists) like M.V.Abhyankar became 
the respected leaders of the region. D.E.U.Baker has dealt
adequately with the process whereby the influence of the
34Gandhian Congress spread in Nagpur. Two prominent recruits 
were Narayan Bhaskar Khare, a Maratha Brahmin Doctor and 
Nilkanthan Deshmukh, a Maratha landowner. The induction of 
these men, and the accomplishments of men like M.V.Abhyankar 
dislodged the hold of the 'Old Brahmin Tilakites1 over the 
Congress in Nagpur. Khare himself established a firm and 
widespread hold in Nagpur and in 1935 after Abhyankar's 
death became the leader of the Congress in Nagpur. Being a 
Brahmin,he could make sure the old support would not be lost/ 
and having non-Brahrain associates to help (like T.J.Kedar 
and G.R.Pradhan), he got new support for Congress as well.
It might be mentioned that his compromises with Responsivists 
and Mahasabhaites on the issue of the Communal Award did not 
go down well with the High Command in 1936. He did,however, 
get Congress the support of agriculturists,both Brahmins 
and non-Brahmins - at the time of the 1937 elections. Land­
less labourers, workers and harijans, however, were not won 
over. An important fact of Khare's mobilisation during this 
period was that he gathered considerable personal support 
and made a name for himself while spreading Congress influ­
ence. This partly explains his later success in getting 
himself chosen as leader.
Mahakoshal, the Hindi-speaking area, was more faction- 
ridden than the other areas even without the complication of 
the Mahasabha and Responsivist angle. Ravi Shankar Shukla 
on one side and Govind Das and D.P.Mishra on the other hea­
ded two rival groups of active politicians. R.S.Shukla 
stood against the Congress candidate Shiv Das Daga, in the 
1926 elections and lost. He then participated in the Civil
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Disobedience movement to redeem his image in the eyes of the 
national Congress leaders. In 1934, he became President of 
Mahakoshal Provincial Congress Committee and was aided in 
this by D.P.Mishra. At a meeting of the PCC at Bilaspur,
R.S.Shukla consented to step down from the Presidency and 
proposed, not Govind Das, but Daga. Another name, that of 
Awadesh Singh, was also proposed by a delegate. Angered 
by the puerile attitude of some leaders, Govind Das withdrew 
with wounded pride. Daga did likewise. But Singh stayed in 
the running and was,therefore,declared elected.
Before the provincial election in 1937, the Mahakoshal 
Provincial Election Committee, with Chaturvedi, a noted Hindi 
poet, as its President, was able to reach unanimity in nomi­
nating most of the Congress candidates. In about a dozen 
disputed constituencies two sets of names were sent to the 
Central Parliamentary Board - in effect to Vallabhbhai Patel. 
In all these disputed cases when the final choices were made 
only Shukla's nominees were on the list. D.P.Mishra was 
quite put out and resigned the secretaryship of the PCC and 
the Election Committee. Govind Das also resigned.
Khare too had grievances against Patel over the selec­
tion of candidates. In his list,Bhikulal Chandak's name 
was substituted for that of P.D.Markare and Patel gave no 
reason for the change. Khare called this a 'highly irregular, 
improper and unconstitutional' act and voiced his resentment 
at the Faizpur session in December 1936:
...I told Sardar Patel in an open meeting of the All 
India Congress Parliamentary Board that this action 
of his was worse than the action of a British Bureau­
crat whom we all condemned, because, the British Bur­
eaucrat if he wanted to punish a person at least gave 
him an opportunity to defend himself. Sardar Patel 
in this case did not follow this proper and necessary 
procedure. Of course, Sardar Patel could not tolerate 
this open attack upon him and from that time onwards 
he nursed a feeling of secret hostility against me. 35
In the Central Provincial Elections of 1937, Congress 
won 72 out of the 122 seats. Of these Mahakoshal members 
won 42. They aligned themselves as a distinct group to exert
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pressure in general and for the election of a cabinet. N.B.
Khare became the Premier. Patel was accused of sending a
message to Ravi Shankar Shukla to see that Khare was not
elected the leader of the Party in the Central Provinces.
David Baker and B.R.Tomlinson both assert that Khare was
elected with the help of R.S.Shukla's rivals who wanted to
reduce Shukla's power and control in the Mahakoshal areas
where he had emerged as the most important leader. According
to these writers, Shukla's Hindi opponents combined with
Marathi Congressmen to elect Khare who was mutually accepta- 
36ble. D.P.Mishra gives a different explanation; claiming
that 'the Congressmen of Mahakoshal were Congressmen first
37and Congressmen last1, he contends that Mahakoshal had
neither a regional nor a caste bias and in electing Khare
the Mahakoshal members were following the established tra-
38dition of electing a man from Nagpur'. Shukla was rejec­
ted according to D.P.Mishra because of his past 'so well
39known to every member of the party'. Khare believed he was 
elected because he had 'the backing of the whole Legislative 
Party'; but clearly the reason lay in the rivalries that 
existed among the other groups, and also the fact mentioned 
earlier that Khare had managed to gather some personal foll­
owing while spreading Congress influence. In forming the
Ministry he was told that his choices should be approved
40by Vallabhbhai. As a result (with Patel's approval)
P.V.Gole and R.R.Deshmukh were chosen from Berar, R.S.Shukla,
D.P.Mishra and D.K.Mehta from the Mahakoshal and Yusuf Sha- 
reef from the Muslim community. The team was tension-ridden 
almost from the start. The cause seems to have lain as much 
with Khare as D.P.Mishra. Khare was elected with the help 
of the Mahakoshal leaders; but once appointed Premier, he 
began placing his own men in key places. He lost even the 
facade of support that men like Mishra and others had mana­
ged to put up for him. Mishra claimed to be victimised by 
Khare and was once again involved in a social scandal in addi­
tion to charges of corruption. The case of Mishra's missing
files and his visit to the Chandni Chowk prostitute became
41the local gossip for some time. There were allegations
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inspired by Khare and his group that Mishrafs appointments 
in the capacity of Minister for Local Government were parti­
san. An inquiry was set up to look into them. These and 
other cases seemed to indicate that Khare had begun a small 
campaign against some of the colleagues with the help of 
some of his supporters like T.N.Kedar and that this culmina­
ted eventually in his own defeat.
At the time of the election of delegates for the Hari- 
pura Congress in February 1938, Khare gave speeches in which 
he tried to meet the charges that the Ministry was weak by 
saying that the friction between the Governor and the Minis­
try was responsible for the weaknesses in the Central Provin­
ces Ministry. The British Government consoled itself that 
these charges were made to clear his name in the eyes of his 
Congress colleagues. But Khare's position did not improve.
Of twentysix places for delegates to the Haripura Cong­
ress, eighteen went to the Marwari group led by Jamnalal 
Bajaj and Poonamchand Ranka, and eight to Khare's group. Pre­
miers in other provinces won their elections with a clear 
majority; Khare had to struggle: he was not on top of his 
provincial list, but third after Poonamchand Ranka and Awari. 
The Marwari group had weight in the Assembly and being com­
posed essentially of capitalists and money-lenders> it had 
influence with the High Command. Jamnalal Bajaj had given 
financial help to men like Rajendra Prasad and also been a 
banker for Nehru. His personal influence was,therefore, 
considerable. There was simmering resentment against the 
group's importance, though an open breach had been avoided 
so far. The High Command sent messages to the different 
groups that disputes and differences should be sorted out 
rather than allowed to develop further. Government believed 
Mishra was waiting in the wings to oust Khare somehow; Shukla 
had agreed to back him and, even though he was persona-non-
grata with the High Command, he expected to force their hand
42by getting a majority in the Party.
After the Haripura Congress, grievances against Khare 
increased and by 8 May 1938, after a meeting of the Ministers
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during which Khare's administration came in for much criti­
cism, Gole, Shukla, Mishra and Mehta sent in their resigna­
tions, enumerating several cases of maladministration. They 
characterised the Home Department as weak and resented the 
fact that Khare did not take the advice of colleagues in vi­
tal matters. They decried Khare's lack of firmness in deal­
ing with the police over the issue of the Jabalpur riots, 
his subservience to the secretariat, and his suspicions of 
a colleague, Gole, in a matter of the sale of a licence for 
mining manganese ore. They thoroughly disapproved of the 
report sent by Khare to Patel dealing with the controversial 
action of Yusuf Shareef as Minister for Law and Order, a re­
port supposedly based on facts provided by the Deputy Commi­
ssioner of Wardha which the Deputy Commissioner denied subse- 
43quently. The Shareef affair had indeed brought much dis­
credit to Congress. Yusuf Shareef had reduced the sentence 
of Zafar Hussain, convicted of raping a minor Harijan girl. 
Hindus had pounced upon the incident to condemn the act of 
a Muslim. In response to Patel's demand for an explanation
Khare sent a report supporting Shareef and condoning his 
44action. Patel was worried about the incident on more than
one count. While Congress was made a target by caste Hindus 
for condoning a heinous crime committed by a Muslim, Govern­
ment made full use of the Shareef propaganda and tried to 
point out to the Minister that he had come in for all this 
criticism because he was a Muslim and that Congress was after 
all a Hindu organisation. The general feeling was that Khare 
was too busy trying to please the Governor and the bureaucracy. 
On receiving the letters of resignation, Khare tried several 
tactics with his colleagues ranging from cajoling to bullying. 
On 9 May, a truce called the Pachmarhi compromise was arrived 
at between Vallabhbhai Patel for the Working Committee and 
Khare, whereby Khare was stripped of his portfolios and 
required to work in conjunction with his colleagues. The 
arrangement was supposed to be endorsed at a Working Committee 
meeting in Bombay on 15 May. Khare wanted to opt out but in 
Bombay he had a bigger adversary in Vallabhbhai Patel. Patel
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had become disenchanted with Khare and with D.P. Mishra. He 
admonished Khare for holding an enquiry into the conduct of 
his colleagues and indicated that disciplining fellow wor­
kers was not Khare's job. Khare tried to go over Patel's 
head and met Gandhi on 12 June 1938. If Gandhi gave a patient 
hearing to Khare's accusations against his colleagues on this 
occasion, two weeks later he had been sufficiently influenced
by Patel almost to turn Khare out and reprimand him for trou-
45bling him over these matters. Khare should have learnt a 
lesson from Nariman and been cautious not to cross Patel's 
path. Now he had to face the consequences. The move and 
counter-moves in this drama culminated in the ousting of 
Khare and the installation of R.S.Shukla as Premier.
According to the Pachmarhi compromise the following sta­
tement had been handed in by the Ministers of Central Provin­
ces to Patel:
In response to the wishes of the Party, as expressed 
at its meeting on May 24, we met together and discu­
ssed all the questions of differences amongst oursel­
ves, some of them being temperamental, some due to 
differences of outlook and others involving questions 
of procedure regarding the internal working of the 
Ministry. We are happy to report that we have been 
able to amicably settle all our differences and have 
agreed to work in a spirit of comradeship and we feel 
confident that we shall have your full co-operation 
and support. 46
But Khare's problems with the Ministers continued. He was 
suspicious of them and all his actions indicated that some­
how, by fair means or foul, he intended ousting his Mahako­
shal colleagues. Earlier in Bombay, he had tried to convince 
Patel of the wisdom of getting rid of those Ministers who 
were not co-operating with him, but his efforts had failed. 
Differences with Ministers continued and the Pachmarhi com­
promise, which was discussed at several cabinet meetings, was 
not implemented. By mid-July, Khare devised another scheme 
to get rid of the unwanted colleagues. He decided to submit 
resignations on his and his colleagues' behalf with the inten­
tion that when he was called by the Governor to form a new 
cabinet then he would drop the Mahakoshal group and appoint
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his own team in their place. Gole and Deshmukh submitted 
their resignations on July 13; Khare then wrote to Shukla, 
Mishra and Mehta and asked them to resign. They refused to 
do so and in turn requested Khare at the instance of Patel 
not to precipitate matters and to wait for the Working Comm­
ittee meeting of 23 July to resolve the matter to everyone's 
satisfaction. Khare feared the worst at the Working Committee 
meeting and on 20 July sent in his resignations to the Gover­
nor. The three ministers who refused to resign were dismissed 
by the Governor on 21 July and some new members of the Cabinet 
were sworn in. The Governor's secretary issued a communique 
explaining the termination of the tenure of the three minis­
ters. It said that the ordinary practice was that the resig­
nation of the Prime Minister involved the resignation of the 
whole council of Ministers and, therefore, because the three
ministers had refused to conform to this practice, the Gover-
47nor had to take the unavoidable step of dismissing them.
When the Parliamentary Sub-Committee met on 22 July 
Khare and his new Cabinet colleagues were clearly advised to 
retreat while there was still time, for advancing any further 
in their plans would lead them nowhere and cause them harm. 
Khare consulted his new colleagues and conceded that there 
was no way out for him and for the cabinet but to submit 
their resignations to the Governor. The Working Committee 
that met on 23 July accepted Khare's resignations and also 
issued instructions to him to convene a meeting of the Cong­
ress Parliamentary Party on 27 July to discuss the issue 
and elect a new leader. Khare was also told not to stand 
for the leadership. This came as a shock to Khare. He had 
thought that he would make a fresh bid for leadership and to 
that end had asked the Governor not to take action on the 
resignations submitted by him and his colleagues until the 
27th when the election for the leader was due to be held.
When the Working Committee decided to prevent him from con­
testing the leadership, Khare retorted:
I readily obeyed the Congress Parliamentary Sub-Commi­
ttee as they told me that tendering the resignation to
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the Governor on July 20 was hasty and injudicious. But 
if they want to drive me out of public life as had 
been done in the case of Mr.K.F.Nariman, then certainly 
I will try my best to oppose that move. 48
On 25 July, the Working Committee expressly forbade Khare*s 
entry in the leadership contest; but Khare was adamant and 
even Gandhi's advice could not stop him. The Working Commi­
ttee thereupon formally charged Khare with indiscipline.
The election of the new leader of Congress in the Cen­
tral Provinces and Berar Assembly took place in Wardha on 27 
July. The members of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee were 
also present at the event and it was later contended that 
their presence was an objectionable feature of the programme 
which influenced the voting much the same way as Patel's 
presence had affected Kher's election in Bombay. There may 
have been some justification in the objection. A member pro­
posed Khare's name and on being reminded of the Working Com­
mittee resolution condemning Khare's behaviour, withdrew it. 
Ultimately, the contest was between Ravi Shankar Shukla and 
Deshmukh, and Shukla was elected by 47 votes to 12 ( 13 mem­
bers remained neutral). In his quest for eliminating oppo­
sition and establishing his supremacy in the province^N.B.
Khare had committed political suicide. He was now referred
49to as 'victim number two of Congress Fascism1.
The post mortem on this crisis carried on for some time. 
The Parliamentary Sub-Committee issued a charge sheet against 
Khare. Khare issued his defence which was answered by Patel. 
Of the members of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee, Khare sin­
gled out Patel as his bitterest opponent. He accused Patel 
of highhandedness and bias. Some of his objections were 
directed at the Congress Party's methods of functioning and 
had no effect on Congressmen who had accepted these methods 
as the basis on which Congress had fought elections and acc­
epted office. Khare wrote to the Congress President on 26 
July:
I am opposed to the further view that the Working 
Committee or Parliamentary Sub-Committee should dic­
tate to the Congress Parliamentary Party the choice
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of its leader. I hold the opinion that the Parlia­
mentary Party must be free to choose its own leader, 
and this choice should be free and unhampered. It 
must also be open to the leader to exercise his in­
dependent judgment in selecting his colleagues. 50
Khare also questioned the negation of the principle of joint 
responsibility, and the substitution of individual responsi­
bility to the High Command for joint responsibility to the 
Prime Minister. As Patel pointed out in a statement made 
earlier in August, Khare's criticisms of Congress methods 
seemed to have been made only when things were going wrong 
for him. From March 1937 onwards,Khare had accepted the 
advice and instructions of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee 
which had been appointed quite clearly 'to be in close and 
constant touch with the work of the Congress parties in the 
Legislatures in the provinces, to advice them in all their
activities and take necessary action in case of an emergen- 
51cy*. In the choice of his colleagues and in their dismi­
ssal (in Shareef's case) Patel pointed out that Khare had 
submitted to the will of the High Command and made no criti­
cism at that time. Dismissing Kharefs new found love for 
joint responsibility' as a hollow sham, Patel pointed out 
that there were at least two occasions when Khare should 
have resigned if he believed in joint responsibility -(1) 
when Shareef resigned at the Working Committee's behest and 
(2) when the Mahakoshal colleagues resigned on the ground 
of his inefficiency in May 1938. But he continued as Prime 
Minister and resigned on 20 July 1938 after formulating an
elaborate scheme to ensure that he would be called upon to
52form a new Ministry. That scheme was foiled by Patel and 
Rajendra Prasad and Khare's wrath was,therefore, directed at 
these two men and primarily at Patel for ruining his poli­
tical career.
The Khare episode is significant for several reasons: 
for the Province the Khare crisis marked the decline of the 
Marathi politicians and the ascendancy of the Hindi-wallahs. 
The Hindi Congress had taken over in a Province where Maha­
rashtrian leaders had built a strong base earlier. This
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state of things became a permanent feature of the political 
fabric of the area. The crisis also revealed the degree to 
which the Central Province was faction-ridden and the High 
Command dictatorial. Moreover, it was an illustration of 
the relative strengths of the relationship of the Ministers 
with (1) the Party and (2) the Government. By design the 
party link was meant to predominate. The policy and organi- 
sational changes described/earlier chapters; undertaken
by Gandhi and Patel from 1934 onwards, were intended to meet 
such situations as the Central Provinces crisis. There 
seemed little doubt that the purpose was that the High Com­
mand's ruling would prevail in the event of a dispute.
The arrangement between the Congress Ministries and
the Parliamentary Sub-Committee was that the former had to
do the bidding of the latter in everything. It was curious
that Khare resented the lack of freedom in this respect in
the later stages of the dispute. Earlier, he consulted
53Vallabhbhai Patel at each stage. The Parliamentary Sub­
committee had the power to choose the Cabinet in each Cong­
ress Province. The entire Congress show was to be run by the 
Party leaders who were assigned the task. That Ministers 
should then complain of lack of initiative and freedom seemed 
strange. Shukla and Mishra reminded Khare of precisely this 
convention of the Congress whereby an oath of allegiance to 
the Congress required unquestioning obedience to the Congress 
Working Committee. 'The brief time of a year should not be 
enough to obliterate from your memory the Congress organisa­
tion which vests the Congress Working Committee with the
54highest authority over Congressmen'.
The implication of the new right-wing strategy in the 
Provinces was that the Ministers were meant to have limited 
control over political developments. Political giants of the 
Parliamentary Sub-Committee controlled the entire operation 
inside and outside the provincial legislature, and with such 
disciplinarians in charge, it was intended that uniformity 
would prevail. In fact, in assessing the performance of the
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Ministries, this one factor relating to the link between the 
Congress Ministries and the Central Congress Party is vital. 
The particular incident brought some theoretical questions 
to the fore which do not strictly fall within the parameters 
of the present subject ; (1) whether the Ministers had to do 
the bidding of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee (2) whether 
the three Mahakoshal Ministers could withhold their resigna­
tions when the Prime Minister had submitted his resignation 
to the Governor and (3) if they did withhold them could the 
Governor dismiss them on the basis of joint responsibility 
or the special powers of appointment and dismissal vested 
in him under Section 105.
After his defeat, Khare began an indictment of the Cong­
ress Working Committee. But the grip of the High Command was 
complete; above all it flourished as a result of a tacit agr­
eement between all provincial Congress leaders. The leaders 
that subscribed to this agreement were all right-wing and 
the interests they represented were those of a socio-economic 
elite of a relatively local nature. The agreement needed 
sorting out only in case of conflict. The conflicts became 
more conspicuous because of the increased patronage that 
now went with power, and purely economic and social differ­
ences were thus magnified and took on a new and more com­
plicated dimension. Bringing about coordination and compro­
mise became vital. Vallabhbhai Patel was a master negotia­
tor. He did not decry self-interest as a motivating force; 
it seemed natural to him. But that it should take ugly 
shapes and sizes was not acceptable to him. It was then 
that he stepped in and asserted the power vested in him - 
that of a master disciplinarian. The criterion of indis­
cipline was non-conformity with Patel’s own plans for the 
Congress.
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(iii)
Patel - Bose Conflict
The episode of Congress in office under the direction 
and control of the High Command, accentuated the grievances 
that some individuals and groups within Congress had against 
the dominant Gandhian group. Between the Haripura and Tri- 
puri Congresses)dissensions in Congress widened further. The 
differences, however, were not purely ideological. The par­
ticular conflict between Vallabhbhai Patel on one side and 
Subhas Bose on the other, was a pertinent confrontation bet­
ween differing men with differing modes of operation. The 
dispute was neither a simple one between the left and right, 
nor solely a fight between rivals for power and dominance.
It was all this and much more. The recurring victory of 
the moderates in Congress had been causing anxiety to men 
like Bose for some time. His hostility to those who were 
keeping the flag flying in the name of Gandhi was based on 
several factors. To him leaders like Patel were provincial 
men with strong provincial bases. They had taken charge of 
the Congress executive and ran the affairs of the entire 
Congress, even in provinces they were not familiar with. 
Their links with these provinces were often through men who 
did not speak for the entire province, or even a large part 
of it, but represented only sectional or limited interests 
which were promoted by the central Congress and which in 
turn supported Congress economically and otherwise. Subhas 
Bose never understood why and how the Gandhians could speak 
or decide for a province like Bengal. He was the spokesman 
for Bengal and believed he had a right to assert his voice 
on behalf of Bengal when matters concerning provinces were 
being discussed by the executive of the Congress. He also 
believed that unlike the Gandhiites at the Congress centre 
he had visions for Congress as a whole; it was a vision which 
those who ran the Congress regarded as unacceptable and 
totalitarian.
Bose spoke the language of the radicals and within Con­
gress supported the socialists although he was not a member
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of the Congress Socialist Party. He was chosen President of 
the Haripura session of Congress with the specific object of 
appeasing socialists, radicals, youth, Bengalis and other 
groups who were discontented with the direction in which Cong­
ress was being taken. Preventing the prevailing rift in Cong­
ress from widening had become imperative. Nehru, speaking on 
behalf of the left wing in Congress in an AICC report, advised 
leaders against carrying on a crusade against leftists:
Inevitably there is a right wing of the Congress and 
a left wing and various middle groups, though this 
simple classification sometimes misleads. An attempt 
to drive out the left if successful, would be fatal, 
for it represents a vital part of the movement with­
out which it would lose much of its flair and become 
increasingly wedded to petty reformist activities. 55
It must be remembered that the strategy of the Congress 
right-wing from 1934 onwards had been precisely one of keep­
ing the political initiative in its own hands and eliminating 
rivals. The threat from the left had been averted by impo­
sing stringent controls on party memberships, by making non- 
conformers uncomfortable, and by a general expansion of 
political involvement in terms of areas and fields of acti­
vity. All this was achieved from the time of the Bombay 
Congress in 1934. Patel's own activity in his own province 
and in other provinces through local leaders was directed 
towards this. Having taken care of the actual threat from 
the left, constant criticism from that direction also had to 
be met. By offering the Presidentship to a spirited radical 
Bengali, the Congress Working Committee believed that many 
opposing groups could be appeased. Congress was already 
fighting on many fronts and if some quarrels could be put 
aside for the time being,Congress could devote its time to 
more vital matters.^
Bose made the issue of federation the main target for 
his Presidential term. The federal aspects of the 1935 Act 
were condemned by Congress primarily due to pressure from 
the left. Some practical politicians and some constitutional 
experts believed Congress's reasons for rejecting the federal 
scheme were 'divorced from facts and realities' and believed
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that the scheme became ’a tragic casualty1 in the 'clash 
of politics, the struggle for power, the wrangle for ascen­
dancy and the scramble for gains'. Just before the Haripura 
Congress session of March 1938, when the Working Committee 
met at Wardha to draft the resolutions that were to be put 
before the session, Bose issued a statement:
My term of office as the Congress President will be 
devoted to resist this unwanted federal scheme with 
all its undemocratic and anti-national features, 
with all the peaceful and legitimate powers, inclu­
ding non-violent, non-cooperation if necessary, and 
to strengthen the country's determination to resist 
this scheme. 57
The Congress's attitude to the scheme was designed to pre­
sent unity - but the left was far from satisfied. The Work­
ing Committee resolution on the federal scheme for Haripura 
did not come up to the expectations of the socialists. The 
resolution condemned the federal scheme as presented in the 
Government of India Act but added that the Congress was not 
opposed to the idea of federation but to the present scheme
in which the concept of representation by election was non- 
58existent. This resolution coupled with the revised atti­
tude towards the struggle of the States' people for civil 
liberties and responsible government made the critics of 
Congress policy sceptical about the intentions of right wing 
government leaders on the subject of federation. On the 
States' question,the draft resolution stated that owing to 
the new problem and conflicts in the States, the Congress 
felt obliged to revise its attitude of complete non-inter­
ference although the restrictions and bans imposed by rulers, 
or British authority prevented Congress as an organisation 
from direct participation. Individual Congressmen were now 
free to render direct assistance in their personal capacity 
to help the struggle to develop without committing the Cong­
ress party in anyway. At the Congress Socialists Conference 
in Lahore on 13 April 1938 a resolution was passed that in 
the event of any attempt being made to impose federation on 
the country, preparations would be made for a nation-wide 
struggle including a no-tax, no-rent campaign and a general
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strike on a national scale.
Bose carried on an intensive campaign against federation 
and although he believed that the formal Congress attitude 
was mellowing somewhat he waited to see what would happen 
when Congress was called upon next to state its formal posi­
tion. Meanwhile, he gave speeches wherever he went that sought
to convince people that Congress was hostile to federation
59and would never yield on the subject.
With the Congress veering round to constitutionalism, 
Bose and his followers began to feel that Congressmen would 
soon be interested in the wielding of power at the centre 
and, consequently, be prepared to accommodate the adversary on 
the subject of federation. In view of the Congress partici­
pation in satyagraha campaigns within several States the 
change of attitude on federation was liable to be interpreted 
as a move by Congress to consolidate its position in the 
States in the event of its possible participation in a fede­
ral centre. Critics of Congress, like the Hindu Mahasabha, 
had been asserting for some time that Congress opposition to 
federation was based not on moral grounds but on expediency, 
and that once it was able to negotiate for itself the power 
at the centre it would change its stand. These details on 
federation are being discussed here because a tussle for 
supremacy between the right and the left seemed imminent, 
and federation became an issue on which differences crysta­
llised. Whether Congress had a long-term plan in relation to 
the States and envisaged a federation in which it was the 
majority party or not is arguable. B .R.Tomlinson refutes
the view that the Congress involvement in the States was
sl 60part of ^ strategy to get power at the Centre. Much of the
evidence, however, suggests that despite formal resolutions 
prohibiting Congress from direct activity in the States, 
Congress had every intention of controlling a popular move­
ment in the States under right-wing leadership. The manifest 
symptoms of this intention and Patel's role in the moves 
made by Congress towards a gradual control in the States are
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discussed in the States’ section of the next chapter. With 
Congress in power in the provinces it seemed unrealistic not 
to strengthen the foothold in the States. Bose looked upon 
appeals to the States’ people to fight for their own right 
as a desire for the enhancement of power of those who had 
the reins of the Congress in their hands. He felt somewhat 
deceived on what he regarded as a softening of the Congress 
attitude. The meeting of the AICC on 24 September 1938 saw 
a flare-up on the subject of federation. The AICC rejected 
the new constitution and explained that it had permitted the 
formation of ministries in the provinces with a view to streng­
thening . the nation in its struggle for independence. Lef­
tist amendments were defeated and suspicions were voiced by 
leftists that Congress would work the federal scheme if cer­
tain amendments were offered by the British. A resolution 
on civil liberties was passed in which radical Congressmen 
were condemned for advocating 'murder, arson, looting and 
class war by the violent means':
...Congress warns the public that civil liberty does 
not cover acts of or incitement to violence or pro­
mulgation of palpable falsehoods. Inspite therefore 
of the Congress policy on civil liberties remaining 
unchanged the Congress will consistently with its 
tradition support measures that may be undertaken by 
the Congress governments for the defence of life and 
property. 61
In the meantime,some Indian leaders who had been in 
England in June and July were reported to have had parleys 
with British leaders on the subject of federation. Insinua­
tions were made in the British Press that Indian leaders were 
negotiating with the British Government over federation which 
caused an uproar among Congress leaders in India. Jawaharlal 
Nehru and Bhulabhai Desai who had gone abroad for separate 
missions had been meeting British leaders and had discussed 
federation with them. Rumours of their talks had an adverse 
effect on the Indian scene. Bose, who had observed the mellow­
ing of the Congress attitude in silence thus far, issued a 
statement to meet the rumours coming in from London:
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So far as I am concerned, should any unthinkable con­
tingency arise of the Federal Scheme being adopted by 
the majority within the Congress it would probably be 
my duty to relieve myself of the trammels of office 
so that I would be free to work for what I consider 
to be in the best interests of the country, namely, 
open, unmitigated and unrelenting opposition to the 
monstrous federation scheme. 62
About thirty members - socialists, leftists, Kisan Sabhaites, 
Royists and others - walked out from the AICC in protest aga­
inst the encroachment on civil liberty. Congress was also 
severely criticised by leftists for negotiation with the All 
India Muslim League. A resolution was moved disapproving 
Congress moves which undermined the influence of the nationa­
list Muslims and obliterated Muslim mass-contact propaganda. 
It can be seen that differences with Congress's right-wing 
increased in proportion to the power wielded by Congress. 
Addressing the AICC members on the subject of Congress's 
negotiations with the Muslim League, Vallabhbhai Patel sug­
gested that resolutions that criticised all that the Congress 
leaders sought to do, would aggravate rather than diminish 
already existing differences in Congress.
The political situation at this point was that whereas 
Gandhiites had taken the attitude that it was practically 
more sound to take control of as much of the decision-making 
machinery as came their way, with a view to mould things 
according to their ideas, the socialists were consistently 
fighting the reforms on ideological grounds. As a result, 
any move on the part of the Gandhiites to tackle aspects of 
the reforms in a piecemeal manner was interpreted by the 
socialists and radicals as a compromise and,therefore, heavily 
criticised. The Gandhiites on their part were growing incre­
asingly weary of the negative attitude of the socialists 
which marred Congress prospects for the future. The socia­
lists could only be contained by maintaining the right wing 
hold on the Congress machinery, by keeping radicals out and 
not allowing indiscipline to go unpunished. This was the 
Congress policy since 1934.
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When Bose declared his intention to run for the Presi­
dency for the party for a second terra,Gandhiites were quite 
clear that he should either be prevented from doing so or 
be defeated in the elections. Maulana Azad's name was sug­
gested. When he declined, that of Pattabhi Sittaramayya was 
put up. Bose did not withdraw and a direct conflict ensued. 
Bose issued a statement on 21 January 1939 explaining his
fi Q
point of view and giving reasons for not withdrawing. He 
asserted that he had been nominated as a candidate from seve­
ral provinces and socialists and non-socialists alike were 
urging him not to withdraw from the contest. It was incumbent 
upon him, therefore, not to let down his supporters at a stage 
when a momentous issue like federation demanded a tough fight. 
Patel prepared a counter-statement on behalf of several mem­
bers of the Working Committee and informed Sarat Bose that 
such a statement was being issued with the object of clari­
fying certain points raised by Bose in his statement. Sarat 
Bose strongly advised Patel not to take sides in the issue 
and warned him that the dissensions between the right and 
the left wings of Congress would be accentuated if members
like Patel took a partisan stand. 'Please do not divide
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Congress' he said at the end of his telegram. Patel issued 
the statement which was signed by him, Rajendra Prasad, Jai- 
ramdas Doulatram, J.B.Kripalani, Jamnalal Bajaj, Shankarrao 
Deo and Bhulabhai Desai. In it he pointed out that re-elec­
tion of a Congress President was advised only under except­
ional circumstances and no such circumstances existed to 
compell the re-election of Subhas Bose. Striking a note of 
warning that the President's powers could not be used by 
any encumbent to further his political ends, Patel and his 
colleagues stated:
The Congress policy and programmes are not determined 
by its successive Presidents. If it were so, the cons­
titution would not limit the office to one year. The 
policy and programme of the Congress, when they are 
not determined by the Congress itself, are determined 
by the Working Committee. The position of the Presi­
dent is that of a Chairman. 65
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In reply to this Bose accused these members of morally coer­
cing the other Congressmen into taking a stand against him:
In an election contest between two members of the 
Working Committee, one would not except the other 
members to take sides in an organised manner, becau­
se that would obviously not be fair. Sardar Patel 
and other leaders have issued the statement as mem­
bers of the All India Congress Committee and not as 
individual Congressmen. I ask if this is fair either, 
when the Working Committee never discussed this que­
stion. If the President is to be elected by the dele­
gates and not be nominated by influential members of 
the Working Committee will Sardar Patel and other lea­
ders withdraw their whip and leave it to the delegates 
to vote as they like? 66
Bose voiced his lurking suspicion that the right-wing of the 
Congress was preparing for a compromise with the British Go­
vernment on the issue of a Federal Scheme. That eventuality 
was feared by the leftists who resolved to fight it. Right- 
wing leaders in their turn were anxious to avoid having a 
left-winger as President. Bose, however, made it clear that 
he would not yield willingly to the right:
Even at this late hour, I am prepared to withdraw from 
the contest if a genuine anti-federationalist like 
Acharya Narendra Deo for instance, be accepted as the 
President for the coming year....If the right wing 
really want national unity and solidarity they would 
be well advised to accept a leftist as President. 67
Subhas Bose's brother, Sarat Bose,sent a letter to Gandhi 
and the Working Committee that the stand against Subhas Bose 
was likely to create serious rifts among the Congress leaders 
and that the Working Committee's sympathy with Patel's state­
ment and analysis was unbecoming and revealed their partisan 
attitude. Patel came in for a good deal of criticism. Socia­
lists from different areas expressed and mobilised support 
for Bose. Commenting on the ensuing presidential election 
and on the statement issued by Patel and his supporters, Rafi 
Ahmed Kidwai said that the votes in the election would be 
cast for or against federation:
I don't want to go into the merits of the two candidates 
but I would appeal to the delegates not to be prejudiced 
by statements issued by members of the Working Committee
68
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Working Committee members were accused of influencing dele­
gates; it was asserted that Patel had clearly instructed the 
Gujarat delegates to vote for Sitaramayya. Acharya Narendra 
Dev refuted Patel's contention that the election of the Pre­
sident had to be unanimous. He pointed out that in 1929, 
Patel had been a candidate and Gandhi had a difficult time 
persuading Patel to withdraw in favour of Jawaharlal Nehru.
In support of Bose he said:
It is necessary to have at the helm a person who will 
inspire confidence in youth. Mr.Bose seems clearly 
marked out for the Presidential 'gadi1. 69
The powers of the two sides in Congress were tested^and at 
the end of it Subhas Bose was elected by 199 votes. How­
ever, he seemed to have lost more than he had gained. Thirteen
members of the fifteen submitted their resignations from the 
Working Committee on 9 February 1939. They felt that with a 
President with whom they were not in accord they would not 
be able to function smoothly and it was better for him to 
have his own men in the Working Committee. Bose made a few 
desperate attempts to patch up the differences but Gandhi 
was sufficiently disenchanted not to allow a softening of 
attitude on the part of the Gandhiites . Leaked reports 
of the Gandhi-Bose talks suggested that Gandhi had castiga­
ted Bose and told him plainly that it was futile his attemp­
ting to procure the co-operation of the right-wing collea-
71gues after he had taken such pains to alienate them. Mat­
ters got worse and by the time of the Tripuri Congress the 
breach was wide and irreconcilable. Subhas Bose was too ill 
to be present. His resolution that Congress should give an 
ultimatum to the Government that it would begin civil disobe­
dience soon was unacceptable to the Subjects Committee domi-
72nated by the group whose power was not easy to crush.
A resolution which this group drew up and which was intro­
duced on its behalf by G.B.Pant was passed and carried. This
resolution stated that despite the recent bickerings within 
Congress over the Presidential election^the policy of the 
Congress was still one that Gandhi had laid down and which
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the Congress had been following in the past year. The AICC 
had full faith in the Working Committee that had functioned 
during the previous year and as a body regretted that some 
of the Working Committee members had been subjected to unne­
cessary criticisms by the dissenting groups. The situation 
in the country was uneasy and it was necessary for the Cong­
ress to conduct itself in an orderly, dignified and at the 
same time powerful manner. It was, therefore, necessary that 
the Working Committee should be appointed by the President 
with Gandhi's advice and the direction of Congress policy 
should be that which Gandhi and his picked men considered appro- 
riate.^3 Needless to say,Bose did not appoint a new Working 
Committee. He considered “"Pawt's resolution ultra vires and 
quite improper. Letters were exchanged between Gandhi and 
Bose on the subject, but clearly there was no satisfactory 
way out of the impasse. Gandhi finally told him that the 
differences between them were too fundamental and that, there­
fore, he should go ahead with a Working Committee of his own 
and not a 'composite' Working Committee. He did,however, sound 
a note of warning at the end of his letter that just as Subhas 
Bose was entitled to full expression and to voice his resent­
ment against suppression so also must he be prepared for 
those whom he wrongly called 'Gandhiites' to be able to 
assert themselves when they differed from him. He said:
There should be no difficulty whatsoever if they are 
in a minority. They may not suppress themselves if 
they are clearly in a majority. 74
The matter remained unresolved. Although Bose's dispute was 
with the Gandhiites, he and his supporters singled out Vall- 
abhbhai Patel as the main culprit who was running the Cong­
ress show in his own image and style, and whose views on the 
role of Congress in the Indian political scene were by then 
becoming clear particularly to his opponents. Referring to 
Patel's statement of 25 January 1939, before the Presidential 
election, Bose had said that reference to the Bardoli meet­
ing, at which Sitaramayya's name was suggested and which 
Patel mentioned in his statement, was an admission that some 
members of the Working Committee took decisions on such vital
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matters as the choice of candidates for the Presidency, with­
out consulting the President or other members:
It is clear that he (Patel) wants a President who will 
be a mere figurehead and a tool in the hands of other 
members of the Working Committee. The above confess­
ion (about the Bardoli meeting) also confirms the gene­
ral impression that the Working Committee is really 
controlled by a group within it and that the other 
members are there on sufferance. 75
After the election^Bose was called upon to resign. Pressure 
to resign continued to be resisted by Bose for some time; Bose 
warned that he was being pressed to resign but was avoiding it 
because it would have fatal consequences:
My resignation would mean the beginning of a new phase 
in Congress policies which I want to avoid till the 
last. If we come to the parting of ways, a bitter 
civil war will commence and whatever be the upshot of 
it - the Congress will be weakened for some time to 
come and the benefits will be reaped by the British 
Government. 76
He tried to appeal to Gandhi as an individual rather than 
Gandhi as a part of Gandhian team of which Vallabhbhai Patel 
was a prominent member. Patel, he regarded as partisan and 
unfair:
People who are bitterly opposed for various reasons to 
Sardar Patel and his group still have confidence in you 
and believe that you can take a dispassionate and non­
partisan view of things. 77
He tried to make a direct appeal to Gandhi to mediate and thus 
clear the ground so that Congress might embark on a forthright 
course of action without dissensions and bickerings. Gandhi 
whose strength now lay as much with the Gandhiites - like 
Patel - as theirs had lain with him earlier, rebuffed Bose's 
appeal:
The views you express seem to be so diametrically opp­
osed to those of the others and my own that I do not 
see any possibility of bridging them...what is wrong 
is not the differences between us but loss of mutual 
respect and trust. 78
Gandhi advised Bose to form a Committee of his own liking and 
choosing and then put forward a programme before the AICC. If
210
the programme was accepted then Bose would face no problems 
and could disregard those with whom he was having differences. 
If it was not accepted, he would have to resign and let the 
Committee chose its President. Bose felt that Gandhi was 
anxious to see the ’Old Guard’ at the helm of affairs and 
advised Gandhi to lead the old guard so that the increasing 
opposition against them would diminish.
...there is a world of difference between yourself and
your lieutenants, even your chosen lieutenants. There
are people who will do anything for you - but not for
them. 79
It soon became clear that the conflict between the two 
political giants, Vallabhbhai Patel and Subhas Bose,was not 
an ordinary one. It could not be patched; nor could it be 
ignored. It would be terminated only when one party succum­
bed to the pressures of the other. Such was the power of the 
Vallabhbhai/Gandhi team that Subhas did not stand a chance.
At the end of April 1939, Subhas Bose called a meeting of 
the AICC in Calcutta. Patel did not go to Calcutta for the 
meeting. Gandhi went to Calcutta but did not attend. Unto­
ward incidents occured there and the lack of harmony persis­
ted -culminating eventually in Bose sending in his resigna­
tion on the second day of the meeting. Bose was faced with 
a dilemma because Gandhi's help was not forthcoming in form­
ing a new Working Committee. Pant's resolution (passed at 
the Tripuri Congress) had stated that everything was to be 
done under Gandhi's direction; to form a Working Committee 
without Gandhi's advice, therefore,went against Pant's reso­
lution. Jawaharlal Nehru in his typically conciliatory pose 
proposed that Bose withdraw his resignation and nominate 
afresh the old Working Committee which functioned in 1938.
That would be a way out of the problem raised by Pant's 
resolution. As for Bose's desire to infuse fresh blood into 
the Committee Nehru explained that Jairamdas Doulatram and 
Jamnalal Bajaj had resigned on grounds of health and that 
would give Bose a chance to nominate two members of his cho­
ice. Jai Prakash Narain and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai seconded his 
proposition. But Bose dillied and dallied and wanted the
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right-wing leaders to make some moves; ultimately his resig­
nation was accepted.
The old guard made provisions for the organisation to 
come under a tighter control. Rajendra Prasad at the AICC 
meeting in Bombay in June 1939 alleged that leftists were 
causing 'domestic faction and internal conflict', and said 
that these forces had to be combated effectively because 
they were disabling the country:
The first and most urgent problem for the Congress is 
therefore to purify the organisation and make it a dis­
ciplined and effective instrument of the people's will.80
At the same meeting, the AICC passed two resolutions that 
led to still more trouble between Bose and the Congress. One 
stipulated that no Congressman might offer individual satya- 
graha in the provinces without the sanction of the PCCs, and 
the second stated that because of recent problems relating 
to the jurisdiction of PCCs in relation to the Congress Pro­
vincial Ministries, the executives of PCCs would not inter­
fere in administrative matters but would reprimand a Minister 
’privately' in the case of some 'abuse or difficulty’. On 
policy matters in case of difference between the PCC and a 
Ministry, the Parliamentary Sub-Committee would deal with
the matter. No public discussion was to take place on Cong-
81ress policy or the functioning of Congress Ministries.
Quite clearly the central executive of Congress wanted 
to keep the reins in its hands as much as possible. Bose's 
further resentment was to be expected. On 30 June he issued 
a statement condemning two resolutions of the AICC and urged 
the Working Committee not to resist or smother the express­
ion of discontent among the masses. To voice a protest agai­
nst these resolutions Bose urged the public to observe 9 July 
as All India Day. In the meantime, Bose had meetings with 
Jinnah and B.R.Ambedkar and also encouraged leftists in dif­
ferent areas to organise so that the right-wingers of Cong-
Q O
ress might be forced into taking a more forward stand. The 
new President of the Congress, Rajendra Prasad, sent a for­
mal warning to Bose that defiance of the AICC resolution would
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mean breach of discipline and, therefore, it would be wise to 
cancel the meeting of 9 July. Undaunted by these threats,
Bose addressed a meeting of 3000 at Bombay on 9 July and 
insisted that an ultimatum should be presented to the British 
Government to concede demands in six months, otherwise a 
mass movement would be started. He also urged the public to 
demand a cancellation of the AICC resolutions. Bose supple­
mented his defiance of the Congress warning by travelling 
extensively in Patel's domain - Gujarat - and seeking support 
and sympathy from workers and students. In an interview with 
the Sentinel correspondent, he proclaimed that the foundation
of his new party, the Forward Bloc, had been securely laid
83down in Gujarat.
Bose also made a statement in Bombay in which he criti­
cised the Bombay Government's prohibition scheme as being 
unrealistic. Patel came down heavily on Bose's attacks and 
on his general political behaviour and revolt against the 
Congress; he particularly resented the encroachment in Guja­
rat and Bombay:
An unseemly aspect of Subhas Bose's conduct is that the 
President of a Provincial Congress Committee should have 
taken the trouble to travel one thousand miles to launch 
an attack on a Congress Ministry in another province. 84
Bose retorted sharply:
I am told by an eminent leader that I have revolted 
against the Congress. This is news to me. I have 
only protested against the highhandedness of the small 
group that now dominate the Congress and the Congress 
Ministries with the help of a packed majority....The 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee has hit 
me below the belt by alleging that I have joined the 
enemies of the Congress. 85
Bose asserted that the tirade against him was part of the 
plan to divert attention away from the idea of a mass struggle 
and side-track the main political issue facing the country, 
namely, how to prepare for the final struggle for India's 
f r e e d o m .  86 Patel answered Bose's charges against him when 
he was in Ahmedabad. He deplored Bose's personal attacks 
against him and other Congressmen and asserted that mere
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talking could not prepare people for a struggle. In Nadiad
he undertook a similar mission - that of undoing Bose's anti-
87Gandhian propaganda. Attacks and counter-attacks between 
Bose and Patel continued. The Working Committee met at Wardha 
and took disciplinary action against Bose on 11 August 1939. 
Bose was disqualified from the Presidentship of the Bengal 
Provincial Congress Committee and from being elected to any 
Congress Committee for three years.®® Gandhi came to Patel's 
side to add moral support as he did in the Nariman episode.
The confrontation,however, was not between Gandhi and Bose.
The last few statements of Patel and Bose referred to above 
do indicate clearly that Bose's grievances were against 
Patel's highhandedness and his increasing strength and domi­
nation of the Congress centre. Gandhi's statements condemn­
ing Bose's antagonistic posture towards Gandhiites do not
show up a quarrel between Bose and Gandhi, as Tomlinson 
89believes. It was not a question of criticising the lieu­
tenant (Patel) to attack the Captain ( G a n d h i ) . A s  far as 
the elections, choices of candidates and formation of Cong­
ress teams was concerned,Patel was very much the captain.
Patel actively participated in the kind of politics that 
Nehru, for instance, shied away from. It was this politics 
that was at the centre of conflicts like those between Patel 
on the one hand and Nariman, Khare and Bose in turn, on the 
other.
What was the significance of this episode in terms of 
Patel's status and role in the Congress organisation at this 
time? Clearly incidents and events centring around indivi­
dual rivalries or ambitions and factional in-fighting all 
came within the jurisdiction of Patel and his associates.
As long as any event had anything to do with the party and 
its smooth and effective functioning, Patel was directly in­
volved and was,therefore,the main target of those who resen­
ted Congress policy during this period. Even though at some 
points the conflict also involved Gandhi, the main adversa­
ries were Bose and Patel and as neither believed in compro­
mising (as Nehru and Gandhi did) the conflict took on a wider
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significance and caused a greater upheaval than it might 
otherwise have done. The issue of Vithalbhai Patel*s will, 
referred to as the ’other bone of contention* by Tomlinson, 
also rancoured in Vallabhbhai’s mind and certainly increased 
his animosity to Bose.^l
The dispute between Patel and Bose, however, must be seen 
in the light of the broader Patelian strategy which we have 
been tracing from the beginning of the thesis. Bose came 
closest to destroying the hegemony of the Gandhiites and the 
latter had to resort to a change of rules to gain a victory 
over him. Bose's rebellion made Patel tougher with oppone­
nts and more particularly with any kind of leftist opposition. 
Jai Prakash Narain described the Patel-Bose dispute as part
of Patel's intensive campaign to dissociate extremists from
92the decision-making areas of Congress.
Nariman, Khare and finally Bose represent a kind of 
escalation in the High Command's control over provincial 
leaders in these terms: Nariman was more or less on his own,
a leader with some following based purely on political per­
formances and activity; Khare represented a faction within 
the local Congress, and Bose represented a party which locally 
threatened the Congress and centrally opposed the old guard. 
Nariman's and Khare's own strength was limited and that is why 
their political demise was more complete than that of Bose 
whose reliance on the Gandhiites was limited. In Bose's 
case the conflict was highlighted by the fact that he had 
organised supporters behind him who laid as much claim to 
national interest as Gandhiites did. Ultimately,victory over 
the Gandhiites was well nigh impossible, for, in addition to 
a vast and controlled organisation, they had enormous control 
over vested interests which had been further strengthened by 
the power and patronage that accompanied their role as incum-
q o
bants. a it was this factor that made Patel a realistic 
negotiator when prospects of gaining control and real power 
brightened after the war.
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CHAPTER VI
ENTRENCHMENT OE CONGRESS POWER 1937-1939
(i)
Congress Ministries
Once the Congress Ministries were formed and functioning, 
each province had to execute the policies laid down by the 
Working Committee within the framework of its own social and 
political alignments of men and materials. The basic direc­
tions had been clearly laid down and there was to be no com­
promise over them. However, in several cases, Patel was 
called in to give special remedies. U.P., Bihar and Bombay 
were faced with troubles from workers and peasants and in 
each case Patel's curbs and controls reveal the wider scheme 
of maintaining a conservative economic and political struc­
ture that would foster 'measured and orderly progress' and
bring about an eclipse of popular protests and mass upris-
1ings.
An AICC circular, sent soon after the permission to accept 
office was granted in July 1937, reminded the Congress Provin­
ces of the nature of the programmes they were expected to pur­
sue. Release of political prisoners, internees and detenues, 
and the return of securities taken from newspapers and press 
were seen as relatively easy tasks to be followed by a repeal 
of all repressive laws. The broad areas of reform were agra­
rian, industrial, educational and social, the last category 
encompassing the controversial policy on prohibition which 
was something Congress leaders were never wholly agreed upon. 
In particular, the land question and problems of rural debt 
were to be given adequate attention on the lines indicated 
by previous Congress resolutions, particularly the agrarian 
resolution of the Faizpur Congress. The execution of this 
programme was likely to take some time and it was,therefore, 
believed that while the legislation was being enacted some 
relief should be given to the peasantry immediately. That 
would assure the masses of the new Government's good inten-
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tions. Each province had its own land tenure system and 
its own agrarian problems and the Central Congress expected 
that land reforms would have to be made according to the 
requirements of each area. The socio-economic structure 
within Provinces was mirrored in the political alignments, 
so that land reform or industrial reform were both also 
political questions in each province.
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar had considerable agricultural 
discontent. Discussions on the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Bill 
went on for months and were lively and animated. Socialist 
leaders thought the reforms did not go far enough. Zamindars 
and taluqdars were upset over the inadequacy of the reforms 
and were the most vehement in their opposition. Zamindars 
like Maheshwar Dayal Seth were ready for an all-out confron­
tation with the tenants. Through the mediation of Nawab Sir 
Ahmed Said of Chhatari, who was the President of the Zamin­
dars’ Association, Patel was asked to intervene to iron out 
some points of difference. For Patel,the negotiations had 
political rather than socio-economic importance for although 
he was not the spokesman of the rent-paying, debt-ridden 
peasantry he had not managed to befriend the landlords in the 
area either; the latter were anxious to get political leve­
rage and power for themselves which Patel resented. However, 
he thought it might be a good opportunity to gain for Cong­
ress the support of an influential section of the vested 
landed interests in an area where the Congress leftists had 
alienated these interests from the Party. On 21 September 
1938,the Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee met a deputa­
tion of Uttar Pradesh Zamindars in Delhi to hear their case. 
G.B.Pant, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and Bhulabhai Desai were also 
present at the meeting. The Zamindars presented their case 
and the Parliamentary Sub-Committee consented to arbitrate 
between the Uttar Pradesh Government and the Zamindars 
'provided the Zamindars agreed to accept the decision of the
3
Committee as final after the Committee had heard both sides'. 
The Zamindars of Agra accepted the offer and their decision 
was conveyed to Patel, the Chairman of the Parliamentary
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Sub-Committee,by the Nawab of Chhatari. At the latter's 
request Patel agreed to postpone the Uttar Pradesh Assembly 
session specially called to consider this Bill so that the 
Zamindars could have a meeting with the Parliamentary Sub- 
Committee. Though the Zamindars of Agra Province were will­
ing to accept Patel's arbitration, some Oudh Zamindars had 
begun an agitation against the Parliamentary Sub-Committee's 
role and alleged that 'the Parliamentary Sub-Committee had 
been brought in to play the game of the Uttar Pradesh Minis­
try, namely to pull the chestnuts from the fire for the 
4
Government'. In particular Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth had
been attacking Patel ceaselessly and although Patel said he
was 'too thick skinned and thoroughly seasoned to take any
notice of such unpleasant attacks' on him, he was not willing
to allow the Congress image to be tarnished by accusations of
5
doubtful motives. The Oudh zamindars rejected the Parlia­
mentary Sub-Committee's offer to arbitrate and asked for a 
negotiated settlement. Some of them were not prepared even 
for negotiations. On Patel's advice the Parliamentary Sub­
committee withdrew its offer. As Patel stated later:
The Committee made its offer to arbitrate and what­
ever decision it gave had to be accepted as final. 
Otherwise it would be unfair to the Congress organi­
sation in the United Provinces and the Congress 
Government, inasmuch as it would necessarily be 
binding on them. 6
The Nawab of Chhatari seemed quite apologetic towards Patel 
that the attitude of some of the landlords had been so diffi­
cult. He wrote to Patel:
...but I do hope that you will still be able to find 
out some means of settling this knotty problem by an 
agreed settlement instead of carrying it through the 
two chambers. 7
But Patel refused to help and indicated that it was a pity 
that some zamindars had thus slighted him and the Parliamen­
tary Sub-Committee:
It is a pity that a section of the Uttar Pradesh zamin­
dars failed to appreciate the disinterested motive which 
actuated the Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee to 
agree to undertake this none too envious responsibility.8
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The motives that lay behind these parleys can be traced 
back a few years. In the early 1930s,at the instance of the 
left, Congress activity among the rural sections of U.P. had 
been given emphasis. The role of the C.S.P. in carrying on 
a tirade against the Congress Parliamentary Board and in high­
lighting their lack of concern for the exploited sections of 
the society caused the Congress Parliamentary Board much con­
cern, given the fact that the Government had already sought to
'frighten the zamindars particularly by the argument that the
a
Congress will confiscate their property'. Congress had two 
problems - winning the peasants and the zamindars. Gandhi 
tried to win the peasants with his Sangh activities; that had 
a limited impact. Patel had to tackle the other end - he had 
to resist socialist propaganda and prevent it from alienating 
the zamindars from Congress. In the end,Congress leaders 
pleased neither side. The U.P. Tenancy Act 1939 was a compro­
mise that made no substantial gains for Congress in terms of 
support.
A look at some of the other measures and the conflicts 
that accompanied them shows the conservative nature of the 
enactments and proposals. While discussing what Congress did 
it must be pointed out that many of these measures owed as 
much to administrative continuity as to Congress initiative. 
Some of the Governments were inexperienced and not all were 
manned by very able people. Caste balance, factional appease­
ment and ideological representation played their part in the 
selection of ministers - at the expense of ability in some 
cases. The experienced Governments often tended to follow 
previous government practice and British officials' advice 
to a greater extent than they or anyone else expected. The 
Uttar Pradesh Borstal Bill, the Maternity Benefit Bill, taxa­
tion measures such as the Court Fees (Amendment) Bill and the 
Stamp (Amendment) Bill were some such measures enacted in 
Uttar Pradesh. In the field of industry and labour,Congress 
faced problems in U.P. that were almost as demanding as those 
in Bombay Province. Kanpur,like Bombay, had a large labour 
force and in 1937, the labour strike caused much anxiety.
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The Congress Government took recourse to repressive measures 
to deal with the strikers. Socialists and labour leaders 
were arrested and Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
was promulgated. The Congress Government was accused of de­
viating from the Election Manifesto and pressure was put by 
leftist leaders for it to withdraw restrictive orders and 
also compel millowners to accept the legitimate demands of 
the workers. Patel, who had gone to Lucknow especially to 
discuss the Kanpur labour situation with the Executive Commi­
ttee of the Congress Party in the U.P. Legislature and had 
endorsed the restrictions put on workers, came in for much 
criticism for his tough attitude towards labour. At the Ben­
gal Socalist Party Conference, for example, Jai Prakash 
Narain indicted Patel for his insensitivity towards the work­
ing classes and for a particular statement which he had made 
against the Ahmedabad workers who had been on strike. Jai 
Prakash Narain reminded Patel that Congress was pledged to 
support all legitimate struggles of the working classes.
But,Patel proceeded in his own vein and in Punjab and Bombay 
he recommended the same stringent measures to control the 
workers.^
In Bihar, landlord-tenant problens also required careful 
handling. On the one hand,the landlords were pressing for a 
better deal in the tenancy legislation; on the other hand,the 
Kisan Sabha had incited the kisans to stage several demons­
trations to press for greater relief. Patel was quite clear 
that neither side was to be placated at the expense of the 
other. On the one hand he suggested that if the landlords 
were ultimately going to be cajoled into accepting it then 
there was no need to worry about improving the Bill to meet 
their wishes. On the other hand he also made it clear that 
he was not the tenants’ spokesman:
We shall have to resist the excessive demands of the
tenants who have been worked up and expected too much
from Congress Ministries. 12
When a compromise between the landlords and the tenants was 
arrived at, he urged Rajendra Prasad to get the tenancy legis­
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lation through. Deploring the opposition of the Kisan Sabha 
to the compromise, he condemned the leniency that Congress 
had hitherto shown to those Sabhas in the name of the masses. 
The alliance with the Sabhas was being misused in that each 
time something went wrong Congress was blamed and when some­
thing good was achieved the Kisan Sabha took the credit. The 
Champaran, Saran and Monghyr DCCs had passed resolutions ban­
ning Kisan Sabha activities in their districts and the Bihar 
PCC approved of the resolutions, declaring that the kind of 
propaganda that was being carried out by the Kisan Sabhas in 
the province was responsible for producing an atmosphere of
hostility to the Congress Ministry and, generally, damaging the 
13Congress work. Strong action taken by the President of the 
Bihar PCC against the leader of the Kisan Sabha was endorsed 
by Patel:
Personally I feel that such action should have been 
taken long ago, but better late than never is also 
a good thing. 14
The trouble that Congress in Bihar and,more particularly,in 
Gaya and Patna had with Kisan Sabhas caused many ripples in 
the Congress. The anger and resentment among Kisan Sabha 
workers made its way into the Congress centre and a resolu­
tion was passed at Haripura, elaborating the position towards
15the Kisan Sabha. Kisan demonstrations were being organised 
mainly in Maharashtra (by Indulal Yajnik), in Bihar (by Swami 
Shahajanand) and in Andhra (by N.G.Ranga). Patel poured out 
his anger towards all these leaders and accused them of mak­
ing deliberate attempts to discredit the Congress Ministries
'by taking crowds of kisans to the Assemblies and encouraging
16them to make impossible and extravagant demands'.
In Bombay Province,kisans organised mammoth rallies and 
marches to place their demands before the Assembly for the 
abolition of intermediary systems like khot and inamdari. For 
the relief of agricultural debt and moneylenders,the Bombay 
Government introduced a moratorium and a Moneylenders' Regis­
tration Bill which would take away the ills without actually 
removing the institution of money lending. It also proposed
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a reduction of land revenue though socialists tried to beli­
ttle its efforts by stating that Congress should have reduced 
land revenue by 50 per cent. B.G.Kher denied that Congress
had ever made such a promise and said that 12 per cent reduc- 
will
tion/be given to smaller peasantry and 25 per cent would be
17considered in heavily assessed areas.
There had never been any love lost between the Kisan 
Sabhas and Patel. He had always been strongly against their 
formation and had no patience with the group that he believed 
had become the spokesman of the masses but had failed to see 
that there was a wider national aim before which even the 
cause of the masses became relatively narrow and limited. An 
interesting feature of nationalist leaders like Patel was 
their ability to take a stand against the overturning of the 
existing order by emphasising the importance of national aims. 
Sometimes this was so effectively done that programmes that 
in fact had a wider appeal were made to seem limited in com­
parison with the nationalist movement. Denouncing all efforts 
towards mass mobilisation as contributions towards mass hys­
teria, Patel wrote to Prasad:
Such rival organisations are bound to destroy Congress 
prestige. Congressmen are forced to join these Kisan 
organisations by the atmosphere created by the organi­
sers. They are waiting for a time when they could dis­
place us, that is why I have given them no quarters 
and they have always been attacking me mercilessly. 18
He had the same intolerant attitude towards the mill- 
V^ or^ ejrs in Bombay and other industrial areas. In Bombay Pro­
vince, he tried to tilt back the scales that he thought had 
inclined too far towards the workers and their demands as a 
result of the concentration of the leftist groups on the work 
force. That in areas where mills and the work force were con­
centrated were socialist strongholds cannot be denied. The 
conduct of the strikes among Bombay's mill force is an exam­
ple of the progress of the socialists. Patel's role in the 
resolution of the industrial and labour conflict in Bombay 
Province was yet another example of his efforts to curtail 
the influence of the leftists. In this particular area he
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was at a considerable disadvantage. Migration trends, resi­
dential clusterings based on districts of origin, the inter­
nal structure and hierarchy within each mill, all contributed 
towards greater success for leftist leaders than for Congress 
workers. Before 1928, most of the interest taken in the work
force in the mills revealed the Marathi character of both the
19mobilisers and the issues that were taken up. Congress's 
overtures towards the work force were marked by a lack of 
trust in the workers' representatives and a lack of understand­
ing of the inner workings of the mill industry. These have 
been shown to have been based on caste-clusterings which in
turn were inevitable given the role of the jobber as the key
20figure inside and outside the mill. But the 1928 strike 
had brought about new patterns of relationships between wor­
kers, jobbers and trade unions, a factor which Congress was
21not able to grapple with. The handling of the 1928 strike
by the British Government and the 1938 strike by the Congress
22Government of Bombay has been compared elsewhere. The cause 
of the 1938 strike was the Bombay Government's Industrial 
Disputes Bill and the clause which labour leaders found parti­
cularly odious was that which allowed compulsory arbitration 
in disputes. The Bombay Congress Socialist Party had sent a 
memorandum to the Bombay Government in March 1938:
...We recognise that some sort of machinery compelling 
recourse to conciliation before direct action in the 
shape of a lockout or strike can be resorted to, is 
necessary.... It is quite another matter, however, where 
arbitration is made compulsory. That means a denial of 
the right to strike, the destruction of that weapon of 
direct action which is the last resort, the only weapon in 
the hands of the workers in their unequal struggle with 
their exploiters under the capitalist regime. 23
The one-day strike on 7 November 1938 brought discredit to 
Congress and Patel. The Congress Government dealt with the 
strike as ruthlessly as the British Government before it. 
Policemen had been called for special duty and had been ins­
tructed to take action if workers were prevented by strikers 
from going to work. When strikers resorted to stone throwing 
and police officers were hit;police opened fire and workers
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were seriously hurt and one was killed. Patel gave elaborate 
explanations to justify the Government’s role. He said that 
labour leaders had no reason to complain because they had 
openly declared that their success depended on their ability 
to provoke Congress to resort to firing. Congress could not 
be blamed, he said,because the atmosphere that existed was 
not conducive to non-violence:
...until it is able to generate that atmosphere of non­
violence in which such firing would become unnecessary, 
it has no alternative but to use minimum force, inclu­
ding firing, for the protection of life and property 
of those who are innocent. 24
These views were constantly reiterated by him and firmness in
dealing with labour was considered the only way to maintain
25public discipline. Trade union leaders referred to this as
a 'perverted fascist mentality1 and criticised Congressmen
for their total disregard of consensus and discussion on vital 
26matters. Patel was unconcerned; he had communicated to G.B. 
Pant a year earlier, when the latter reported labour trouble 
in U.P., that labour and leftist leaders would have to be 
curbed effectively:
Similar elements are also likely to give trouble in 
Bombay. Unless we are able to control communist ele­
ments in the labour areas, such as Bombay, Sholapur, 
Kanpur and Calcutta, we will sooner or later be faced 
with a very unpleasant situation. 27
Patel's remarks were reminiscent of British comments made in
28the 1920s during their handling of strikes and demonstrations.
The Congress Government's obsession with workers' movements
and the advance of the leftists can be seen in Munshi's hand-
29ling of the 'red menace'. Congress right-wing leaders 
failed to meet the problem. This failure and some other fea­
tures of the Congress in power at the time have led historians 
to believe that the two and a half year period of Congress in 
office can be regarded as a momentous period in which, if 
Congress had made the appropriate adjustments to economic 
and social forces, power groups and rivals, then some of the
later conflicts in the process of change from imperialism to
30self-government might have been avoided. This contention
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is not totally without substance. It has some weight in the 
case of the Muslims, workers and peasants. In the case of 
the States to which we shall now turn, it had limited appli­
cation. The maladjustments in that area emanated from within 
the States rather than outside. Conflicts within Congress, 
however, did not help their handling of the issues involved.
(ii)
Policy Towards Indian States
While power politics were being conducted in the British
Provinces, Congress became involved in agitation in several
States and in some the campaigns were directed and controlled
by Patel. There have been several studies dealing with the
emergence, shaping and reshaping of these States, the patterns
of relationships within them and the policies and attitudes of
the imperial power and Indian political groups towards these 
31States. For the present purpose it is not necessary to look
too minutely at how the individual States were ruled, what
were the modes of traditional relationships existing in the
States and the extent of disenchantment among the people in 
32the States. The important thing is the nature of Congress 
involvement and control of political agitation in some of the 
States. More specifically, it is the movements after the intro­
duction of Provincial Autonomy that concern us here because 
Patel’s direct involvement began about that time. The Act 
of 1935 brought a new dimension to the Indian political scene 
in its idea of an all-India Federation in which the British
Provinces and the Indian States would participate together
33and yet separately. The conditions that had to be satis­
fied before a proclamation could declare a federation of 
India were that the rulers of the States in accordance with 
certain provisions would be entitled to choose not less than 
fifty-two members of the Council of States, and that the 
aggregate population of the States that came into the Fede­
ration would be at least half of the total population of the 
States. In principle,Congress rejected the federal provisions
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of the Act which gave more importance to the Princes than to 
the people of the States. But in practice,it did not start 
agitating on the federal part of the Act until it had sorted 
out what it intended to do about Provincial Autonomy. Having 
negotiated its position on office acceptance and established 
itself in the Provinces through its disciplined and organised 
party machinery, the Congress leadership turned its attention 
to the other parts of the Act - the Federal Scheme. This in­
terest in State affairs appeared like a change of policy on 
the part of the Congress and the opponents of the Gandhian 
wing accused the Gandhians of a change of policy and a com­
promise. But what had really happened was that the Congress 
did not have to pay much attention to the States1 problem un­
til the issue of federation assumed importance on the politi­
cal scene. At the Calcutta Congress in 1928,it had declared 
its policy towards the States. In a resolution moved by 
Manilal Kothari the Congress assured the people of the States 
of its 'sympathy with and support in their legitimate and
peaceful struggle for the attainment of full responsible
34government in the States'. Patel had elaborated his own
views on the States, their rulers and the source of the
35rulers' strength - the Paramount Power. But there seemed 
no urgency for Congress to take a more active role in States' 
affairs.
With the Government of India Bill being hotly debated 
in the British Parliament,the States' question began to occu­
py the attention of political groups and princes. The princes 
began to voice their apprehension and put forward objections 
which the Government was quick to attend to and answer. At 
a meeting of princes and their ministers in Bombay at the end 
of February 1935, the princes voiced an objection that the Bill 
as framed required their acceptance of the whole Statute which 
they had not agreed upon. The unlimited control over all 
State matters allowed to the executive authority of the 
Federal Government was unacceptable to the rulers; so were the 
inroads into the domain of sovereignty and the internal auto­
nomy of the States. Encroachments upon substantial sources
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of revenue of some of the States (particularly income tax 
and customs) and matters like the administration of railways 
of States which the Federal Railway Authority intended to
36control were all matters that rulers found objectionable. 
Rulers’ objections could not be dismissed easily,for the 
Government depended so much on princely support. The Secre­
tary of State issued a statement straightaway in the House 
of Commons that the Princes' interests would be properly 
safeguarded.
The States' peoples' contact with outside political for­
ces began in the 1920s. Within the States,local organisations 
37came up. Congress's formal interest in the States' people 
can be traced back to 1920. However, it is in the years after 
the 1935 Act that the uprisings in the States gained political 
significance. At the Jabalpur AICC meeting in April 1935,the 
socialists demanded a change in States' policy on the part of 
the Congress. N.V.Gadgil moved a resolution that the inter­
ests of States' subjects were as much the concern of the Con­
gress party as those of British Indian subjects and that 
States' people should get the full co-operation of Congress 
in the struggle for freedom. Kamladevi Chattopadhyaya main­
tained that the Calcutta Congress resolution of 1928 did not 
mean non-interference in the affairs of the States' people. 
Patel in opposing the resolution asserted emphatically that it 
was not Congress policy to interfere in the affairs of Indian 
States. States' subjects were welcome to join the Congress 
but Congress could not promise direct assistance to them in 
return. Giving some reasons for this attitude he said:
We were not prepared to go into an Indian State and 
interfere in its affairs in case it banned the Cong­
ress. A necessary consequence of Mr.Gadgil's resolu­
tion would be the abolition of Indian States. We 
were not prepared to subscribe to this policy. 38
G.B.Pant supported Patel's point of view and added that if 
Congress interfered in States' affairs the rulers would ti­
ghten their hold on the subjects. The shrewdness behind the 
policy was undeniable. Open hostility to the princes and 
manifest support to the States' people would fetch no gains
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for Congress; in fact it would lead to political losses in 
terms of Congress losing a potential area of support. Socia­
list utterances like 1 princes would have no place in a Socia­
list India1 were not helping the cause of the people's free-
39dom in the current framework.
It was obvious that there were vast differences between
Patel's and Gadgil's ideas of freedom for the people. Congress
Socialists continued their propaganda against the Congress's
States policy. At the Kerala CSP Conference in May and at the
Gujarat CSP Conference in June 1935,resolutions were passed
that the subjects of States should be encouraged to organise
40and join the struggle for independence in British India.
The Congress President deplored the constant criticism by the 
Congress Socialists of Congress policy and said that it con­
fused people unnecessarily. But as in other matters in this 
too-the socialists were worried about how Congress would ma­
nage and control such a vital section of opinion as that of 
the States' people through its uncompromising right-wing 
leadership. During the Congress President's visit to Bombay 
in June 1935,there was a demand to tidy up relations between 
the Congress Socialists and the Gandhiites. Jai Prakash Na­
rain, the CSP General Secretary, replied to Prasad's criticism 
of the Socialists' opposition to Congress policy by denying 
that the CSP was working in opposition, although he conceded 
that they had a right to oppose whatever they did not agree 
with in Congress:
...we must exercise our right as a minority to propa­
gate our views within the Congress, to work along our 
own lines to criticise and even oppose such policies 
of the Congress as appear to us to be not in the in­
terests of the masses. 41
The pressure from the socialists elicited a resolution from 
the Working Committee that met at the end of July 1935. This 
stated that the Congress recognised that the people of the 
States had the inherent right to swaraj and that it also belie­
ved in the establishment of representative and responsible 
government in States. It also asserted that Princes had been 
advised that it was in their own interest to establish res-
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ponsible institutions and guarantee freedom to the people.
It was not considered politically wise, however, for Congress 
to take on the people's struggle for freedom directly; the 
States'people themselves should fight:
The Congress can exercise moral and friendly influence 
upon States; and this it is bound to do, wherever possi­
ble. The Congress had no other power under the existing 
circumstances although the people of India, whether un­
der the British, the Princes or any other power are geo­
graphically and historically one and indivisible. In 
the heat of controversy, the limitation of the Congress 
is often forgotten. Indeed any other policy will defeat 
the common purpose. 42
At the AICC meeting in Madras in October 1935, Patel moved 
a resolution to adopt the above resolution of the Working 
Committee. The socialists suggested two amendments to the 
motion - that Congress assure the States' people that in the 
proposed Constituent Assembly the States' people would be 
represented on the same basis as the people of British India, 
and that until the Constituent Assembly was formed it would 
not accept any Federal constitution which did not embody the 
elementary rights of citizenship for the States' people and 
the protection of these rights by a Federal Court, or did 
not give the States' people the right of representation in a 
Federal Legislature. Charging the socialists with ignorance 
of the States' problem Patel said that the Working Committee 
resolution should and would go no further than its declared 
intention. Resenting the pressure which the AICC members 
were exerting on the Working Committee, he asked them not to 
try and force their views on the Committee which had made its 
final decision and knew what it was doing:
...we tell you, for god's sake, don't throw the res­
ponsibility on us, and if you want to go further, go 
to the Lucknow Congress where there will be a fuller 
house who will decide. 43
The resolution was voted in, and in Congress circles it was
44considered a personal triumph for Patel and Prasad.
At the Lucknow session in April 1936, the 1928 Calcutta 
resolution and the October 1935 Madras statements were both 
reaffirmed; at the same time,a further assurance was given to
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the States1 people later:
...that in its opinion the people of the States should 
have the same right of self determination as those of 
the rest of India, and thus the Congress stands for the 
same political, civil and democratic liberties for eve­
ry part of India. The Congress however desires to 
point out that the struggle for liberty within the 
States is in the very nature of things to be carried 
on by the people of the States themselves. 45
Amritlal Seth moved an amendment that Congress should abandon 
its neutral attitude, to which Patel gave a caustic reply. 
Denouncing Seth as a member of the 'opposition camp* in the 
matter of the States, Patel said that Congress could only 
take as much responsibility in the States' matter as it could 
bear. It was a complicated and delicate matter and had to be 
handled carefully. He urged people, the socialists in parti­
cular, not to forget that it was through Congress influence 
that people in some States had become vocal - although in 
other States peoples' voices were heard in anti-Congress slo­
gans. The situation, he said, was much the same as kisan and 
labour organisations which had sprung up as a result of Cong­
ress work among the workers and peasants but which were now
46rivalling the claim of Congress to stand for the people.
The States' Peoples' Conference in the meantime continued to 
put pressure on Congress to participate directly in the aff­
airs of the States. At a meeting in Karachi attended by 
Nehru, the Conference expressed approval of a genuine all- 
India Federation as opposed to the one proposed by the Govern­
ment of India Act and resolved to obtain recognition of the 
right of States' people to equal representation with the peo­
ple of British India in the Constituent Assembly when it would
be formed. The Conference appealed to Congress to abandon the
47
policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of States.
For the first half of 1937,Congress was busy with Pro­
vincial elections and the issue of office acceptance which 
was resolved by July. In September 1937,Congress was called 
upon to express itself again on the States' people's problems 
as a result of the Mysore Government's excessively prohibitive 
orders against the Congress organisation. Kamladevi Chatto-
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padhyaya, the Congress Socialist member, who was visiting
Mysore at the time decided to address a public meeting in
Mysore despite the prohibitory order,which enfuriated the
48Mysore Government further. More stringent bans were impo­
sed on Congress and Congressmen. At a gathering in New Delhi, 
Nehru, the Congress President, expressed dissatisfaction at the 
attitude of the States and indicated that Congress would be
compelled to take retaliatory measures against those Indian
49States that were imposing bans on the Congress. In October 
1937, the 'Mysore Resolution' was moved by Kamladevi Chatto- 
padhyaya and passed by the AICC at Calcutta. This became the 
subject of some controversy within Congress and between Cong­
ress leaders and the Mysore State representatives. The reso­
lution condemned the Mysore State Government's inauguration of 
a new policy of repression and suppression of rights and liber­
ties. The resolution said:
This meeting sends its fraternal greetings to the people 
of Mysore and wishes them all success in their legiti­
mate non-violent struggle and appeals to the people of 
Indian States and British India to give all support and 
encouragement to the people of Mysore in their struggle 
against the former's right of self-determination. 50
51This resolution led to much discussion. Gandhi took a strong 
stand against it. In an article in the Harijan on 13 November 
1937, he condemned the resolution as ultra vires and criticised 
the AICC for unconstitutional behaviour. Nehru disagreed with 
Gandhi and was distressed that Gandhi should have passed an
52opinion on a resolution without ascertaining the full facts.
Gandhi's part in this whole question of just how involved the
Congress should get in the States question appears ambiguous.
James Manor discusses the lack of coordination between Gandhi's
views and official Congress policy and points to a 'muddle' on
the issue. Actually there was no muddle. Gandhi's hand was
being played by Patel at this point and it soon became clear 
53why. From this point onwards there was more active parti­
cipation in the States by the national Congress. Gandhi and 
Patel had probably thought they would accelerate the pace of 
Congress involvement in the States in their own time. But,
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events in Mysore developed faster than they had anticipated.
The situation got worse and Congress was pulled in as a re­
sult. The details of the manner in which the 'Mysore reso­
lution' was brought before the AICC at Calcutta and was intro­
duced and passed reveal that Patel felt that Congress Socia­
lists were taking the initiative in the States' people's prob­
lems and it was becoming imperative that Congress should keep 
the control in its own hands. R.S.Hukerikar, the Secretary 
of the KPCC, and Chengalraya Reddi, the President of the Mysore 
Congress Board,went to Calcutta to explain to the National 
Congress that repression had increased in Mysore and it was 
time for Congress to take a more active role in States' affa­
irs. For two daysthey waited to be given a hearing and on the 
third day were summoned before the Working Committee only to 
be questioned about the political activities of Kamladevi 
Chattopadhyaya and K.F.Nariman. Meanwhile,some members had 
drafted a sympathetic resolution relating to Mysore and,after 
circulating it,had obtained 84 signatures in its favour. This 
resolution was moved by Kamladevi. Patel was infuriated at 
the way the Province and State Congress representatives,spear­
headed by socialist leaders, were trying to take the initia­
tive in getting the AICC to formulate the Congress policy to­
wards the States. Patel felt that it was the Working Commi­
ttee's prerogative to effect changes in Congress policy. He 
threatened to oppose the resolution tooth and nail at the AICC 
meeting. Shankarrao Deo accused Gangadharrao Deshpande and 
R.S.Hukerikar of having betrayed the Working Committee by push­
ing at an AICC meeting a resolution that suggested such a 
fundamental change in the Congress attitude. Chengalraya Reddi 
offered to modify the resolution into one that was a mere con­
demnation of the repressive policy in Mysore. Patel, however, 
was not prepared to entertain any proposal on the question.
His attitude was adamant enough to frighten Chengalraya Reddi 
who,thereupon,suggested to some of the Karnatak members that 
the whole matter be put before the Working Committee which
seemed to resent the encroachment on what it considered its 
54prerogative. The Working Committee members sat silently 
while the resolution was passed and had made up their minds
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to attack the resolution later, with Gandhi's moral weight 
behind them.
The resolution was condemned, but reconsideration of 
Congress policy on the States’ question was inevitable beca­
use that was the only way Congress would get back its control 
over the matter. There is no doubt that the Congress Working 
Committee wanted to control the States' question and the 
method of the struggle fully and completely. The change came 
soon enough when the resolutions for the next session of Con­
gress had to be prepared. The Working Committee expressed 
solidarity with States' people and indicated that owing to 
'new problems' and 'new conflicts' Congress was formulating 
a fresh policy with regard to Indian States. Full responsi­
ble government and the guarantee of civil liberty were recog­
nised as legitimate goals for the States' people. It was 
clearly stated:
The Congress considers it its right and privilege to 
work for the attainment of this objective in the States 
but under the existing circumstances the Congress is 
not in a position to work more effectively to this end 
within the States. 55
Restrictions imposed by rulers and by the British rendered it 
necessary that the States' people would for some time have to 
carry on the task of struggling for their rights on their own. 
Congress would render support and goodwill from outside:
Individual Congressmen however will be free to render 
further assistance in their personal capacities. 56
Furthermore, although the setting up of Congress Committees 
within the States was forbidden, independent organisations 
could be set up by individuals. People of the States could 
also become primary or elective members of the Congress but 
the Committee of which they became members had to be situated 
outside the States.
Mysore State saw the enactment of this decision to parti­
cipate more visibly in States' affairs. The Congress decision 
to hoist the ’national* flag in various places and to celebrate 
26 January as Independence Day in the State was met with consi­
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derable resistance by the State authorities. On 26 April, at 
Viduraswathara, a village 50 miles from Bangalore, 32 persons 
were reported killed and 60 injured as a result of police fi­
ring over the raising of the Congress flag. That gave Cong­
ress the pretext to step in directly in a State problem. Ano­
ther 'Flag Satyagraha' was on, this time in an Indian State.
Patel's role in the States' question was, by design, un­
obtrusive in the initial stages. But for anyone who cared to 
look deeper into Congress reasoning,the purpose of his inter­
vention was clear. The opportune moment for Congress to take 
hold of the States' people had come. Socialists had increased 
their interest in the States as a result of which there was
increased pressure on Congress to play a more direct and sym-
57pathetic role in the States' peoples' problems. It will be 
seen in the case of Rajkot, for instance,that Gujarat Socia­
lists also took an active part in the agitation which Patel
was controlling. Without appearing to interfere Congress had 
58to intervene. While it made public utterances that the 
States' people must carry on their own fight, it was sometimes 
necessary to spur them on. Patel did just that. He inter­
vened in the Mysore problem and took over the role of super­
vising negotiations. He asked the Mysore Congress represen­
tatives to see Gandhi and take instructions on how to conduct 
the movement. Gandhi had already expressed unreserved support 
for the movement and had advised the agitators as follows:
Do everything possible to keep the movement absolutely 
non-violent.... If necessary, I am prepared personally 
to lead this movement in Mysore whenever I happen to 
be in India. 59
Patel handled the Mysore situation himself as it developed 
further. He tried to conduct the negotiations in such a way 
that people felt that something could be achieved by agitating. 
On 6 May,Patel and Kripalani arrived in Bangalore and the for­
mer had two long interviews with Mirza Ismail, the Dewan of 
Mysore, during which the main points of difference between 
the Government and the Congress were discussed. Patel also 
met the Working Committee of the Mysore Congress two days 
later and determined and discussed their demands, which were
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(1) recognition of the Mysore Congress (2) adequate represen­
tation in the Reforms Committee (3) recommendation of respon­
sible government under the aegis of the Maharaja and (4) per-
60mission to the Mysore Congress to have its own flag.
On 8 May,the dispute was concluded as a result of Patel's 
talks with the Dewan. It was agreed that (1) the Mysore State 
Flag would be hoisted alongwith the Congress flag in all cere­
monial occasions involving Congress and (2) the Reforms
61Committee should consist of six Congress nominees. On 9 May, 
Patel addressed a gathering of 30,000 people for 75 minutes 
and was able to communicate to them that an amicable settlement 
had been arrived at with the Government and that it would be 
given effect to in Government orders which would be issued in 
due course of time. Government had also promised an inquiry 
into the unfortunate incident at Viduraswatham on 26 April. He 
made some significant remarks that clearly indicated that Con­
gress would not lose the States from its political grip. On 
the one hand,it would instil fervour into the people in their 
demand for responsible government and on the other,it would 
cultivate the States' officials too, because eliminating them
was likely to harm Congress at that stage. Addressing Cong-
on
ressmen Patel encouraged them to work/ their programme but war­
ned them not to insist that the Congress flag be flown over 
Assembly Chambers or on Government Secretariat buildings. Even 
in British India, Congress had not made this a live issue. 
Advising Mysore Congressmen to be moderate in their demands 
so that the very existence of their organisation was not jeo­
pardised, Patel also recommended a policy of congeniality in 
their relations with States' officials so that they would 
make some headway in achieving their aims:
I do not think it is unpatriotic to have friendly rela­
tions with States' officials. You must remember that 
they are Indian States and not foreign States. The 
struggle for freedom under the aegis of the Indian 
National Congress is freedom for 350 million people 
including Indian States' people and Indian Princes.
Once the Prices are free, we shall settle our acc­
ounts with them without third party intervention. 62
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The significance of this remark deserves to be noted. It is 
a curious amalgam turning at first on the meaning of 'freedom' 
and then implying either the domination of the States under a 
future Congress 'Raj', or perhaps their incorporation within 
a democratic system. The evidence so far suggests that Patel 
did not have, as Nehru did, any very clear political philoso­
phy in relation to a future constitutional and representative 
democracy. Here the strategy was rather like the earlier 
(pre-1916) strategy of Congress vis-a-vis the British Govern­
ment - to avoid internecene quarrels for a time and get the 
limited objectives first, and then seek further gains. Patel 
felt that on no account was it worthwhile for Congress to 
take on the government of the States at a time when the orga­
nisation was still building up its strength in the States:
I advised you to avoid competition among yourselves for 
places in the reformed government. If you can get res­
ponsible government...without a struggle and bitterness 
why not get it by co-operating with the government. 63
Instances like these show the extent to which Patel actually 
readjusted intermediary goals to achieve the ultimate goal - 
that of capturing as much political power for the Gandhiites 
in Congress as was possible under the circumstances. Patel 
believed he was not compromising but simply changing tactics. 
Socialists,however, looked upon Patel's terms of agreement with 
the Mysore State as a compromise and were critical of his sug­
gestion that the State flag should be hoisted alongwith the 
Congress flag. The criticism faded out when Gandhi gave full 
support to the settlement and deplored the socialists' criti­
cism as unworthy of attention because socialists were prepared
to use violence in States which Gandhi dismissed as immoral
. . 64and unwise.
In Rajkot State Patel supervised an agitation which assu­
med large proportions as Congress participation in it increa­
sed. Rajkot was particularly suitable for a comprehensive 
struggle between the various forces involved in the States' 
problems. Its urban nature, large immigrant population, its 
status as the centre from which the British Resident of the
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Western India States Agency operated and,last but not least, 
its association with Gandhi and his wife added to the rea­
sons why it was ideal as the State where Congress would try 
out its strength against possibly two adversaries at once.
Rajkot was not a prosperous State. Its ruler Dharmendra
Sinhji who succeeded the relatively benign Lakhajirah as ruler
in 1931 was aptly described as 'the despair of the political 
65service'. While the ruler squandered away his riches, the 
State as a unit was not economically sound. It had an annual 
income of about twelve lakhs. Its people were not the reci­
pients of any benefits of welfare schemes and were consequently 
dissatisfied. In 1936,there had been a strike in the State 
cotton mill and a labour union had been formed under the gui­
dance of Jethelal Joshi. In March 1937, Joshi and U.N.Dhebar 
convened a meeting of the Kathiawar Rajkiya Parishad. Dhebar 
was a Rajkot lawyer, conservative like Patel and imbued with 
a desire for reform rather than revolution. At the conference, 
various proposals were put forward which would bring social 
and economic benefits to the people but scant attention was 
paid to them by the rulers. Virawala, the Dewan of the extra­
vagant ruler, was more deliberate in his disregard of the 
people than the negligent prince. He persisted with the State 
policy of selling ijaras (monopolies) on various consumer 
items and thus enriching the princely coffers. In August 
1938,when the monopoly on gambling at the Gokulashtmi fair 
was given to a group called 'Carnival', agitators organised 
a protest at the fair. Lathi charges and arrests and an esca­
lation of the agitation ensued. On 19 August,the Working 
Committee of Congress sent its formal support to the Rajkot 
State Subjects. Balwantrai Mehta and Rasiklal Parikh came 
to Rajkot with a message from Patel that the agitators would
get formal Congress co-operation in their fight against the
66autocratic methods of administration. The support elicited 
by the agitation made the Rajkot State authorities nervous.
The Secretary of the Gujarat Congress Socialist Party issued 
a statement that the fight in Rajkot was a peoples' fight and 
that the struggle against gambling had turned into a struggle
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for the 'immediate abolition of autocracy and immediate achi-
67evement of responsible government'.
At the suggestion of Vallabhbhai Patel,the workers of 
Rajkot decided to hold a Rajkot Peoples’ Conference on 3 and 
4 September. Patel attended this conference and in his speech 
elaborated on the maladministration of the State and the mis­
demeanours of its rulers. A resolution was passed asking for 
responsible government with limited powers resting with the 
ruler. Later that day, Patel and Virawala had discussions in 
which Patel recommended that responsible government should be 
aimed at by the appointment of a reforms committee which would 
work towards it, that the ruler should be prevented from draw­
ing excess amounts from the State coffers, that land grants 
should be reduced by 15 per cent and that all monopoly grants 
should be cancelled.
The Dewan, however, had already put into action a plan 
whereby Patel's scheme would be severely dealt with. He advi­
sed the Thakur to release him from the duties of Dewan on 
grounds of illness and suggested the appointment of a new 
Dewan, Sir Patrick Cadell, a Britisher who had been Dewan in 
Junagadh many years before.
Patel was quick to appreciate the strategy,that an Eng­
lishman had been put in the front line to put into effect 
disagreeable policies that would bring discredit to him and 
not to the ruler or the ex-Dewan, who would in fact be func­
tioning from behind the scenes. He accused the ruler and his 
advisers of being party to a 'highly objectional and unjusti­
fiable arrangement' from which the conniving Dewan had removed
himself to give the agitators a taste of repression at the
69hands of an Englishman. Patel realised that a European 
administrator would face the struggle and carry out a policy 
of ruthless repression with greater self-confidence and more 
support from the Political Department than an Indian officer 
would. These hopes and fears were belied somewhat. A few 
weeks later the Thakur was complaining that the situation and 
the people's movement had become worse since Cadell arrived
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because the latter tailed to cope with it by not taking pro­
per steps at the proper time. He wanted Cadell to leave but 
the latter would not do so and seemed to have the Resident's
support in asserting that he had been appointed for six mon-
70ths in the first instance and would stay till then. Cadell
had nothing but contempt for the ruler and if he carried out
any measure it was with the idea of assisting the British
71Agent rather than the ruler of Rajkot. The Thakur was sharply 
criticised by Cadell for his behaviour both private and public 
and Cadell told him that the agitation was a direct result of 
the mismanagement of the State. He wrote to the Thakur:
The condition of affairs in the State is very serious.
Many of the complaints against the State are based on 
your behaviour. It is believed that you spend too 
large a share of your State's revenue, that more of 
your expenditure is on unworthy objects and that you 
take no part in the administration of the State. I 
do not wish to make any reference at present either 
to the amount of money you spend or the way you spend 
it. But it is certainly true that you take no part 
in the administration and show no interest in the 
welfare of your people. 72
Cadell made several suggestions and demanded a promise from
the Thakur that he would follow them, failing which he would
leave and also make sure that 'this may have unfortunate con-
73sequences both for your State and for yourself1.
The peoples' movement in the meantime progressed rapidly 
under Patel's supervision and Dhebar's direct control. The 
people's grievances had been ignored and a formal satyagraha 
had been started at the end of September 1938. Patel had ad­
vised Dhebar to auction a box of matches, which was one of the 
items over which Virawala had secured monopoly rights. Dhebar 
was sentenced to 15 days' imprisonment; others followed and 
the agitation gained in strength and the State had to make 
some move if it wanted to avoid disaster. Reluctantly, on 
Cadell's advice, the Thakur conceded some points, one among 
them being the release of Dhebar. Dhebar had Patel's full 
support and the Thakur was well acquainted with Patel's stre­
ngth. He admitted as much in a letter to the Resident , Mr. 
Gibson, on 16 October 1938:
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...I was not in favour of releasing Dhebar as he would 
create more trouble and would also run up to Vallabh- 
bhai Patel for instructions for agitation on a scale 
much larger and more serious....Dhebar was released on 
the night of 11th and a very large meeting of some ten 
thousand people was held to welcome him. It seemed 
that the State had lost all control over its subjects. 
Dhebar free, proved more harmful. 74
The struggle continued because no concrete concessions were 
made and also because of untoward incidents like the murder 
of a farmer and the harassment of villagers. At a public 
meeting on 21 November 1938, Patel declared that until the 
authorities in Rajkot negotiated with him they were not likely 
to achieve anything. No Dewan could make any headway unless 
he sought Patel's assistance:
I am neither a politician nor a statesman, but a simple 
peasant and I have one simple method. I keep saying no 
until I get what I want. 75
A meeting between Cadell and Patel was arranged and took place 
on 29 November 1938 at which many points were discussed - that 
of general amnesty for all civil disobedience prisoners, the 
appointment of a committee of ten to draw up reforms and the 
redefinition of the powers of the ruler. Cadell had objec­
tions to Patel's statement and the meeting came to nought. The 
Thakur invited Patel to Rajkot and Patel reached Rajkot on 25 
December 1938. He reiterated to the Thakur that interested 
parties were consciously creating misunderstanding and it 
would be in the interests of both the Thakur and Patel to dis­
cuss the problems face-to-face. A settlement emerged after 
eight hours of discussion which emphasised the vital need for 
the redress of the people's grievances. On his part, Patel 
promised that all unconstitutional agitations would cease and 
the Thakur agreed to grant amnesty to all political prisoners. 
He also conceded a reforms committee of ten which would give
the 'widest possible powers consistent with our obligation
76to the Paramount Power'.
Within two days of the publication of this agreement the 
Resident met the Thakur and his Council. He first reprimanded 
the latter for conducting negotiations with Patel. He said:
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You know that Government of India was opposed to out­
side interference. By settling with him (Patel) you 
have lost the sympathies of your brother princes and 
the Government.... Even amongst the Congress workers,
Mr.Patel is regarded as most untrustworthy. 77
He also objected to the phrase 'widest possible powers' which 
he insisted would be misused by Patel. The Thakur, however,was 
relying on the fact that Virawala, whom he intended reinstating 
as Dewan and President of the proposed Committee, would check 
any Congress excesses. However, under pressure from the Resi­
dent and vicariously from the Paramount Power and with support
from Virawala, the Thakur rejected three of the seven names
78that Patel sent to him on 4 January 1939. The grounds given 
for rejections were (a) that the list of names appeared in the 
Press before it reached the Thakur (b) that the names suggested 
by Patel were unrepresentative of such communities as Bhayats, 
Muslims and depressed classes whose interests could not be ig­
nored and (c) that names like Dhebar were objectional as it 
could be disputed whether they could be called State subjects. 
Patel reacted strongly to these objections but added that if 
any further pretexts were found for not implementing the agree­
ment he would give orders for the struggle to be resumed. He 
added by way of characteristic intimidation:
I must also add that I have in my possession copies of 
correspondence that had taken place with H.H.the Thakur 
Saheb and Sir Patrick Cadell, and of the summary of an 
interview with the Resident. If the settlement breaks 
down I am afraid it will be my duty to publish in pub­
lic interest these and other documents in my possession. 
But I hope I may have to do nothing of that kind and 
the Committee will be appointed and begin work immedia­
tely. 79
Patel's recommendations were not accepted. The Thakur appoin­
ted his own Committee and on 25 January Patel told the people 
of Rajkot to resume their struggle. The State authorities on 
their part increased the repression and suppression of the 
agitators. Kasturba Gandhi and Manibehn Patel decided to 
plunge into the struggle and were arrested and imprisoned on 
arrival in Rajkot on 3 February. Vivid accounts of ill-treat­
ment of satyagrahis were received by Patel and Gandhi in let-
80ters from Manibehn and other volunteers.
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At this point Gandhi intervened. His requests for ex­
planations about reports of maltreatment of prisoners from 
the Rajkot State officers were disregarded and he decided to 
go to Rajkot to ascertain the true position. After reviewing 
the situation and having unsatisfactory talks with the Thakur 
and Virawala, Gandhi wrote to the Thakur on 2 March that if 
the suggestions he was making were not accepted by the follow­
ing day he would begin a fast which would go on till he was
81satisfied that his demands had been met. His suggestions 
were rejected and he began his fast. He made it clear that 
the main reason for it was that there had been a breach of 
faith whereby an agreement made between the Thakur and Patel 
had not been honoured by the Thakur. The fast had the desi­
red effect. The likely consequences of a fast undertaken by 
Gandhi in his seventieth year were well known. The Viceroy 
cancelled his tour and returned to Delhi on 6 March 1939. In 
reply to Gandhifs communication on his fast the Viceroy sent 
a note on 7 March:
...the best way in which these doubts can be resolved 
is to refer their interpretation to the highest judi­
cial authority in the land,that is to say the Chief 
Justice of India. 82
Assuring Gandhi that he would exert his own influence on the
Thakur to see that he would carry out the promises contained 
in the agreement, the Viceroy appealed to him to abandon his 
fast. Gandhi broke his fast on 7 March and left for Delhi 
on the 13th to attend the arbitration conducted by Sir Mau­
rice Gwyer, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court. Sir 
Maurice's verdict was that the Thakur was in breach of the 
agreement of 26 December and was bound to accept the names 
recommended by Patel, for Patel's right to recommend the 
names in this case clearly meant 'choose' the names of seven 
members of the Committee. Unfortunately,that was not the 
end of the matter. Patel and Gandhi returned to Rajkot on 
9 April only to be faced with further disputes over the names 
of the Committee's members. Minority groups had been incited 
against Gandhi and made to believe that he was rejecting their 
names. Communal disturbances followed. Further negotiations
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achieved nothing. In fact, in May 1939, Gandhi admitted 
defeat, renounced the advantages accruing from Sir Maurice's 
award and denounced his Rajkot fast as impure and tainted with 
'himsa'. He left it to the Thakur and his adviser to appease 
the people as they saw fit. Reforms were announced in Rajkot 
by November 1939 but they were worthless and Gandhi advised 
the people of Rajkot not to cooperate with them.
The real significance of the Rajkot satyagraha and 
Patel's role in it lay (1) in the effect it had on some nei­
ghbouring rulers and on the States' peoples' movement in 
general, (2) in the opportunity it provided for Congress to 
try and gain some of the ground it had lost to radicals like 
Bose at Haripura and (3) in providing Patel yet another ins­
tance of showing the political strength he was wielding with 
Gandhi's backing and which was becoming increasingly effec­
tive with each usage. It must be remembered that Rajkot was 
one of 283 States of Kathiawar which was about half the total 
number (584) of Princely States. To wield influence in the 
area was vital and had to be done cautiously. Although in 
Mysore we find Patel advising Congress workers not to chall­
enge State officers, in Rajkot he seems to have got impatient 
of what he later called the 'grossest form of medieval auto­
cracy' and decided that pressure had to be used against the 
ruler and his advisers. Patel's pressurising tactics did 
result in some neighbouring States announcing reforms. The 
liberal ruler of Aundh State had already announced reforms; 
a new State Constitution was prepared embodying the principles 
of Panchayat Raj, a truly representative Assembly, the utili­
sation of the State revenues for welfare purposes and the gg 
like. The new constitution was inaugurated on 21 January 1939.
The ruler of Rajpipla State whom Patel met on 29 December also
84announced a number of concessions. Some Kathiawar States 
were directly affected by Rajkot. The State of Lathi announ­
ced several measures to the agriculturists; the Darbar of
85Wankaner followed suit.
Some rulers in Kathaiwar, however, were unaffected by 
happenings in Rajkot, and Patel tried other tactics to
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bring them into line. In the principality of Limbdi,the ruler 
was old and retired and his two sons controlled the affairs of 
the State. Repression was rampant and in February 1939, raids 
were carried out in villages, homes were looted and people 
were beaten up. Patel abhorred the indifference shown by the 
Agent of the Crown Representative to the atrocities committed 
by the ruler and officials. He wrote in an interesting change 
of tune:
The responsibility for these happenings is therefore 
not only of the Thakur Sahab but in the ultimate ana­
lysis rests with the Parliament of Britain, which, 
while claiming to speak in the name of democracy, per­
mits the grossest form of medieval autocracy to flou­
rish in India and places the life and liberty of hap­
less individuals at the mercy of little despots. 86
Patel devised a new way to pressurize the rulers and officials 
of Limbdi. He organised a boycott of Limbdi cotton, a commo­
dity upon which the merchants of Limbdi, and through them the
87State, thrived. The Limbdi State Prajamandal's efforts in 
the boycott were strengthened by the support which the big 
business magnates of Bombay extended to them. A Committee was 
set up by them at the instance of Patel to keep close watch 
and ensure that not one bale of Limbdi State cotton was sold 
in India or outside the country. The boycott was so effective 
that it could not be lifted even when the Congress Ministries 
resigned in November 1939. Cotton dealers in Limbdi heaved 
a sigh of relief when the Ministries resigned but soon rea­
lised that business was still slack because cotton brokers in 
Bombay were reluctant to alienate the Congress which was likely 
to come in at the helm of affairs again. A cotton broker can­
didly remarked:
Because the Congress Ministry in Bombay has ceased to 
function it does not mean that the Congress High Com­
mand also ceased to give orders and express opinions. 
Unless and until the States come to an agreement with 
the Congress Party in India, we regret that we shall 
be unable to handle your Limbdi cotton much as we 
should like to do so. 88
Patel's control over interest groups was an important factor 
in Congress's ability to intimidate economic and political
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opposition; and for Patel, intimidation was a useful political 
weapon. The conduct of the States’ struggles at this stage was 
of importance to Congress in more ways than one. The show of 
Congress power and strength in their handling of the peoples' 
struggle gave the States' people confidence. It also made ru­
lers cautious in tackling the issue in the future. Unfortuna­
tely, despite the changing attitudes of some of the rulers men­
tioned above there was no definite pattern of a shift in poli­
tical alignments discernible in the role of the Princes in the 
power structure. Barbara Ramusack rightly points out that in 
the 1920s and 1930s whereas the numbers of 'politically aware 
Indians' that either rejected or severely criticised British 
policies in India swelled enormously, 'the princes however
were one of the few groups within the empire who continued to
89identify their goals with those of the British1. Urmila 
Phadnis also suggests that had the rulers not antagonised the 
politically conscious sections of their population to the ex­
tent that they did, Congress's hold over the States' peoples''
90struggle would not have increased the way it did.
As it happened,Congress’s involvement initially undertaken 
to keep socialist and extremist activity at bay had considera­
ble impact on the States' people. Socialists were overtaken by 
Congress although that did not prevent them from carrying on 
their activities. In addition, Congress entry into States' aff­
airs made the Muslim League aware of its lack of support in the 
area and prompted it to make a belated attempt to recover lost 
ground. They were helped by the fact that many of the rulers 
were Muslims. Thus,the States' question soon became an area of 
multi-dimensional conflicts. That gave Patel added incentive 
to intensify Congress involvement in the States. He did this 
in two ways:(l) by making the political!/ambitious but relatively 
inexperienced local agitators dependent on Congress for organi­
sational techniques and political leverage and (2) by showing 
up the local politics within the States and instructing those 
who had the resources to utilize them for political ends.
Patel's calculated and slow but sure entry into State poli­
tics had a lasting psychological effect on the rulers and
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the subjects and enabled Patel to make bold decisions at the 
time of transfer of power. The manner in which most rulers 
did Patel's bidding around the time of independence and the 
recalcitrant States - Junagadh, Jammu and Kashmir and Hyde­
rabad- were firmly dealt with,was linked to Patel's earlier 
political stick-and-carrot strategy. The fate of the Princely 
States was tied up with earlier Congress decisions of the 
1930s in which bold plans for right-wing ascendancy were 
made.
(iii)
The Exit of the Ministries
During the summer of 1939,no direct confrontation took 
place between the Congress and the British. Congress had 
been busy with provincial work and with its internal problems. 
In September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. On their 
side, initially Britain did not think that anything untoward 
was likely to happen in the nature of India's response which 
required a change of policy. The King Emperor's broadcast of 
3 September and the Viceroy's proclamation thereafter expre­
ssed the hope that India would play a mature part in the con­
frontation between the forces of democracy and dictatorship 
and throw her weight behind those that stood for human freedom 
and dignity. Upon observing the negative reactions of the 
Congress and the League to the question of their co-operation 
in the war effort, the Governments of Britain and India felt 
the need for a revision of their opinion. Congress demanded 
a specific declaration of war aims. The Working Committee of 
Congress issued its reply on 14 September and accused Britain 
of having failed in keeping its promises after the First War 
and accused the States of hypocrisy in offering men, material 
and moral support for the safeguarding of democracy abroad 
while their own States could boast of nothing that vaguely 
resembled democracy. It also asked the British Government 'to 
declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard 
to democracy and imperialism and the new order that is envi-
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saged'. The British Government resented the moral pressure. 
Gandhi, who earlier expressed some regret at the Congress’s 
condition for supporting the war effort, now chided the Bri­
tish for presenting a facade of injured innocence after having 
spoken the ’old language of imperialists' - threats, cajole­
ment and pressure - for so long.
The prestige of the Congress had been somewhat damaged 
in March 1939 by the conflict between Subhas Bose and the 
'old guard'. Although the incident had ended in a victory 
for the Working Committee,the storm of opposition against the 
right wing continued unabated. Apart from Bose's continued 
indictment of Congress, other left-wing groups joined in point­
ing out that the manner in which the Gandhiites in Congress 
had been consolidating their strength was responsible for the 
leftists' strong reaction. On behalf of the Communists of 
India, a few leaders issued a statement condemning Congress's 
treatment of Bose and its continued efforts to push the left 
wing out of Congress. The statement particularly condemned 
the Congress strategy of the past three years. This strategy, 
it said, was designed to divide the parliamentary work of 
Congress from the work pertaining to the masses:
The ministries were to perform the alchemistic experi­
ment of transforming the dross of the British Consti­
tution into the gold of Indian freedom and the masses 
of Congressmen were to restrict themselves to the con­
structive programme and create a non-violent atmosphere 
suitable to the success of the experiment. It was a 
line of curbing the fighting power of the working cla­
sses and the peasant masses - of refusing to unify th­
ese forces with those of the Congress, of refusing to 
weld the Congress into a weapon of united front strug­
gle. 91
Thus, keeping the masses in control was seen as a devious 
right-wing strategy which left-wing groups regarded as a re­
petition of the true goal of Congress - the unity of parlia­
mentary and extra-parliamentary work. Communists also accu­
sed Congress of attempting to keep the left at bay by refusing 
formally to launch a country-wide offensive in both British 
India and the States and yet working all the while on its 
own on a planned programme in both regions to secure a right-
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92wing Congress foot-hold well controlled by the Gandhiites.
The Bombay Left Consolidation Committee also made the same 
charge, adding that the constitutional changes made in Cong­
ress in recent years were intended to toughen the organisa­
tion against the growing influence of the left. The pressure 
from the left was mounting. If a confrontation with the Bri­
tish was likely, a head-on collision with leftists was not 
considered prudent. The Working Committee deferred its final 
decision on the Congress's formal attitude to the war in order 
to have time for a full discussion of the issues involved and 
a Sub-Committee consisting of Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad
and Vallabhbhai Patel was appointed to deal with the situa- 
93tion. By the beginning of October*Congress was feeling 
restive over Britain's silence with regard to Congress's dema­
nds for a declaration of war aims. Gandhi made haste to add 
that he had differed with the Working Committee on the 14
September statement and had been alone in asserting that uncon-
94ditional support should be given to Britain. In a House of 
Lords debate on Indian affairs, Congress's demands had been 
criticised. No formal answer, however, had been given to the 
demand. Pressure on Congress from other quarters had increa­
sed. Apart from the leftists, the Muslims had been more aggre- 
sive and Jinnah in particular had openly expressed his antago­
nism towards Congress and Gandhi. He clarified his position: 
Congress was required to recognise the Muslim League as the
sole representative of the Muslims, and Congress must give
95up completely its claim to represent Muslims. Given these 
pressures, and the likelihood of a direct clash with the Bri­
tish, Congress had to first strengthen its position. At the 
AICC meeting on 10 October 1939, the official resolution was 
passed despite 22 amendments (mostly from the leftists). It 
asserted that Congress was opposed to all Imperialist wars 
and condemned Nazism, but it also believed that democracy had 
to be extended to all colonized countries if real peace was 
aimed at. Britain had declared India a belligerent country 
without the consent of the Indian people and no declaration 
of war aims had been made by the British Government.
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Although Patel took pains to point out that Congress was
not bargaining, in effect, the Congress was doing just that.
While seconding the resolution Patel demanded proof of British
sincerity and stated that Britain would have to treat India
as a free country if it wanted India to further the cause of
96democracy and freedom. That he considered this a good chance 
to twist Britain's arm. was evident. At a flag hoisting cere­
mony at Wardha he warned Congressmen that India would never 
get such an opportunity again when it could apply pressure 
on Britain and dictate terms from a position of advantage.
W3S
Patel was quite clear that Congress should bargain. He^also
clear that unity was imperative. A united decision and
total compliance with 'the Commander’s' wishes was necessary
if Congress was to make any move. The Working Committee had
been given more powers at the AICC meeting to counteract the
97problem of 'too many commanders and very few soldiers'.
Patel half expected the British to turn down Congress's requ­
est for a clarification of British war aims in relation to 
India. The idea was to present the British with an either/or 
solution in which Gandhiites would be the gainers each way.
The Viceroy's statement of 17 October was Britain's answer to 
Congress's demands.
The Working Committee met on 22 October 1939 and expre­
ssed dissatisfaction at the Viceroy's statement. The Congress 
Ministries were asked to tender their resignations. Patel 
expressed regret at a public meeting that Britain had turned 
down Congress's conciliatory gesture:
We decided to ask the Viceroy for the objectivesof the 
war. We did not receive any direct reply but now are 
being asked if we are fit for independence. We are 
told to go and settle with the Muslims, i.e. with the 
Muslim League. If we do not succeed in coming to an 
agreement with them, we shall probably be told 'to go 
and settle with the Indian Princes'. When that happ­
ens no doubt they will say 'what about the Europeans 
who have so many interests in the country and who have 
invested so much money?'. 98
The British, he said, were like the proverbial monkey that 
pretended to sort out the dispute between the two cats and
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all the while filled his own stomach. Patel was critical of 
different groups and communities for meekly succumbing to 
British overtures and increasing the suspicion and hostility 
among themselves. Muslims and Indian princes alike were the 
objects of his contempt for their betrayal in what should 
have been a national cause:
In fact the institution of the princes may be said to 
have come to an end. India is not the home of the 
world's lost causes.99
It would not be far wrong to assert that Patel’s attitude 
towards the Muslims and the Princes had hardened by the time 
the war situation brought out their responses of conditional 
and unconditional co-operation. If and when the Congress 
came to power at the centre and Patel had to decide the fate 
of these groups,it was evident that he would not go out of 
his way to help them. While Congress contemplated civil dis­
obedience of one variety or another,Patel's mind was now work­
ing in the direction of how best to get Congress to be at the 
helm of affairs once the British were made to leave and how 
to establish Congress supremacy even out of office.
Patel's views on the subject of resignations are signi­
ficant because he was one Gandhiite who had been constantly 
building up the party to avail of the power that office would 
bring. His anxiety at this time was that if Congress resigned 
it would lose the head start it had gained over other politi­
cal groups On the other hand staying in office meant in­
viting criticism for the many unpleasant decisions that a war 
situation would demand. His fears were justified; when Cong­
ress resigned, other political groups got an opportunity to 
build their strength.
The entrenchment of Congress power in the Provinces and 
States had been for Patel a prelude towards further political 
gains at the centre. Before going on to discuss the ways in 
which Patel fortified Congress strength at the centre, a word 
about Patel's idea of unity would not be out of place. For 
all his talk of a lack of unity and common purpose between 
different political groups, Patel himself did not encourage
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his group within Congress to unite with other groups. He 
wanted unity on his own terms. Since most decisions had to 
be politically sound and fruitful and procure dominance for 
Congress and the Gandhiites, links lasted as long as their 
political advantage. Ties based on religion, caste, commu­
nity, ideology and even class, therefore, had limited strength 
in Patel's eyes. The best allies were those who were part­
ners in a common quest for dominance and had no ambition for 
overtaking. In the supervision of the Congress Ministries 
in Provinces and the conduct of agitations in the States, 
Patel's actions were devoid of long term visionary goals.
Unity with groups that had particular commitments was, there- 
fore, unnecessary, for it would bind and delimit and require 
compromises that Patel was neither inclined nor required to 
make given the absence of all-encompassing programmes. This 
attitude persisted in the penultimate and ultimate phases of 
the struggle for power and independence. Several quick results 
were obtained on the political front. Several losses were 
also incurred on the socio-economic front.
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CHAPTER VII
NEGOTIATOR 19 39-194 7
As the curtain fell on the last scene of the Congress 
Ministries’ performance under Provincial Autonomy, and the 
attention of the British shifted to the more dramatic event 
which had opened in Europe - the War - the inevitable reshuf­
fling and readjustments began on the Indian political scene. 
With Congress out of office, other political organisations 
felt that everyone was now on an equal footing and faced with 
like alternatives, whether to offer resistance or to compromise 
with the British Government's plans relating to the long and 
short term future of India and its people. In either case, the 
choice had to be worked out by each organisation with an eye on 
what others were doing. Suggestions of ways out of the impasse 
were made by leaders of all organisations. The lack of unity 
was lamented by many and the lack of reason decried.^
The existing bargaining positions of the Indian political 
groups and the attitude of the British to them was the starting 
point of this new chapter in British India. Congress attention 
which had been taken up for two and a half years by its inter­
nal problems and organisation was focused once again on the 
ramifications of the British position in India. The nature
of this position and the details of the British attitude have
2
been analysed in several well-documented works.
Patel's role in this phase of Indian politics can be 
analysed under three different heads:(i) as negotiator,(ii) 
as election manager and (iii) as administrator. In each of 
these his preoccupation with political aspects is evident 
in differing degrees. It is interesting to see which field 
reveals his maximum political strength.
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(i)
Before looking at Vallabhbhai’s own role and activity 
at this critical juncture of Congress politics, it might be 
worthwhile to analyse the Congress dilemma. Congress had 
abandoned office and,therefore, lost a position of advantage; 
Britain had taken the initiative into its own hands and al­
though from its own stand-point (of the war and 'home poli­
tics') it could scarcely lay down the law, the scope to mano­
euvre between communities put it at an advantage. A dissen­
sion-ridden Congress had a limited capacity to intimidate and 
its ultimate threat - civil disobedience - was likely to ach­
ieve little in terms of support or acclaim. How to negotiate 
with the least loss of face and with Gandhiites in control 
was the question.
Anxious to conceal Congress1s quest for a respectable
settlement, Patel emphatically ruled out any likelihood of
Congress looking favourably either towards office or towards
the Muslim League till the Congress demand was conceded.
Contradicting all reports of Congress's weak position, Patel
insisted that Congress was in a position both to resume office
3
and to launch a movement. While negotiations with the Mus­
lim League were categorically ruled out in view of the unre-
tractable position it had taken, Patel maintained a discreet
4
silence on the question of negotiations with the British. 
Warning the public that the Independence Day celebrations on 
26 January should not be mistaken for a declaration of civil 
disobedience, Gandhi seemed to take pains to assure the 
Government that civil disobedience was not going to be em-
5
barked on. Patel had also stated that Gandhi would not take 
any step without taking full stock of the situation and ascer- 
taining the strength of the Congress.
The British were conscious that at that point they had 
the upper hand despite their involvement in the war. Clearly 
then it was Congress that had to find ways of keeping a dia­
logue going all around. An apt cartoon in the papers called 
it 'chain talking' and elaborated it thus:
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Sardar Patel had talks with Mr.Subhas Bose who had 
talks with Mr.Jinnah who is having a talk today with 
the Viceroy who will have a talk with the Mahatma 
who is bound to talk to Sardar Patel. 7
Yet Congress was not being taken seriously; its non­
violence seemed to be a stumbling block. Patel felt that 
a change in tactics was necessary for Congress because the 
existing impasse was putting a strain on provincial leaders.
Patel candidly admitted, 'at least I feel that I would not be
8able to take my province with me'. Gandhi asked Patel to 
take the 'grave decision' and move towards a workable solu-
9
tion. At its Delhi meeting from 3 to 7 July, the Working 
Committee took yet another step. A resolution demanded the 
unequivocal declaration by the British that complete indepen­
dence was the goal for India. It also promised support in 
the defence of the country if as an immediate step a Provls- 
lOr\al national government were set up at the centre. Patel 
and Rajaji,who were steering the Congress Working Committee 
through the paces of the so-called negotiations, had a lurking 
fear that some excuse or other would be forthcoming from the 
British Government to justify their rejection of Congress's 
proposals.^
Britain turned down the proposal for a National Govern­
ment. The Viceroy made an offer on 8 August 1940 (the August 
Offer) which in broad terms suggested the enlargement of the 
Viceroy's Executive Council by the inclusion of Indian repre­
sentatives of major political parties and the setting up of 
a War Council which included representatives of Indian States
Congress^ denunciation of the Offer was followed by its deci-
12sion to launch civil disobedience. Maulana Azad, Nehru and
Patel chalked out the details about how the movement would
13be carried out. Vinoba Bhave was chosen to begin the move-
14ment from 17 October 1940. He was arrested on 20 October 
and was followed by Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 November, Patel on 
17 November and other members of the Working Committee, AICC 
and PCCs soon thereafter. Patel was in jail till August 1941 
when he was released on medical grounds.
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As individual civil disobedience petered out, the Bri­
tish Government was encouraged into taking a more rigid and 
uncompromising stand in relation to the Congress. The situa­
tion was worse by mid-1941 when the Axis powers seemed to be 
gaining ground in Yugoslavia, Greece and the Aegean Sea and 
marching into Russia. North Africa had become vulnerable 
and Britain was nervous. But yielding to any pressure from 
the Congress was :not about to make matters any better (a) 
because giving any advantage to Congress would alienate the 
Muslims, particularly of the League and generally perhaps 
even the non-committed Muslims and (b) because Congress co­
operation in the war itself would not be forthcoming. The 
armed forces were manned substantially by Muslims - that was 
only one of many reasons why Muslims as a community had to 
be appeased more than the Congress.
By February 1941, a Muslim League Sub-Committee presen­
ted the idea of geographically contiguous units composed of 
areas where Muslims predominated being formed into indepen­
dent Muslim States. In July 1941, an official communique 
suggested the enlargement of the Executive Council regardless 
of the refusal of Congress and Muslim League to participate. 
The Council was to have twelve members instead of seven, and 
eight Indians instead of three. A National Defence Council, 
consisting of thirty members mainly from the Indian States 
and other elements, was to be set up in order to give some 
avenue for the ventilation of Indian opinion even if that 
opinion was really quite unrepresentative.
During this period Congress deliberations were the result 
of several factors. Civil disobedience was not achieving very 
much; far from satisfying the restive elements of the left it 
had begun to irritate even patient men. The background of 
the Congress's next meeting at Bardoli on 23 December 1941 
was formed by the new developments described above and minis­
terial manouevrings in Bengal and Orissa, coupled with the 
inclination among some leading Congressmen to opt for office 
in the firm belief that that would put Congress on a surer 
footing as well as put in its proper place the Muslim League's
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idea of a separate nation. To emphasise the differences of 
opinion expressed at this meeting or to point to Gandhi's 
subsequent withdrawal from the Congress as symptoms of Cong­
ress disunity at this juncture would be an oversimplifica­
tion. As Patel had said in July 1940:
We have been following Mahatma Gandhi as faithful sol­
diers for the past twenty years. We are prepared to 
do so even now but Mahatma Gandhi did not want us to 
follow him blindly. 15
Congress was faced with the problem of keeping its posi­
tion as the premier organisation on the Indian political scene 
without appearing to compromise in any way. At a time when
any political advance was possible only with some compromise,
was
this posed a dilemma. The best way out^to have some members 
negotiating a respectable compromise while others adhered str­
ictly to the Congress doctrine and thus kept Congress on a 
pedestal. Gandhi stepped aside again so that leaders like 
Patel, Prasad and Rajaji could make the tough decisions and 
save the 'Mahatma1 from tarnishing the Gandhian image.
Linlithgow's reluctance to make another offer, the diver­
gence of opinion in the British Cabinet, the emergence of 
several proposals and finally the Cripps' offer are well known 
historical events. 'Churchillian negativism' and 'Crippsian 
constructiveness' too have been adequately dealt with by Moore
in his comprehensive analysis of British policy during this 
16period. Cripps' offer was crushed, says Moore, by the Cong­
ress and the basis for rejection was precisely that clarifi­
cation on the role and powers of the Viceroy and the new
Executive Council which the Congress had sought and which
17Cripps had been instructed to withhold.
Congress had much to lose in staying out of the Govern­
ment, but accepting an offer that clearly undermined their 
position and strength vis-a-vis their own organisation and 
other parties was considered suicidal, for the offer did not 
take the country a step further either politically or econo­
mically. While Azad and Nehru carried out talks with Cripps, 
there were those who were suspicious about the very purpose
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of the mission. Rajendra Prasad along with J.B.Kripalani, 
Vallabhbhai Patel, Prafulla Ghosh and Shankarrao Deo had 
taken the position that moves like the Cripps offer and the 
negotiations that accompanied it were related to India’s 
participation in the war effort and were, therefore, not free 
from ulterior motives. As such this went against Congress’s 
fundamental policy.
What was Patel's attitude to negotiations? That he stood 
with Gandhi was well known, but his attitude was guided by more 
practical considerations. His preoccupation was less with con 
cepts like non-violence and more with just how much would come 
into Congress hands if they accepted the offer. Negotiations 
had to be conducted on four planes. Congress and the British, 
Congress and the League, Congress and the Left and Congress 
and the Princes. Congressmen like Patel had resolved in their 
minds that promises about the distinct future,though important 
must not overshadow the immediate delivery of a worthwhile 
offer. Hodson divided Congress thinking on Cripps'offer into 
three schools of thought; one was the 'pacifists', the strict 
followers of Gandhi who wanted independence, freedom and 
power, not to participate in the war but to evolve its own 
methods of combating the crisis; who exactly were included in 
this category was not clear - Rajendra Prasad seemed the 
only 'close disciple' whose opinion counted and who could fit 
this description. A second category was the 'moderates' such 
as Rajagopalachari and Maulana Azad,who wished to negotiate 
for real power, upon the procurement of which they would give 
full help in the war effort. The third category, of which 
Vallabhbhai was given as the sole example, was 'a group of 
hardened politicians'...who were not opposed in principle to 
Congress participation in the war but were not willing to 
compromise on any of the policy demands that Congress had
18been consistently making for years - long term or short term. 
Nehru,whose role in the negotiations was prominent and signi­
ficant, did not figure in any category.
Patel's attitude towards the British was always more 
tough than either Gandhi's or Nehru's; the more reluctant the
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British seemed to give India what it wanted,the more rigid 
his attitude became. Disinclined to bargain when negotia­
tions made no headway, Patel was prone to be quick in suppor­
ting Gandhi's alternative course of a popular movement. In
April 1940, Patel had felt that unless some sort of action
19was taken demoralisation would set in. He was also not
very squeamish about violence. In 1940, when British reac­
tion to Congress's national government offer was being awai­
ted he had said:
In the circumstances which obtain today it would not 
be practical politics for the Congress to attempt the 
experiment of complete non-violence....I cannot see 
that we will be able to avoid using violence in deal­
ing with those who inflict hardships upon our people. 
This is not the time for discussing principles; we 
have only to answer the straight question whether 
the people of this country think that they would or
would not have recourse to force in dealing with
internal disorder and external attack. 20
Between Britain's principle of 'no freedom without unity' and
Patel's insistence that there would be no unity without a
guarantee for freedom and adequate steps in that direction,
21the goals of freedom and unity were considerably altered. 
Gandhi had stayed away from direct negotiations soon after 
the first meeting with Cripps. After Cripp's departure and 
before the scheduled AICC meeting at Allahabad, Gandhi had 
instructed Patel to attend the meeting and to reinject the 
Gandhian spirit into the organisation. Congress was not 
going to be pushed into taking a stand on the war simply by 
the ogre of a Japanese invasion. It would formulate its own 
policy. Gandhi contemplated a mass movement as it became 
more and more clear that the British were going ahead with 
the war effort and Indians had no say in the matter, while 
Patel had begun to feel that in missing opportunities of 
participation in Government, Congress was damaging itself 
both in relation to the League and to the British Government.
In the absence of a worthwhile offer,Patel asserted 
Gandhian dominance. Gandhi's draft was voted in at the AICC. 
The campaign was to be initiated in the provinces where Gan- 
dhiites had always commanded the maximum support namely,
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Bombay and Bihar. Again,therefore,it was to be based on the
strength and influence of the two leaders, Vallabhbhai Patel
and Rajendra Prasad, without whose hard work Gandhi's cam-
paignswere unlikely to gather momentum. On this occasion,
the provincial leaders such as Patel, Prafulla Chandra Ghosh
and Shankarrao Deo were to initiate the preaching of the gos-
21pel of a mass awakening in their respective provinces. At 
first>British opinion underestimated the support such a move­
ment was likely to get:
I should doubt myself whether the Working Committee 
would let him (Gandhi) go as far as this, for I think 
such an attitude would shock a great many people. 22
Such an analysis overlooked the strength of those on whom Gan­
dhi relied at such times. Patel closed the doors to negotia­
tions on the question of India's independence and geared him-
23self to preparing for a movement on a mass scale. He began
touring his home province to explain the coming mass movement.
Britain had kept up the facade of negotiations and compromise
but the intentions were always at variance with the declared
aims. The time for negotiations was over and a unique type
of struggle was to be started. Addressing crowded meetings
at various places in Gujarat and in Bombay, Patel predicted
that this was Gandhi's last struggle and it would be 'short 
24and swift'. Patel made an incredible statement at a public
meeting in Ahmedabad that even if Britain handed over power
to the Muslim League or any other Indian party, Congressmen
25like him would be quite content. The Secretary of State 
came under fire from Labourites for his unwillingness to acco­
mmodate Congress when Congressmen were being so reasonable.
In the House of Commons, Sorenson called Amery's attention 
to Patel's statement that Congress was not seeking power solely 
for itself:
If this statement is accurate, does it not indicate 
that the alleged hostility to the Muslim League is 
not so averse as is sometimes assumed? 26
Amery did not answer this supplementary question,but in reply 
to the main question he declared that the statements of in­
dividual representatives were not authoritative and should
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receive scant attention from Government. The statement was 
part of a political stunt.
Patel's ways of whipping up support in a mass movement
were most feared by the British; so was his capacity to force
27a decision for action on the Working Committee. A large 
volume of support in Gujarat and considerable support in Bom­
bay City was expected. Patel's organisational work in Gujarat 
was likely to be fruitful enough to have the desired effect 
on cloth merchants and students. His 'influence' on mill- 
owners also caused concern to the government; when he went to 
meet Kasturbhai Lalbhai in Ahmedabad,the Government began to 
worry that he was going to put millowners in a dilemma by 
pointing out that their war contracts were anti-national and 
almost immoral. It was his old policy of intimidation again, 
and it was suggested that he had hinted to Congressmen that 
they need not be too squeamish about violence during the move­
ment. A relatively dejected Gujarat was transformed into a
confident one as a result of Patel's efforts at whipping up 
28enthusiasm. The changed atmosphere in Western India was 
attributed mainly to Patel and partly to Shankarrao Deo and 
Yusuf Meherali.^
Government had planned a counter-attack as thoroughly as 
Congress had planned its attack. The Intelligence Bureau of 
the Home Department intercepted documents to gauge the details 
of the nature of the movement. At dawn on 9 August, Gandhi 
and the Working Committee members were all arrested in Bombay 
and taken by special train to Ahmedabad. In every province, 
Government clamped down on activities of a political or semi­
political nature. Serious disturbances accompanied by consi­
derable disorder followed in most provinces, but more parti­
cularly in Gujarat and Bihar. In terms of success the move­
ment did not achieve anything very positive for the Congress. 
The Quit India movement has been much discussed by historians, 
political analysists and journalists. Congress gains have 
been weighed against its losses to conclude that all in all it 
was a tactical error. Congress lost prestige and popularity 
and others made political capital out of the outlawing of
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Congress. Britain tightened its control and the idea was 
mooted to hold India by force,if necessary. Other groups 
were also encouraged into taking more hostile stands. For 
the Muslim League,the Quit India Movement brought considera­
ble gains in terms of support and credibility. It benefited
from Congress losses and could now strike a hard bargain with 
30confidence. The role of the Communists in 1942 is a vital 
and separate aspect of the freedom struggle. It concerns us 
here only to the extent that the Gandhiites and Patel in par­
ticular came down heavily on the Communists in 1944 and later.
31for their anti-national role earlier.
The Quit India movement played a vital role in the direc­
tion of Congress strategy and gave leaders like Patel a better 
sense of purpose for the political aims they now formulated 
for Congress. For some time, Patel and other Congress leaders 
were non-functional and to that extent Congress lost that edge 
it had over the League. After the leaders came out of jail, 
two sets of negotiations followed. In the summer of 1945,the 
First Simla Conference came to an abrupt end. Jinnah turned 
down Wavell's suggestions that the latter would let four Mus­
lim members be appointed by the League and the fifth Muslim 
could be a non-League member from the Punjab. In August,the 
Viceroy announced elections for the Central and Provincial 
assemblies, which announcement was the likely outcome of the 
coming into office of a Labour Government and of the Japanese 
surrender on 15 August. The next set of negotiations between 
the Congress, the League and the British were in the summer 
of 1946. In between,a Parliamentary Delegation visited India 
in January 1946 to ascertain the political position and de­
mands of the different Indian parties and groups. It is nece­
ssary to look at Patel's attitude to all these events to deter­
mine what he felt about negotiating with the British and the 
League. Patel had already expressed his displeasure at Wa­
vell's announcement of the First Simla Conference. In his 
broadcast Wavell had said that the Executive Council would 
include an 'equal proportion of caste Hindus and Muslims'.
Patel had recoiled at the phrase 'caste Hindus' and speaking
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for himself had said:
If these conditions persist Congressmen can have no 
place at the Conference. Congress is not a sectional 
organisation.... I express these sentiments not only 
on my own behalf but all those Congressmen who are 
with Gandhiji at the moment. 32
There was much speculation and indignation over the fai­
lure of the Conference. Congress leaders had gone with some
33hope and returned full of bitterness. Regarding the offer 
for elections,Patel was unmoved. Yet he realised that sitting 
around and sulking would only jeopardise Congress's long term 
plans. A neat balance had to be evolved between protesting 
and availing of the offers made by the British with ample pro­
visions for the League's predictable and unpredictable dema­
nds. Congress,therefore,decided to contest the elections. 
Patel's next involvement in negotiations came at the time of 
the final discussions following the elections. In the final 
discussions in 1946,we see Patel bringing to bear all the 
facets of his political personality that so far had been seen 
in piecemeal measures at various points - the apparently simple 
but very practical Gujarati, the ambitious Patidar, the hair­
splitting mofussil lawyer and municipal councillor, the nar- 
now provincial leader, the right-wing nationalist, the uncom­
promising anti-Leaguer and,above all,the power politician.
Patel made it clear that this would be the last and most 
concrete opportunity for Britain to settle the Indian question 
amicably. He argued that an immediate transfer of real power 
would eliminate the bitterness that had spread among Congress 
as a result of Britain's attitude of indulgence towards the 
League which in turn had encouraged the League to become more 
obstructive than before. Patel expected trouble during the 
transfer of power ; the extent of the trouble he believed 
would depend on the sincerity of the transfer:
One must always expect trouble of some kind. After all 
the transfer of power in a vast country like India is a 
stupendous proposition and in the process a few distur­
bances here and there cannot be regarded as anything 
serious and are not likely to retard the progress of a 
vast country fully conscious of its national aspira­
tions 34
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To the Parliamentary Delegation visiting India in January 
1946, Patel clarified that the fear of disturbances,however, 
would not restrain Congress from its goal:
Pakistan is not in the hands of the British Government. 
If Pakistan is to be achieved the Hindus and Muslims 
will have to fight. There will be a civil war. 35
The League leaders made much of Patel's references to violent
means for achieving goals; Chowdhry Khaliq-uz-zaman asked
what became of Congress's creed of non-violence and called
the civil war threat a device to mislead the Parliamentary
Delegation into believing that the League’s Pakistan scheme
would throw the country into total chaos and must,therefore,
36not be encouraged or pursued.
At the Working Committee meeting from 12-15 March 1946, 
Congress had appointed an ad-hoc committee consisting of 
Azad, Patel and Nehru to negotiate with the Cabinet Delega­
tion. Patel announced Congress demands at a press interview: 
Congress wanted immediate transfer of power for India. Al­
though it would provide safeguards for the protection of the 
legitimate rights of minorities it would not give in to Jin- 
nah's demand for dividing India as he wanted. This was Bri­
tain's biggest and last opportunity to enable India to be 
independent and conduct its international and foreign affairs 
in a spirit of friendship towards all nations. Encouraged 
by the British Prime Minister's statement,Patel expressed 
relief that the undue importance Britain had been giving to 
the Muslim League over the past six years would at last stop. 
Congress had gone to great lengths to accommodate the League; 
this demand for the vivi7/section of India was unfair to Hindu
and Sikh minorities in the Punjab and Bengal and would endan-
37ger the safety of both the constituent parts. In Patel's 
view Congress was negotiating with the Cabinet Mission with 
the object of (a) stepping into the shoes of the British when 
they finally left India and (b) keeping the Muslim League 
from gaining too much without Congress actually losing ground 
itself at any stage. Hints were given to the effect that 
Congress was keen to get on with the working of an interim
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government immediately. The British treated Patel's state­
ment as the 'attitude of Congress' and felt that it would
certainly develop into a formal 'demand to hand over respon- 
38sibility'. Patel suggested this soon enough: that the Bri­
tish should go ahead with the formation of a new government. 
The Mission should do that without consulting either the 
Congress or the Muslim League.
He was anxious to get across to the Mission that the 
longer they took the uglier the communal aspect of the pro­
blems was likely to become. 'The Congress trusts the Delega-
39
tion to give a fair deal to India'. Patel sounded almost 
desperate. The Congress had to get ahead of the League at 
all costs. Within Congress,he was struggling to keep ahead 
of the others in order that the party stayed in his image. 
These two factors which now governed much of his political 
activity also got him much disrepute. Gandhi rebuked him on 
these two fronts because more and more complaints had begun 
to come in about Patel's (a) anti-Muslim behaviour and (b) 
his highhandedness and overpowering role in the Working 
Committee.
Patel took a strong stand on the grouping scheme that
was suggested at the Second Simla Conference and voiced his
suspicions that Jinnah wanted groups with the intention of
seceding and eventually carving out his sovereign Pakistan.
When Jinnah was asked at the fourth meeting of the Conference
to give his views on the right of secession, he said that
the Union should not be for more than a period of five years.
Patel pointed out that that was a clear indication of the
40reality behind Jinnah's emphasis on the group proposal.
The Conference closed on 12 May 1946. The proposals 
which the Government announced on 16 May were the focus of
41high drama between Government, the Congress and the League.
The League accepted the scheme of a compulsory grouping of 
Provinces and inclusion of the six Muslim Provinces into 
sections B and C, 'in the hope that it would ultimately 
result in the establishment of a complete sovereign Pakistan'. 
Patel's early fears about Muslim intentions were more than
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justified.
From the start, despite all the protestation about the 
long term, Congress's anxiety had really been about the short 
term. It sought many clarifications on and modifications of 
the 16 May proposals and also asserted that it could not give 
a reply until Government's scheme for the immediate future 
was known. Congress resumed its discussions with the Viceroy 
on the question of the composition of the Provision A  National 
Government. The question of parity between Congress and the 
Muslim League posed a problem. The original British sugges­
tion of 5:5:2 had Jinnah's full support; Congress refused to 
accept that ratio. Wavell believed it was Patel who was most 
vehemently opposed to the parity formula, a view conceded by 
Birla and suggested by Turnbull:
I suspect that it is Patel who is running this parity 
question and that he is using Birla to inject alarm 
into civil disobedience. 42
Patel did not accept Wavell's argument that parity would not 
become a precedent and would not be adopted in the Constitu­
ent Assembly or the Union Legislature, and that it was only 
an expedient to get over the difficulty of getting the League 
to participate in the Interim Government. Rejecting that 
explanation he contended that parity had become the pattern
£LS
at the local level as well/in villages and in Municipal Comm­
ittees. He made no secret of his bitterness and 'hostility' 
towards Jinnah's designs to break up India and go down in 
history as the maker of Pakistan. Patel made his position
clear and then recommended that Jinnah and Nehru might meet
43aid confer further on the problem, knowing fully well that 
the Viceroy realised that it was Patel's opposition that had
44resulted in the Delegation's scheme 'hanging in the balance'.
Wavell tried to persuade Patel but reported 'Patel was not
45at all convinced'. Eventually, all attempts to negotiate 
an agreement between the two parties on the composition of 
the Interim Government failed. Between parity (5:5:2), the 
basis of 13 portfolios (6:5:2, the Congress quota including 
a scheduled caste) and 15 portfolios recommended by Patel,
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nothing could be worked out that was acceptable to all. Patel 
thus made it a point to impede in as many ways as possible 
the smooth realisation of objectives for Jinnah and the Muslim 
League.
The Viceroy issued his statement on 16 June in which an 
Interim Government was announced on the basis that the cons­
titution would proceed in accordance with the statement of 
16 May. It was also stipulated that if the two major parties 
or either of them was not able to join on the lines laid down, 
the Viceroy would proceed with the formation of an Interim
Government 'which will be as representative as possible of
46those willing to accept the Statement of May 16th'. The 
Congress Working Committee met the same evening that the State­
ment of 16 June was issued and Patel criticised the basis of 
the statement. Gandhi pointed out particular shortcomings.
The Viceroy accepted the suggestions that Sarat Bose's 
name be included but was not willing to accommodate the Cong­
ress on Sardar Nishtar's exclusion and Zakir Hussain's inclu-
47sion. To Jinnah,the inclusion of the Nationalist Muslim 
was quite unacceptable; Patel too had first refused a Muslim 
in the Congress quota until Gandhi pointed out the expediency 
of insisting on this point to keep the support of the Natio­
nalist Muslims. The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy met 
Azad, Nehru, Patel and Prasad on 23 June and urged them not 
to press the inclusion of a Nationalist Muslim among the 
Congress representatives in the Interim Government. The Dele­
gation assured Congressmen that it had been made clear to 
Jinnah that the League did not represent all Muslim political 
opinion nor was a precedent or principle being set about Mus­
lim appointees being the privilege of the League. It was, 
as stated several times before, a way out of a particular 
difficulty. Patel pointed out that this clearly meant that 
in the case of Nationalist Muslims to be a Muslim was a han­
dicap, and the Muslims would leave Congress if they felt that 
their religion precluded them from political positions if they 
were in the Congress camp but not if they were in the League. 
Moreover, by giving so much deference to Jinnah on this one
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point, the British were already allowing him the exercise
48of a veto which they had earlier so vehemently denied. It
was Patel's idea that Congress should accept the statement of
16 May and reject that of 16 June, which suggested the forma-
49tion of Interim Government, along the lines stated earlier.
At a meeting with Gandhi and Patel the Secretary of State 
pointed out that if Congress accepted the statement of 16 
May they were then on an equal footing with the League as 
far as the Interim Government was concerned. The Viceroy and 
the First Lord stated quite clearly that this move of accep­
ting one statement and rejecting the other was simply a tac­
tic to outmanoeuvre the League by giving a paper acceptance 
to the Statement of 16 May. The Delegation had been somewhat 
deliberately outsmarted and, as they felt, almost tricked.
The Viceroy declared:
We have in fact been outmanoeuvred by the Congress, 
and this ability of Congress to twist words and ph­
rases and to take advantage of any slip in wordings 
is what Mr.Jinnah has all along feared, and had 
been the reason for his difficult attitude. 50
That was not quite accurate of course. Mr.Jinnah had his 
own reasons for being 'difficult1. But what the Congress had, 
in their view, achieved was an abandoning of the 16th June 
proposals which 'fell to the ground'. A fresh start had to 
be made which'the Viceroy was inclined to do after a short 
interval rather than immediately. It is said that Patel thus 
let slip the real last chance to avoid partition. Although 
the question of partition was more fundamental and deep to 
be in the hands of one man, Patel's posture certainly Infu­
riated the League leaders further and made them difficult as 
coalition partners.
The Government was now even more convinced that Patel 
and not Nehru had to be satisfied in any negotiations for a 
settlement. After the Constituent Assembly elections in the 
various provinces, the Viceroy had expressed the urgency for 
forging a Provisional. Government. On 22 July he had sent for­
mal letters to Jinnah and Nehru putting forward certain pro­
posals for an Interim Government. Nehru argued that the
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primary issue was ‘the independence in action1 allowed to the
Government, all other points of disagreement being 'minor
51issues' which would offer no difficulty. Nehru's demands
and objections were often regarded as nebulous and wordy (the
phrase 'independence of action' was cited as one example of
52his tendency to be non-specific). Patel's views were anxi­
ously awaited. The Viceroy had already expressed fears that 
Patel was the one representative of a section of Congress who 
was out to 'improve' the Cabinet Delegation's scheme in such a 
way that the Muslim League stayed away both from the Interim 
Government and Constituent Assembly:
This section had no interest in the framing of a final 
constitution; all it wants is power, complete power, 
and power at once. The leader of this section in the 
Congress Working Committee is of course Patel. 53
Gandhi, it was felt, wavered between support for Patel one day
and for Nehru the next but was intrinsically more in tune with
Patel's thinking. He had left a host of decisions to him and
was generally content with the version of discussions that
54Patel gave him. As a result, Government found it necessary
to talk to Patel. V.P.Menon suggested that Sir John Colville
might go to Poona and see Gandhi, who would send for Patel to
55discuss the offer.
In the meantime, the League decided to resort to direct 
action on 18 August. Jinnah's fury continued unabated. Com­
munal disturbances followed in many areas, the worst of which 
was Calcutta, where there was loss of life and property on an 
unprecedented scale. Patel took a grim view of this provoca­
tion by the League; he made a note of all the trouble caused
by the League and decided that 'they must be made to pay for
56this senseless butchery'. The British also noted that Jin­
nah's and the League's prevailing attitude was likely to cause 
a lost of violence in the country and that it had certainly 
made Congress less prone to accommodating the League on any­
thing but its own terms. Patel, in particular, was described
as being in a very truculent mood on this issue of the Muslim
r 57League.
Congress was anxious to form the Government as soon as
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possible, with or without the League. Patel shrewdly obser­
ved to a Karachi lawyer, an independent supporter of
Congress, that he was quite clear in his mind that according 
to the legal interpretation of the statement of 16 May the 
provinces were 'free to join, even in the first instance, and 
after the group constitution is framed they have a further 
right to opt out of the group1. But, he did not want these 
points to be opened up at this stage:
If we find the proposals otherwise satisfactory and the 
interim arrangement is made to our satisfaction it would 
be wise to accept the proposals. 58
Ideally, the British Government wanted a coalition; but given 
the League's reservations, it wanted to get on with the job 
of the Interim Government. Wavell, who had reopened the 
grouping question with Congress leaders and threatened that 
if they did not come round to the British point of view he 
would not convene the Constituent Assembly, received a snub 
from the India Office for giving such an ultimatum and was 
warned:
...we must ask you not to take any steps which are 
likely to result in a breach with the Congress with­
out prior consultation with us. 59
Wavell's analysis that Congress always meant to use their 
position in the Interim Government to break up the Muslim 
League and in the Constituent Assembly to destroy the grouping 
scheme was similarly rejected by the India Office, and the 
retention of the caretaker government beyond the agreed time 
was firmly opposed.
On 2 September 1946*the Interim Government was sworn in 
and the distribution of the portfolios recommended by Congress
W£LSand accepted by the Viceroyyas follows: Jawaharlal Nehru - 
External Affairs and Commonwealth relations , Baldev Singh - 
Defence, Vallabhbhai Patel - Home, including Information and 
Broadcasting, John Mathai - Finance, M.Asaf Ali - Communica­
tions (War, Transport and Railway), Rajendra Prasad - Agricul­
ture and Food, Jagjivan Ram - Labour, Shafat Ahmed Khan - 
Health, Education and Arts, Syed Ali Zaheer - Legislative,
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Posts and Air, C.Rajagopalachari - Industries and Supplies, 
Sarat Chandra Bose - Works and Mines and Power, and C.H.
Bhaba - Commerce.
i
Negotiations did not end with the formation of the In­
terim Government. A disgruntled Muslim League still remained 
outside; and Jinnah was getting increasingly bitter towards 
both the Congress and the British Government. It took another 
seven weeks to persuade the League to join the Interim Govern­
ment. On 25 October, five portfolios were made available to 
the League and their members were sworn in an follows:
Liaquat Ali Khan - Finance ; I.I.Chundrigar - Commerce, A.R. 
Nishtar - Posts and Air , Ghaznafar Ali Khan - Health and 
Joginder Nath Mandal - Legislature.
The last lap of negotiations followed Attlee*s announce­
ment on 20 February 1947 that power would be transferred to 
Indian hands by June 1948. Mountbatten replaced Wavell as 
Viceroy in March 1947 to execute the new British Scheme. 
Questions of policy relating to the partition scheme and the 
reactions to, and alteration of the Mountbatten Plan, have been 
widely written about in scholarly works and journalistic 
best-sellers. Patel's contribution at this stage was two­
fold: (1) the introduction of the Dominion Status idea and 
(2) the scheme of the partition of particular areas where 
Muslims were in a majority. The burden of convincing Gandhi 
on the latter part of the plan fell on Patel, who had been 
convinced for some time of the impossibility of working side 
by side with Muslim League. Gandhi's excessive concern for 
the Muslims cost him his life. Patel,who had no ideological 
commitment to any group, had sufficient support in the Work­
ing Committee to carry his suggestions through. The feverish 
activity that accompanied the announcement of the 3 June Plan 
by Mountbatten is described in V.P.Menon and Campbell John­
son's books. 15 August 1947 was set as the date for the 
transfer of power and a Partition Council was set up (of 
which Patel was a member) to work out details. Patel's 
secretary writes;
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the main burden at the top level fell on Patel and 
Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan. 61
The practical issues that engaged Patel's attention show his 
administrative acumen as much as his negotiating skills. As 
some of them relate to his performance as Home Member and 
Minister for States Affairs, they have been dealt with in 
the section dealing with Patel as administrator.
(ii)
Patel's greatest anxiety in 1946 was Congress^performance 
in the Central and Provincial Assembly elections and later in 
the elections for the Constituent Assembly. Although Govern­
ment's proposals were considered 'vague, inadequate and un­
satisfactory', and were regarded as a variation of the Cripps'
offer with no mention of the independence of India, Congress
62was still going to contest the elections. Patel was on
and
stage again playing the familiar role of choosing and picking,/ 
hiring and firing,the partymen who would deliver the goods at 
election time. Even Gandhi took the back seat when Patel was 
in control on such occasions. As election manager, Patel exhi­
bited his political skills most effectively. Contesting elec­
tions without reopening the registry roll to new voters and 
with so many Congressmen still in prison seemed a mockery and 
Patel indicated that such grudging gestures only made Congress
wonder whether Government really wanted Congress strength to
63show up in the elections or not. Closeted with Gandhi and 
Maulana Azad for several hours, Patel as Chairman of the 
Parliamentary Board of the Congress discussed the election 
issue from every angle and was able to promise a more than 
respectable performance on the part of the Congress. This 
electoral scene differed in many ways from that of 1936-37. 
These elections were for the Central and Provincial Assemblies 
and for the Constituent Assembly and each election had its own 
importance. Congress was numerically the largest party,but 
with the Muslim League fighting for a separate nation,the 
victory of the League in the Muslim seats took a significance
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which was out of proportion to its numbers. In the previous 
election Congress had to prove something to the British; in 
this one it had to prove something to itself, the British and 
the Muslim League, to say nothing of the other minorities like 
the Sikhs and the scheduled castes. The rivalries between the 
Congress leaders within the Provinces and differences between 
the Provincial leaders and the Congress Working Committee 
members in charge also assumed proportions that were ominous 
of things to come. Perhaps they set a pattern for the future. 
That may be better analysed after a closer examination of the 
events of the elections and Vallabhbhai's role in them.
For the Central Assembly elections, Patel set up the 
special office of the Central Election Board on the top floor 
of Congress House in Bombay with Shantilal Shah as his secre­
tary. Nominations were required by the end of October and 
two circular letters were issued to each province; one asking 
for nominations from the various provinces and the other for 
a 'draft pledge' that each candidate was required to sign.
Nehru was asked to prepare an election manifesto based on the
64main issue of independence or Quit India. The manifesto
recounted Congress's past record of constructive and national
work and deplored the adverse effects of a hundred and fifty
years of foreign rule. The most vital and urgent need of
India was the removal of poverty and the raising of living
standards of its people and a comprehensive move towards
economic and political planning by Indians themselves was,
therefore,necessary. This was intended to pacify the left
wing. The battle cry of the elections was 'Quit India' and
Congress wanted people to help it to fulfil the Indian dream
of independence by which all other freedoms would come to 
65the people. After this,Patel made most of the decisions
according to his own style. In uncontested constituencies 
where there was only one candidate,Patel approved the appli­
cation straightaway. In other cases, he was required to cir­
culate the applications with his recommendations among the 
seven members of the Election Board whose approval was requi­
red for a nomination. Who would actually make the final 
decisions became evident after one or two disagreements bet-
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ween the top leaders in which Patel had the final word.
Patel worked meticulously. After procuring the latest 
edition of the Legislative Assembly Electoral Rules and Regu­
lations for electoral information about all the provinces, 
he began collecting information about the voters and the pro­
vinces. In the case of special constituencies in particular 
provinces, such as the constituency of Deccan Sardars and 
Inamdars in Gujarat , he procured the entire list of voters 
to determine the character of the electorate. In this parti­
cular case, the voters were conservative Maharashtrians and
word was sent to the Maharashtra Congress Committee to choose
66a suitable Congress candidate from the area.
By the middle of October, proposals began coming in from 
the various provinces. Patel showed scant regard for others' 
opinions and after the receipt of names from the first pro­
vince, Kerala, he expressed a desire to take decisions on 
his own, rather than circulate the names to all the members 
of the Election Board:
I am afraid the procedure of circulation is cumbrous 
and lengthy. In many cases there will be more candi­
dates than one for a constituency and there will be 
disputes.... I will have no alternative but to give a 
decision according to my own light in case the repl­
ies are not received in time from the members of the 
Committee. 67
There were disputes in most provinces and differences over 
most of the candidates. With Maulana Azad,there was a funda­
mental conflict on the question of the procedure and method 
of decision-making. By arrangement, Maulana Azad was supposed 
to handle Bengal, Assam and the eastern areas, Patel , Bombay, 
Gujarat, Maharashtra and the west, and Rajagopalachari the 
south. Within this broad demarcation were provincial mana­
gers such as Rafi Ahmed Kidwai for U.P., Rajendra Prasad for
Bihar, Maulana Baksh for Sind, Gopala Reddy for Andhra and
68Kamaraj for Tamilnad. In several areas Patel and Azad had 
differences which were not easily ironed out. Deshmukh 
(Bombay), Biswanath Das (Cuttack, Orissa), Thakurdas Bhargava 
(Punjab), Pandey (Mahakoshal), the Ahrars, these were some of 
the subjects of vehement disagreements. The Maulana pointed
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out that Deshmukh failed the test required for suitability
by Congress candidates. He was guilty of indiscipline against
69the party and malicious statements against Gandhi. Rajen-
dra Prasad and Asaf Ali also made similar observations about 
70him. Patel believed that Deshmukh would appeal to the 
Deccan voters in his constituency. He recommended him in the 
face of much opposition:
Inspite of his faults he is a good fighter and is a 
sport also. This time he will behave alright and so 
you need not be anxious about him on this score. 71
Biswanath Das's name was rejected and Maulana Azad made an
72appeal for reconsideration which was rejected by Vallabhbhai.
A more serious difference was that over the seat from Ambala
Division which the Punjab Board allotted to Thakurdas Bhar-
gava instead of the sitting member Shamlal. Azad objected
to Thakurdas and saw no reason why being Gopichand Bhargava's
brother should give him more right to a seat than the sitting
member who was a 'trusted man of the Congress...constantly
been going to jail, and had never stayed back in any move- 
73ment'. But Azad's was a voice in the wilderness; Patel 
reminded him that four members out of seven of the Central 
Board had voted for Thakurdas and two had acquiesced in the
74decision; he,therefore,had no reason to upset the decision. 
Although Azad did not retaliate just then, the incident ran- 
coured in his mind. At the time of the provincial elections 
three months later, he decided to assert himself. The Board 
decided on a particular Mahakoshal candidate; Pandey appealed 
to Azad against the decision and the latter reversed the de­
cision without consulting the Mahakoshal in-charge, R.S. 
Shukla. Patel disapproved sharply:
I had issued a public statement that the decisions of 
Mahakoshal are final and are not appealable and hence 
there will be no change....If you had taken all the 
powers alone and disposed of all the nominations, no­
body would have been more glad than myself. The pro­
cedure adopted in this case is such that I cannot 
understand it at all. 75
A telephone conversation about the above incident and about 
a proposed visit of Patel's to Lahore and Sind of which Azad
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disapproved led to a strong reaction from Patel:
...The least that I could do in the circumstances is 
that in view of your attitude, I propose to immedia­
tely tender my resignation from the Central Board as
well as the Working Committee. I should be grateful
if you will relieve me without any delay as my cont­
inuance in the present state is likely to give me 
constant mental trouble and anxiety. 76
Maulana Azad's explanatory reply was vague and inadequate.
He had not expected Patel to react so violently and apologised
77without hesitation. But Patel reminded him that the incident
over Thakurdas Bhargava had been handled ungracefully by him;
that in fact he had encouraged the impression 'all over that the
President can hear appeals over the decisions of the Board1.
The Mahakoshal decision was 'arbitrary and ex parte' and had
78placed Patel in a 'ridiculous position':
Perhaps it may be that your approach to those questions 
is different from mine and therefore it is difficult 
for me to understand or appreciate it. It would there­
fore be better to relieve me from this embarrassing 
position altogether, as early as possible. 79
At this juncture, Patel had made himself indispensable. More­
over, as in the case of candidates from Punjab, Bengal and Sind, 
the selection of candidates was a complex and 'bad business' 
and the skirmish for going to the councils was bringing out 
the worst in everybody. As soon as a name was proposed vari­
ous complaints would begin to pour in. Most of the complaints,
according to Patel, were 'absolutely false' and above all 'no
80selection is possible which would satisfy all'. Patel 
concluded that it was best that he himself should be satisfied 
by the choice.
The controversy between Rajagopalachari and Kamaraj re­
quired Vallabhbhai's attention and had to be handled very 
tactfully. Rajaji had kept away from the Congress ever since 
the difference of opinion in 1942. This difference stemmed 
from Rajaji's view that Congress should woo the Muslim League 
and concede Pakistan,if necessary, a suggestion that Patel 
thought ridiculous. Rajagopalachari had a resolution passed 
in the Madras Legislature recommending to the AICC,which was
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due to meet in Allahabad from 29 April 1942, that the Cong­
ress should recognise the League’s claim to separation and 
negotiate with it. Rajaji’s subsequent resignation from the 
Working Committee enabled him to propagate his controversial 
ideas about conceding Pakistan to the League and working out 
a scheme for participation in a National Government. Gandhi 
granted him the freedom to sell that idea in principle but 
not without clarifying that in practice he was likely to suffer
the consequences of annoying Patel. 'You should obey Vallabh-
81bhai’s ruling1, he wrote to Rajaji in May 1942. Patel was 
most impatient with Rajaji:
We have made many attempts and courted many insults.
The Congress today is reeling under two blows. One 
Cripps and the other Rajaji's resolution have done 
us enormous harm. 82
Thereafter, a certain shyness or reserve could be observed in 
Rajaji's relations with the top Congressmen and more parti­
cularly with men like Patel who had chosen to stick with Gan­
dhi when the Quit India decision was taken. For his indisci­
pline in 1942, the Tamilnad Congress Committee castigated 
him more than the CWC. Kamaraj, the President of the TCC, 
insisted on the withdrawal of Rajaji's 4 anna membership of 
the Congress. After the release of Congressmen in the summer 
of 1945 and the refunctioning of PCCs, Rajaji began attempts 
towards re-entry on the Tamilnad Congress scene and more 
specifically, leadership of the South. Kamaraj was still a 
bitter opponent. He abhorred Rajaji's opportunism of 1942 
and the callousness he had shown to Satyamurthi who had died 
in 1943 and left the road clear for Rajaji in the south. De­
tecting a softening of attitude on the part of the Working
Committee, Kamaraj forewarned Maulana Azad that Tamilnad would
83not accept the re-entry of Rajaji 'into the Congress fold'.
An election engineered by Rajaji's group in Tamilnad was con­
sidered 'wholly irregular and void not merely on technical
grounds but on substantive grounds' by Muthuranga Mudaliar
84and other members of the Kamaraj group. Rajaji sent mess­
ages to Maulana Azad as well as Gandhi to get the Working 
Committee's support in making a re-entry. He realised, how­
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ever, that in the end it was Patel who was in-charge of the 
elections. In November 1945, Dr. P.Subbarayan carried mess­
ages to Patel about Rajaji's plight and other grievances re­
lated to the Madras Congress. Patel had asked Kamaraj to 
suggest to Rajagopalachari that he might stand for the Madras 
seat of the Central Legislature. That was Patel's way of 
obliging Rajaji without upsetting the existing Tamilnad group. 
The 'offer* was watered down by Kamaraj into a 'casual men­
tion' which Rajaji did not take seriously, much to Patel's 
surprise. It was later brought to his notice,however*that 
Patel had taken offence at Rajaji's refusal to stand for the 
election. Having gathered that at the provincial level he 
was having a difficult time*Patel thought the Central Assembly
o c
was a good point of come-back.
I do not know why you declined to accept that offer. If 
I thought that your way in the province was easy, I 
would not have suggested that you should go to the cen­
tre. As I sensed many difficulties in your way for the 
provincial leadership, I made this suggestion which 
could have cleared yourway for the future.... 86
Rajaji regretted the missed opportunity but his heart was 
still in provincial leadership. Patel was in a position at 
this juncture to effect a working arrangement between the two 
warring sides of the province and thereby procure their indeb­
tedness and unconditional support. Rajaji appealed for Patel's
help in preventing the 'whispering propaganda campaign that
87you are behind the move to destroy me'. His proposal was 
that the existing TNCC members should be prevented from mana­
ging the selection of candidates for the elections. They 
might manage the Andhra districts but they were likely to 
make a mess in the Tamil districts:
If you select and set up a solid parliamentary board 
for this province the atmosphere will be clarified.
If you desire my assistance in this, I can advise you. 88
Patel took the matter in his hands and dealt first
with those who threatened 'unfortunate repercussions' if any 
decision was imposed on them. Those who had refused to co­
operate with Asaf Ali, who had been sent there to clear the 
'political water', were reminded that the selection of candi-
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dates ultimately rested with the Central Parliamentary Board
which would see that the local selection Board was represen-
89tative of 'all important claims and interests*. At the same 
time, Patel realised that reliance on popular provincial lea­
ders was necessary. He suggested a Board of eight to Kamaraj 
out of which three names would be Rajaji's choice, and stipu­
lated that Rajaji's advice would be taken in exactly the 
same way as that of a member of the Board even though formally 
he would not be member of the Board. Patel explained that 
with adversaries like the British on the one side and the Mus­
lim League on the other 'it was unbecoming to quarrel inter­
nally'. Moreover, antagonising an international figure like 
Rajaji would not be prudent for the party and the country.
With Patel's characteristic ability to manoeuvre men and 
situations the crisis was averted. Kamaraj still asserted his 
opinion in the case of some names. He tried to revoke the 
ELlectioYv Board's endorsement of Rajaji's choice (Velayudapani) 
and permitted an opponent P .V .Ponnuswamy to file his nomina­
tion. Patel regretted Kamaraj's treatment of Rajaji as an 
'untouchable' and indicated quite clearly without mincing his 
words that if he did not carry out the terms of the agreement
he would take strong measures to make sure that his instruc-
90tions were followed. This coupled with Gandhi's attempts 
towards Rajaji's revival in the south, led to Kamaraj tender­
ing his resignation from the membership of the Provincial 
Parliamentary Board. It had become evident to him that the 
Centre was anxious that Rajaji should be reinstated as the 
provincial leader. In his article 'Curious' in the Harijan 
of 5 February 1946, Gandhi answered allegations that his trip 
to the south was undertaken for the purpose of reinstating 
Rajaji as leader and Premier of Madras. Gandhi proclaimed 
that his visit was in relation to the Dakshin Bharat Hindi 
Prachar Sabha and the Madura and Palani temples; he added 
however:
I had no hesitation in saying that Rajaji was by far the 
best man for the purpose in the Southern Presidency and 
if I had the disposal in my hands I would call Rajaji 
to office if I did not give it to him myself. 91
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Kamaraj protested and subsequently resigned over Gandhi's 
statement, which made Patel indignant. But Patel felt more 
let down when ten days later Rajaji wished to resign; he felt 
unable to accept the manner in which some Congress leaders 
stuck an independent note when it suited them, leaving him 
to bring harmony out of the chaos created by them. His eff­
orts to get Rajaji into the provincial organisation at the 
top was also a move designed to benefit the organisation in 
terms of its wider national role. Rajaji's past record in 
the legislature had been commendable and with Congress head­
ing towards participation in government activities,he had 
much to contribute. But Rajaji thought otherwise and felt 
he had lost his foothold in the province. He had supporters 
but he also had a wide opposition and he, above all, knew the 
problems it could create for him. Patel called him 'unfair 
and 'unjust' toothers and rebuked him for letting him down:
How can anyone support you if you were to act like this?
You do not even consult us, but that had always been
your way of life. I cannot understand you. 92
Rajaji had spoilt many chances for himself. This time he was 
not easily forgiven. But the problem was not easy for him. 
His control over the province had diminished. His opponents 
had become so sure of themselves that after the provincial 
elections in April 1946, when the three southern PCC Presi­
dents, Prakasam, Kamaraj and Madhava Menon,were summoned by 
Patel to choose Rajaji as the leader of the Madras Assembly 
Party, they refused outright and said publicly that they were 
at liberty to choose whomsoever they liked and that the High
Command's advice was not mandatory. Prakasam was elected
93leader of the Madras Congress Assembly Party.
The Rajaji incident has been narrated at some length to 
bring out the pivotal role Patel was meant to have in the 
Congress organisation and the relatively negligible impact 
of his political personality in areas in which he had hardly 
any control over vested interests. The South was clearly
out of his grip. Gujarat, Maharashtra, Central Provinces and 
Karnatak,directly, and Bihar and U.P., indirectly, were still
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controlled by Patel. The repercussions of falling out with 
him had been felt earlier in most of these provinces. Deci­
sions about Congress adjustments with other groups also had 
to be made by Patel. At the time of the Central Assembly 
election,the Hindu Mahasabha leader,Dr.Shyam Prasad Mookerji, 
proposed to Rajendra Prasad that a settlement might be made 
between the Mahasabha and the Congress. Patel recoiled at 
the idea and refused permission straightaway. Congress was
to contest every seat except that for which Dr.Mookerji was 
94standing. The Muslim League posed the biggest problem for 
Congress in view of the rapidly changing strength of the 
former. Congress strategy in this matter differed from area 
to area. In the Punjab, Ahrars and Unionists were likely to 
procure some seats and Congress had decided to support them 
with financial and other help primarily at Maulana Azad's 
behest. Patel's dissatisfaction at this proposal proved 
justified. In some areas in the Punjab where the Muslim 
League's nominations were declared invalid, the Ahrar candi­
dates whose nominations were valid and who were being suppor-
95ted by Congress switched sides and joined the Muslim League.
In the Central Assembly election,the Congress fa"r_ed 
badly in the Muslim seats where Nationalist Muslims were com­
pletely eliminated and the League had got all the seats. With 
success on their side,the League made Congressswork more
difficult. Members from other parties (like the Krishak
96Praja Party) were joining the League. The Punjab and the 
Bengal posed a big problem in this respect. Vallabhbhai 
nevertheless felt that the candidates for the Muslim seats 
should stand as Congress candidates rather than as indepen­
dents. Others increased the infighting. Each province had 
peculiar problems and it was Patel's task to see that factions 
and groups did not hinder the ultimate goal of Congress suc­
cess. Patel looked at each case pragmatically. In Karnatak, 
for instance, Latthe aspired for a candidacy to the Bombay 
Assembly. He had been Finance Minister in the Kher Ministry 
and resigned his seat in the Assembly in 1940-41 because he 
could not accept the principle of non-violence absolutely in
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meeting the war-crisis in 1942 and he differed on the ques­
tion of the Quit India movement. For him to stand on the 
Congress ticket was,therefore/considered precarious because 
many voters were likely to refrain from supporting him for 
his vac ilation in alternately accepting and rejecting Cong­
ress policy towards government proposals. Patel permitted 
him to stand as an independent with the understanding that 
he would sign the Congress pledge and join the party after 
the election. His opponent, Sambrani, who was a loyal Cong­
ressman was treated with as much concern and it was consi­
dered quite vital *to satisfy him by providing for him some­
where else, whether in the municipality or in the local 
97board*. Eventually, however, the support of the Mahar 
community in that area was solicited and their candidate was 
allowed to stand as an independent backed by Congress while 
Latthe was persuaded to be the Congress candidate from the 
Northern Division of Belgaum district.
Disunity persisted in Punjab and Bengal at the time of 
provincial elections. In Punjab,the Akalis were creating a 
problem in reaching a settlement with Congress. Patel had 
given Maulana Azad a mandate in the Punjab PCC to settle with 
the Akalis on the basis that in 16 or 17 Punjab seats they 
would not put up their candidates. Gopichand Bhargava and 
Daud met the Sikh representative Sardar Baldev Singh in 
Lahore and after some discussion they agreed that the Akalis 
would leave ten seats to Congress, the Congress would give 
ten seats to the Akalis. Both would contest five of the seats 
and in seven,Congress would step aside for want of suita­
ble candidates. But that did not work out either and the 
lack of a suitable settlement with the Sikhs proved harmful 
for Congress; it encouraged a pro-League drift which Patel was 
struggling hard to avert. Each non-Muslim general constitu­
ency was vital because Punjab was 'a key province of Pakis-
98tan1. Deeply distressed by the inability of the three top
leaders of Punjab to act in union, Patel asked them to stop
quarrelling and to make demands, whether financial or other-
99wise, in consultation with each other. A frustrated Daud
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Ghaznavi complained to Patel that the Unionists and Akalis 
were using Congress to enhance their own strength and not to 
help Congress defeat the Muslim League and that steps were 
essential in order to prevent Congress being fmade a pawn in 
the game of power p o l i t i c s ' . D a u d  suggested a tour by 
Jawaharlal Nehru to whip up public support. But the prob­
lem was not one of public support. Patel questioned the 
value, in terms of actual results,of diverting attention and 
resources to a general campaign for gathering the support of 
the masses. His election strategy was rather more pointed 
and specific and rested on particular individuals in parti­
cular areas whose prestige, power and position over groups 
was sufficient to control their political behaviour. Where­
as Daud Ghaznavi believed that if Nehru conducted a two week 
tour in the Punjab the situation could be retrieved, Patel 
believed that for purposes of election simply creating 'a lot 
of enthusiasm' and gathering huge crowds was not sufficient:
...these demonstrations have no value for the purpose
of election, as they influence no voters in the Mus­
lim constituencies. The Hindu voters need no encour­
agement . 102
He had expressed the same idea to Jawaharlal Nehru be­
fore the Central Assembly elections. The latter wished to 
stay clear of local squabbles and preferred to look away when 
such squabbles were brought to his notice. He admitted he 
had no time for quarrels among groups and would rather spend 
his time encouraging enthusiastic young people and the masses 
generally to work for the party and its goals. Patel consi­
dered the concept of 'mobilising the masses' nebulous and 
sought to give it more concrete shape by identifying particu­
lar sections and groups among these masses who would control 
the larger sections of the people. While regarding disdain­
fully the petty quarrels among factions,Patel looked them 
squarely in the face and set into motion his patent remedies 
for eradicating these maladies - pressure, control and some­
times even force. ’Demonstrative enthusiasm' was superficial 
to Patel's mind. Directing people's interests along channels 
in which the mobilisers and mobilised had a mutual advantage
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103was far more fruitful. The doubt over Congress being able 
to procure enough Muslim seats and the disunity and mistrust 
among Congress workers was a source of irritation for Patel 
to whom the elections, and more particularly, the Provincial 
elections, meant a great deal to the extent that they advan­
ced Congress's political plans.
He was constantly on the look cut for provincial leaders 
who would come down on dissidents rather than simply play 
safe and steer clear of factional infighting. To Bhim Sen 
Sachar, Patel wrote:
, . been. ,
I notice that you have/trying to steer clear of parties,
but that is not enough...unless there is someone who
can assert and enforce his will without caring for the
displeasure of those who are in the wrong, no progress
can be made. 104
Patel had provincial strength to which he came back again 
and again and on which he relied even when he was fully in­
volved with national questions of a wider nature. Patel 
showed in ample measure that although he had a distaste of 
infighting, he recognised its inevitability and dealt with it 
firmly. The Constituent Assembly elections provide further 
evidence of this.
The Constituent Assembly elections in the provinces had
to be supervised with care in order to prove to the British
and the opponents of Congress that the Old Guard still held
sway over the machinery of the party. In most provinces^the
elections went off smoothly and Patel was in touch with the
105leaders to suggest or approve names. Among Congressmen
there seemed to be a scramble for Constituent Assembly seats 
which grieved Gandhi more than it did Patel. Chiding the 
power-seeking Congressmen for publicising their jail records 
in order to get elected,Patel compared them to dogs who wal­
ked under fully loaded carts and deluded themselves into 
believing that they were in fact carrying the entire load on 
their shoulders. While Gandhi grieved at the loss of mora­
lity all around and wrote exhaustively in the Harijan about 
it, Patel was making a mental note of all the opportunists;
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it was well-known that he did not forgive easily. Two pro­
vinces that he was particularly disheartened with were Madras 
and Punjab. Madras had defied him at the earlier elections 
and Punjab had made a muddle of the Sikh representation to 
the Constituent Assembly. Unhappy with the Cabinet Mission's 
treatment of the Sikhs' problems,Master Tara Singh had rejec­
ted their plan and the Akalis refused to elect their represen­
tatives to the Constituent Assembly. Patel intervened through 
Baldev Singh and sent messages to the Congress Sikhs in Punjab 
that they must nominate their representatives. The intention 
was that then the Akalis would follow suit and send their men 
as well. Pratap Singh Kairon was* appointed to the Congress 
Working Committee to ease the problem with the Sikhs somewhat. 
As a result of Congress nominations, eight Sikhs did get nomin­
ated for Constituent Assembly elections. A few days later, 
on 14 July 1946, the Panthic Board met and Pratap Singh came 
in for criticism from all envious quarters. Conflicts arose 
as a result of Nehru's intervention which had been sought 
by Bhim Sen Sachar; the Sikhs were told that they might do 
as they pleased. All Sikh nominations were withdrawn and the 
previous boycott decision was reverted to. Fresh moves were 
made by Congress to get Sikhs to send representatives and the 
possibility of having bye-elections was explored. The Panthic 
Board agreed to accept the Statement of 16 May and to send 
representatives to the Constituent Assembly. There being no 
provision for bye-elections,these elections had to wait. Bhim 
Sen Sachar incurred Patel's displeasure and expressed a desire 
to resign which infuriated Patel further. Daud Ghaznavi who 
had been made Congress President of the Punjab PCC also left 
the Congress fold and went over to the League. Sachar was 
told plainly that he had failed to understand the situation 
and the repercussions were serious for Congress as a whole;
he must,therefore,take counsel of Gopichand Bhargava who Patel
106regarded as more mature and reliable than Sachar.
Before assessing what these three elections secured for 
Congress and for Patel,it might be appropriate to make a brief 
survey of the kinds of candidates Patel chose. First of all.
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a candidate had to be a winner. Success at elections was so 
vital that no compromise could be made for any one on perso­
nal or compassionate grounds. Patel constantly referred to
107the need for 'strong candidates'. That was the requirement
even when compromises with other groups and parties were sought 
or considered. Prasad had suggested a settlement with Shyam 
Prasad Mookerji with the object of luring the orthodox Hindu 
votes. Patel ruled out such gestures and stated:
...that the Congress cannot afford to enter into any 
settlement with the Hindu Mahasabha, which had no chan­
ce of winning any seat anywhere in the whole country.
It would compromise our position without any compen­
sating advantage. 108
Loyalty to the party and adherance to the party discipline
109was another quality that Patel looked for in a candidate.
But, when Azad objected to G .V .Deshmukh's candidature on the 
basis that he fell short of the test of having 'proved his 
worth at the time of test', Patel asserted that other consi­
derations sometimes took precedence over expressions of loyal­
ty. Bombay City had a large Deccani population and the choice 
of a Konkani candidate was intended to woo the Konkani voters.
A conservative personality seemed another quality that Patel 
sought in candidates. Apart from the conservatism in politi­
cal thinking, simplicity in personal life was desirable.
Nehru's recommendation of Dharam Yash Dev was rejected on this 
basis:
...from his conversation with me I gathered that he has 
a family and a style of living which is expensive... his 
wife is a society girl of expensive habits. 110
While ensuring representation to prominent communities in dif­
ferent areas, and encouraging the choice of candidates who had 
links which were advantageous, Patel declared that the choice 
could not be left entirely to Provincial Committees. The 
existing Committees were too old and consequently 'out of 
touch with the present day atmosphere' . It was,therefore, 
necessary for him to take charge of picking and choosing can­
didates for the elections.
Gandhi's confidence in Patel made the latter indispen-
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sable at election time. Every decision of Patel’s was made 
unilaterally and Gandhi kept out of the elections completely. 
Patel declared confidently:
Gandhiji takes no interest in these matters. It is 
unnecessary to enter into the reasons as to why he 
has kept out of these elections....He is therefore 
not inclined to give advice to anybody and his per­
mission should not be necessary. 112
With Gandhi's prestigious backing Patel had worked his way to 
a position of tremendous strength at the Congress centre. He, 
therefore,felt particularly slighted when on some occasions 
Gandhi expressed a preference for Nehru. Details of particu­
lar Congress Presidential elections are being mentioned here 
to show that Nehru was perhaps the only national leader by 
whom Patel felt threatened and vice versa. In 1945, Congress 
underwent a formal change. Jawaharlal Nehru took over as the 
new President and appointed a new Working Committee, which had 
some new names, some of which were not acceptable to the Old 
Guard. Patel was also running for the Congress Presidency,but 
at that juncture Nehru was recommended to appease certain 
sections within and without Congress, and Patel's name was 
withheld so as not to antagonise certain sections excessively. 
Patel cautioned those who were disgruntled as a result of 
'the revolutionary change of personnel' in the Working Comm­
ittee against allowing their emotions to get the better of 
them. When the fruits of labour of those that had struggled 
consistently were so near at hand he thought it foolish to 
throw them away by expressions of anger. Patel admitted that 
he too had swallowed a bitter pill and under normal circum­
stances would have resigned from the Committee. But he had 
other plans and his own ways of ensuring that the Committee 
did what he had chalked out for it. To D.P.Mishra, who ri­
diculed Nehru's constant cry for new blood, Patel wrote:
You may, however, rest assured that so long as one of 
us is inside the group that governs the policy of the 
Congress the straight and steady march of the ship 
will not be interrupted. 113
The Presidency of the Congress had somehow eluded Patel each 
time and he had grown accustomed to working off-stage. He
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was quite clear,however,that he would ensure the 'right 
candidate' as President. After Nehru stepped aside on becom­
ing Vice President of the Executive Council, a new President 
of Congress had to be elected. Kripalani, the High Command's 
candidate was opposed by Azad who sought the Congress Presi­
dency as a compensation for his exclusion from the Interim 
Government. Patel's mistrust of Azad was well-known and the 
latter finally withdrew realising that Patel's partisan role 
could ruin him. Patel's secretary wrote:
This was the first major organisational conflict which 
I had the opportunity of witnessing at close quarters 
and I could see what powerful strings Sardar could pull 
from his house in Delhi, in distant corners of the cou­
ntry, to forestall and checkmate the Maulana's attempts.114
The same show of forces occurred at the time of the election 
for the President of the Jaipur Congress in December 1948, 
which Sitaramayya and P.D.Tandon were contesting. Patel was 
in favour of Tandon and Nehru was vehemently opposed to him. 
Tandon was a Hindu fanatic and was alleged to have a decidedly 
communal approach to many problems. Sitaramayya was elected 
with Nehru's vicarious support. Patel declared that he had 
maintained a neutral stand and Nehru should have done like­
wise. In 1950, Patel got Tandon proposed against Kripalani - 
Nehru's candidate. This time Patel spared no pains in getting 
his nominee elected. His secretary wrote ,'So far as Sardar
was concerned he had been hurt too deeply to persuade himself
115to forget the past'. Provincial leaders who gave unflinching
support to Patel formed a 'formidable list'. Thus,even these 
elections showed Patel's managerial skills.
What did the different sets of elections achieve for 
Congress and for Patel? More important than the figures were 
the other features of the election which were pointers for the 
parties concerned. The strength of the League was now an es­
tablished fact upon which Jinnah could make further dem­
ands, not the least of which was the demand for Pakistan. Con­
trol over the Muslim seats at the Centre, where Congress did 
not get a single Muslim seat enhanced its prestige among the 
non-committed Muslims, and increased Jinnah's bargaining power
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tremendously. He could now make some headway; for if he
failed to procure anything for the League,he could at least
obstruct proceedings and prevent the realisation of Congress
aims. This further hardened Patel’s attitude towards the
League. On the Congress side,the elections revitalised the
Congress machinery and showed it to be the best organised and
most widespread party. It offered little by way of programmes
or visionary goals. Nehru objected to this limitation of
Congress, 'Congress has done very little in the way of big
116propaganda. They simply cannot function in a big way'.
Patel believed the achievement of intermediary goals and 
limited objectives was bringing Congress nearer the desired 
end.
As a financially sound and efficiently run organisation, 
Congress had evolved a pattern of functioning through a chain 
of intermediaries who had their pockets of influence and were 
solely dependent for their political livelihood upon their 
immediate superiors. Patel was at the apex of the set-up and 
exercised absolute control. Organisational strength was 
Patel's greatest contribution to the party and to its politi­
cal advancement at the time, an advancement without which it 
was likely to lose all the ground it had gained upto the ear­
lier period of its term in office under Provincial Autonomy. 
Directing, controlling and co-ordinating the party functiona­
ries in each province, picking and choosing candidates, and 
carrying the entire responsibility of these decisions meant 
that Patel would be popular with some and unpopular with others. 
Neither reaction perturbed him; the work was often dull but 
the power it carried with it was both extensive and intensive.
In every province,the local leaders were anxious not to dis­
please Patel if they had intentions of building a political 
future. Acutely conscious that in this matter neither Gandhi 
nor Nehru counted for much, they curried favour with Patel; 
they brought complaints against their rivals to him and some­
how made sure that they retained the goodwill of those confi­
dants of Patel in the Provinces, such as Shankarrao Deo, S.K. 
Patil and others, alienating whom could bring them political 
losses.
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'The ship has reached the shore', Patel said to a large
gathering in Karachi, when he went to Sind to impress upon
the public there that the province must return to a state of
order and discipline if it wished to avail of the opportunity
that had come its way in the form of the elections and the
117formation of new Assemblies. As in 1937, so in 1945-46,
victory at elections was most crucial for Patel. The section
'Patel as negotiator' demonstrated his preoccupation with
securing tangible gains for Congress. This had been his aim
since the 1920s and more so since the time of the Bardoli
Satyagraha. 'How to rule India we will show when we acquire
. ng
Swaraj', Patel had declared at a meeting in Bardoli in 1928. 
Congress's victory in the elections and Congress gains in the 
Interim Government were two achievements that brought Patel 
on an equal national footing with Gandhi and Nehru during the 
transfer of power period. This further increased the areas 
of tension between the leaders, particularly between Nehru and 
Patel. Their styles and goals were different and the friction 
manifest itself further in their administrative roles.
(iii)
Patel's role as administrator could well be the subject 
of a separate thesis. It does not strictly speaking fall 
within the scope of this thesis. A brief discussion of it is 
necessary because it reveals that even with the colonial bogey 
almost gone, some features of Patel's political style which 
could only find some justification in a colonial setting, still 
persisted. After examining his role in some of the important 
fields under his charge it will be easy to see why the abse­
nce of a foreign enemy made little difference to his politi­
cal style.
One of the first matters Patel had to deal with as Home 
Member was the change in the civil service. Question of com­
pensation to British Civil Servants who wished to,or were 
required to,go on leave was dealt side by side with the issue 
of Indian civil servants who were given no option but to
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continue in service. Acutely aware of the reliance of the 
administration on these services, Patel was very particular 
to assure them of their dues. It is worth noting that where­
as as an agitator Patel had little respect for the civil ser­
vice doing certain jobs in their line of duty, as an adminis­
trator and Home Member he took great care to ensure that 
their rights and privileges were duly respected. ’The key to 
efficient administration is the sense of security in the ser­
vice at the top and non-interference by Congressmen or other 
people connected either with the Congress or with the Minis­
ters in the administration. The Ministers should not give
direct orders to any subordinate officers and they must deal
119with them through their superiors'. Civil servants who
worked with him,all recall this trait in Patel. That was not
120Congress's attitude in 1937.
Patel's handling of the question of Princely States is 
regarded as his greatest contribution towards the making of a 
united integrated India. We are concerned here not with the 
achievement of a united India but with the style and method 
that accompanied this achievement. From the mid-1930s,Patel 
concentrated on acquiring power in order to get this section 
of the Indian politic under the Gandhiites' control. He 
felt that the effective use of that power could achieve for 
Congress what discussion and negotiation could not. Patel 
had given warnings to the Princes in the 1930s,when they had 
resisted Congress influence in their territories. In 1947, 
he was in a stronger position and cautioned them against ado­
pting dilatory tactics and warned them of dire consequences
if they did not pay due regard to the wishes of the Congress 
121rulers. There was 'double slavery' in the States accord-
122ing to Patel. While assuring rulers not to be afraid of
Congress,he made every effort to instil fear in Princes. If
they created disunity, Patel warned them that there would be
a central power that would wield enough authority to quell
123internal troubles. That was how the warring States fell
in line,one by one, and decided to co-operate with Patel. 
Princes decided to form unions among themselves and gradually,
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through persuasion, threat and advice,they responded favou­
rably to Patel's appeal to accede to the Indian Union. Those who 
responded unfavourably, like the rulers of Hyderabad and 
Kashmir, were treated accordingly.
To the press,Patel showed no indulgence. In November
1946, he warned the press that it had to co-operate with the
Government and show restraint and discretion in publishing
news and offering comments; if it did not, government would
unwillingly be driven into taking actions unpalatable for the
124press, public and government alike. That action was taken;
in February 1947, an ordinance was passed restricting the
freedom of the press. A committee was appointed on 15 March
1251947 to review Indian Press Laws.
In handling labour problems Patel revealed a similar
recourse to repressive power. Labour problems had never been
Patel's strong point. His lack of sympathy for strikers was
well-known. In 1938, when Congress was faced with a strike
in Bombay, Patel handled it with a firmness not unlike that
shown by Governor Sykes in 1928. Patel justified Congress's
firmness by blaming the existing atmosphere of violence crea-
126ted by the workers. His attitude to the BEST strike in
Bombay in 1947 was equally tough and he referred to the stri-
127kers as 'robbers'. Patel's links with millowners and
industrialists were well-known. Labour leaders,therefore,had 
no rapport with him. Yet,Patel needed some link with the 
work force because its leaders could bring much discredit to 
Congress by highlighting Congressfe relative neglect of labour. 
Leftist leaders had always underlined this failing of Congress 
and in particular of leaders like Patel who claimed to come 
from humble stock and yet had difficulty in establishing sym­
pathetic links with workers. To meet this criticism, a labour 
organisation - Indian National Trade Union Congress - was set
up in May 1947, as an alternative to the already existing 
128AITUC. Socialist leaders opposed this inroad of Gandhiites
into a field they were incapable of understanding, given their 
class interests. Jai Prakash Narain voiced his opposition 
to 'government sponsored trade unionism' and asserted that
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Muslim workers would not come near it. Patel on the other 
hand felt that the AITUC with its posture of constant readi­
ness to attack Congress had to be trimmed to size and believed 
the setting up of a rival organisation would solve some of the 
problems. He was disappointed when none of those whom he
called 'our people', attended the existing AITUC Conference to
130stage their promised walk-out. He was anxious to strengthen
the new organisation and to counteract the hold of the Commu-
131nist Party over the existing Trade Union Congress. Side
by side with implementing details of the partition scheme
132relating to boundaries, the partition of assets and lia-
133 134bilities, the relief of refugees, and the maintenance
135of emergency services for the protection of minorities,
Patel was seen playing the familiar role of settling disputes 
between Congressmen in the Provincial Ministries. In Bengal, 
Bihar, Central Provinces, Madras and Orissa,differences bet­
ween Ministers were resulting in loss of prestige for Congress,
1a fact that Patel was very mindful of. Patel admonished
Provincial Premiers for 'weak spots in your administration',
adding 'I trust that you will lose no time in settling right
137the defects as quickly as possible'.
Now more than ever, Patel expected Congressmen to show 
discipline. Independence had come. Congress could boast of 
having thrown out imperialism. Patel personally could boast 
of having ensured that throughout the struggle for freedom 
(and power) Gandhiites could keep the levers of control in 
their hands and through a disciplined organisation and autho­
ritarian leadership take full charge during and after the 
transfer of power.
Even as details of independence and partition were being 
worked out and Congress was in the saddle for all practical 
purposes, Patel revealed his continuing preoccupation with 
questions of power and dominance that had engaged his atten­
tion throughout his political career. For him.the biggest 
threat to power was posed by the socialists, who he realised
had a wider and more comprehensive scheme for the country than
138Patel's group did. On the one hand,he made desparate
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appeals to them not to ruin Congress's chances of fulfilling
its dream. On the other hand, he instructed provincial
governments and the party machinery to meet the threat as
severely as necessary. While socialists complained that
Congress Ministries were persecuting them 'on the flimsiest 
139grounds', Patel pointed out to the Bihar Ministry that
all its problems stemmed from its ineffectiveness in dealing 
with socialists. He had expected the Ministry to control the 
activities of the Socialist Party 'either by vigorous mea­
sures taken by the Government or by disciplinary control thr­
ough the Congress organisation', and suggested that a strong 
police force should be in readiness so that if socialists
14caused a crisis the police force could be used against them. 
Strength, power and domination more than progress, develop­
ment and reform had occupied Patel's mind from the beginning 
of his public life. That still held good at the time of 
independence as can be gauged from a letter he wrote in June 
1947:
We are now free to develop about 80 per cent of our 
country in our own way. If we can consolidate our 
forces, have a strong Central Government and a strong 
army, we can, during the course of five years, make 
considerable progress. 141
Therein lies the reason behind Patel's ability to maintain, 
politically, a consistent predominance for twenty years, and 
his inability to be bracketed on par with Gandhi and Nehru 
in the category of 'first class' leaders. His equation of 
progress with factors like strength, force, dominance and 
authority was both an asset and a liability.
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CONCLUSION
There is no dearth of work on leaders and leadership 
qualities. Types of leadership, bases of authority, modes 
of control and nature of following are some of the important 
facets of leadership that have been thoroughly analysed by 
historians and sociologists. What has this work on Patel 
contributed to leadership analysis or to the study of Indian 
politics?
This thesis comes in the wake of a widespread move tow­
ards subaltern studies in history, politics and sociology. 
Perhaps it stands condemned at the start for being out of 
tune with current trends in historiography. While I do not 
wish to apologise for having chosen a national leader as the 
subject of my inquiry, I would like to assert that this study 
can hardly be categorised as elitist history. What makes 
most writings on prominent leaders particularly odious is the 
tendency and temptation of writers to make heroes out of lea­
ders and to highlight their outstanding qualities and circum­
stances to portray them as objects worthy of deification. This 
study of Patel has no such aim. It places Patel's leadership 
in a particular context to ascertain how far a leader's parti­
cular style is an act of volition and to what extent the 
choice of style has an effect on the wider socio-political 
scene. A study of this process by which individuals (they 
may or may not be elites to begin with) become leaders, brings 
out a multiplicity of factors that affect the relationship 
between a leader and his environment. Some of these factors 
are used by leaders rather like Robert Stern's 'resources', 
their use depending on a particular leader/S aims and objec­
tives. This study seeks to place this correlation on the 
continuity/change and conflict/consensus continuum to deter­
mine Patel's attitude to these social phenomena.
Leaders become successful when they are able to translate 
the needs of society, or parts of it,into intelligible terms 
and then to satisfy some of these needs over a period of time. 
They fail when they miscalculate the nature of these needs, the
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strength of the counter forces and their own capacity to 
meet these forces. Related to this is a feature of leader­
ship which forms an important backdrop for any study - the 
motives?aims and purposes of particular leaders. The motives 
and objectives of leaders are not always calculable or dis­
cernible prior to 'take-off. Observation of the spheres in 
which a leader chooses to work and those that he avoids give 
some idea of his goals and objectives.
Focusing on Patel's role and style in a period in which 
the clash between the imperial and nationalist forces was at 
its most intense has posed a problem. Anti-imperialism be­
came a war-cry for many would-be heroes and tended to camou­
flage some of the rationale behind their plans. It is,there­
fore, necessary to look at many of the leaders of that period 
sans imperialism. That is what has been attempted in the 
case of Patel. In examining his social background, his con­
duct of satyagraha campaigns, his relationships with provin­
cial and national leaders and other modalities of his role, 
the objective has been to identify the central theme of his 
career and activities.
The first feature of Patel's role and style that is cons- 
picious is a preoccupation with questions of power, authority 
and discipline which form the essence of what may be called 
predominantly political pursuits. Starting with his public 
career in the municipality there are innumerable instances of 
checking misuse of power, penalising corrupt persons, chalking 
out moves to check-mate opponents or organising supporters for 
a show of strength. Patel eventually resigned from the munici­
pality due to a lack of support; the municipal years, however, 
gave Patel incomparable experience in political manipulation.
The quest for political power and dominance was related 
both to the faculties he possessed and the goals he desired.
In his recent book, The Anatomy of Power, John Galbraith 
asserts that for the effective exercise of power three attri­
butes are vital - personality, property and organisation. In 
Patel's case the traits of personality, moulded to a substan­
tial degree by his social back/ground, and property, related
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to his economic status, were present from an early stage as 
was indicated in Chapter I. Organisation, for which he leaned 
heavily on Gujarat, Gandhi and Congress, came later and added 
to his capacity to dominate political situations. Patel exer­
cised influence through (1) the existing Patidar organisation 
and other Gujarati links,(2) the network of the Gandhian move­
ment and (3) the Congress structure which he spruced up as 
and when he considered necessary. The degree of effectiveness 
of each link varied according to Patel's perceptions of that 
link at different times. For instance,Patel attached himself 
to Gandhi with no ideological commitment. His preoccupation 
with political results did not necessitate a full and all-en­
compassing contact with the many manifestations of Gandhian 
activity.
The lack of social content in Patel's activities was 
noteworthy. Speeches delivered in villages and small towns 
were all directly or indirectly aimed at driving out the im­
perialists and taking their place. Identification with socio­
economic grievances of the worse off sections of the popula­
tion was likely to put demands that were not easy to meet. It 
meant tampering with social institutions and established mores 
that were likely to disturb the status quo. Patel did not 
concentrate on poverty, ignorance or backward or decaying 
institutions. He did not concern himself with the bottom 
layers of Indian society. Any reference to this section was 
only as part of the general Gandhian movement. Patel also 
brought the influence of his own organisational links to bear 
on the Gandhian movement; the benefits were,therefore, mutual. 
Judith Brown in her article 'Gandhi's leadership' asserts that 
for the 'efficacy of a movement' it was not Gandhi's 'extra­
ordinary public image' that was necessary; political movement 
concerned with power gave 'bite and strength' to agitation and 
non-cooperation. This political sustenance was provided con­
sistently by Patel. It was in marked contrast to Nehru, for 
instance, who was, according to Wavell, inclined to range 'at 
large over economics and history'. Patel considered it 
more worthwhile to try and achieve the possible than spend
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time defining the impossible . Thus, as an enemy Ihtel had an appeal 
to some of the British. Wavell thought him unattractive in 
personality and uncompromising but ’more of a man’ than most 
Indian politicians.
Related to this is the question why Patel succeeded in 
the political field to a greater extent than other leaders of 
the time. The activities of some of Patel’s contemporaries 
reveal differing commitments to socio-economic concepts - 
classlessness, total or partial traditionalism, religious or 
cultural revivalism, uncompromising nationalism, through vio­
lent or non-violent means. Most of the national leaders,in­
cluding the two with whom Patel had the maximum affinity - 
Rajendra Prasad and Rajagopalachari - could fit into one or 
more of these commitment categories. Commitment to principle 
could be an asset and a liability. It limited the sphere of 
functioning of a leader and allowed for concentration of energy 
and resources on specific issues and subjects; on the other 
hand it also made for demands of an intense nature on these 
leaders and heightened the degree of non-performance if the 
demands were not satisfied. Patel's political role defied 
categorisation. Staying clear of issues and areas that deman­
ded changes, Patel preferred to stay on the surface, at the 
political level. This level was in a sense the highest common 
factor, the central theme that was applicable to British India 
and the States. In fact it was this political level that gave 
him general appeal despite his insular and parochial outlook 
on many matters.
This leads us to the next point which this thesis has
tried to meet. How did Patel deal with opposition? In a field
of activity that was predominantly political Patel's enemies
were likely to be numerous and varied, given the widespread
nature of the links that were forged according to the need of
the hour and Patel's own potential. Opposition included (1)
political rivals,(2) ideological opponents, (3) social adver- 
and
saries /(4) economic obstructers. Within each category there 
were leaders from Gujarat and other provinces and national 
leaders. Any dispute with, or threat posed by, political
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rivals and opponents within Gujarat or other provinces was 
relatively easy tp suppress because in the eyes of provincial 
leaders Patel had Gandhi’s full backing and any leader with 
political ambitions was ill-advised to alienate Patel. But 
some provincial leaders who were ideologically opposed to 
Patel were less shy of open disputes and risked their politi­
cal careers rather than allow Patel to ride rough shod over 
them in their commitment. We have seen examples of this with 
Indulal Yajnik in Gujarat, Nariman in Bombay, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai 
in U.P., Jai Prakash Narain in Bihar and Subhas Bose in Bengal. 
At the national level,leaders who differed ideologically, such 
as Nehru, were often more discreet partly because of their 
political stature and partly out of deference to Gandhi who 
both supported Patel and placated his opponents. Bose who oppo­
sed Ib.tel at the national level did so to his own detriment. Soc­
ial adversaries were those who could form pressure groups on 
the basis of caste, religion or status and pose a threat to 
Patel by either presenting problems as pressure groups or 
threatening his leadership by undue and unreasonable demands. 
Mahasabhaites, Muslims and Princes came within this category.
The economic obstructers were those that could slacken the 
pace of Patel's programme by asserting the leverage that goes 
with economic strength and privilege - such as Purshotamdas 
Thakurdas, the Nawab of Chhatari. Internal Congress conflicts 
of 1934-39 bring out the different kinds of opposition to 
Patel's dominance and give a clear insight into the different 
views of political development held by groups despite the 
presence of a common imperialist adversary.
A third and related factor of Patel's political leadership 
relates to the resolution of conflict. The general tendency 
seems to have been to resolve conflict by overpowering rather 
than compromising. That was the case in both power conflicts 
and ideological differences. In the former case overpowering 
was blatant. In ideological differences it was through insti­
tutional changes like altering the Congress constitution, 
giving extra powers to the Working Committee, working towards 
the removal of an undesired President and getting a desired
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one elected. In either case,conflict was never resolved by 
compromise. Patel's intention was that the opponent had to be 
defeated not accommodated and if the ideological opponents 
were appeased by Gandhi, Patel made sure their programmes were 
fully combated by him.
This brings us back to Patel's view of society and social 
change. As stated before-Patel was a conservative who was in­
terested in the status quo and concentrated on the political 
rather than the socio-economic aspects of society. He spent a 
lot of time and energy fighting those forces in society that 
sought any fundamental changes. To that extent he differed 
from true Gandhians. Patel did not share with Gandhi even an 
emotional passion for reform, such as the upliftment of untou­
chables or women, or the raising of living standards of the 
landless or jobless. He had no ideological scheme for rural or 
urban improvement (although in the municipality he executed ur­
ban improvement schemes with indefatigable energy). The four 
satyagraha campaigns which Patel organised or participated in 
before he became a national leader provide hardly any evidence 
of reformist zeal or fervour. The objects of the campaign, the 
support base, the appeals, all seem to suggest that the activi­
ty was designed to build a power-base and then reinforce that 
base by fulfilling the requirements of the areas or groups in 
question. Sometimes political activity was undertaken to make 
a show of political strength - as in Bardoli - or sometimes to 
vindicate a political stand or retrieve a lost position, as 
with the Nagpur Flag Satyagraha.
In over-emphasising the political factor and attributing 
purely political motives to Patel in his quest for leadership 
it is not intended to under-emphasise the economic factor.
This is not a thesis against economic determinism. Rather, in 
revealing the up-hill nature of Patel's political struggle aga­
inst the propounders of the economic faith, a degree of impor­
tance is conceded by implication to the latter. The signifi­
cant thing, however, is that Patel gave the political dimen­
sions of leadership an existence of their own. This thesis 
has sought to explain how this was so.
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The backwarjiess of the lower peasants, their total depen­
dence on benefactors, lords and masters, and the structural 
relationships which bound the rural hierarchy were not the 
objects of attack even when Patel acted 'peasant leader*. 
Writers on peasant struggles maintain that the poor peasant
is not inherently servile and lacking in a spirit of revolt.
dL
The apparent backwardness and demoralisation of these peasants 
is rooted in other objective factors. This work has tried 
to demonstrate how the objective impediments to rural change 
are often perpetuated by skilful, successful and conservative 
politicians like Patel. Even middle peasants who could assist 
in generating a momentum towards change in rural areas were 
distracted by political gains and losses.
The same preoccupation with features like dominance and 
power can be observed in Patel's contribution in the final 
negotiations preceding the transfer of power. These negotia­
tions had their roots in at least two decades of political 
perception and activity which in turn reinforced tentative con­
clusions about the goals for the Party, and within the Party 
the aims of a certain set of political leaders. If the inter­
action between rival groups in the decade or more before 
partition is closely analysed, much of what immediately pre­
ceded or followed partition fits into a pattern. Patel’s 
attitude to socialists, Princes and Muslims was directly re­
lated to the political designs of each group and its inter­
action with Patel’s political goals and methods. This had 
been made sufficiently evident in the 1930s and what happened 
in the transfer of power years was only a culmination of 
earlier processes involving political manoeuvrings among 
rivals and rival groups and changes in policy and attitudes 
on the British side. Nothing very radical happened socially 
or economically, or even politically. If there was a quest 
for radical changes Patel made sure it was obstructed. In 
these crucial yearsyunder the garb of concepts like anti­
imperialism, nationalism and liberal democracy, there was 
a tendency towards an increasing use of public institutions 
for private (which includes party) gain which Patel endorsed
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and in some instances even initiated. In an imperialist 
context such a tendency, while fostering discipline and obedi­
ence could pose as altruism. Without that context, it perpetu­
ated acquisitiveness, anti-social behaviour, the rejection 
of the idea of potential human equality and a tendency among 
holders of power to treat the state as a private 1jagir1. In 
so far as that feature is to be found in Congress as a party 
and a government even today, it may be seen in part as a 
legacy of the career of Vallabhbhai Patel.
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IHistorians, sociologists, political scientists and 
anthropologists have recently made rural India their main 
concern and, within rural India,their preoccupation is incre­
asingly with the peasant.^- More recently, subalternists 
have suggested that the historian*s focus on the elite has 
given a distorted analysis of history and society and that
it is their aim now to put matters right by looking solely
2at the •inferior* sections of society. Peasants have now 
been made the elites of historiography. Peasant movements 
of all kinds have become the focus of study and historians 
have begun to explore the causes, failures and successes of 
peasant movements with a view to understanding the function­
ing of peasant societies and their interaction with society 
as a whole. On the positive side,this trend has contributed 
much by enabling us to understand specific properties of 
particular societies hitherto neglected. On the other hand, 
in underplaying the role of dominating elites (the nature of 
the domination varies according to the patterns of each area), 
it takes attention away from the * enemy*and far from streng­
thening the weaker sections,such an approach often glorifies 
them and their weaknesses. The result is the perpetuation 
of the status quo. Cognizance must be taken of as many social, 
economic and political factors that accompany conflicts and 
changes within society.
The myth of the Indian peasantry as a passive mass of 
people, silently putting up with their lot till a fiery leader 
shows them how to break the shackles that bind them, has long 
been exploded. Quite apart from the peasant not always being 
passive nor the leader always fiery, there are some factors 
that are well recognised:
3
(1 ) the peasantry is not one social or economic cate^ 
gory but many;
C2) the peasantry is ridden with conflicts and contra­
dictions in which reconciliation is not always 
aimed at;
C.3) as a result of (1) and C2), peasant uprisings, whe­
ther they are started from above or below, do not 
always meet general peasant interests.
Ghanshyam Shah,who has done much work on * grass roots
mobilisation*, recently presented a paper on post independence
grass-roots mobilisation at a seminar 'India 2000* in Prince- 
3ton. He divided the mobilisation of the rural poor into two 
categories Cl) ethnic mobilisation and C2) peasant mobilisa­
tion. The former takes into account features such as primor- 
diality and the latter emphasises the economic aspects of 
rural mobilisation. Shah stressed that both types of mobili­
sation were intertwined. That is inevitable,given the fea­
tures of peasant society mentioned above. The subject of 
peasant mobilisation can be looked at from another plane - 
the objects and aims of mobilisation. At this level,the 
'why' of mobilisation is more important than the 'how*. This 
aspect is of particular significance in an era when mass 
mobilisation is sought for agitational and electoral purposes 
that are often devoid of socio-economic content. In order 
that each exercise in mobilisation is seen in the right pers­
pective the real purposes of mobilisation need to be clearly 
differentiated from their distortions.
Peasants mobilise or are mobilised to fight against an 
injustice or loss, or to achieve a goal or gain. The nature 
of the goal, both immediate and ultimate, affects the method 
and style of mobilisation. So also with real and apparent 
goals. Sometimes the immediate and apparent goals conceal 
the ultimate and real goals of mobilisation. To assess the 
nature of a particular exercise in mobilisation the apparent, 
real, immediate and ultimate goals must be differentiated and 
measured from the view point of the mobilisers and the mobili­
sed. The ultimate goal of the peasantry in a particular exer-
4
ctse in mobilisation must be determined by the analyst before 
an effort is made to study the different kinds of mobilisa­
tions and the side issues raised by them* For instance,in 
Ghanshyam Shah*s recent paper the ultimate goal is that of 
building a ^participatory, egalitarian and just social order* 
and it forms a backdrop for analysing the mobilisation of the 
backward strata of rural India.^ This backdrop provides
the steering factor for his thesis on grass roots mobilisa­
tion - whether of backward castes, scheduled castes, sched­
uled tribes, agricultural labourers or poor peasant farmers.
Without quibbling over the term ^peasant* I would like 
to state at the outset that as used in this essay the term 
is suggestive of some degree of economic backwardness and
5
oppression. Bearing this in mind,an analysis of the Bardoli 
satyagraha and Patel will be made. The Bardoli satyagraha 
was not an uprising of the most down-trodden section of the
g
peasantry; nor was Vallabhbhai Patel the most typical or 
representative peasant leader. There is much literature on 
the Gandhiites betraying the cause of the peasants and wor­
kers in the national movement. Patel's and indeed Gandhi's 
commitment to the peasantry was limited. Yet, Bardoli has the 
reputation of being an exemplary exercise in peasant mobili­
sation. Some communists felt that the Workers' and Peoples1
Party should have supported the agitation which was,after
7
all, a peasants agitation. What was it in the Bardoli satya­
graha that brought both the taluka and Patel in the national 
limelight? Bardoli secured for Patel the title of 'Sardar* 
and the issue became important enough to affect wider nego­
tiations between the British and the Indian leaders.
The Bardoli satyagraha was directed against the proposed 
enhancement of land revenue as a result of the new assess­
ment. What was the nature of the problem caused by the pro­
posed revision of assessment of land revenue? Details of the 
evolution of the land revenue system of the British,particu­
larly in Surat District, has been adequately dealt with in
g
Shirin Mehta*s very plausible account of the Bardoli issue.
5
There was the age-old controversy about the basis for deter­
mining land reyenue. In the JL92Qs,this debate was personi­
fied in F.G.K.Anderson, the Settlement Commissioner and H.L. 
Painter, Commissioner for the Northern Division, Anderson 
was the chief exponent of the theory of rental value which 
he explained in Facts ahdxFallacies^ about the' Bombay Land 
Revenue System. Painter believed in the empirical theory 
whereby profits of agriculture, environmental changes and the 
like were considered vital factors in any discussion of land 
revenue. The Assistant Settlement Officer, M.S. Jayakar*s, 
proposals for fresh rates were first based on gross value 
of produce. After Anderson*s criticism of his proposals, 
Jayakar stuck to the emphasis placed by Anderson on the re­
quirement in the Land Revenue Code that •settlements shall
9
have regard to the value of land1, Jayakar*s report gave 
an all round picture of general improvement in agricultural 
conditions and prices in Bardoli taluka and he recommended 
an increase of 30.59% in the land revenue.'1'0 The increase 
was 25% over the existing rates of assessment. With the 
elevation of 23 villages to a higher group the increase came 
to 30.59%. It must be mentioned here that talukas in Kaira 
district were settled in 1923-24 and increases of 27 per cent 
in Borsad and 25 per cent in Anand and reductions of 7 per 
cent in Thasra and 8 per cent in Nadiad and Kapadvanj had 
been recommended. There were protests from several Kaira 
villages but none so organised and intense as that which 
occurred in Bardoli in 1928, The increase recommended for 
Bardoli was not unprecedented nor was protest from the pea­
sants a novelty. What made the Bardoli protest movement so 
intense and what gave it the impact it had on the national 
scene?
XI
Bardoli Taluka,along with Valod Peta,forms one of the 
eastern-most talukas of the Surat district. It consists of 
flat country traversed by three big rivers, the Tapti, the 
Purna and the Mindhola and some small tributaries that cut
6
up the otherwise H a t  landscape. The three riyers make 
clear compartments of the areaf without making one area part­
icularly superior to another. The hest lands are, however, 
situated in the western part of the taluka between the Purna 
and the Mindhola. They consist of level flat land with 
rich, deep C4* to 6 *), black soil with a good moisture-reten- 
tion capacity. The soil expands on wetting and cracks deeply 
and widely on drying which is of advantage as it leads to 
surface soil being mixed with sub-soil. Water can also be 
tapped at easy levels which is a great facility for garden 
cultivation. In the 1920s, however, this facility was not 
being utilised adequately. The rainfall during the monsoon 
is good in most of Surat district. At the highest rainfall 
station, it is 69.72 and at the lowest 34.36 inches annually.
The taluka and peta were well connected by the Tapti 
Valley Railway and the Bardoli-Supa Road, with trading centres 
lj,ke Bardoli * town* and Navsari. The density of population 
per sq.mile of total area in Surat was 420 and of cultivable 
area 530. All the talukas in Surat district were and are 
still predominantly rural in nature. All cultivable lands 
come under one of 2 main categories, jirayat (dry crop land) 
and kyari (irrigated lands). Dry crops are further divided 
into kharif (early monsoon) and rabi (late monsoon). Kharif 
crops grow with the help of the south-west monsoon from 
middle June to middle October. They are reaped in the last 
week of September. Rabi crops depend on dew, irrigation and 
occassional fair weather showers falling between October and 
May. Bardoli*s chief crops were jowar, rice and cotton.
Cotton was becoming more and more popular because its culti­
vation involved less trouble and expenditure and its increa­
sed demand and rising prices brought greater profits to the 
cultivators. It is sown in June and reaped in March.
According to the 1921 census, of a total population of 
87,909, agriculturists formed 67,160; the rest were artisans, 
teachers, traders and money-lenders. The population in most 
villages ranged from 501 to 3,000. Bardoli *town* had a
7
population of 5,000 and Ha^ipuya 4,519, $ost o£ the yillages 
had between. JLQ to 25 houses. Others had more,^ The
total cultivated area was J. ,21,366 acres. Of this, 97,371 
acres was owner cultivated; the rest C23,995) was owned by 
non-cultivators who leased it to tenants because they had 
other means of earning or because they acquired it in lieu 
of debts from owner cultivators.
The size of land holdings in Bardoli taluka ranged
12from 1 acre to 500 acres. The average size of holdings 
was 7 acres.
Number of holdings 
Bardoli Taluka Taluka & Peta
Acres 1915 1920 1924 1921
1 - 5 7,102 7,260 7,463 10,379
6 - 2 5 3,947 4,077 3,958 5,934
26 -100 503 492 507 829
101-500 17 13 14 40
500 & above _
The size of the holdings is not an acurate indication of the 
average size of the unit of cultivation. The holdings are 
often divided among members of the family, and in some cases, 
scattered over the village and taluka and even different 
talukas, and in rare cases even over adjoining districts.
As the tables above reveal,Bardoli did not have many 
big landholders. More than 2/3 of the land was in the hands 
of those who cultivated it and 5,934 holdings C3,958 and 
1,976 in the taluka and peta respectively) were from 6 to 25 
acres and represented the holdings of the majority of culti­
vators. In Bardoli alone the number of land holdings which 
were between 101-500 acres was only 14. The average size of 
land holdings in the taluka - approximately 7.1 acres - was 
uneconomic by all standards. As families increased this 
figure became even more uneconomic and led to a greater
8
tendency towards tenancy. Tenants paid either cash rent or 
*Adh Bagh* in which, the assessment is paid by the owner 
and other costs by the tenantf after the produce is shared 
equally between them.
It is necessary to look at the caste and community 
break up of Bardolifs population. Sixty-three per cent of 
the population was Kaliparaj or backward castes. About 13% 
were Ujliparaj or higher castes and 24% were the intermediate 
groups:
CASTE CLASSIErCATrON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION
HIGHER
MIDDLE
LOWER
HIGHER - Anavil Brahmin 
13% Vanias 
Muslims 
Parsis
MIDDLE
24%
LOWER
63%
Patidars
Kolis
Dheds 
Dublas 
Chodras
»
Non-cultivating land­
holders 1 .2%
Landholders or Khate- 
dar 25%
Tenants 45%
Agricultural labour­
ers 51%
Artisans, teachers 
etc. 20%
(These groups were 
not mutually exclu­
sive)
Adapted from" Census of' Tndia ,1921 ; Gazetter of the' Bombay 
Presidency : Guj arat,x Surat and Broach (Bombay,1926) ; and 
M.S,Jayakar, Second" Revision Settlement of the Bardoli Taluka 
and VaTod Peta of the SUrat District (Bombay, 1927),
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According to the analysis put forward by Shirin Mehta, 
the higher castes were also the better educated and the 
economically better off. The burden of the revised assess­
ment was more likely to hit them than the worse off agri­
cultural labourers that formed the majority of the peasant 
population. Yet, the agitation is described as a widespread, 
all - encompassing, intense campaign that shook the taluka, 
district and province and achieved national status for the 
provincial leaders within a short period of time. Just how 
widespread and intense was this campaign and what did it 
achieve?
Kanbis were the dominant agriculturists in Bardoli taluka; 
in Valod, Brahmins, Muslims and Kaliparaj also cultivated 
land. Of the four divisions of kanbis - Anjana, Leva,Kadva 
and Matia, the last were the most numerous in the taluka.
Leva kanbis, who always referred to themselves as Patidars, 
were the next numerous. They sought to differentiate them­
selves from non-Patidar kanbis and organised themselves 
socially as a distinct group to establish their superiority. 
Leva Patidars and Matias were the most hard working cultiva­
tors. They employed *Halis* or labourers. Anavil Brahmins, 
who were also socially a dominant group of peasant proprie­
tors, had the added advantage of being the most educated group 
in the taluka. They had gone into government service, teach­
ing, law and trade. Kolis, who claimed Rajput origin and 
were competent agriculturists,were regarded as Kaliparaj.
Kolis have been put into the * Middle’ caste classification 
because like some castes CYadavas of Bihar) they tried, suc­
cessfully in some areas,to upgrade themselves by * Sanskriti- 
zation*. Economically, their status varied. Some kolis worked 
as Halis, Other Kaliparaj consisted of Dublas, Chodras, 
Dhondias and Dheds. Most Kaliparaj were Halis; some had 
small pieces of land. They were greatly in debt and the 
moneylenders exploited them excessively.
The population of Bardoli was, therefore, divided clearly 
along caste and class lines. Although there is a broad corre­
10
lation between the class and caste hierarchy from the yiew 
point of land ownership, some features of the hierarchy are mea­
ningless, Ownership of land had less economic significance; 
the size of the holding and the total income accruing was 
more important even if the agriculturist was a tenant. Some 
factors make an assessment of the standard of living diffi­
cult :
Cl) despite a money economy, exchange transactions in 
rural areas are in terms of agricultural commodi­
ties;
C2) all classes claim a share in the produce - owners, 
tenant-cultivators and servants;
C3) most farmers supplement their agricultural income 
with related occupations;
C4) help from family members working in the cities is 
common.
From surveys of villages in Bardoli (carried out later) it 
becomes apparent that the case of landless labourers is quite 
clear; they were in debt, had acute financial problems and 
even those who owned land Cbetween 2 to 4 acres) could only 
eke out enough income for subsistence. The big farmers 
(those who had over 60 acres, more than a pair of bullocks, 
and about 9 other animals) were clearly well off and did not 
have financial problems. Of the other cultivators,there was 
not much difference in the income of the medium owner-culti- 
vators, which formed the agricultural middle class, and the 
class of tenant cultivators, just above the lower rung of the 
agricultural ladder. The annual income of the former was 
Es.1,500 to 2,000 and that of the latter approximately Rs. 
1,250, The former, however, were in debt for marriages and 
other occasions demanded by their so-called higher social 
customs, and borrowed money from relations, friends and 
moneylenders. In addition,traders formed a category of peo­
ple whose income was about Rs,2,000 and who belonged to three
13or four different communities. They had a higher standard 
of living and higher expenses. Their participation in the 
agitation was sought by methods that were non-economic.
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Ill this picture one can see that an increase in the land 
revenue assessment was going to affect about J.7,000 agricul­
turists, Among these were well-to-do Patidars, Kanbis, Par- 
sis, Anavil Brahmins and Sunni-Vohras who had other busine­
sses outside the taluka and had leased out their lands. Not 
all of them found increase in land revenue assessment an 
issue of such great magnitude as the organisers would have 
liked to believe. Of course, as the figures have shown,60 
per cent of these 11.7,182 occupants held land between 1 - 5  
acres Ci*e* about 10,379 occupants). They were the Khatedars 
who were likely to be affected by the land revenue assess­
ment, The average land holding in the taluka was 7.1 acres. 
With an increase in population the number of tenants had 
increased to 31,604. This section of the population (nearly 
twice the figure affected by the land revenue assessment) 
needed a movement on tenancy laws rather than an agitation 
against land revenue increase. Yet, land revenue was chosen 
as the subject for an agitation in Bardoli.
The conduct of the agitation will show that it was clea­
rly a vehicle for a political journey. Its base, method, tac­
tics and conclusion all reveal facets that have wider connota­
tions than that of a peasant movement, pure and simple. All 
this brings us back from the subaltern to the elite and the 
power system whereby they dominated society.
Ill
There was a political background to the Bardoli satya­
graha which I have discussed at length in an unpublished work 
14on Patel, Broadly, it had three facets: QL) Patel's politi­
cal ambitions C2) Patel*s politicization of Gandhian methods 
and C3)the need at that particular time for particular Gandhi- 
ites to prove political potency to a group within the Congress 
that had begun to be weary of some aspects of Gandhian techni­
ques.
Patel's political ambitions were the result of his family
12
and social environment. The pragmatism came £rom his early 
family life and his Patidar background. The choice of a 
political career was influenced by the desire to emulate his 
brother Vithalbhai, The municipality took him up to a point 
in political recognition. In the meantime, a method with 
more vitality and quicker recognition appeared on the scene - 
the Gandhian way. It also catered to Patel’s independent 
temperament. The hesitation in following the Gandhian path 
was that Patel was only partialy committed to Gandhi’s 
all-encompassing social^political and economic goals. Patel 
was anxious to make a political impact and breakthrough. 
Satyagraha campaigns in Kaira, Borsad and Nagpur,all contri­
buted to Patel’s enhanced political status. Bardoli*s parti­
cular significance lay in its timing. It gave the Congress
15a break from its ’schizophrenic existence*. Those who had 
opted for agitation as a form of political participation 
resented the free hand that had been given to the Swarajists 
by Gandhi, while the latter busied himself with spinning and 
’constructive* work. They had to be reassured that their 
contribution in the national movement was as vital as that 
of the counci1-wallahs. Each side had been trying for some 
time to show that its methods in resolving the conflict bet­
ween the people and the ruling power were superior. In 1926,
16the Swarajists had suffered reverses in the elections. The 
announcement of an all-white Simon Commission to inquire 
into and recommend constitutional reform in India further 
strengthened the position of those who favoured agitation. 
Patel was already having problems in the Ahmedabad Municipa­
lity and in a show of strength between him and Ambalal Sara- 
bhai in the election of the district officer Patel had to 
admit defeat when his man lost to Sarabhai’s candidate. 
Reverting to agitation was the only answer.
Another factor that had begun to irk Patel was the acti­
vity of socialists and communists who were trying to infil­
trate the Congress party and to influence people, in particu­
lar areas and occupations, with their propaganda. They did 
have some effect on Congressmen and accelerated the pace of
13
the Congress's interests in peasants and workers, The Cong­
ress's commitment to peasants, however, was neither constant 
nor uniform and certainly political leaders like Patel had 
much to do with the direction that it took. This political 
background of the Bardoli agitation was as important as the 
particular issues and incidents of the movement.
IV
It must at the outset be mentioned that Bardoli had 
had a dress rehearsal for non-violent non-cooperation in 1922, 
when it was chosen as the 'battleground* or the *kurukshetra* 
for Gandhian satyagraha to protest against the atrocities of 
British rule (in particular the Jalianwala Bagh massacre and 
the Rowlatt Bills). Gandhi was first inclined to choose 
Kaira for this big agitation,but for various reasons agreed 
to Bardoli, An important reason was that he knew many fami­
lies from Bardoli taluka who had been associated with him 
directly or indirectly in South Africa and had worked closely 
with him. Most of them were well-to-do Patidars who could 
command a substantial following by virtue of being among the 
elite families of the taluka. Some Patidar families of Surat 
district had already been working towards building up a 
political consciousness in their community and area. Kunverji 
and Kalyanji Mehta had founded the Patidar Yuvak Mandal which 
later got a permanent location - the Patidar Ashram in Surat 
city. Similarly, Dayalji Desai, an Anavil Brahmin,had set up 
the Anavil Vidhyarthi Ashram and had been closely in touch 
with Gandhi's work in South Africa. These local men had no 
problems as far as recognition and respect was concerned.
They were high in the caste hierarchy and were looked up to 
by most of the people. But their limited sphere of operation 
and clearly semi-political intentions could not get a move­
ment going without a widespread cause and sufficient support 
for the cause. Their social work in Bardoli and Surat was 
parochial and limited.and the biggest service Gandhi did for
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them in 1920 was to give a nationalist dimension to their 
organisation,with his speeches on boycott of government 
schools, propagation of Swadeshi and prohibition. Even so, 
when preparations for the 1922 movement were afoot, it was 
soon apparent that people from lower castes and classes 
would not be easily absorbed. For Gandhi,this was a bad sign 
and an organisational weakness.
In the 1928 campaign, a remedy was sought to this weak­
ness. Kalyanji and Kunverji Mehta requested Vallabhbhai Patel 
Cat Gandhi’s behest) to direct a no-tax campaign in Bardoli.
As already indicated,Vallabhbhai had his own reasons for mobi­
lising agitation at this time. He had resigned from the 
Ahmedabad Municipality; his brother Vithalbhai was part of the 
moderate group in the Bombay legislature which was taking an 
interest in the Gujarat peasants to redress their grievances 
by constitutional means; the moderates had already got some 
kind of campaign going in 1927 through petitions and deputa­
tions and had procured a nominal reduction in the increased 
assessment. Patel took on the task of organising the campa­
ign, but he seems to have had some reservations on the subject 
of leadership. The peasants had hitherto been following the 
MLCs* orders and suggestions and Vallabhbhai seemed anxious 
to clarify that once he was in charge of the campaign it would 
be directed by him according to Gandhian methods of satyagraha. 
The MLCs spoke at the 4 February meeting called by Vallabhbhai 
and assured him that he was free to take charge and
carry on the peasants’ campaign. In a letter to Sir Leslie 
Wilson, Governor of Bombay, Vallabhbhai asked for an indepen­
dent inquiry committee that would look into the inaccuracies 
of the settlement report, failing which-he would advise the
peasants to withhold the land revenue and suffer the consequ- 
17ences. He also suggested that he would willingly discuss 
the whole matter and avoid a confrontation if the Governor 
agreed. The Governor refused to give any importance to a 
self-styled leader of the peasantry and Patel decided to plan 
out the campaign with local leaders.
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With the negative experiences of J.922 to warn him, Patel 
now chalked out details whereby the pitfalls and failures of 
the last campaign could be avoided. First of all, he brought 
some of his own men with him to guide, help and inspire the 
local leaders, Swami Anand, Darbar Gopaldas, Mahadev Desai 
and a few colleagues of Gandhi’s from Sabarmati Ashram incl­
uding Imam Bewazir would meet people from different communi­
ties and encourage them to fight. The idea was that the pace
should be set by leaders from the higher communities and ^
was passed
others would follow their example. A resolution/describing 
the revision settlement as arbitrary, unjust and oppressive.
It advised the occupants to refuse to pay the revised asse­
ssment ’until the Government is prepared to accept the amount 
of the old assessment in full satisfaction of their dues, or 
until the government appoints an impartial tribunal to settle 
the whole question of revision by investigation and inquiry 
on the spot*. This resolution was proposed and seconded by
leading Patidars and Anavils. Two Muslims and one Vania and
18a Parsi also supported the resolution.
Relying primarily on the leadership angle, Patel sent out 
the team to influence people in the villages. Aware that the 
campaign was not a mass movement unanimously supported by peo­
ple, Vallabhbhai impressed two things on the minds of the peo­
ple and the local leaders: (1) that the government would attem­
pt to divide their ranks, a move which they must resist to the 
best of their ability and (2) that the government would first 
strike at the leaders and confiscate the best lands so that if
the most influential men succumbed the rest would yield sooner
19or later. The people were advised to be wary of such a move.
It was not a smooth-sailing campaign. There was lack of 
cohesion among the different communities and within each com­
munity among the different economic strata. Patidars often 
acted together to establish their superiority and demonstrate 
their higher status * This, in turn, made for greater solida­
rity among them. ’Solidarity seeking* has been described as 
an inherent trait of Patidars - a trait that had been directed
16
successfully along political channels. Village Patels In 
wore than half of the ylllages In the taluka were Patidars 
and had much control In their areas, Vanias as a community , 
however, posed a problem. Their financial stake and commit­
ment in the land, loans, the crop trade and other commercial 
aspects of the taluka was too great for them to get carried 
away by a satyagraha conducted to benefit either a part of 
the taluka*s population or the nation at large, Vanias were 
a weak link in the chain of support and one that the govern­
ment tried to break, Anavil Brahmins, described as *proud 
and defiant* by a co-Brahmin Mahadev Desai, were also reluc­
tant at first. Although Anavil leaders had been organising 
themselves for socio-political supremacy and dominance in the 
area generally, Anavil occupants were prone to calculate 
their losses before joining the campaign. It was not until 
the campaign picked up considerable momentum that they joined 
the fray. Parsis were mostly liquor merchants, money-lenders 
or traders and lived in villages inhabited by the kaliparaj 
who were the biggest liquor consumers. There were very few 
landholders and they were well-off as they supplemented their 
agricultural income with earnings from trade. Their response 
to the agitation was minimal.
Muslim cultivators in the taluka belonged to the Sunni 
Vohras, numbering 874 and the Sheikhs, numbering 1,033. The 
former were owner-cultivators economically comfortable and, 
therefore, reluctant to join a campaign with which they had 
otherwise little affinity. Sheikhs were artisans and were 
relatively poor. Their participation in the agitation seemed 
of no direct benefit to them. Given these attitudes of the 
upper castes and classes, Congress workers had an up-hill 
task in mobilizing numerical support. Sixty per cent of the 
population had no direct interest in the agitation anyway. 
Dublas were likely to follow their creditors or masters in 
giving moral support. But they counted for little. The 
organisers did not envisage a campaign like the one at Kaira. 
Mohanlal Pandya, who had seen the enthusiasm at the time of 
the Kaira agitation,wrote to Vallabhbhai Patel after survey­
17
ing the taluka:
No one seems to me to be In fighting trim* They are 
going about their business as though nothing had hap­
pened.,, .I do not despair, but let m s not overrate 
our strength, 20
Having weighed the strength and weaknesses of the taluka, 
Patel chalked out his plan based on the strengths of the talu­
ka. It was not his style to indulge in pious platitudes. A 
realistic assessment of the different attitudes of the people 
based on their different socio-economic positions enabled him 
to negotiate with individuals and groups to mutual advantage. 
To begin with, he addressed himself to the landholders and 
urged them to be man enough to fight their own battles and 
not simply reap the benefits of workers and volunteers who 
had come forward to make sacrifices.
The taluka was divided into four regions,which in turn 
had camps within them. The regions had an overall in-charge 
and the camps had different leaders in-charge. Regional head­
quarters were set up at Bardoli for the central region with 
Kalyanji, Jugatram and Kushalbhai in-charge, at Sarbhon in 
the south-west region with Dr.Tribuvandas in-charge, at Modhi 
in the north with Makanji Desai and at Vedchchi in the east 
with Chunilal Mehta and his wife in charge. The regions were 
further subdivided into chhavanis (4 each in the northern, 
central and south-eastern regions and one in the south-western 
region). Each chhavani was headed by Patel's own man and not 
a local man from the taluka. These men analysed the geogra­
phical and social factors of each village and organised them 
accordingly. Valod, the Mahal headquarters, and Buhari in
and
the south-east were Vania strongholds; Vankaner in the centre/ 
Varad and Bamni in the north were Patidar strongholds. Sea­
soned leaders like Mohanlal Pandya, Darbar Gopaldas, Chandu- 
lal Desai and Sumant Mehta persuaded people in these areas to 
follow the Congress lead and look to their long-term future. 
Abbas Tyabji and Imam Bewazir were told to mobilise Muslim 
support. Thus the appeals were given a communal or interest- 
based slant.^
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The Government also exploited communal attitudes and 
acted accordingly, Chauthai notices demanding four times the 
original assessment were sent to Vanias, Muslims and Parsis.
To facilitate japti officers, magistrates and mamlatdars were 
appointed from the Vania, Muslim and Parsi communities. This 
strategy worked and some Vanias, Muslims and Parsis paid up 
the first instalment on the specified date. Vallabhbhai sug­
gested caste pressure and social boycott against defaulters. 
Supplies of essential commodities were cut off for some house­
holds and they were compelled to comply with the satyagraha 
rules : Government officers were likewise threatened and pres­
surized. Satyagrahis compelled and persuaded the menial ser­
vants and other staff of government officers to stop working 
22for them. The campaigners had contacts to elicit informa-
23tion from government sources and to trail potential payers.
The element of coercion and social pressure was conside­
rable. The Bardoli Satyagraha Patrika was the chief organ of 
propaganda and it often publicized the lack of courage of 
individuals, communities or villages. Kadod village with its 
predominantly Vania population had not joined the satyagraha. 
Its surrounding villages ensured that labourers would not work 
for the Vanias of that village. Patels and talatis were also 
humiliated into submission; they resigned and thus obstructed 
part of the collection machinery of the government.
The campaign took the shape of a grim battle between the 
forces of the government and those of the non-cooperators.
The Congress workers arrayed themselves as an organisation 
parallel to the government and able to match the governments 
ability to redress peoples1 grievances and look to their 
needs. The government began to attach land, cattle and chat­
tel including pots, pans, tools and ornaments. The peasants 
bore the hardships bravely, partly because Patel and his men 
worked hard to assure them that tbey would-not be the losers 
in the encf/ partly because they were made examples of in the 
leaders* speeches and the satyagraha pamphlets. Patel tried 
to focus as much limelight on Bardoli as he could. He got a 
resolution passed at the Congress Working Committee meeting
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in Bombay on 18 May 1928 in which. the conduct of the campaign, 
the xole of the leaders and particularly his own role, and 
the courage of the peasants were all commended in superlative 
terms. An inquiry was recommended and the Governments role 
was criticized. Obtaining recognition at the national level 
served two purposes - it encouraged the local leaders and 
helped Patel to make the transition from the provincial to 
the national stage. Other national leaders were called to 
Bardoli for the same reasons. The agitation thus had the 
required impact for various reasons that were not directly 
related to the peasants* participation. Not the least among 
them was the role of the counci1-wallahs and other mediators.
The resignation of eight MLCs from Gujarat by April 
followed by the efforts at mediation and finally the resigna­
tion by Munshi and the material support and sympathy elicited
by Patel from the commercial and trading associations of Bom-
24bay city all helped the cause. Purshottamdas Thakurdas,
H.N. Kunzru, Motilal Nehru, T.B. Sapru all expressed their 
views on the matter. This was just what Patel needed and 
wanted. It made Bardoli a wide enough issue and Patel the 
focal point of a crisis which had national implications. In­
advertently, the constitutionalists helped the agitators.
Another factor that helped the satyagrahis somewhat was 
the pressure that was building up on the Bombay Government 
from within and from*home7. Bombay was paralysed by a wide­
spread and effective strike in the textile mills. The strike 
was significant not just economically but also politically. 
Apart from paralysing the cotton industry the strike had bec­
ome a rallying point for leftist leaders who got an opportu­
nity to spread propaganda against capitalism and exploitation 
in general and to use the strike platform for the spread of 
communist or socialist ideas. Geographically, the lay out of 
the Bombay mill area further aided the concentrati6n of the
work force in particular areas where they were easily accessi- 
0 5
ble.. . This communist menance caused the right wing Congress
leaders as much anxiety as it did the British Government of 
26Bombay. Sir Leslie Wilson was, therefore, facing fire on
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two fronts. However, back home the questions on Bardoli were 
causing the Qoyernment much anxiety. In Bombay, the strike 
was posing a continuing threat. While the Governor clamoured 
for more powers to deal with the strike, the government at 
the centre worried about Bardoli, An unspoken pact emerged. 
The centre prevailed in breaking the deadlock on Bardoli by 
persuading Leslie Wilson to go to Surat; it yielded by gran­
ting the Bombay Government greater powers to deal with the 
strike situation. The outcome was negotiations and a settle­
ment.
How did it come about and what did it achieve? After 
conferring with the Viceroy, the Governor of Bombay visited 
Surat on 18 July and, in accordance with the plan,announced 
that if the agitation was called off an official inquiry 
might be set up, provided also that the peasants paid the new 
assessment or a third party paid the difference in amount 
between the old and the new assessment. Leslie Wilson agreed 
to discuss the matter with the peasants1 representatives fore­
most among them being Vallabhbhai Patel. The latter did not 
agree to the condition regarding the payment. He also empha­
sised that all those lands that had been forfeited the
peasants and sold by the government to recover the dues would 
have to be restored to their original owners, and village 
officials who had resigned would have to be reinstated. The 
discussions achieved nothing. Neither Patel nor Wilson was 
willing to yield any more. Economic reasons had faded in the 
background. Patel had made promises to the peasantry that 
they would not be the losers in the struggle. The restora­
tion of forfeited lands became a major issue. The Governor 
too was under pressure and was the subject of discussion in 
the British Cabinet where *the authority and prestige of 
government1 was of greater importance than the peasants* grie­
vances. The Secretary of State stated clearly : 1 The econo­
mic element in struggle is of quite secondary importance*.
This was not the first time a provincial governor had differ-
27ing instructions from the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. 
Added to that,the Governor faced pressure in his council and
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in the Legislature.
The MLCs had their own reasons for wanting a speedy 
settlement in Bardoli. There were Bills pending in the legis­
lature which required the support of particular groups - like 
non-Brahmins - who in turn were anxious for a speedy settle­
ment in Bardoli, Patel's antagonism to MLCs like Chunilal
28Mehta was well-known. He had tried to keep the MLCs out 
of the active part of the campaign; their role,however,could 
not be ignored. The Government was taking them more seriously 
than the agitators and they in turn, for their own political 
reasons, had.a more compromising attitude to the problem than 
the NCOs. For different reasons,the Viceroy and the Governor 
wished to avoid a breakdown. MLCs like Chunilal Mehta desired 
a speedy settlement and Vallabhbhai wanted to reduce the stress 
of the campaign for fear of losing what support had been gained 
among the peasants, Chunilal Mehta persuaded Vallabhbhai to 
agree to give a letter to the Governor giving a vague assura­
nce which the government desired in return for a concession 
on the subject of the forfeited lands. This letter and Chuni­
lal Mehta's personal undertakings provided face savers for it.
For Pateljthe return of confiscated lands and the ins­
titution of an inquiry were the two main issues on the basis 
of which he could claim the settlement as a victory for him­
self. The MLCs undertook to get the forfeited lands returned 
to their original owners. That solved a big problem for 
Patel. It is interesting to note that during the 1930 civil 
disobedience movement the subject of forfeited lands provided 
a stumbling block in negotiations between Gandhi and Irwin 
and almost led to a breakdown in the absence of mediating 
parties who could prevail upon both the government and the 
new owners. This is being mentioned here for two reasons. 
First, peasants' willingness to sacrifice for Congress is 
often highlighted to such a degree that it blurs some of the 
underlying reasons leading to the success of a campaign. Land 
owners did not recklessly agree to allow confiscation and 
Patel worked hard to ensure that lands would not be lost. 
Second, non-cooperation leaders like Patel on their own were
2 2
Impotent to settle the matter q£ confiscated lands without 
help from financiers brought in by Bombay bigwigs and. cons­
titutionalists, The role of the MLCs, therefore,must not be 
underrated.
The conclusion of the agitation highlights its politi­
cal nature, Patel had his hand on the peasants* as well as 
the government’s pulse. The onset of monsoon raids, the 
impending sowing season, a reduction in the peasants* power 
of endurance and the accompanying toughening of the govern­
ment’s attitude (deluding the possibility pf the deployment 
of troops if necessary) all had an effect on the pace and 
intensity of the agitation. Government threats of repressive 
action were met by counterthreats from Vallabhbhai which were 
aimed at the Government and the peasants. From talk of burn­
ing the standing crops to prevent government from confiscating 
it, to inciting the peasants and other groups to rebel,Patel 
made efforts to ensure the continuance of the agitation. When 
he noticed weariness and a diminising enthusiasm,he began 
casting around for an end to the agitation. The services of 
the MLCs came in useful when the stalemate could not be bro­
ken .
It was agreed that an enquiry headed by a judicial offi­
cer and aided by a revenue officer would be instituted to 
look into the people’s complaints and then determine the in­
crease or decrease in the old assessment. The terms of ref­
erence further stated:
....as the enquiry is to be full, open and indepen­
dent the people will be free to lead as well as test 
evidence before it with the help of their represen­
tatives including legal advisers. 29
Patel told the peasants that as the Government had accepted 
their terms they were bound to pay the old assessment, which 
the people did. The Broomfield and Maxwell report was pub­
lished in May 1929. The increase recommended in the revised 
assessment was 5.7%. Many of the peasants* objections were 
conceded; Anderson’s principle of *rental-value’, if properly 
determined, was, however, still considered sound and capable
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of reflecting adequately all the other factors that were
30bracketed as 'profits of agriculture1.
Three features of the peasantry were emphasised at the 
beginning of this article. ^Differentiation* poses a pro- 
blem when the success of a movement is to be measured. Suc­
cess for whom? Simplistic sub-divisions such as rich, mid­
dle and poor peasants do not provide satisfactory answers.
Much work has been done on this issue. Wolf and Alavi's 
middle peasants are said to form the substance of agitation 
and radicalism in the rural set up because they are the sub­
sistence landowning peasantry threatened by the progress of
31commercialisation. Was Bardoli an agitation by the middle 
peasantry? Hamza Alavi emphasises economic independence as 
the main distinguishing feature of the middle peasantry, 
pointing out at the same time that the middle peasant may be 
characterised by more than one mode of production. The deter­
mining feature in such a case would be *the principal rela­
tion of production from which a person draws his livelihood? 
David Hard imani middle peasant thesis, later revised into the 
caste-cum-class (Patidar) thesis, was rejected by Neil Char- 
lesworth who stated that peasant agitations between the two 
wars brought many agrarian classes together. Neil Charles- 
worth sought to demonstrate how the middle peasantry, as 
shaped by commercialisation, was actually the *most dependent* 
and most involved in varied market relationships of all pea­
sant groups. Pressure from commercialisation is thus not
33accepted as the reason for middle peasantry militancy.
Then of course there is the question whether the Bardoli pea­
sants were the *Wolfian middle peasants*?
According to our table of class and caste groups - (the 
intermediate sections) - Patidars, Kolis, Kumhars and Ganchis- 
the last mentioned were not dependent solely on cultivation. 
Among higher caste groups, some Anavil Brahmins and Vanias 
Cof the upper castes and,according to Shirin Mehta, also 
upper class) come under the economic definition of middle 
peasants. Did these groups - Patidars, Kolis, Anavils and 
Vanias - constitute the mainstay of the agitation? The
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reluctance of Anavils and yanias has already been discussed. 
In Valod, Chodras (JLower caste) Brahmins Cupper castel, and 
Muslims Cupper caste) also cultivated their land for a liv­
ing. They were the middle peasants. All these groups did 
not, as we have seen, constitute the agitation*s supporters. 
Those rich and middle peasants who did support the campaign 
relied on the assurances given by Patel,that confiscated 
lands would be returned. Charlesworth*s own answer to the 
reasons that lay behind the unity and strength of the Bardoli 
campaign is that *the breadth of involvement in commercial 
production and the tenurial conditions under which it had
recently evolved were such that even the leasing-in tenants
34recognised a serious threat from the reassessment*. In 
the early 1920s, cash crop production had brought returns 
through which even a labourer could cope with some rent rise. 
With the threat of land revenue increase,land lords were 
planning to pass on some of the burden of that increase to 
the tenant in the form of higher rent.
This argument has limited application in an agitation 
in which so much threat and persuasion,as has been described, 
was used. The tenants were not likely to go beyond a certain 
point on the risk/return continuum. The risks that were 
involved were far greater than the benefits that were likely. 
The benefits of such a campaign would vary from one section 
of the peasantry to other. Price collapse might affect a 
wide range of the peasantry, but a peasant agitation with 
high risks of property-loss would have to bring other com­
pensations to enrol the support of those not directly affec­
ted by its declared objectives.
Let us look at Patel*s and other leaders* attitudes 
towards some socio-economic groups in the taluka to ascer­
tain what attraction the campaign or Patel could have for 
them. The institution of money-lending, for instance, needed 
reform. Money-lenders were at once a blessing and a curse 
for the indebted peasantry. In Bardoli,Vanias, Parsis and 
Marwaris were the main money-lenders; Brahmins and Kanbis
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also became money-lenders later, The peasants1 primary 
source of credit was priyate money-lenders. Inevitably* 
money—lenders were in a position to harass the peasantry.
The system of Halis, or hereditary labourers, originated 
in the money-lending business when heavily indebted peasants 
offered their services as part payment for the loan; they 
could never pay off the loan because the high interest rates 
made the loan more or less permanent. Given the status and 
influence of money-lenders in the taluka, Patel would not 
even consider any radical changes in the system. Instead*he 
recommended an assimilation of interests between the money­
lenders and the peasants. The money-lenders, he said, were
35merged in the tenant like water in milk. Any attempt to
{alienate the one from the other would be to the detriment of
36both, Hardiman does not accept the primacy of short term 
economic grievances in causing the Bardoli agitation. His 
reasons are that earlier,when cotton prices were stable in 
1921-22,Bardoli was ready for a campaign; and also that back­
ward communities in eastern Bardoli supported the campaign
and they were not affected with the fluctuations of prices
37of cotton or other cash crops,
Adivasis* (Dublas and Chodras) conversion to Gandhian 
ways had little to do with the mobilisation of their support 
towards a peasant agitation, I will refer to the entire back­
ward classes as Kaliparaj and seek to demonstrate what was 
the nature of their interest and link with Gandhians at this 
phase of the national movement.
Much has been written about the involvement of the Kali­
paraj in campaigns for redress of grievances. Figures of 
Kaliparaj attendance at meetings are cited to show the extent 
of Kaliparaj involvement. The fact is that land revenue agi­
tations like Bardoli had little to do with Kaliparaj partici­
pation in co-operative activity. The Kaliparaj had been a 
neglected section of society for a long time. The Bhakti 
and Arya Samaj movements played a significant part in their 
awakening at the beginning of the century. By focusing on
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the problems of the tribals and landless these movements gave 
confidence to these sections of society and also gathered 
support for themselves. Also, during the first non-coopera­
tion movement Gandhi realised that support from the backward 
sections in Gujarat was lacking. He urged volunteers to go out 
and tap adivasi support. When the constructive programme 
was launched a concerted effort was made to spread the mes­
sage of khadi and prohibition. The khadi programme had an 
appeal for tribals and backward classes because it provided 
work for many idle families. From within the Kaliparaj, 
leaders came forward to request the Bardoli Ashram to expand 
its programme to remote backward areas. Jiwanbhai Bababhai
Chaudhri and Gomjibhai Lalbhai Chaudhri of Vedchhi village
the
were particularly active in seeking/help of Gandhian insti­
tutions in their areas. Chunilal Mehta and Kesavbhai Patel 
were asked to assist in this programme.
The greatest contribution towards the upliftment of 
Kaliparaj was by Jugatram Dave, a social worker with no poli­
tical designs. He took an interest in their education, 
social welfare and general progress. But no intensive cam­
paign geared to a change in the pattern of land ownership or 
economic relationships was either envisaged or executed.
Recent studies on rural development in areas around Bardoli 
show that economic relationships pertaining to land have 
not changed till today; the basic problems remain the same.
Marginal farmers who lost land to middle or rich farmers
38have become landless labourers.
The Bardoli agitation made little contribution towards 
making Congress the spokesman of the peasantry. By focusing 
on increases in land revenue assessment, or additional tax 
levies, Congress was really evading the real problems - the 
burden of debt, exploitation by money-lenders, the lack of 
mobility in the village social structures, the insecurity 
of tenure, wage struggles and so on,
A new sphere - a kind of predominantly political employ­
ment bureau-was opening up with vast opportunities for various
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classes and castes; and what gave agitations like Bardoli so 
rouch recognition was the manner In which leaders like Patel 
were able to give socio-economic flavour to a predominantly 
political mission. What was then the driving force behind 
the Bardoli agitation that gave it 'leverage* value for Con­
gress even with limited numerical support and minimal signi­
ficance in terms of socio-economic change? The force was not 
simply caste, class or factions (whether this is described 
as patron-client networks, guru-disciple relationships or 
'brokerage* structures). Nor was it the dominant or middle 
peasant theory. The force was the changing concept of 
power brought about by non-cooperation, satyagraha and other 
methods of agilation whereby leaders like Patel gave concrete 
shape to the new predominantly political yard stick through 
which an individual's or group's influence, control and 
effectiveness could be measured or ascertained. An alterna­
tive mode of domination that could match the governments 
conventionally legitimate authority was set-up; something 
apart from force and legality. Agitational techniques be­
came part of the Congress strategy of a parallel power-struc- 
ture that would meet people's needs and requirements and 
establish the authority of those who devised the scheme . To 
use a phrase somewhat acontextually - a bourgeois 'dual 
power' system was sought.
The focus on political dominance marred much of the 
agitation's leaders*performance and played an important part 
in both the nature of leadership and support in the campaign. 
Amrut Nakhre's study of satyagrahi attitudes demonstrates 
that sub-leaders had a purely pragmatic (as opposed to ideo­
logical) attitude to satyagraha. The social composition of 
the participants was that they were the young elites mostly 
in their 20s, relatively more educated and of higher economic 
status than the majority. The leaders were educated and had 
participated in previous satyagraha campaigns. Occupation 
and education distinguished them as a group rather than sim­
ply caste. Their reasons for participation can be gauged 
from their responses to some of the questions put to them
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on .the subject:
The ijnmediate goal of the satyagraha was to get laud 
revenue xeduced. Personally, however, I was not in­
terested in this aspect at all*...to me the Bardoli 
satyagraha was only a part of the on going struggle 
for swaraj, 35
To those who otherwise had a negligible control over general
affairs in the taluka,it provided an opportunity to affect,
vicariously, some dominant groups like the police, officials
and the government machinery. One satyagrahi said *...for
most of the satyagrahis, including the leaders, it was noth-
40ing more than a tactic*.
One attitude appears to be common to all the leaders, 
particularly those who considered *ahimsa* as a tactic; they 
all viewed conflict as a contest for power. In a traditional 
society in which pockets of influence and power were numerous 
and varied, a contest for power with an emphasis on the poli­
tical factor was likely to serve as a unifying factor for 
those embroiled in other power conflicts. In this contest, 
non-violence plays an interesting part - subordinate groups that 
are otherwise unlikely to unseat, match or win over dominant 
groups take recourse to non-violence as a device that will 
restrain those already entrenched in power. It is the only 
*string* that binds everyone equally. The rank and file, 
therefore, often show greater adherance to non-violence and 
the leaders and sub-leaders make a virtue out of necessity.
In this agitation, therefore, the commitment of the lea­
ders to the peasantry was limited by several factors, which 
come in the way of this agitation being labelled a typical 
peasants* agitation. First, the composition of the taluka 
in terms of caste and class groupings, landholdings, crop 
distribution, all point to a taluka where different combina­
tions of factors made the issue of land revenue assessment 
less imperative to the bulk of the population than other 
peasant problems. Second, the nature of support of the 
campaign also showed no corelation between the most vocal 
supporters and the most hard-pressed sections of the taluka .
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Supplementing this was the fact that the majority either did 
not actively need to join the agitation or did so for rea­
sons other than redress of real grievances, such, as. threats 
from and support to acknowledged leaders and political rec­
ognition, which often served as a compensation from the depr­
ivations in other areas. Third, the nature of leadership 
and Patel's particular role in the agitation detract from 
its truly peasant nature. The leaders and sub-leaders were 
trained satyagrahis that organised the campaign meticulously. 
But they were not always able to formulate programmes that 
contributed towards any substantial socio-economic change in 
the taluka. Patel himself was primarily motivated by poli­
tical stimuli and needed this satyagraha campaign to make 
the transition to the national stage. Fourth, and connected 
to the previous point,were the political antecedents and 
methods of the campaign. The ascendancy of other political 
groups like the Swarajists and socialists spurred on leaders 
like Patel to take steps that would quicken the pace of the 
agitation and bring about the advancement of the Gandhiites. 
The fifth factor was the contradiction between the subsis­
tence peasants1 real goals and the Gandhian goals,and the 
techniques of satyagraha. The technique of satyagraha is 
ostensibly designed to enable the weakest sections of society 
to assert themselves against the most powerful adversary by 
conducting non-cooperation through ahimsa. Non-violence in­
fact perpetuates the weaknesses of the feeble sections of 
society because it puts constraints on them and circumscribes 
their area of active protest against those whose power, posi­
tions and interests are well-entrenched. Through non-violence 
the weak are tamed into following leaders who are already 
strong, and the leaders in turn are able to reinforce their 
positions by recommending paths of nonviolence and giving 
ideological reasons that restrain the weak. The discrepancy 
between the goals of the different sections of the peasantry 
- rich, middle and poor - can thus be glossed over and a cam­
paign which serves different purposes for different groups of 
leaders is embarked upon. Ghanshyam Shah has compared the
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responses of backward groups in Maharashtra aad Qujarat, He 
suggests that whereas the backward groups of Maharashtra 
were militant and pressed their demands to the point of be­
ing prepared to break from the caste structure, backward 
groups like the untouchables of Gujarat were prompted pri­
marily by Gandhian workers to exercise self-restraint rather 
41than revolt. Their endeavours met with limited success 
for two reasons: Cl) working within the caste framework 
meant support from caste Hindus; this was not readily forth­
coming and (2) the Gandhian programme among these groups was 
confined and did not help or seek to bring them in full con­
tact with society at large.
It can be seen that while Congress work among the pea­
sants began with Gandhi through his ingenious methods, Cong­
ress's commitment to the peasantry was neither constant nor 
consistent, Jannuzi has divided this varied commitment into 
three types: (1) those who were most committed and had
a programme geared entirely to the peasant socio-economic 
system, like Jai Prakash Narain, Rammanohar Lohia, Minoo 
Masani; (2) those who believed in the goals of (1) but com­
promised on several fronts, like Jawaharlal Nehru and (3)
those who stood substantially apart,like Vallabhbhai Patel,
42Rajendra Prasad and even Gandhi. The ^hy* of mobilisa­
tion mentioned at the beginning of the article assumes impor­
tance here. Patel*s interest in the peasantry was political 
and,therefore, to the extent that it was deficient in socio­
economic content, it went against the peasant interests. Bar­
doli has been called a 1balancing trick1 aimed at a compro­
mise between landed interests and industrial interests. Pri­
marily, it was a trick to keep revolution at bay.
On no account does that imply that the Bardoli campaign 
served no useful purpose at all for the peasants of the talu­
ka and was,therefore, inconsequential. Apart from fulfilling, 
albeit partially, the political aims and designs of the lea­
ders, the agitation achieved different things for different 
people. For Patel,it was a well-timed well-planned campaign
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that gave him a Foothold on the national scene with a power­
ful provincial baching. For Qandhians in generalyit was an 
exercise in satyagraha that reinforced their beliefs in Gan­
dhian methods and further strengthened the Gandhian movement. 
To the rank and file, it gave a confidence that their socio­
economic status could not provide. It thus released a sec­
tion of the peasantry from a relatively passive role to one 
of limited activity. The state of helplessness of the subor­
dinate groups was reduced by the opportunity to participate 
in a movement in which acts of service and self-denial could 
make heroes out of people otherwise considered impotent by 
the elite. Relief from economic burdens was not forthcoming 
and the existing hierarchy that perpetuated the roles of ex­
ploiters and exploited was left intact; the campaign did 
nevertheless instil a general self-confidence in the people 
of the area. The Gandhiites managed to focus the attention 
of leaders of social and economic groups towards political 
conflicts and got them involved in the national movement.
I would like to end with a point made at the beginning 
of the article. Peasants have increasingly come to occupy 
the centre of the historical stage and an effort is being 
made to show the peasant's awareness of his plight and his 
will to fight it. This is a reaction from the image of a 
peasantry led by altruistic leadership. The change in appr­
oach is both welcome and needed. But it has not been achie­
ved effectively. Perhaps that is because the power of the 
elite cannot be wished away simply by excessive preoccupa­
tion with the subaltern. Underlying much of the reaction 
against elitist studies is the assumption that implied in 
the study of elites in society is an admission of their 
superiority. This is not so. Nor are the social ideals and 
expectations of propertied people considered the key to an 
understanding of society as a whole. Even when the central 
questions in an inquiry relate to the non-privileged, there 
are many reasons put forward by social historians for paying 
considerable attention towards elites. First, insights pro­
vided by looking at elitist activity give an interesting idea
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of one class's perceptions of another class. Second, the 
historical evidence at hand is often that which has been 
preserved by the 'dominant classes’ or groups, so that know­
ledge of the 'commitments, biases and ideological disposi­
tions* of these groups is inevitably central to any inquiry 
about the non-privileged, non-propertied people. So,even 
when questions relating to the world as actually experienced 
by ordinary people are asked, the answers cannot ignore the 
world as it is ideologically perceived by elites. What 
makes elitist historiography particularly odious is the fact 
that hitherto elites have been put on pedestals and studied 
with admiration and adulation. It is this aspect of elitism 
which is deserving of the historians' contempt rather than 
all elitist perceptions. What is needed is probably a closer 
and more critical analysis of the whole genre of elites, 
their composition background and their modus operandi, so 
that the patterns of exploitation which form not a small 
part of subaltern studies can be appropriately dealt with. 
Without this, subaltern studies may themselves be 'one-sided 
and blinkered* . ^
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